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INTRODUCTION

This article surveys selected criminal law decisions of the Supreme
Court of Florida and the Florida District Courts of Appeal published between
August 1, 2010 and July 31, 2012. The survey covers cases of first impression, decisions involving or identifying conflicts between the Florida District
Courts of Appeal, questions certified to the Supreme Court of Florida as being of great public importance, and cases that clarify or expand upon existing
principles of law. Decisions discussing procedural and evidentiary issues
and Florida’s sentencing guidelines are beyond the scope of this article,
which focuses on substantive principles of criminal law.
II.
A.

CRIMES

Burglary
1.

Burglary of a Dwelling

Burglary of a dwelling, which is a second-degree felony in Florida, includes burglary of an “attached porch.”1 In Colbert v. State,2 the issue was
whether the area in front of the victim’s townhouse, from which the defendant had taken a bicycle, was an attached porch and therefore a dwelling.3
Noting that Florida’s judicial treatment of this term demonstrates only “what
1. FLA. STAT. §§ 810.02(3), 810.011(2) (2012); FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 13.1
(2008).
2. 78 So. 3d 111 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
3. Id. at 112; see also FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2).
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an ‘attached porch’ is not,” the First District distinguished the instant case
from decisions dealing “with areas where common notions of security and
privacy associated with a dwelling were present.”4 In contrast, the area from
which the defendant had taken the bicycle, a concrete pad and mulch, “was
open to unknown, uninvited people.”5 It was therefore not an attached
porch.6 For this reason, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction.7
The definition of the term “dwelling” also includes the “curtilage,”8
which must be enclosed.9 The question of what constitutes an enclosure is
frequently the subject of debate, however.10 In J.L. v. State,11 for example,
the Fifth District held that items leaning against the side of a house were not
taken from its curtilage, even though the yard was fenced on two sides, because there was no proof of the distance between these fences and the house,
any connection between the fences, or the existence of a fence on the side of
the house from which the property was removed.12 The court rejected the
State’s argument “that curtilage necessarily includes an item that touches
(but is not attached) to the house [because this] would mean that a burglary
of a dwelling would occur if an individual took a fruit from a tree in an open
yard when the fruit happened to be touching the house.”13 Concluding that
this result would not comport with legislative intent,14 the court reversed the
defendant’s burglary conviction and directed entry of judgment for trespass.15
In Jacobs v. State,16 on the other hand, the First District held that “[t]he
enclosure need not be continuous and an ungated opening for ingress and
egress does not preclude” a finding that the yard is part of the curtilage.17
4. Colbert, 78 So. 3d at 112–13; see also FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2).
5. Colbert, 78 So. 3d at 112–13.
6. Id. at 113; see also FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2).
7. Colbert, 78 So. 3d at 113.
8. FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2); see FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 13.1 (2008).
9. FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2); see also State v. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038, 1044 (Fla.
1995).
10. See FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2); J.L. v. State, 57 So. 3d 924, 925–26 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2011) (quoting Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1044); Jacobs v. State, 41 So. 3d 1004, 1005–06
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1044), review denied, 79 So.
3d 744 (Fla. 2012).
11. 57 So. 3d 924 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
12. Id. at 925–26; see also FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2).
13. J.L., 57 So. 3d at 926.
14. Id. (citing Hamilton, 660 So. 2d at 1044).
15. Id.
16. 41 So. 3d 1004 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review denied, 79 So. 3d 744 (Fla.
2012).
17. Id. at 1006 (citing Chambers v. State, 700 So. 2d 441, 442 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1997)); see also FLA. STAT. § 810.011(2).
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The residential yard in Jacobs was an enclosure, the court explained, because
it was “fenc[ed] on three sides,” with a “low-walled ‘stoop’ in . . . front” and
an “opening for the driveway.”18 The court also rejected the defendant’s
argument that the house ceased to be a “dwelling” after it was damaged in a
fire.19 The house, which was being restored, had a roof, floors, walls, and
“plumbing and electric utilities [that were turned off] because the home was
unoccupied.”20 Accordingly, the court held that the fire had not “substantially changed the character of the house to the extent that it was unsuitable for
lodging by people.”21 As authority, the court cited Munoz v. State,22 a
Second District opinion that was called into question in two cases during the
survey period.23
In Munoz, the Second District held that a house under renovation was
not a “dwelling under the burglary statute” because the renovations rendered
it temporarily uninhabitable.24 The court reasoned that to qualify as a “dwelling,” a structure must be designed for human habitation and must not be so
substantially changed that it becomes unsuitable for habitation.25 In Michael
v. State,26 however, the Fifth District criticized Munoz for adding an element
to the crime that improperly required the State to “prove that the structure
was habitable as a dwelling on the date of the offense.”27 Instead, the Michael court adopted the dissenting opinion in Munoz,28 which had eschewed
the majority’s reasoning on two grounds.29 First, the majority’s reasoning in
Munoz was inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, which re-

18. Jacobs, 41 So. 3d at 1006; see also Dicks v. State, 75 So. 3d 857, 858–60 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that a prosecutor’s misstatement of law during closing argument
by defining the term “dwelling” to include a trespass on the unenclosed property surrounding
the dwelling did not constitute fundamental error because the defendant was found beneath the
victim’s mobile home where he was removing its copper wiring).
19. Jacobs, 41 So. 3d at 1005–06.
20. Id. at 1006.
21. Id. at 1007.
22. 937 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
23. Young v. State (Young I), 73 So. 3d 825, 825 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per
curiam) (certifying conflict with Munoz), review granted, 84 So. 3d 1033 (Fla. 2012); Michael
v. State, 51 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (certifying conflict with Munoz);
Jacobs, 41 So. 3d at 1006–07 (citing Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 689).
24. Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 689 (citing Perkins v. State (Perkins II), 682 So. 2d 1083, 1084
(Fla. 1996) (per curiam)).
25. Id. at 688–89 (relying on Perkins II, 682 So. 2d at 1084).
26. 51 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
27. Id. at 575; see also Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 689.
28. Michael, 51 So. 3d at 575.
29. Id.; see also Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 690–91 (Canady, J., dissenting).
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quired only that a “dwelling” be “designed” for habitation.30 Second, it was
inconsistent with the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in Perkins v.
State (Perkins II),31 which made clear that in determining whether a structure
qualified as a dwelling, “‘the design of the structure’ . . . is ‘paramount.’”32
Therefore, according to the Munoz dissent, the home’s temporary transformation had not altered its use for human habitation.33 Adopting this reasoning, the Michael court affirmed the defendant’s conviction for burglary of a
dwelling and certified conflict with Munoz.34 The Fifth District again certified conflict with Munoz in Young v. State (Young I).35 The Supreme Court
of Florida has accepted jurisdiction in Young v. State (Young II).36
2.

Ownership and Possession of the Burglarized Premises

A victim’s ownership of the burglarized premises is a necessary “element of the crime of burglary.”37 However, the definition of “ownership”
under the burglary statute differs from its counterpart in property law because it requires the victim to have a possessory interest in the burglarized
structure superior to that of the defendant.38 In Pierre v. State,39 the Third
District reversed a conviction for burglary of an occupied dwelling on the
ground that the State had not established the victim’s superior possessory
interest.40 In this case, a sexual battery took place on the victim’s last night
as a guest in an apartment leased by the defendant who was moving out of
the premises.41 The court found no conclusive evidence that the defendant
had abandoned his possessory interest in the apartment.42 His possessions
30. Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 690 (Canady, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Bennett, 565 So. 2d
803, 805 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam)).
31. 682 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam).
32. Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 691 (Canady, J., dissenting) (quoting Perkins v. State (Perkins
I), 630 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review granted per curiam, 673 So.
2d 30 (Fla. 1996)).
33. Id.
34. Michael v. State, 51 So. 3d 574, 575 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Baker v.
State, 636 So. 2d 1342, 1344 (Fla. 1994)).
35. 73 So. 3d 825, 825 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam), review granted, 84 So.
3d 1033 (Fla. 2012); see also Munoz, 937 So. 2d at 689–90.
36. 84 So. 3d 1033, 1033 (Fla. 2012) (unpublished table decision).
37. D.S.S. v. State, 850 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 2003) (citing In re M.E., 370 So. 2d 795,
796 (Fla. 1979)).
38. Pierre v. State, 77 So. 3d 699, 701 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Whetstone
v. State, 778 So. 2d 338, 342 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
39. 77 So. 3d 699 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
40. Id. at 702.
41. Id. at 700.
42. Id. at 702.
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remained there, he went back and forth between the two properties, and the
victim returned her key on her last night in the unit.43 Although a lessee’s
legal interest in the leased premises does not conclusively establish his possessory interest, in this case, the evidence showed that the defendant’s legal
interest in the property was superior or “at least equal to the victim’s temporary possessory interest.”44 As a result, the appellate court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal on the burglary
count.45
The concept of ownership was also the subject of the appeal in Morris
v. State,46 where the Fourth District held that the victim named in the information “did not have the requisite possessory interest in the [burglarized
warehouse] to support” Morris’ armed burglary conviction because he was
an employee.47 The court noted that the important distinction is between a
“manager, who exercises lawful control over premises,” and an “employee,
[who] occupies the space but does not control it.”48 In Morris, however, the
named victim was not a manager; instead, he was an employee of a subsidiary of the warehouse owner and did not ordinarily work at the location in
question.49 Because “[h]is interest in the warehouse was limited to servicing
the open distribution route,” he “did not have the requisite possessory interest in the property.”50 Consequently, the court reversed the defendant’s
armed burglary conviction.51
3.

Remaining in the Premises

The statutory definition of burglary includes the act of remaining in the
premises, “[n]otwithstanding a licensed or invited entry,” with intent to
commit a forcible felony.52 In Harris v. State,53 the Fifth District held that
“the legislative intent [of the statute] indicates that a licensed or invited entry
is an element of a remaining in burglary,” and that this interpretation is sup-

43. Id. at 700, 702.
44. Pierre, 77 So. 3d at 702.
45. Id.
46. 87 So. 3d 89 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
47. Id. at 91.
48. Id. at 90–91 (citing Adirim v. State, 350 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (per curiam)).
49. Id. at 89–90.
50. Id. at 91.
51. Morris, 87 So. 3d at 91.
52. FLA. STAT. § 810.02(1)(a)–(b) (2012).
53. 48 So. 3d 922 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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ported by decisional law and the applicable standard jury instruction.54 Accordingly, a defendant who knocked on the door of a residence, then pushed
his way in and stole money from the occupants, could not be convicted of a
remaining in burglary under the statute because his initial entry was neither
licensed nor invited.55
B.

Criminal Mischief

In Marrero v. State (Marrero II),56 the Supreme Court of Florida held
that the State must prove a specific monetary amount of damage to convict a
defendant of felony criminal mischief and cannot rely on a “life experience”
exception.57 This decision resolved a conflict among Florida’s District
Courts of Appeal “as to whether the amount of damage is” a necessary element of the offense and called into question the use of a life experience exception in any criminal statute, including theft.58 In this case, the defendant
drove his truck through a casino entrance, requiring replacement of four tall
impact-resistant glass doors.59 He was charged with felony criminal mischief
under section 806.13(1)(b)(3) of the Florida Statutes, which applies only
when the mischief causes one thousand dollars or more in damages.60 At
trial, the State presented no “evidence of the repair or replacement costs of
the damaged [doors].”61 The trial court therefore instructed the jury, according to the standard theft instruction, to “attempt to determine a minimum
value” of the damaged property.62 Marrero was convicted of felony criminal
mischief based upon the jury’s finding “that ‘the property was [valued at]
one thousand dollars or more.’”63 The Third District affirmed, holding that
“‘a trial court may conclude “that certain repairs are so self-evident that the
fact-finder could conclude based on life experience that the statutory damage
threshold has been met.”’”64

54. Id. at 924–25 (citing FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 13.1 (2008)).
55. Id. at 923, 925 (reversing and remanding the judgment and sentence for burglary).
56. 71 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam).
57. Id. at 891 (citing Jackson v. State, 413 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
58. Id. at 886–87, 891.
59. Id. at 883–84.
60. See id. at 884, 886 (citing FLA. STAT. § 806.13(1)(b)(3) (2012)).
61. Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 884.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 884–85.
64. Marrero v. State (Marrero I), 22 So. 3d 822, 823 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting T.B.S. v. State, 935 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)), review granted, 29 So. 3d
291 (Fla. 2010), and quashed, 71 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2011).
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The Supreme Court of Florida reversed and remanded for entry of a
judgment for misdemeanor criminal mischief.65 Application of the “life experience” exception was invalid on due process grounds, the court explained,
because “the amount of damage is an essential element of the crime of felony
criminal mischief.”66 In so ruling, the court disapproved Jackson v. State,67 a
Second District case interpreting the theft statute to permit a petty theft conviction when, in the absence of proof of value, no reasonable person could
doubt that the value of the stolen property exceeded one hundred dollars.68
The court held that Jackson had misinterpreted the theft statute, which permits a jury to determine a minimum value only if it is impossible to ascertain
the value of the stolen items.69 However, the jury may not do so if the state
fails to prove the value of property that is capable of valuation.70 Finally, the
court observed, “application of a ‘life experience’ exception to any criminal
statute, including the criminal theft statute, is inconsistent with the uniform
system of justice that both the Florida and Federal Constitutions require and
should not be left to the whim of individual jury members.”71
C.

Homicide
1.
a.

Felony Murder
Merger Doctrine

In State v. Sturdivant,72 the Supreme Court of Florida receded from its
decision in Brooks v. State73 and held “that the merger doctrine does not
preclude . . . conviction” for felony murder when death is caused by “a single

65. Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 891.
66. Id. at 887, 889.
67. 413 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
68. Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 888–89 (citing Jackson, 413 So. 2d at 112); see FLA. STAT. §
812.012(10)(b) (2012).
69. Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 888–89 (citing Jackson, 413 So. 2d at 112); see FLA. STAT. §
812.012(10)(b).
70. Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 889 (citing Jackson, 413 So. 2d at 112).
71. Id.; see also Colletti v. State, 74 So. 3d 497, 498, 500 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(citing Marrero II, 71 So. 3d at 891) (reversing the defendant’s felony murder conviction,
which was based on the underlying felony of grand theft, because the State failed to present
any evidence showing the value of the items taken from the victim’s home).
72. 94 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2012).
73. 918 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam), abrogated in part by State v. Sturdivant, 94
So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2012).
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act of aggravated child abuse.”74 Sturdivant was convicted of both firstdegree felony murder and aggravated child abuse because he struck his twoyear old victim on the head so forcefully that the child fell and hit his head
on a concrete wall.75 The First District reversed and certified the following
question: “Whether Brooks precludes a conviction for felony murder based
on the predicate offense of aggravated child abuse when the abuse consists of
a single act, despite the language of section 782.04(1)(a)2., the felonymurder statute.”76
The court began by examining the merger doctrine as a doctrine of statutory construction distinct from the constitutional principle of double jeopardy.77 Consequently, the analysis centered on the plain language of the
statute, which expressly permits a felony murder conviction to be predicated
upon “‘any . . . [a]ggravated child abuse.’”78 Thus, the court concluded that
the legislature’s unambiguous intent is to preclude merger of an enumerated
felony into a homicide conviction and to increase punishment when a child’s
death “is caused by even a single act of aggravated child abuse.”79
The court then reviewed its decision in Brooks, which held that where a
child was killed by a single act of stabbing, the abusive act merged with the
homicide because both crimes involved the same conduct.80 The court concluded that Brooks was incorrectly decided on two levels.81 First, the decision “was contrary to the plain language of the statute and legislative intent”
because it “created a distinction not contemplated by the Legislature—
whether the underlying felony of aggravated child abuse consists of a single
act or multiple acts.”82 Second, the decision “improperly extended and relied
upon”83 Mills v. State,84 where the court held that an aggravated battery conviction merged with a homicide conviction because both were based on a
74. Compare Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 442, with Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 198 (holding that
the underlying felony of aggravated child abuse could not serve as the predicate felony crime
in a first-degree felony murder charge if only a single act led to the child’s death because in
that situation the felony would merge into the homicide).
75. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 436.
76. Id. at 437 (citing FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2. (2012)).
77. Id. at 437 n.3.
78. Id. at 440 (alteration in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2.h.).
79. Id.; see also § 782.04(1)(a)2.h.
80. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 440–42 (citing Brooks v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 198 (Fla.
2005) (per curiam), abrogated in part by State v. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 2012)).
81. Id. at 441 (citing Dorsey v. State, 868 So. 2d 1192, 1199 (Fla. 2003); Mills v. State,
476 So. 2d 172, 177 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam)); see also Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 198.
82. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 441; see also Brooks, 918 So. 2d at 217 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
83. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 441.
84. 476 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1985) (per curiam).
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single gunshot blast.85 Mills was inapposite, the court explained, because the
underlying crime in that case was an unenumerated felony.86 The felony
murder statute has been amended since Mills87 to include aggravated child
abuse as an enumerated predicate felony.88 Accordingly, the court quashed
the decision of the First District, receded from Brooks, and held that “the
merger doctrine does not preclude a felony-murder conviction predicated
upon a single act of aggravated child abuse that caused the child’s death
since aggravated child abuse is an enumerated underlying offense in the felony murder statute.”89
In Williams v. State,90 the First District reversed a conviction for attempted felony murder based on the felony merger doctrine and endeavored
to explain the difference between a “standard double jeopardy analysis and
the principle of merger.”91 The defendant in this case was convicted, inter
alia, of attempted premeditated first-degree murder and attempted felony
murder after he fired multiple shots at his fleeing victim.92 In support of his
argument that his convictions violated the principle against double jeopardy,
he cited case law addressing the merger principle.93 The court rejected the
double jeopardy claim because the design to kill element that is required for
attempted premeditated first-degree murder is not required for attempted
felony murder, and no exception in the double jeopardy statute applied.94
However, the merger principle “is an exception to the standard double jeopardy analysis,” the court wrote.95 Because the defendant’s “pursuit of the
victim constituted one criminal act or one attempted murder,” the dual convictions were impermissible.96 In other words, unless each attempted murder
conviction is based on “a separate criminal episode or distinct acts,” multiple
punishments for the same attempted killing of the same victim violate the

85. Id. at 177; see also Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 442 (citing Mills, 476 So. 2d at 177).
86. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 442 (citing Mills, 476 So. 2d at 177).
87. Mills, 476 So. 2d at 177. Although Mills was decided in 1985, the court relied on the
1979 statute. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a) (1979), amended by FLA. STAT. §
782.04(1)(a)2.h. (Supp. 1984).
88. FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2.h. (2012).
89. Sturdivant, 94 So. 3d at 442.
90. 90 So. 3d 931 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
91. Id. at 932–33.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 934 (citing Smith v. State, 973 So. 2d 1209, 1210–11 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2008); Jackson v. State, 868 So. 2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)).
94. Id.; see also Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (citing Gavieres
v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)).
95. Williams, 90 So. 3d at 934.
96. Id. at 935.
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merger principle.97 Accordingly, the court affirmed Williams’ conviction for
attempted premeditated first-degree murder and reversed his conviction for
attempted felony murder.98
b.

Underlying Felony

In Hernandez v. State (Hernandez II),99 the Supreme Court of Florida
reversed a defendant’s first-degree felony murder convictions on the ground
that the evidence failed to establish the predicate crime of trafficking or attempted trafficking in cocaine.100 In this case, the State charged Hernandez
with two counts of first-degree felony murder, alleging that the victims were
killed while he was engaged in the underlying felony of trafficking or attempting to traffic in cocaine.101 The Third District affirmed, holding that the
evidence was sufficient evidence for a jury to infer that the parties contemplated a sale of twenty-eight grams or more of cocaine.102 The Supreme
Court of Florida granted discretionary review based on conflict with Williams v. State,103 where the First District overturned a conviction for conspiracy to traffic in twenty-eight or more grams of cocaine because “‘no specific
amounts were discussed on the two occasions when appellant was present,
nor did appellant agree to furnish a specific amount of cocaine.’”104 This,
then, was the context for the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida in
Hernandez.105
The court decided that, as in Williams, the evidence was insufficient to
establish the predicate crime.106 Testimony that Hernandez intended to sell
10,000 grams of counterfeit cocaine was unhelpful in establishing his intent

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 56 So. 3d 752 (Fla. 2010).
100. Id. at 758; see FLA. STAT. § 782.04(1)(a)2.a. (2012) (stating that an unlawful killing
committed “in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, [a] [t]rafficking offense
prohibited by s[ection] 893.135(1)” is first-degree murder); see also FLA. STAT. §
893.135(1)(b)1.; Williams v. State, 592 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
101. Hernandez II, 56 So. 3d at 754; see also FLA. STAT. §§ 782.04(1)(a)2.a.,
893.135(1)(b)1.
102. Hernandez v. State (Hernandez I), 994 So. 2d 488, 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008),
review granted, 15 So. 3d 590 (Fla. 2009), and rev’d, 56 So. 3d 580 (Fla. 2010); see also FLA.
STAT. § 893.135(1)(b)1.a.
103. 592 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
104. Hernandez II, 56 So. 3d at 754, 758 (quoting Williams, 592 So. 2d at 739); see also
Hernandez I, 994 So. 2d at 490.
105. Hernandez II, 56 So. 3d at 754, 757–58.
106. Id. at 762.

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

23

Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1

NOVA LAW REVIEW

12

[Vol. 37

to traffic in actual cocaine, the court explained.107 The inference that Hernandez believed that the transaction was going to be for $30,000 was also
insufficient.108 There was no evidence of the value of the cocaine, the court
stated, adding that the price of this drug is not “sufficiently known to the
public at large that a jury can be left to infer on its own that a dollar value
alone proves that a trafficking quantity of cocaine was involved.”109 Finally,
Hernandez’s statement that the seller arrived at the transaction with a large
box was likewise insufficient because no evidence showed that drugs were in
the box or that Hernandez even believed the box contained $30,000 worth of
cocaine.110 However, the court found that the evidence was sufficient to
convict Hernandez of an “attempt[] to engage in a transaction involving an
unspecified quantity of cocaine,” which is a predicate felony for third-degree
felony murder.111 Accordingly, the court vacated his first-degree felony
murder convictions and directed entry of judgment for third-degree felony
murder.112
2.

Second-Degree Depraved Mind Murder

In Black v. State,113 the issue before the Second District was whether extreme recklessness alone is legally sufficient to establish the actual malice
element of second-degree murder.114 In this case, Black told a friend that he
wanted to commit suicide and “intended to make big headlines and go out
with a bang.”115 He then drove into a parking lot and accelerated directly
into a group of people.116 After driving away from his first victim, Black
crossed into oncoming traffic and drove toward a pregnant pedestrian, killing
her and her unborn child.117 A jury convicted the defendant, inter alia, of
two counts of second-degree murder and one count of attempted seconddegree murder.118 On appeal, he argued that extreme recklessness alone is
legally insufficient to establish the actual malice element of second-degree
107. Id. at 760–61 (citing Hernandez I, 994 So. 2d at 490).
108. Id. at 761–62.
109. Id. at 762.
110. Hernandez II, 56 So. 3d at 761.
111. Id. at 763–64 (citing Ross v. State, 528 So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1988)); see also FLA. STAT. § 782.04(4) (2012).
112. Hernandez II, 56 So. 3d at 754, 764.
113. 37 Fla. L. Weekly D593 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2012).
114. Id. at D594.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Black, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D593.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss1/1

24

: Nova Law Review 37, 1

2012]

CRIMINAL LAW: 2010–2012 SURVEY OF FLORIDA LAW

13

murder.119 The court disagreed and distinguished the decisional law on
which Black relied.120 In those cases, the court wrote, the reckless driving
was motivated by a desire to elude arrest, and each driver either “failed to see
the victims until it was too late . . . or lost control over his vehicle.”121 No
evidence established that those defendants acted with malice toward their
victims.122 In contrast, because Black drove directly into his victims, the jury
could reasonably infer that he was trying to carry out his threat.123 The court
affirmed Black’s convictions, writing that a plan such as that one demonstrated the requisite malice for second-degree murder.124
3.
a.

Manslaughter

Manslaughter by Act

During the survey period, the Florida courts continued to struggle with
the jury instructions for manslaughter and attempted manslaughter.125 In
2010, in State v. Montgomery (Montgomery II),126 the Supreme Court of
Florida held that where the defendant was charged with second-degree murder, it was fundamentally erroneous127 to give the 2006 standard jury instruction for manslaughter by act because that instruction incorrectly required the
jury to find that the defendant intended to cause the death of the victim.128
The 2006 jury instruction that proved problematic in Montgomery II required
119. Id. at D594 (citing Hicks v. State, 41 So. 3d 327, 331 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010);
Michelson v. State, 805 So. 2d 983, 985 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam); Ellison v.
State, 547 So. 2d 1003, 1006 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989), quashed in part, 561 So. 2d 576
(Fla. 1990)).
120. Id. (citing Hicks, 41 So. 3d at 331; Michelson, 805 So. 2d at 985; Ellison, 547 So. 2d
at 1006).
121. Id. at D595 (citing Hicks, 41 So. 3d at 331; Michelson, 805 So. 2d at 984; Ellison,
547 So. 2d at 1006).
122. Id. at D594 (citing Hicks, 41 So. 3d at 331; Michelson, 805 So. 2d at 985; Ellison,
547 So. 2d at 1006).
123. Black, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D594.
124. Id. at D594–95.
125. See State v. Montgomery (Montgomery II), 39 So. 3d 252, 256–57 (Fla. 2010) (citing
FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7 (2006)); In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases–Report No. 2007-10, 997 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Taylor v. State,
444 So. 2d 931, 934 (Fla. 1983); FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 6.6 (1994)).
126. 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010).
127. Id. at 259. A harmless error analysis applies when the manslaughter charge is two or
more degrees removed from the charge for which the defendant is convicted. Id. (citing Pena
v. State, 901 So. 2d 781, 787 (Fla. 2005)); Daugherty v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1231,
D1231 (4th Dist. Ct. App. May 23, 2012) (citing Pena, 901 So. 2d at 787).
128. Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 258.
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“the State [to] prove that the defendant intentionally caused the death of the
victim.”129 This language was at odds with the statutory definition of manslaughter, which required only an intent to commit an act that was neither
justifiable nor excusable.130 The court explained that the flawed manslaughter instruction could have led to a second-degree murder conviction if the
jury believed that the defendant did not intentionally cause the victim’s
death.131
The Montgomery II court specifically limited its decision to the 2006
instruction,132 distinguishing it from the 2008 instruction approved after
Montgomery’s trial.133 The 2008 amendment changed the instruction to require proof that the defendant had “an intent to commit an act which caused
death.”134 The appendix to the amendment also provided that the State is not
required to prove premeditation when the intent-to-kill element is “alleged
and proved, and manslaughter [was] being defined as a lesser included offense of first-degree premeditated murder.”135 The court believed that this
language was sufficient to clarify that manslaughter by act requires “the intent to commit an act that caused the death of the victim.”136 Nevertheless,
the 2008 instruction was bound to create confusion because it still required
the State to prove that the defendant intentionally caused the victim’s
death.137 Perhaps for this reason, the court issued an interim amended instruction—the 2010 instruction—on its own motion together with the release
of its opinion in Montgomery II.138 This new instruction replaced the intentto-kill language with the requirement that the defendant “inten[ded] to com129. Id. at 257 (emphasis added); FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7. (2006).
130. Compare FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7, with FLA. STAT. § 782.07(1) (2012).
131. See Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 259.
132. Id. at 256 (citing FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7).
133. Id. at 257 (quoting In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases–Report No.
2007-10, 997 So. 2d 403, 403 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam)). Montgomery II “does not apply
retroactively to convictions [that] were final before” the Supreme Court of Florida issued its
opinion in that case. Ross v. State, 82 So. 3d 975, 976 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per
curiam) (citing Harricharan v. State, 59 So. 3d 1162, 1163 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per
curiam), review denied, 92 So. 3d 213 (Fla. 2012); Rozzelle v. State, 29 So. 3d 1141, 1142
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009), review denied, 92 So. 3d 214 (Fla. 2012)).
134. In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 997 So. 2d at 403 (citing Hall v.
State, 951 So. 2d 91, 96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (en banc)).
135. Id. at 404 (citing FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7).
136. Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 257.
137. See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 997 So. 2d at 404 (citing
FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7).
138. Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 257 n.3 (citing In re Amendments to Standard Jury
Instructions in Criminal Cases—Instruction 7.7 (In re Amendments to Instruction 7.7 I), 41
So. 3d 853, 853 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam), amended by 75 So. 3d 210 (Fla. 2011)).
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mit an act that was not justified or excusable and which caused death.”139
After receiving comments about the 2010 instruction, the court issued the
most recent instruction—the 2011 instruction.140 This 2011 instruction provides that the State is not required “to prove that the defendant had an intent
to cause death, only an intent to commit an act that was not merely negligent,
justified, or excusable and which caused death.”141
Together with these amendments, the Montgomery II decision has unleashed a veritable tsunami of conflicting decisions on the applicability of
that ruling in myriad situations.142 The following discussion attempts to categorize and synthesize those opinions.
i.

The 2008 Jury Instruction

A conflict exists among the district courts of appeal as to whether the
2008 instruction suffered from the same infirmities as the instruction that
was the subject of the Montgomery II ruling.143 The first court to analyze the
2008 instruction was the First District in Riesel v. State,144 which held that
the amended instruction had not obviated the problems of its predecessor
“because it, too, erroneously stated that intent-to-kill was an element of manslaughter.”145 The Second and Third Districts disagreed, however.146

139. In re Amendments to Instruction 7.7 I, 41 So. 3d at 855.
140. In re Amendments to Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Instruction 7.7
(In re Amendments to Instruction 7.7 II), 75 So. 3d 210, 210 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam).
141. Id. at 212 app. (emphasis omitted).
142. See infra Part II.C.3.a.i.
143. Compare Riesel v. State, 48 So. 3d 885, 886 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 256, 259), with Figueroa v. State, 77 So. 3d 714,
714 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011), and Daniels v. State (Daniels I), 72 So. 3d 227, 230 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 79 So. 3d 744 (Fla. 2012); see also In re Standard Jury
Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report No. 2007-10, 997 So. 2d 403, 404 (Fla. 2008) (per
curiam).
144. 48 So. 3d 885 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam), review denied, 66 So. 3d
304 (Fla. 2011).
145. Id. at 886 (citing Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 256, 259). The First District reaffirmed
Riesel. See Richards v. State, 84 So. 3d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Noack v.
State, 61 So. 3d 1208, 1208 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Herring v.
State, 43 So. 3d 823, 824 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam); Lamb v. State, 18 So. 3d
734, 735 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam)); Williams v. State, 50 So. 3d 1207, 1208
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam) (discussing Riesel, 48 So. 3d at 886; Pryor v. State,
48 So. 3d 159, 161 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review dismissed, 66 So. 3d 304 (Fla.
2011)).
146. Compare Daniels I, 72 So. 3d at 230, with Figueroa, 77 So. 3d at 714, 716.
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In Figueroa v. State,147 the Third District held that the amendment of the
2008 instruction in 2010 did “not render the giving of the 2008 instruction
fundamental error.”148 After all, the court wrote, the Montgomery II decision
“clearly and unequivocally” concluded that the clarifying language in the
2008 instruction had rectified the problems with the 2006 instruction.149 The
Third District therefore certified conflict with the First District’s opinion in
Riesel.150
Similarly, in Daniels v. State (Daniels I),151 the Second District determined that the 2008 instruction did not require proof of intent-to-kill.152
First, the court wrote, the Montgomery II decision specifically concluded that
the clarifying language in the 2008 instruction had cured any apparent defect.153 Second, the fact that the 2010 instruction retained this clarifying language while eliminating other mention of “intentional acts or premeditated
intent” demonstrated that the two instructions were not so “materially different . . . [as to warrant] a finding that the 2008 . . . instruction was fundamentally erroneous.”154 Thus, in Daniels I, the trial court correctly instructed the
jury that, when trying to determine if the defendant’s actions “intentionally
caused the death of the victim,” the jury must determine if the defendant
“‘inten[ded] to commit an act [that] caused death.’”155 According to the appellate court, this language correctly defined the intent element of manslaughter.156 The Second District nevertheless certified conflict with the decision of the First District in Riesel.157 The Supreme Court of Florida has
accepted jurisdiction in Daniels v. State (Daniels II).158
147. 77 So. 3d 714 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
148. Id. at 714.
149. Id. at 715 (citing Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 256–57); see also Page v. State, 81 So.
3d 525, 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (“[I]t is difficult to believe, much less hold, that the
[s]upreme [c]ourt would even ‘authorize’ a purportedly curative instruction which was fundamentally wrong.”).
150. Figueroa, 77 So. 3d at 715–16 (certifying conflict with Noack, 61 So. 3d at 1208,
Pryor, 48 So. 3d at 162–63, and Riesel, 48 So. 3d at 886).
151. 72 So. 3d 227 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011), review granted, 79 So. 3d 744 (Fla.
2012).
152. Id. at 230.
153. Id. (citing Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 257).
154. Id. at 232. The Second District reaffirmed Daniels I. Berube v. State, 84 So. 3d 436,
436 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012); Black v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D593, D595 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. Mar. 9, 2012); Pharisien v. State, 74 So. 3d 156, 157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
155. Daniels I, 72 So. 3d at 230, 232 (quoting Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 257).
156. Id. at 232.
157. Id.; see also Riesel v. State, 48 So. 3d 885, 886–87 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per
curiam), review denied, 66 So. 3d 304 (Fla. 2011).
158. 79 So. 3d 744, 744 (Fla. 2012) (unpublished table decision).
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Instructing the Jury on Both Manslaughter by Act and Manslaughter by
Culpable Negligence

In spite of these differences, all of the Florida District Courts of Appeal
agree that a trial court does not commit fundamental error by giving the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction in a second-degree murder prosecution
if the jury is also instructed on manslaughter by culpable negligence.159 The
reason cited is that this additional instruction affords the jury the opportunity
to return a verdict for the lesser included offense of manslaughter by culpable negligence, which does not require intent-to-kill.160 These cases were
therefore distinguishable from the Montgomery cases, where the absence of
an instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence required the jury to
return a verdict of second-degree murder upon finding no intent-to-kill.161
If the evidence does not support a culpable negligence theory of manslaughter, however, a jury instruction on that crime may not cure an erroneous manslaughter by act instruction.162 This was the problem confronting the
Second District in Haygood v. State (Haygood I),163 where the court felt
bound by governing precedent to affirm a second-degree murder conviction
after the jury was instructed on both forms of manslaughter.164 In this case,
however, the jury was faced with a conundrum. The manslaughter by act
instruction was flawed, and the evidence arguably did not support “a theory
of manslaughter by culpable negligence.”165 This meant that if the jury be159. See, e.g., Paul v. State, 63 So. 3d 828, 830 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Guerra v.
State, 44 So. 3d 226, 226 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Barros-Dias v. State, 41 So. 3d 370,
372 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010); Singh v. State, 36 So. 3d 848, 851 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2010); Salonko v. State, 42 So. 3d 801, 802–03 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam)
(citing Nieves v. State, 22 So. 3d 691, 692 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009)).
160. Jackson v. State, 49 So. 3d 271, 272 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam)
(“[E]ven though the erroneous instruction on manslaughter by act was given, the jury in this
case was given the option of finding manslaughter by culpable negligence.”).
161. Compare, e.g., Barros-Dias, 41 So. 3d at 372, with Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d 252,
258–60 (Fla. 2010), and Montgomery v. State (Montgomery I), 70 So. 3d 603, 608 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010).
162. Curry v. State, 64 So. 3d 152, 156 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam) (finding
that the defendant “did not waive the fundamental error in the manslaughter by act instruction
by requesting that the [jury] . . . not [be] instruct[ed] on manslaughter by culpable negligence
[where] [t]he evidence arguably did not support a culpable negligence theory of manslaughter”); Pollock v. State, 64 So. 3d 695, 698 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that the erroneous manslaughter by act instruction was not saved by a manslaughter by culpable negligence instruction where the evidence did not support that theory).
163. 54 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) (per curiam), review granted, 61 So. 3d 410
(Fla. 2011).
164. Id. at 1036–37.
165. Id. at 1037.
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lieved the defendant intended his act but not the resulting death, “then neither
form of manslaughter provided a viable lesser offense” on which to convict
him.166 Although the evidence supported the second-degree murder verdict,
the court found it “impossible to speculate what the jury would have found
had it been properly instructed that manslaughter by act does not require the
intent-to-kill.”167 For this reason, the Second District certified the following
question to the Supreme Court of Florida:
If a jury returns a verdict finding a defendant guilty of seconddegree murder in a case where the evidence does not support a
theory of culpable negligence, does a trial court commit fundamental error by giving a flawed manslaughter by act instruction
when it also gives an instruction on manslaughter by culpable negligence?168

The Supreme Court of Florida has accepted discretionary review of Haygood
I.169
iii. The Attempted Manslaughter by Act Instruction
Although the manslaughter by act instruction has been amended three
times since the trial court decision in Montgomery II,170 the corresponding
instruction for attempted manslaughter has remained unchanged.171 This
instruction requires the State to prove that the defendant committed an act
that was intended to cause the victim’s death, and would have caused death,
if the defendant had not failed or been prevented from doing so.172 A conflict
exists among the district courts as to whether this instruction remains viable
166. Id.
167. Id. But cf. Carey v. State, 84 So. 3d 404, 405–06 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per
curiam) (finding it irrelevant that the evidence did not support a theory of manslaughter by
culpable negligence because the term “intentional act” did not mislead jurors into thinking that
an intent-to-kill was required).
168. Haygood I, 54 So. 3d at 1038; see also Pierre-Louis v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly
D1732, D1733 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 20, 2012); Garrido v. State, 76 So. 3d 378, 378 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam); McNealy v. State, 67 So. 3d 1187, 1188 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2011) (per curiam).
169. See Haygood v. State (Haygood II), 61 So. 3d 410, 410 (Fla. 2011).
170. See In re Amendments to Instruction 7.7 I, 41 So. 3d 853, 853, 857 (Fla. 2010) (per
curiam), amended by 75 So. 3d 210 (Fla. 2011); Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d 252, 254 (Fla.
2010); FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 7.7 (2011).
171. See FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 6.6 (1994).
172. Id. When “attempted manslaughter is . . . defined as a lesser included offense of
attempted first-degree premeditated murder,” the jury is also instructed that the State need not
“prove that the defendant had a premeditated intent to cause death.” Id.
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in light of Montgomery II.173 The debate centers on the question whether the
instruction improperly adds an intent-to-kill element that is not an element of
the statutory crime of attempted manslaughter by act.174
During the last survey period, the First District decided Lamb v. State175
and Rushing v. State,176 which held that the attempted manslaughter by act
instruction improperly requires the jury to find that the defendant intentionally attempted to kill the victim.177 The Fourth District rejected this argument
in Williams v. State (Williams I).178 There, the court refused to extend Montgomery II to the attempted manslaughter by act instruction because that
crime “requires an intent to commit an unlawful act that would have resulted
in the victim’s death rather than an intent-to-kill.”179 The court also concluded that the instruction, as worded, did not confuse the jury because the
defendant’s second-degree murder conviction reflected the jury’s finding that
he intended to commit an “imminently dangerous [act evincing] a depraved
mind.”180 The Fourth District certified conflict with Lamb and also “certif[ied] the following questions of great public importance: (1) Does the
standard jury instruction on attempted manslaughter constitute fundamental
error? (2) Is attempted manslaughter a viable offense in light of [Montgomery II]?”181
More recently, in Houston v. State,182 the Second District held that the
attempted manslaughter instruction suffers from the same infirmity as the
2008 manslaughter instruction in Montgomery II and constitutes fundamental
173. See, e.g., Fenster v. State, 61 So. 3d 465, 466–67 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (applying Williams v. State (Williams I), 40 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review
granted, 64 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 2011)); Rushing v. State, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1376, D1377 (1st
Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2010) (citing Lamb v. State, 18 So. 3d 734, 735 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2009) (per curiam)); see also Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 254.
174. See FLA. STAT. §§ 777.04(1), 782.07(1) (2012); Fenster, 61 So. 3d at 466–67 (citing
Williams I, 40 So. 3d at 74–75); Lamb, 18 So. 3d at 735.
175. 18 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
176. 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1376 (1st Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2010).
177. Id. at D1376; Lamb, 18 So. 3d at 735; see also Montgomery I, 70 So. 3d 603, 608
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010).
178. 40 So. 3d 72, 75–76 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review granted, 64 So. 3d 1262
(Fla. 2011); see also Fenster, 61 So. 3d at 466–67 (agreeing with Williams I, 40 So. 3d at 75,
that no fundamental error occurs when the jury convicts a defendant of attempted seconddegree murder after receiving the standard jury instruction for the lesser offense of attempted
manslaughter).
179. Williams I, 40 So. 3d at 74–75 (citing Taylor v. State, 444 So. 2d 931, 934 (Fla.
1983)).
180. Id. at 75.
181. Id. at 75–76. The same questions were certified in Fenster. Fenster, 61 So. 3d at
467.
182. 87 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 73 So. 3d 760 (Fla. 2011).
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error.183 Nothing in either the manslaughter statute184 or the attempt statute185
“suggests that the crime of attempted manslaughter requires an intent-tokill,” the court wrote.186 Reversing for a new trial on the charge of attempted
second-degree murder, the court also certified conflict with Williams I.187
The First,188 Third,189 and Fifth190 Districts have followed Houston and certified conflict with Williams I.191
The Supreme Court of Florida has granted review of Williams I to resolve this conflict,192 and Instruction 6.6 for attempted voluntary manslaughter is currently under review by the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions
in Criminal Cases.193 The proposed instruction seeks to remove the phrase
“intended to cause the death of [the] victim” and to add the word “intention-

183. Id. at 3–4; see also Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d 252, 259–60 (Fla. 2010).
184. See FLA. STAT. § 782.07 (2012).
185. See id. § 777.04.
186. Houston, 87 So. 3d at 2 (citing Bass v. State, 45 So. 3d 970, 971 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (per curiam); Lamb v. State, 18 So. 3d 734, 735 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per
curiam)).
187. Id. at 4. Conflict was also certified in Pierre-Louis v. State. Pierre-Louis v. State, 37
Fla. L. Weekly D1732, D1733 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 20, 2012).
188. Moore v. State, 78 So. 3d 118, 118 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam) (“certify[ing] the following question of great public importance: Is attempted manslaughter a viable
offense in light of [Montgomery II]?”); Minnich v. State, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D216, D217 (1st
Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2011) (per curiam) (“certify[ing] conflict with Williams [I], [and certifying] the following questions of great public importance: (1) Does the standard jury instruction on attempted manslaughter constitute fundamental error? (2) Is attempted manslaughter a
viable offense in light of [Montgomery II]?”).
189. Gordon v. State, 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2590, D2590 (3d Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2011);
Burrows v. State, 62 So. 3d 1258, 1259 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (finding the attempted
manslaughter instruction to be fundamental error and certifying conflict with Williams I).
190. Thomas v. State, 91 So. 3d 880, 882 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (finding the attempted manslaughter instruction to be fundamental error because “the jury could reasonably
have concluded that the offenses were presented in descending order of seriousness and that
attempted voluntary manslaughter was less serious than aggravated battery,” and certifying
conflict with Williams I). But see Pavolko v. State, 78 So. 3d 86, 87–88 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2012) (per curiam) (emphasis omitted) (finding that a non-standard instruction requiring
the state to prove that the defendant “intentionally committed an act, which would have resulted in the death of [the victim] except that someone prevented [the defendant] from killing
[the victim] or he failed to do so,” could not have been reasonably understood by the jury “as
including an [element of] intent to cause death”).
191. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text.
192. Williams v. State (Williams II), 64 So. 3d 1262, 1262 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table
decision).
FLA.
SUPREME
CT.,
193. Alerts
–
Criminal
Jury
Instructions,
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/alerts.shtml (last updated Oct. 7, 2011).
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ally” before “committed an act.”194 In other words, the proposed revision
would require the State to prove that the “[d]efendant intentionally committed an act . . . [that] would have resulted in the [victim’s] death” if the defendant had not failed or been prevented from doing so.195
iv.

Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

All district courts have found ineffective assistance of counsel where
appellate counsel failed to raise the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in
Montgomery II while direct appeal was pending.196 The First and Fifth Districts have held that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that
the manslaughter instruction was fundamentally erroneous after conflict was
certified in Montgomery v. State (Montgomery I)197 and the Supreme Court of
Florida accepted the issue for review.198 The Second and Fifth Districts have
found ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to argue that the
attempted manslaughter by act instruction was fundamentally erroneous.199
v.

Conclusion

The decisional chaos described above appears to stem from the failure
of these opinions, including Montgomery II, to recognize that Florida’s manslaughter by act statute is a codification of two forms of common law manslaughter requiring different mental states.200 Thus, manslaughter by act is
involuntary when the defendant intends to commit an unlawful act that re-

194. Proposed Amendments to the Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, FLA B. NEWS, Feb.
15, 2011, http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf/Articles/CEC66F4B11B443
8285257830004DB637.
195. Id.
196. See Bonilla v. State, 87 So. 3d 1222, 1222–23 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per
curiam); Cooper v. State, 83 So. 3d 998, 999 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam);
Ferrer v. State, 69 So. 3d 360, 361–62 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Hartley v. State, 65 So.
3d 584, 584–85 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam); Hodges v. State, 64 So. 3d 142,
142–43 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam), mandamus denied, 88 So. 3d 149 (Fla.
2012).
197. 70 So. 3d 603 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 39 So. 3d 252 (Fla. 2010).
198. Lopez v. State, 68 So. 3d 332, 333, 335 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Asberry v.
State, 32 So. 3d 718, 719 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
199. See McClendon v. State, 93 So. 3d 1131, 1131–32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012);
Mendenhall v. State, 82 So. 3d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam) (citing
Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d 252, 256–58 (Fla. 2010)).
200. Compare Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 256, with Fortner v. State, 161 So. 94, 96 (Fla.
1935) (Brown, J., concurring).
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sults in death, although with no intent-to-kill.201 In such cases, Montgomery
II correctly holds that fundamental error occurs when the trial court instructs
a jury that intent-to-kill is an element of manslaughter by act.202 Manslaughter by act is voluntary, on the other hand, when the defendant intends to kill
“another in a sudden heat of passion due to adequate provocation, and not
with malice.”203 In Taylor v. State,204 the Supreme Court of Florida explained
that nothing in the statutory definition of manslaughter excludes all intentional killings and provided heat of passion killings as an example of an intentional killing that constitutes manslaughter.205 The Taylor court extended
this reasoning to conclude that the crime of attempted manslaughter would
include “situations where, if death had resulted, the defendant could have
been found guilty of voluntary manslaughter.”206
Arguably, by removing the intent-to-kill element from the jury instruction, the Supreme Court of Florida has eliminated the crime of voluntary
manslaughter and possibly attempted voluntary manslaughter as well.207
Separate jury instructions for voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter could eliminate the seemingly endless interpretive problems described in this section.208
b.

Manslaughter by Culpable Negligence

Santarelli v. State209 was the first manslaughter case to be decided under
Florida’s Open House Party statute,210 which prohibits a person in charge of a
201. Hall v. State, 951 So. 2d 91, 95–96 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (en banc).
202. Montgomery II, 39 So. 3d at 258. Courts recognize a “narrow exception” when the
erroneous manslaughter by act instruction is accompanied by the manslaughter by culpable
negligence instruction because the latter option permits the jury to return a manslaughter verdict without finding an intent-to-kill. See Sullivan v. State, 50 So. 3d 33, 34 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2010) (citing Joyner v. State, 41 So. 3d 306, 306–07 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010)),
review denied, 67 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. 2011).
203. Fortner, 161 So. at 96 (Brown, J., concurring).
204. 444 So. 2d 931 (Fla. 1983).
205. See id. at 933 (quoting Williams v. State, 26 So. 184, 186 (Fla. 1899)).
206. See id. at 934 (citing Anthony v. State, 409 N.E.2d 632, 636 (Ind. 1980); Commonwealth v. Hebert, 368 N.E.2d 1204, 1206 (Mass. 1977); People v. Genes, 227 N.W.2d 241,
242–43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 1978)).
207. See id. at 934; Fortner, 161 So. at 96 (Brown, J., concurring).
208. See, e.g., 11TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 46.1 (2010) (voluntary manslaughter “is the unlawful and intentional killing of a human being without malice upon a sudden
quarrel or heat of passion”); 11TH CIR. PATTERN JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 46.2 (involuntary manslaughter “is the unlawful but unintentional killing of a human being [that occurs] while
committing an unlawful act that isn’t a felony [or] as a result of an act done in wanton and
reckless disregard for human life”).
209. 62 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 77 So. 3d 1255 (Fla. 2011).
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house from allowing minors to consume intoxicants on the premises.211 In
this case, two teenagers were killed in a drunk driving incident after leaving
a house party, hosted by Santarelli, at which minors were permitted to consume alcohol and other illegal substances.”212 After the trial court denied her
motion to dismiss the manslaughter counts, Santarelli was acquitted of manslaughter and convicted of two misdemeanor “count[s] of allowing an open
house party . . . and . . . of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.”213 On
appeal, she argued that “the judgments and sentences . . . on the misdemeanor counts [were] void” because the circuit court would have lost jurisdiction
over these counts if the two felony manslaughter counts had been properly
dismissed.214
The Fifth District disagreed and affirmed her convictions.215 In her first
argument, Santarelli asserted that the driver’s decision to operate a motor
vehicle while intoxicated and the passenger’s decision to ride with him constituted superseding events that broke the causation link necessary for the
manslaughter charges.216 The court rejected this argument, concluding that
the defendant’s permissive acts had triggered a chain of foreseeable events
that led to the deaths.217 In her second argument, Santarelli maintained that a
violation of the Open House Party statute “[could not] legally constitute
culpable negligence” because it “is not sufficiently willful or wanton to support an award of punitive damages” and so could not support felony subject
matter jurisdiction.218 The court rejected this argument because the defendant relied on a case that predated the Open House Party statute and because
her other “intentional and culpably negligent acts” were sufficient to support
the manslaughter charges.219 Thus, the Fifth District held that the trial court
properly denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss two counts of manslaughter.220

210. See id. at 1213, 1215; see also FLA. STAT. § 856.015 (2012).
211. FLA. STAT. § 856.015(2).
212. Santarelli, 62 So. 3d at 1212.
213. Id. at 1212–13.
214. Id. at 1212.
215. Id. at 1212, 1215.
216. Id. at 1213.
217. Santarelli, 62 So. 3d at 1214–15 (citing Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835 A.2d
801, 808 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)).
218. See id. at 1212–13, 1215 (citing Jacmar Pac. Pizza Corp. v. Huston, 502 So. 2d 91, 92
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. § 856.015 (2012)).
219. Id. at 1215 (citing Huston, 502 So. 2d at 92).
220. Id.
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Kidnapping

During the survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida wrote two opinions interpreting the state kidnapping statute.221 In Davila v. State (Davila
II),222 the court held that a custodial parent may be convicted of kidnapping
his or her own minor child.223 The defendant in this case was convicted of
three counts of kidnapping his eleven-year-old son based on the child’s lengthy confinement in various rooms in the family home on multiple occasions.224 The Third District affirmed the convictions.225 The court recognized a general rule barring conviction for parental kidnapping when no
court order deprives the defendant of custody.226 However, a judicial exception exists when the defendant “‘does not simply exercise his rights to the
child, but takes her for an ulterior and unlawful purpose which is specifically
forbidden by the kidnapping statute itself.’”227 The court certified conflict
with Muniz v. State,228 in which the Second District held that it is legally impossible for a custodial parent to kidnap his or her own child.229
Affirming Davila’s conviction, the Supreme Court of Florida resolved
the conflict by disapproving of Muniz.230 The court declared that no language in Florida’s kidnapping statute precludes criminal liability when a
custodial parent consents to the child’s confinement.231 Under section
787.01(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, kidnapping occurs when the defendant
“confines, abducts, or imprisons another person, against [that person’s] will,”
with the intent (in relevant part) to harm or terrorize that person.232 Under
section 787.01(1)(b), if the victim is under the age of thirteen, the absence of
parental consent to the confinement establishes that the act is against the
child’s will.233 The court rejected the argument that this language means a

221. Davila v. State (Davila II), 75 So. 3d 192, 195 (Fla. 2011); Delgado v. State (Delgado
II), 71 So. 3d 54, 56 (Fla. 2011).
222. 75 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2011).
223. Id. at 193, 197.
224. Id. at 192–94.
225. Davila v. State (Davila I), 26 So. 3d 5, 6 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009), review
granted, 75 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2010), and aff’d, 75 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2011).
226. Id. at 7 (citing Johnson v. State, 637 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per
curiam)).
227. Id. (quoting Lafleur v. State, 661 So. 2d 346, 349 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
228. 764 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
229. Davila I, 26 So. 3d at 7 (citing Muniz, 764 So. 2d at 731).
230. See Davila II, 75 So. 3d 192, 197 (Fla. 2011) (citing Muniz, 764 So. 2d at 729).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 196; see also FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(a) (2012).
233. Davila II, 75 So. 3d at 197; see also FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(b).
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parent who confines a child necessarily consents to that confinement.234 Instead, the section simply provides “a method of proof which allows the State
to establish that the overt act on the part of the defendant was against a person’s will when that person is a child under the age of thirteen.”235 The court
concluded that “if the Legislature intended to exempt a [custodial] parent
from [such] criminal liability . . . it would have expressly stated so.”236
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Charles T. Canady argued that,
when the victim is under the age of thirteen, the absence of parental consent
is a necessary condition for establishing that “confinement is ‘against the
[child’s] will.’”237 In other words, the statute could be read to “exempt custodial parents from criminal liability for kidnapping their own children who
are under thirteen.”238 Justice Barbara J. Pariente added a concurring opinion
in which she wrote that the dissent’s reasoning would lead to the absurd result that, “the parent . . . could be convicted of kidnapping a child who is
thirteen years of age or older, but not a child under the age of thirteen.”239
She also cautioned that section 787.01(1)(b) “was not intended to operate to
preclude criminal liability for parents or legal guardians who meet the elements of the statute.”240
The second case was Delgado v. State (Delgado II),241 in which the
court held that a defendant cannot be convicted of kidnapping with the intent
to commit or facilitate another felony unless he or she is “aware of the victim’s presence” at the time the victim is constrained.242 Here, Delgado and
an accomplice stole a pickup truck with a sleeping toddler in the backseat,
only to abandon the vehicle three miles away with the child frightened but
unhurt.243 Based on these acts, he was convicted of, inter alia, “kidnapping
with the intent to commit or facilitate a felony.”244 The Third District upheld
the conviction on the ground that the three-part test set out in Faison v.

234. Davila II, 75 So. 3d at 197.
235. Id. at 196; see also FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(b).
236. Davila II, 75 So. 3d at 196.
237. Id. at 199 (Canady, C.J., dissenting); see also FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(b).
238. Davila II, 75 So. 3d at 199.
239. Id. at 197 (Pariente, J., concurring) (citing Davila II, 75 So. 3d at 199 (Canady, C.J.,
dissenting)).
240. Id.
241. 71 So. 3d 54 (Fla. 2011).
242. Id. at 61.
243. Id. at 57 & n.2.
244. Id. at 58.
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State245 was satisfied when the defendant became aware of the child’s presence in the truck and continued to confine her.246
Under the Faison test, in order for a defendant’s actions during the
commission of another felony to constitute kidnapping, the movement or
confinement:
“(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental to
the other crime;
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other
crime; and
(c) Must have some significance.independent of the other crime in
that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or
substantially lessens the risk of detection.”247

According to the Third District in Delgado v. State (Delgado I),248 the “continued confinement of the child” constituted kidnapping under Faison because it was not incidental to the theft, but rather “was essential to Delgado’s
attempt to avoid apprehension for [grand] theft.”249
The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed, however, writing that the Faison test was not intended to replace the elements of the kidnapping statute.250
Because the purpose of the test is to prevent kidnapping convictions for
crimes such as sexual battery and robbery that inherently involve unlawful
confinement, the court ruled that all elements of a kidnapping charge must be
proved before applying Faison.251 In this case, the State was required to
prove that Delgado performed an overt act with the “specific intent to commit or facilitate the commission of an underlying felony.”252 Without advance knowledge of the victim’s confinement, he could not have constrained
the victim with that specific intent, and so Faison was inapplicable.253 Because the State’s evidence was insufficient to sustain the kidnapping convic245. 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983).
246. See Delgado v. State (Delgado I), 19 So. 3d 1055, 1057–58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2009) (citing Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965), review granted, 32 So. 3d 622 (Fla. 2010), and
quashed, 71 So. 3d 54 (Fla. 2011).
247. Faison, 426 So. 2d at 965 (quoting State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 731 (Kan. 1976)).
248. 19 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009), review granted, 32 So. 3d 622 (Fla.
2010), and quashed, 71 So. 3d 54 (Fla. 2011).
249. Id. at 1057–58.
250. Delgado II, 71 So. 3d 54, 56, 60 (Fla. 2011).
251. Id. at 60.
252. Id. at 61.
253. Id. at 63–64, 68; see also FLA. STAT. § 787.01(1)(a)2. (2012).
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tion, the court remanded the case with instructions to vacate Delgado’s kidnapping conviction.254
E.

Sexual Offenses

During the survey period, the Second District decided two child pornography cases in which the faces of children were superimposed upon the
nude bodies of adults to form composite images.255 In Stelmack v. State,256
the defendant was convicted under section 827.071(5) of the Florida Statutes
for possessing composite images in which the faces and heads of two young
girls were cut and pasted onto images of a woman exhibiting her genitals.257
On appeal, Stelmack maintained that the images did not violate the child
pornography statute as a matter of law because the nude bodies depicted in
the composites were those of an adult.258 The Second District agreed, concluding that the images depicted no more than “a simulated lewd exhibition
of the genitals by a child,” which the statute does not proscribe.259 In other
words, the child pornography provision requires “actual lewd exhibition of
the genitals by a child.”260 This conclusion is supported by the legislative
history of the statute, which “was aimed at preventing the exploitation of
children in sexual performances.”261 Because “no part of any of the images
displays a child who is actually lewdly exhibiting her genitals,” the appellate
court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for the trial court to
discharge the defendant.262
The same court extended this decision in Parker v. State,263 where the
composite images showed “a child’s head superimposed on an adult female
body” involved in various forms of sexual activity.264 Regardless of whether
the images depicted actual or simulated conduct, the court held they were not
child pornography because no child had engaged in the conduct shown in the
images.265 The dissent distinguished the simulated lewd exhibition of child254. Delgado II, 71 So. 3d at 67–68.
255. Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451, 452 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Stelmack v. State,
58 So. 3d 874, 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
256. 58 So. 3d 874 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
257. Id. at 874.
258. Id. at 875.
259. Id. at 876; see also FLA. STAT. § 827.071(1)(g) (2007) (amended 2011).
260. Stelmack, 58 So. 3d at 876 (first emphasis added).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 877.
263. 81 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
264. Id. at 453.
265. Id.
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ren’s genitalia in Stelmack from the simulated sexual activity by a child in
the instant case.266 The former was not a criminal act, according to the dissent, while the latter constituted prohibited sexual activity.267 The majority
refuted this distinction on the ground that, no matter how the images were
characterized, the conduct was “that of an adult.”268 Consequently, Parker’s
convictions were reversed.269
In L.A.P. v. State,270 the Second District held that : a defendant who
failed to advise her partner of her human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
positive status before participating in oral sex and digital vaginal penetration
did not violate section 384.24(2) of the Florida Statutes.271 That section
makes it unlawful for an individual knowingly infected with HIV to engage
in sexual intercourse without both informing a partner that he or she risks
contracting HIV and obtaining the partner’s consent.272 Because section
384.24(2) does not define “sexual intercourse,”273 the court considered other
statutory274 and decisional law275 and defined this term as “‘the penetration of
the female sex organ by the male sex organ.’”276 Accordingly, the court
agreed with the defendant “that sexual intercourse is an unambiguous phrase
which must be given its plain meaning in the absence of a definition in chapter 384” and which does not include oral and digital penetration.277 The
Second District reversed and remanded with directions that the trial court
discharge the defendant.278
F.

Theft

In Sanders v. State,279 the Fourth District considered the limits of Florida’s jurisdiction over a defendant whose” offense occurred “on a commercial

266. Id. at 458 (Morris, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Stelmack, 58
So. 3d at 877).
267. Id.
268. Parker, 81 So. 3d at 453 (majority opinion).
269. Id. at 457.
270. 62 So. 3d 693 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
271. Id. at 694–95; see also FLA. STAT. § 384.24(2) (2012).
272. FLA. STAT. § 384.24(2).
273. L.A.P., 62 So. 3d at 694; see also FLA. STAT. § 384.24(2).
274. L.A.P., 62 So. 3d at 694; see also FLA. STAT. § 826.04.
275. L.A.P., 62 So. 3d at 694–95 (quoting Green v. State, 765 So. 2d 910, 913 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2000)).
276. Id. at 694 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 826.04).
277. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 384.24(2).
278. L.A.P., 62 So. 3d at 695.
279. 77 So. 3d 914 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
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flight from Arizona before it entered Florida airspace.280 The State alleged
that, before the flight landed in Fort Lauderdale, Sanders stole $500 from
another passenger’s handbag but was forced to return the money when a
flight attendant interceded.281 The plane was not in Florida’s airspace when
the theft or recovery of the stolen funds occurred.282 Sanders was charged
with grand theft.283
Sanders moved to dismiss on the ground that, pursuant to section
910.005 of the Florida Statutes, Florida lacked jurisdiction to prosecute because all acts relating to the charge transpired outside the state.284 The State
argued that her conduct amounted to an attempt to commit grand theft within
the state because, in order to complete the crime, she would have had to deplane with the victim’s money after landing in Florida.285 After the trial court
denied her motion to dismiss, Sanders pled no contest and reserved her right
to appeal.286 The Fourth District reversed.287 The court first noted that the
crime of theft includes “both the completed offense and the attempt[ed] . . .
offense.”288 By the time the flight had entered Florida airspace, the court
wrote, all elements of theft were complete because Sanders had “obtained the
victim’s property with the intent to permanently deprive her of it.”289 “This
means that the theft was not ‘committed . . . within’ Florida” under section
910.005(1)(a).290 It also meant that her actions on the plane did not amount
to an attempt to commit theft within Florida under section 910.005(1)(b).291
The case was remanded with instructions for the trial court to grant the motion to dismiss.292

280. Id. at 914–15.
281. Id. at 915.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Sanders, 77 So. 3d at 915; see also FLA. STAT, § 910.005 (2012).
285. Sanders, 77 So. 3d at 915.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 917.
288. Id. at 915 (citing FLA. STAT. § 812.014(1)(a) (2012)). Section 812.04(1)(a) of the
Florida Statutes includes the “endeavor[] to obtain or to use the property of another with
intent to, either temporarily or permanently deprive the other person of a right to the property
or a benefit from the property.” Id. at 915 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. STAT. §
812.014(1)(a)).
289. Sanders, 77 So. 3d at 916.
290. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 910.005(1)(a)).
291. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 910.005(1)(b)).
292. Id. at 917.
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During the survey period, the courts continued to have difficulty applying section 812.025 of the Florida Statutes.293 That section permits “the
State to charge [both] theft and dealing in stolen property in connection with
one scheme or course of conduct,” but allows the trier of fact to return a
guilty verdict on only one offense.294 The problem in the district courts centers on the proper remedy to apply when dual convictions result from a trial
court’s unchallenged failure to instruct the jury that it may not convict on
both offenses.
In Kiss v. State,295 for example, the Fourth District concluded that the
failure to instruct the jury on its obligation under section 812.025 required a
new trial because merely striking the grand theft charge could not cure the
error.296 The court reasoned that a properly instructed jury could have found
the defendant guilty of only theft, the lesser offense.297 In Blackmon v.
State,298 on the other hand, the First District held that the proper remedy is to
vacate the conviction for the lesser offense.299 “[T]his remedy better respects
the jury’s determination that the state met its burden to prove the greater offense and also avoids the need to speculate what verdict the jury might have
returned had it been required to choose between the greater and lesser offenses,” the court wrote.300 Additionally, it comports with the decision of the
Supreme Court of Florida in Hall v. State,301 where the case was remanded
with directions to reverse one count and to resentence the defendant on the
remaining count.302 The Blackmon court “certif[ied] conflict with Kiss regarding the proper remedy when, contrary to section 812.025, the defendant
is convicted of both theft and dealing in stolen property.”303
The Second District arrived at the same conclusion in Williams v.
State,304 where the trial court failed to instruct the jury on section 812.025
and then dismissed the third-degree grand theft charge when the jury con-

293. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 826 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam); Kiss v. State, 42
So. 3d 810, 811 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
294. Hall, 826 So. 2d at 271 (recognizing that under this statute, the trier of fact must first
determine the “defendant's intended use of the stolen property” and then may convict the
defendant “of one or the other offense, but not both”).
295. 42 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
296. Id. at 811; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.025.
297. See Kiss, 42 So. 3d at 812–13.
298. 58 So. 3d 343 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 67 So. 3d 198 (Fla. 2011).
299. Id. at 348.
300. Id.
301. 826 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam).
302. Id. at 272.
303. Blackmon, 58 So. 3d at 348; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.025 (2012).
304. 66 So. 3d 360 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 70 So. 3d 588 (Fla. 2011).
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victed the defendant on both counts.305 The appellate court determined that
no new trial was warranted306 and that pursuant to the policy of double jeopardy, the defendant could be sentenced based on the greater offense.307
However, the court also criticized section 812.025 for its legislative policy
and its lack of guidance for juries.308 Finally, the court expressed doubt as to
whether any jury instruction was required at all, as further instruction might
unnecessarily complicate an already confusing process.309 The court concluded as follows:
[T]he procedural requirements in section 812.025 are unenforceable to the extent that the statute (1) attempts to establish a procedure by which a jury does not return a factual finding announcing
a verdict of guilty on each of the two separately charged offenses
despite its determination that the State has proven the offenses
beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) requires the jury to make this
selection without any legal criteria or factual basis.310

Affirming the trial court’s decision, the Second District certified the following questions of great public importance:
1. Must the trial court instruct the jury to perform the selection
process described in section 812.025 of the Florida Statutes?
2. If so, must the appellate court order a new trial on both offenses
if the trial court fails to give the instruction?
3. If the appellate court is not required to mandate a new trial, must
it require the trial court to select the greater offense or the lesser
offense when the two offenses are offenses of different degrees or
of different severity ranking? 311

305. Id. at 361; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.025; Wilkins v. State, 78 So. 3d 18, 19 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (certifying conflict with Kiss v. State, 42 So. 3d 810, 812 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2010)).
306. Williams, 66 So. 3d at 365.
307. See id.
308. Id. at 363; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.025.
309. See Williams, 66 So. 3d at 364.
310. Id. at 361.
311. Id. at 365 (emphasis added). The Second District again certified these three questions
in Poole v. State, 67 So. 3d 431, 432 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
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In Kablitz v. State,312 the Fourth District reaffirmed the approach it took
in Kiss and certified conflict with Blackmon and Williams.313
G.

Trespass

Trespass on school grounds is a first-degree misdemeanor when the defendant enters or remains there after being directed to leave the premises by
the principal of the school or the principal’s designee.314 A designee is “one
who has received express or implied authorization from the school’s principal to exercise control over the property of the school.”315
In D.J. v. State (D.J. I),316 the defendant “was found to have trespassed
on school property” after being warned by a school security guard not to
enter school property.317 On appeal, D.J. argued that the case should have
been dismissed because the State produced no evidence that the security
guard was a designee of the principal, as required by section 810.097(2).318
The Third District rejected this argument, holding that the state is not required to prove the identity of the person issuing the order unless the defendant challenges that person’s authority.319 Because D.J. did not contest the
security guard’s authority at trial, the Third District affirmed the conviction.320 D.J. filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Florida on
the ground that the Third District’s decision expressly and directly conflicted
with the supreme court’s decision in State v. Dye.321 In contrast, in B.C. v.
State,322 the First District held that, “the State must prove the involvement of
the principal or his/her designee to establish a violation of section

312. 36 Fla. L. Weekly D2358 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2011).
313. Id. at D2358 (citing Williams, 66 So. 3d at 365; Blackmon v. State, 58 So. 3d 343,
347 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 67 So. 3d 198 (Fla. 2011); Kiss v. State, 42 So.
3d 810, 811, 813 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010)).
314. FLA. STAT. § 810.097(2) (2012); see also FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 13.5(b)
(2007).
315. D.J. v. State (D.J. II), 67 So. 3d 1029, 1033 (Fla. 2011).
316. 43 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010),
and quashed, 67 So. 3d 1029 (Fla. 2011).
317. Id. at 177 (citing FLA. STAT. § 810.097).
318. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 810.097(2).
319. D.J. I, 43 So. 3d at 177 (quoting Downer v. State, 375 So. 2d 840, 845–46 (Fla.
1979)).
320. See id.
321. D.J. II, 67 So. 3d 1029, 1031 (Fla. 2011) (citing State v. Dye, 346 So. 2d 538, 542
(Fla. 1977)).
322. 70 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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810.097(2).”323 Because this decision conflicted with D.J. I, the First District
certified conflict.324
This conflict was resolved by the Supreme Court of Florida in D.J. v.
State (D.J. II).325 Without mentioning B.C., the court quashed D.J.’s conviction and held that the State must prove both the identity of the individual
who warned defendant to leave school grounds and that individual’s authority to control access to the property as necessary elements of the crime.326
This conclusion was supported by the plain language of both the statute and
the applicable standard jury instruction, the court wrote.327 It was also supported by the court’s own decision in Dye,328 which held that a trespass conviction requires proof of the identity and authority of the person issuing the
warning.329 Under that standard, the State had failed to present evidence that
the school’s security guard was the principal’s designee, or was otherwise
authorized to limit access to school property, and had not cited any “rule or
statute indicating that a school security guard, by virtue of his or her title,
would possess such authority as a matter of law.”330
H.

Miscellaneous

In Anderson v. State,331 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the offense of driving with a suspended license in violation of section 322.34 of
the Florida Statutes did not require actual knowledge of the suspension by
the defendant.332 The knowledge element of the offense is satisfied, the court
wrote, by evidence that written notice was mailed to a defendant’s last
known address, and proof that this was the defendant’s address at the time of
mailing.333 In so ruling, the court disapproved of the decisions of the First
and Fourth District courts in Haygood v. State334 and Brown v. State,335 which

323. Id. at 669.
324. Id. at 671.
325. 67 So. 3d. 1029, 1035 (Fla. 2011).
326. Id. (citing Dye, 346 So. 2d at 542).
327. Id. at 1033–34 (citing FLA. STAT. § 810.097(2) (2012); FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.)
13.5(b) (2007)).
328. Id. at 1035 (citing Dye, 346 So. 2d at 541–42).
329. Dye, 346 So. 2d at 541 (citing FLA. STAT. § 810.09(2)(a) (1975) (current version at
FLA. STAT. § 810.09(2)(b) (2012)).
330. D.J. II, 67 So. 3d at 1035 (citing Dye, 346 So. 2d at 542).
331. 87 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2012).
332. See id. at 781; see also FLA. STAT. § 322.34(2) (2012).
333. Anderson, 87 So. 3d at 781.
334. 17 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam), abrogated by Anderson v.
State, 87 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2012).
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required the State to prove actual receipt of a license suspension notice to
establish knowledge of that suspension.336
The Third District reviewed the dismissal of a cannabis trafficking
charge in State v. Estrada,337 holding that Florida’s statutory definition of
cannabis includes the moisture of a fresh marijuana plant.338 The seized cannabis at issue weighed twenty-six pounds at the time of arrest but, after secreting moisture in storage, it weighed less than the statutory threshold for
trafficking.339 The trial court dismissed the trafficking charge, reasoning that
the weight of cannabis does not include moisture because wet marijuana
cannot be sold on the market.340 The appellate court disagreed and held that
the statutory definition of cannabis in section 893.02(3) excludes excess water weight that is “not inherent in the [marijuana] plant’s vegetable matter.”341 The court further defined the term “excess water” as “‘water that has
been added extrinsically to . . . or . . . accidentally acquired’” by the
marijuana.342 In Estrada, the type of water that drained from the marijuana
while it was in evidence storage was “inherent” in its vegetable matter
because the live plants had been seized from the defendant’s lab and vehicle,
and “had not fallen into a canal or other body of water.”343 The court acknowledged a contrary interpretation in Hatch v. State, Department of Revenue,344 where the First District held that the weight of seized marijuana excludes the moisture of a fresh marijuana plant.345 However, the court distinguished Hatch because it was “limited to tax assessment cases” that require

335. 764 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), overruled in part by Anderson v. State, 87 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 2012).
336. Anderson, 87 So. 3d at 779–81 (citing Haygood, 17 So. 3d at 896; Brown, 764 So. 2d
at 743–44).
337. 76 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
338. Id. at 372–73 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 893.02(3) (2012)).
339. Id. at 374; see also FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(a).
340. Estrada, 76 So. 3d at 372.
341. Id. at 373 (quoting State v. Velasquez, 879 So. 2d 1259, 1260 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 2004) (per curiam). Cannabis is defined as “all parts of any plant of the genus Cannabis,
whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and
every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant or its seeds
or resin.” FLA. STAT. § 893.02(3).
342. Estrada, 76 So. 3d at 373 (quoting Cronin v. State, 470 So. 2d 802, 803 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
343. See id. at 374 (citing Cronin, 470 So. 2d at 804).
344. 585 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
345. Estrada, 76 So. 3d at 373 n.5 (quoting Hatch, 585 So. 2d at 1079).
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courts to estimate the retail price of cannabis.346 Accordingly, the Third District reversed the order dismissing the charges.347
In Pinkney v. State,348 the Second District clarified the mental state required for assault under section 784.011(1) of the Florida Statutes.349 This
defendant was charged with aggravated assault because he backed his vehicle in the direction of a police officer.350 On appeal, Pinkney argued that
the State had not proven his “specific intent to do violence to [his] victim,”351
as required by the Second District in State v. Shorette.352 Conceding that this
was an accurate statement of Shorette, the court nevertheless receded from
that case on the ground that it incorrectly stated the law.353 In so ruling, the
court held that the State must prove that the defendant’s act “was substantially certain to put the victim in fear of imminent violence, not that the defendant had the intent to do violence to the victim.”354 A statute’s use of the
word “intentionally,” without more, signifies that the statute “‘prohibits either a specific voluntary act or something that is substantially certain to result from the act,’” rather than an act committed accidentally or negligently.355 Thus, the “‘subjective intent to cause the particular result is irrelevant,’” the court explained.356 In light of his vehicle’s proximity to the officer, Pinkney’s act constituted a threat of violence because it was substantially
certain to put the officer in fear of imminent violence.357
The issue confronting the First District in Wess v. State358 was whether a
defendant commits robbery by sudden snatching by taking property that is
“close to the victim or within the victim’s reach or control.”359 The victim in
this case was sitting on a bench with her purse next to her, touching her
hip.360 She felt it move and then spotted the defendant running away with
346. Id.
347. Id. at 374.
348. 74 So. 3d 572 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (en banc), reviewed denied, 95 So. 3d 213
(Fla. 2012).
349. Id. at 576 (citing FLA. STAT. § 784.011(1) (2012)).
350. Id. at 573–74.
351. Id. at 575.
352. 404 So. 2d 816, 817 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 784.011,
.021).
353. Pinkney, 74 So. 3d at 575.
354. Id. at 576.
355. Id. (quoting Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244, 247 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (en
banc)).
356. Id. (quoting Linehan, 442 So. 2d at 247).
357. Id. at 577.
358. 67 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
359. Id. at 1135–36.
360. Id. at 1134.
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it.361 Wess was convicted of robbery by sudden snatching under section
812.131 of the Florida Statutes, which applies when money or other property
is taken “from the victim’s person.”362 The appellate court interpreted this
phrase to require the property to be “on” the person of the victim.363 The
essential difference between this crime and robbery, which applies when
property is taken from a “victim’s immediate vicinity and/or control,”364 is
that robbery by sudden snatching requires property to be “‘abruptly and unexpectedly plucked from the embrace of the person.’”365 It is not enough that
the property is next to her, even if it is touching her or within her reach or
control.366 Therefore, the court reversed the defendant’s conviction for robbery by sudden snatching and directed the trial court to enter a judgment for
misdemeanor theft.367
In State v. Morival,368 a case of first impression, the Second District
held that a defendant’s act of repeatedly depriving his dogs of nourishment
over an extended period was properly charged as felony animal cruelty.369 In
this case, the discovery of the defendant’s dogs in a severely undernourished
and emaciated condition led to charges against him for felony animal cruelty
under section 828.12(2) of the Florida Statutes.370 The trial court granted
Morival’s motion to dismiss on the ground “that failure to feed a dog can
constitute no more than a misdemeanor.”371 On appeal, however, the Second
District concluded that the felony and misdemeanor provisions of section
828.12 properly distinguished between a temporary and short-term deprivation of necessary sustenance and extended deprivation causing malnutrition.372 Because the dogs were extremely emaciated, the court found that
Morival’s failure to provide food could be considered “excessive or repeated
infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering” under the felony animal cruelty

361. Id.
362. Id. at 1134–35 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 812.131(1) (2012)).
363. Wess, 67 So. 3d at 1137.
364. Id. at 1135.
365. Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 848 So. 2d 361, 364 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
366. See id. at 1136–37.
367. Id. at 1137.
368. 75 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
369. Id. at 810, 812.
370. Id. at 810–11 (citing FLA. STAT. § 828.12(2) (2012)). Under section 828.12(2), any
intentional act resulting in “the cruel death, or excessive or repeated infliction of unnecessary
pain or suffering" of an animal is a felony. FLA. STAT. § 828.12(2).
371. Morival, 75 So. 3d at 811.
372. Id. at 812; see also FLA. STAT. § 828.12(1)–(2).
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provision.373 The court therefore reversed and remanded on the ground that
the issue could not “be resolved by a motion to dismiss.”374
III. DEFENSES
A.

Abandonment

The defense of abandonment was at issue in Rockmore v. State.375 In
this case, as Rockmore left a store without paying for goods in his possession, a store employee pursued him and caused him to drop the merchandise.376 The employee chased him to his car, where Rockmore displayed a
firearm.377 At trial, he argued that no robbery had occurred because he had
abandoned the goods before displaying the firearm.378 The trial court denied
his motion for judgment of acquittal and his request for a special jury instruction on the defense of abandonment.379
On appeal of his conviction for robbery with a firearm, the Fifth District
considered both the meaning of the term “abandonment” and the effect of the
1987 amendments to Florida’s robbery statute.380 These amendments expanded robbery to include the use or threat of force “‘in the course of the
taking.’”381 This phrase includes acts “‘subsequent to the taking,’” provided
both the act and the taking are part of a “‘continuous series of acts or
events.’”382 The court defined the phrase “‘continuous series of acts or
events’” as an uninterrupted “‘sequence of related acts or events’” that would
include both flight and discarding stolen goods.383 The court also expressed
doubt that discarding stolen merchandise when grabbed by a pursuing merchant is the same as ‘“abandonment,”’ which typically excludes an involun-

373. See Morival, 75 So. 3d at 811–12 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 828.12(2)).
374. Id. at 812.
375. 37 Fla. L. Weekly D533, D534 (5th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2012).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at D534–35 (citing Simmons v. State, 551 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (per curiam); State v. Baker, 540 So. 2d 847, 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
380. Rockmore, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D534–35; see also FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(b) (2012);
Act effective Oct. 1, 1987, ch. 87-315, § 812.13, 1987 Fla. Laws 2052, 2052 (amending FLA.
STAT. § 812.13 (1986)).
381. Rockmore, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D534 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(b) (2012)).
382. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(b)).
DICTIONARIES,
383. Id.
at
D535
(citing
Series,
OXFORD
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/series?q=series (last visited Oct. 28, 2012));
see also FLA. STAT. § 812.13(3)(b).
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tary act motivated by fear of apprehension.384 Even if Rockmore’s acts constituted abandonment, however, a judgment of acquittal was precluded by the
factual dispute as to whether he had dropped all the merchandise before displaying the firearm.385 Moreover, no special jury instruction on abandonment was required, the court held, because the standard instruction tracks the
statutory language and the proffered special instruction inaccurately stated
the law.386 Upholding the conviction, the Fifth District acknowledged conflict with a line of cases holding that the taking and the force or threat are not
a ‘“continuous series of acts or events”’ if the property is abandoned before
the defendant uses some force or threat to escape.387
B.

Prescription Defense

Section 893.13(6)(a) of the Florida Statutes sets out an affirmative defense to criminal charges based on possession of certain controlled substances that have been “lawfully obtained from a practitioner or pursuant to a
valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his
or her professional practice.”388 Section 499.03 of the Florida Statutes also
provides a prescription defense to charges based on possession of a prescription drug or possession of a prescription drug “with intent to sell, dispense,
or deliver” except when “obtained by a valid prescription of a practitioner
licensed by law to prescribe the drug.”389 During the survey period, Florida’s
appellate courts were called upon to interpret this defense in a variety of situations.390
In the first category of cases, the issue was whether the prescription defense is available to an innocent possessor of another person’s prescribed
drugs.391 Until the decision of the First District in McCoy v. State,392 no Flor384. Rockmore, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D534–35, D536 n.2; see also FLA. STAT. §
777.04(5)(a).
385. Rockmore, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D534–35.
386. Id. at D535 (citing State v. White, 891 So. 2d 502, 503 (Fla. 2004); State v. Hubbard,
751 So. 2d 552, 558 (Fla. 1999); City of Tampa v. Long, 638 So. 2d 35, 39 (Fla. 1994)).
387. Id. at D534–35 (citing Peterson v. State, 24 So. 3d 686, 690 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2009); Simmons v. State, 551 So. 2d 607, 608 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam);
State v. Baker, 540 So. 2d 847, 847–48 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); see also FLA. STAT. §
812.13(3)(b).
388. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(6)(a).
389. Id. § 499.03(1).
390. See, e.g., Knipp v. State, 67 So. 3d 376, 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (analyzing
FLA. STAT. §§ 499.03(1), 893.13); McCoy v. State, 56 So. 3d 37, 39 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
391. E.g., McCoy, 56 So. 3d at 39.
392. 56 So. 3d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
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ida court had ever decided this issue.393 McCoy was convicted of trafficking
in hydrocodone based upon her possession of a pill bottle that contained Lorcet tablets and bore a label in her husband’s name.394 She claimed that she
was carrying the pills for her husband, who held a valid prescription.395 Reversing her conviction, the court first noted that when the language of section
893.13(6)(a) is read in conjunction with other state pharmaceutical laws, the
words “lawfully obtained” authorize possession pursuant to an agency relationship.396 The court held that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on
the prescription defense constituted fundamental error, compounded by the
prosecutor’s misleading and legally incorrect argument that McCoy had no
right to carry her husband’s pills.397 In State v. Latona,398 the Fifth District
applied the prescription defense in section 893.13(6)(a) to a home health care
nurse charged with possession after three prescription bottles bearing her
patient’s name were found in her purse during a traffic stop.399 Dismissal
was warranted as a matter of law, the court held, based on the express terms
of an executed durable power of attorney that expressly authorized her to
hold her patient’s property, and based on the absence of any notice of revocation to the defendant of that authority.400
In the second category of cases, the issue was whether a valid prescription defense is vitiated by a violation of Florida’s “doctor shopping” law.401
The doctor shopping statute prohibits individuals from seeking multiple prescriptions for controlled substances within a thirty-day period without disclosing the other prescriptions to one of the prescribing doctors.402 In Knipp
393. Id. at 39.
394. Id. at 38.
395. See id.
396. Id. at 39 (construing FLA. STAT. §§ 465.003(6), 893.04(2)(a) (2012)); see also FLA.
STAT. § 893.13(6)(a).
397. McCoy, 56 So. 3d at 40–41; see also Williams v. State, 85 So. 3d 1185, 1186 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (finding error where the court failed to instruct the jury on the prescription defense in spite of the defendant’s evidence that she temporarily possessed the clonazepam “at the request of the prescription holder,” whose memory problems sometimes
prevented her from taking her pills at the correct time); Ayotte v. State, 67 So. 3d 330, 331–32
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (finding fundamental error where the court failed to instruct the
jury on the prescription defense in spite of the defendant’s claim that he was holding the pills
for his girlfriend who had a valid prescription).
398. 75 So. 3d 394 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
399. Id. at 395 (analyzing FLA. STAT. § 893.13(6)(a)).
400. Id. at 395–96 (citing Fla.-Ga. Chem., Inc. v. Nat’l Labs. Inc., 153 So. 2d 752, 754
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1963)).
401. E.g., Knipp v. State, 67 So. 3d 376, 378 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (analyzing
FLA. STAT. § 893.13(7)(a)8.).
402. Id. at 378–79 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 893.13(7)(a)8.). Pursuant to section
893.13(7)(a)8. of the Florida Statutes, it is unlawful for any person:
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v. State,403 the defendants were charged with doctor shopping and trafficking
by possession, which occurs when the amount of the controlled substance in
the individual’s possession “exceed[s] the legal limit set by the trafficking
statute.”404 The trial court denied their motions to dismiss the doctor shopping charges but dismissed the trafficking charges because “each defendant
possessed a valid prescription” written by a licensed physician.405 The
Fourth District affirmed.406 The court rejected the State’s argument that the
violations of the doctor shopping statute invalidated the defendants’ prescriptions as a matter of law, stating:
[N]othing in either sections 499.03(2) or 893.13(7)(a)8., Florida
Statutes, eliminates the valid prescription defense to trafficking or
possession of a controlled substance if the prescription is obtained
in violation of the doctor shopping statute. That may have been
the intention of the Legislature, but we are constrained by the rules
of statutory interpretation to follow the plain language of the statute.407

The Fourth District applied Knipp in Wagner v. State,408 where the defendant was charged with doctor shopping and trafficking by sale.409 Here,
Wagner obtained Oxycodone prescriptions from two different physicians
during a thirty-day period without disclosing the duplicate prescriptions to
either doctor.410 He then brought four prescription bottles to sell to an individual who was a confidential informant and was arrested when he arrived at
the sale.411 In a special jury instruction, the trial court limited the prescription defense to controlled substances “lawfully obtained for a lawful purpose
[To] [w]ithhold information from a practitioner from whom the person seeks to obtain a controlled substance or a prescription for a controlled substance that the person making the request
has received a controlled substance or a prescription for a controlled substance of like therapeutic use from another practitioner within the previous 30 days.

FLA. STAT. § 893.13(7)(a)8.
403. 67 So. 3d 376 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
404. Id. at 377–78; see also Gonzalez v. State, 84 So. 3d 362, 363 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2012) (per curiam) (directing the trial court to vacate the conviction for trafficking by possession where the defendant obtained a valid prescription by misrepresenting to her physician
that she had not obtained a narcotic prescription within the prior thirty days).
405. Knipp, 67 So. 3d at 378.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 380 (footnote omitted) (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984));
see also FLA. STAT. §§ 499.03(2), 893.13(7)(a)8.
408. 88 So. 3d 250 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
409. Id. at 251–53.
410. Id. at 251.
411. Id. at 251–52.
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from a practitioner or pursuant to a valid prescription . . . .”412 The problem
with this instruction was that it replaced the statutory phrase “‘while acting
in the course of his or her professional practice’” with the phrase “‘for a lawful purpose.’”413 The jury convicted the defendant on all counts, and Wagner
appealed.414 Citing Knipp, the Fourth District concluded that the validity of
Wagner’s prescription was not affected by either his violation of the doctor
shopping statute or his decision to sell the contents of that prescription.415
Because “the trial court’s jury instruction misstated the law, misled the jury,
and negated Wagner’s only defense,” the appellate court reversed the trafficking conviction and remanded for a new trial on that charge.416
Although Wagner was charged with trafficking by sale, it is important
to note that he was arrested before he could deliver the pills to any individual.417 It was not clear whether the prescription defense would have afforded
him shelter if he had delivered or sold his prescription pills to a person without a prescription for that drug.418 The First District appeared to take this
step, however, in Glovacz v. State,419 where the defendant was convicted of
trafficking after she gave hydrocodone to an undercover officer.420 Glovacz
presented a prescription defense at trial, claiming she expected the officer to
return the pills in the same amount when the officer obtained her own prescription.421 The appellate court reversed the conviction for fundamental
error because the jury was not instructed on the prescription defense and
because the State suggested to the jury that Glovacz’s possession of her own
pills before handing them to the officer could support a trafficking conviction.422 This case is noteworthy because the appellate court held that Glovacz
was entitled to a jury instruction on the prescription defense even though she
completed delivery of the controlled substance to the officer.423

412. Id. at 252 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
413. Wagner, 88 So. 3d at 252.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 253 (citing Knipp v. State, 67 So. 3d 376, 380 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011)).
416. Id.
417. See id. at 252.
418. Compare Wagner, 88 So. 3d at 253, with Singleton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:07cv-1419-T-33MAP, 2009 WL 975783, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2009) (acknowledging that the
defendant’s valid prescription provided no defense to an attempted trafficking charge under
Florida law).
419. 60 So. 3d 423 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
420. Id. at 424.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 425–26.
423. Id. at 424–26.
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Self-Defense

The Second District considered the forcible felony exception to selfdefense in Santiago v. State.424 This exception provides that self-defense is
not available as a defense if the act occurred while the defendant was “attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of, a forcible felony.”425 At trial, Santiago claimed that, on the date in question, he
was approached by three men with whom he had an earlier altercation.426
When one man appeared to reach for a gun, Santiago pulled out a handgun,
fired, and killed one man.427 As a result, he was charged with, and convicted
of, first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder.428 The forcible
felonies at issue concerned aggressive action taken by Santiago toward the
police officers pursuing him as he fled from the scene.429 These actions resulted in convictions for resisting arrest with violence and aggravated fleeing
and eluding, and acquittals for “aggravated assault on a law enforcement
officer.”430
Santiago’s motion for postconviction relief, which claimed ineffective
assistance of counsel, was denied on the ground that the multiple murder and
attempted murder charges were sufficient, in and of themselves, to require
the forcible felony instruction.431 The Second District reversed, holding that
the facts “do not show that Santiago was engaged in a separate and independent forcible felony” at the time of the shooting.432 First, the court wrote,
“the applicability of the forcible felony instruction is not determined solely
by the number of offenses with which the defendant is charged.”433 Second,
because Santiago raised self-defense to all homicide-related charges, no separately charged forcible felony remained to trigger the exception.434 Third,
the forcible felonies were temporally separate from his defensive act.435 Finally, the aggravated assaults could not have constituted the forcible felonies
in question, as the State argued on appeal, because the jury was instructed “at

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
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88 So. 3d 1020, 1022 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
FLA. STAT. § 776.041(1) (2012).
Santiago, 88 So. 3d at 1023.
Id.
Id. at 1023–24.
Id. at 1023, 1025.
Id. at 1024 n.1.
Santiago, 88 So. 3d at 1024–25.
Id. at 1024.
Id. at 1025.
Id.
Id.
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the State’s request, that the applicable forcible felony was murder.”436 Therefore, finding that Santiago’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was
facially sufficient, the court reversed the summary denial of his postconviction claim and remanded for further proceedings.437
The standard jury instructions on self-defense were called into question
in Bassallo v. State,438 where the defendant was charged with aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon after an altercation with a co-worker.439 At
trial, the defense presented a theory of justifiable use of force in selfdefense.440 Without a defense objection, the trial court gave the standard
self-defense instruction, which states that self-defense applies only if the
victim suffered an injury.441 However, the State presented no evidence of
victim injury at trial and, during closing argument, pointed out that the selfdefense instruction made no sense because the victim was not injured.442 On
appeal of his conviction, the Fourth District agreed with Bassallo’s claim of
fundamental error because the instruction inaccurately stated the law, injury
was not an element of aggravated assault, and the State presented no evidence of injury to the victim.443 Moreover, the guilty verdict could not have
been obtained without the instructional error,444 which was compounded by
the prosecutor’s comments.445 The court therefore reversed his conviction
and remanded for a new trial.446 As a result of the decision in Bassallo, this
instruction is presently under review by the Committee on Standard Jury
Instructions in Criminal Cases.447
In Montijo v. State,448 the Fifth District held that a trial court’s “inclusion of the phrase ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in [a] jury instruction” on
436. Santiago, 88 So. 3d at 1025.
437. Id.
438. 46 So. 3d 1205 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
439. Id. at 1207, 1210; see also FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 3.6(f) (2010) (“It is a defense to the offense with which (defendant) is charged if the [death of] [injury to] (victim)
resulted from the justifiable use of deadly force.”); id. 3.6(g).
440. Basallo, 46 So. 3d at 1211.
441. Id. at 1210; see also FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 3.6(f), (g).
442. Basallo, 46 So. 3d at 1210–11.
443. Id.
444. See id. at 1209.
445. See id. at 1211.
446. Id.; see also Brown v. State, 59 So. 3d 1217, 1219 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011)
(finding fundamental error in the giving of the standard self-defense instruction for battery on
a law enforcement officer, where the statute did not require injury, the State did not prove
injury, and the State argued that the instruction was inapplicable because the victim did not
suffer injury).
447. Alerts – Criminal Jury Instructions, supra note 193.
448. 61 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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self-defense constituted fundamental error because it shifted the burden to
the defendant to prove self-defense, which in turn deprived him of a fair trial.449 The court emphasized that because defendants are required only to
“present enough evidence to support giving the [self-defense] instruction,”
the trial court’s instruction should have referred only to the requisite elements and not to the burden of proof.450 Accordingly, the Fifth District reversed the defendant’s conviction for manslaughter with a deadly weapon
and referred the issue to the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in
Criminal Cases.451 The Committee has recommended that Instructions 3.6(f)
and (g) on the justifiable use of force be amended to “omit any reference to
burden of proof.”452
D.

Stand Your Ground Law

Under Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law,453 which was signed into
law on April 26, 2005, an individual is permitted to use defensive force,
“without fear of prosecution or civil action,”454 against anyone who “unlawfully and forcibly enter[s] [the] dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle” of
another person.455 The law also abrogated the common law duty to retreat
before using defensive force whenever the actor “is not engaged in an unlawful activity and . . . is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right
to be.”456 Until the recent fatal shooting of an unarmed teenager in Sanford,
Florida, the law had generated scant controversy in Florida’s judicial system.457 When Trayvon Martin was shot and killed by George Zimmerman,
who claimed that Martin had attacked him, the police cited the Stand Your

449. Id. at 427.
450. Id.; see also Alvarado v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1607, D1607 (5th Dist. Ct. App.
July 6, 2012) (per curiam) (citing Montijo, 61 So. 3d at 427) (reversing the defendant’s convictions and remanding for a new trial on the authority of Montijo).
451. Montijo, 61 So. 3d at 427 & n.4.
452. Amendments to the Jury Instructions for Criminal Cases, FLA. B. NEWS, Apr. 1, 2012,
at 22–23.
453. The term “Stand Your Ground Law” refers to sections 776.012–.013 and 776.031–
.032 of the Florida Statutes collectively. Montanez v. State, 24 So. 3d 799, 801 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2010); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012–.013, .031–.032 (2012).
454. Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 2005-27, § 5, 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 202 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012–.013, .031–.032 (2012)). Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012,
.031 (2004) (amended 2005), with FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012–.013, .031–.032 (2012).
455. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(1)(a) (2012).
456. Id. § 776.013(2)(a).
457. Frances Robles, Lt. Gov.: Stand Your Ground Is Not ‘Shoot First’ Law, LEDGER
(Lakeland), June 12, 2012.
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Ground Law as the reason Zimmerman was not immediately arrested.458
Zimmerman has since been charged with second-degree murder, and Governor Rick Scott has convened a nineteen-member Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection to address ambiguities in the Stand Your Ground Law.459
Otherwise, the most contentious issue surrounding this law has involved
the proper procedural vehicle to be employed in statutory immunity cases.
This immunity is provided in section 776.032, which states that in certain
circumstances a person may use deadly force to stand his ground against an
attacker without fearing prosecution.460 The question dividing the district
courts of appeal was whether factual disputes should be resolved at a pretrial
evidentiary hearing or at trial.461
This conflict was resolved during the survey period in Dennis v.
State,462 where the Supreme Court of Florida concluded that when a defendant invokes immunity from prosecution in a pretrial motion, the trial court
must conduct a pretrial evidentiary hearing and “decide the factual question
of the applicability of the statutory immunity.”463 The court explained that
the plain language of “[s]ection 776.032(1) expressly grants defendants a
substantive right to not be arrested, detained, charged, or prosecuted as a
result of the use of legally justified force.”464 This grant of immunity from
criminal prosecution differs from the affirmative defense of self-defense and
must be interpreted to “provide[] the defendant with more protection from
prosecution for a justified use of force than the probable cause determination
previously provided to the defendant by rule.”465 Otherwise, the legislation
would have been an exercise in futility, the court said.466 The court nevertheless found that the error was harmless because Dennis never claimed that the
trial was unfair, that the pretrial ruling limited his defense, or that the evi458. Id.
459. Id.; see Governor Rick Scott Announces New State Attorney and Task Force in Response to Trayvon Martin Incident, RICK SCOTT: 45TH GOVERNOR OF FLA. (Mar. 22, 2012),
http://www.flgov.com/2012/03/22/governor-rick-scott-announces-new-state-attorney-andtask-force-in-response-to-trayvon-martin-incident/.
460. See FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1). The legislature passed the law that created section
776.032 because it determined “that it is proper for law-abiding people to protect themselves,
their families, and others from intruders and attackers without fear of prosecution or civil
action for acting in defense of themselves and others.” Act effective Oct. 1, 2005, ch. 200527, § 776.013, 2005 Fla. Laws 199, 199–200 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. §§ 776.012–
.013, .031–.032 (2012)).
461. Dennis v. State, 51 So. 3d 456, 460 (Fla. 2010).
462. 51 So. 3d 456 (Fla. 2010).
463. Id. at 458.
464. Id. at 462 (citing FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1)).
465. Id. at 463.
466. See id. (quoting Martinez v. State, 981 So. 2d 449, 452 (Fla. 2008) (per curiam)).
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dence he would have presented at a hearing differed from that presented at
trial.467 Accordingly, the court affirmed the Fourth District’s decision that
Dennis was not entitled to relief.468
In Mocio v. State,469 the Second District held that when challenging a
trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss under the Stand Your Ground Law,
the proper remedy is a petition for writ of prohibition.470 In this case, which
involved a domestic battery, the county court held the required evidentiary
hearing, concluded that Mocio’s actions were unreasonable, and denied his
motion to dismiss.471 The circuit court then denied his petition for writ of
prohibition on the ground that it was the wrong vehicle to challenge the
county court’s exercise of jurisdiction over him and that he “had an adequate
remedy via direct appeal if convicted.”472 The Second District disagreed
because settled law clearly establishes “that a writ of prohibition is a proper
remedy for an accused who is challenging his continued prosecution based
on grounds of immunity.”473 If the petition is denied on the merits, however,
“res judicata bars re-litigation of the immunity claims on appeal.474 This was
the decision of the First District in Rice v. State,475 where the court reasoned
that “denial of the petition . . . reflects this court’s determination that the trial
court did not err in denying Rice’s claim of immunity under the Stand Your
Ground [L]aw.”476
A different issue arose in Dorsey v. State,477 where the Fourth District
was called upon to decide how a jury should be instructed when the defendant is “‘engaged in an unlawful activity’ at the time . . . deadly force” is
used against an attacker.478 This case involved a convicted felon’s use of a
concealed firearm to kill two attackers who were part of a group that surrounded him as his back was against a vehicle.479 During the charging conference, the defense made two requests.480 The first request asked the court to
467. Dennis, 51 So. 3d at 463–64.
468. Id. at 463–64.
469. 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1746 (2d Dist. Ct. App. July 25, 2012).
470. Id. at D1746.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id. (citing Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1977); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Newell, 102 So. 2d 613, 615 (Fla. 1958); State ex rel. Marshall v. Petteway, 164 So.
872, 874 (Fla. 1935) (en banc)).
474. Rice v. State, 90 So. 3d 929, 929, 931 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
475. 90 So. 3d 929 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
476. Id. at 931.
477. 74 So. 3d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
478. See id. at 525–26; see also FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2012).
479. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 522–23.
480. Id. at 525–26.
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exclude the Stand Your Ground instruction because Dorsey was “engaged in
an unlawful activity” and had no right to stand his ground without retreating.481 The second request asked the court to give a special instruction based
on “the pre-2005 standard jury instruction [for] the justifiable use of deadly
force,” which would have informed the jury of the scope of the duty to retreat when a defendant is engaged in an unlawful activity.482 The court denied both requests and gave the jury the standard Stand Your Ground instruction based on section 776.013(3).483 Dorsey was convicted, inter alia, of two
counts of second-degree murder.484
On appeal, the Fourth District decided, as a threshold matter, “that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon qualifies as ‘unlawful activity’”
under Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law.485 The court also decided that the
common law retreat rule is available to a defendant whose unlawful activity
has deprived him of the right to stand his ground, provided he faces imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and finds retreat to be impossible
or futile.486 In this case, the standard instruction informed the jury that Dorsey’s unlawful activity deprived him of the right to stand his ground without
retreating, but failed to explain the common law duty to retreat in Dorsey’s
unique circumstances.487 This goal could have been accomplished, the court
explained, by giving both the defendant’s specially requested instruction and
the Stand Your Ground instruction, or by providing only the pre-2005 standard instruction on self-defense.488 Concluding that the evidence would support a conviction for manslaughter only, the court reversed the defendant’s
second-degree murder convictions and remanded for retrial on manslaughter
charges.489

481. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3).
482. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 526; see also FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 3.6(f) (2000)
(amended 2010).
483. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 526; see also FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3).
484. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 522.
485. Id. at 527; see also FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3).
486. Dorsey, 74 So. 3d at 525–27 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3); FLA. STD. JURY
INSTR. (CRIM.) 3.6(f) (2010)) (citing State v. Rivera, 719 So. 2d 335, 338 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) (per curiam); Thompson v. State, 552 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989)).
487. Id. at 527.
488. Id. at 528.
489. Id. at 522, 528.

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

59

Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1

NOVA LAW REVIEW

48

[Vol. 37

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

During the survey period, Florida courts faced issues relating to the execution of mentally retarded defendants, the modification of the state’s lethal
injection protocol, and the imposition of life-without-parole sentences on
juvenile offenders.490
1.

Execution of Mentally Retarded Defendants

In 2001, the Florida Legislature enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded defendants and establishing a procedure for
determining which capital defendants are mentally retarded.491 The following year, in Atkins v. Virginia,492 the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the execution of a mentally retarded criminal defendant constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment.493 However, the Court relegated to the states the
task of determining specific rules for classifying defendants as mentally retarded.494 Since then, Florida has required an IQ score of seventy or below to
establish “‘significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning.’”495
During the survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida addressed the constitutionality of this cut-off score in Franqui v. State,496 where the defendant
argued that this threshold violated both the Eighth Amendment and the decision in Atkins because “Atkins approved a wider range of IQ . . . results that
can meet the test for mental retardation.”497 The Franqui court rejected this
argument, finding that Florida’s definition of mental retardation is consistent
with diagnostic criteria used by the American Psychiatric Association and is
490. See Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 92 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 2110 (2012); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530, 538 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1 (2011); Manuel v. State, 48 So. 3d 94, 97 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review denied, 63
So. 3d 750 (Fla.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 446 (2011).
491. FLA. STAT. § 921.137(2), (4); see also State v. Herring (Herring I), 76 So. 3d 891,
894 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam) (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.137), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3707
(U.S. June 25, 2012).
492. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
493. Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405, 406 (1986)).
494. Id. at 317 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405, 416–17).
495. Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235, 246 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting FLA. STAT. §
921.137(1)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1150 (2012).
496. 59 So. 3d 82 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2110 (2012). The
court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s mental retardation claim. Id. at
90, 106.
497. Id. at 92.
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within “the broad authority given in Atkins to the states to enact their own
laws to determine who is mentally retarded, without any requirement that the
states adhere to one definition over another.”498 The court therefore affirmed
the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s mental retardation claim.499
2.

Lethal Injection Protocol

In Valle v. State,500 the Supreme Court of Florida rejected a condemned
inmate’s claim that the Florida Department of Correction’s modified lethal
injection protocol, which substituted pentobarbital for sodium thiopental as
the first drug in its three-drug sequence, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.501 Valle argued that there were “‘serious concerns’ regarding the
efficacy of pentobarbital to render an inmate unconscious.”502 The court held
that Valle had not demonstrated that pentobarbital was “sure or very likely to
cause serious illness and needless suffering or that its use will result in a substantial risk of serious harm,” so as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.503 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief and vacated the temporary stay of
execution.504
3.

Life Sentences Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders

In 2010, in Graham v. Florida,505 the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause prohibits the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile offender for a nonhomicide offense.506 The Court specifically limited its
holding to “those juvenile offenders sentenced to life-without-parole solely
for a nonhomicide offense.”507 During the survey period, Florida’s appellate
498. Id. at 94 (citing Nixon v. State, 2 So. 3d 137, 143 (Fla. 2009) (per curiam)).
499. Id. at 90, 106; see also Herring I, 76 So. 3d 891, 895 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 25, 2012) (citing Zack v. State, 911 So. 2d 1190, 1201
(Fla. 2005) (per curiam)) (confirming that the Supreme Court of Florida has adopted a brightline rule that a death sentence is not precluded by a defendant’s intellectual disability unless
the defendant’s IQ tests below seventy).
500. 70 So. 3d 530 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011).
501. Id. at 538, 546.
502. Id. at 536–37.
503. Id. at 541, 546 (citing DeYoung v. Owens, 646 F.3d 1319, 1326 n.4 (11th Cir.
2011)).
504. Id. at 553.
505. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
506. Id. at 2030; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
507. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023.
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courts have been called upon to consider whether Graham applies to convictions for attempted murder, felony murder, and nonhomicide offenses committed in conjunction with homicide offenses, and to determine what constitutes a life-without-parole sentence.508
The Second District issued three opinions on the question of what constitutes a nonhomicide offense.509 In Manuel v. State,510 the defendant received a life sentence on one count of attempted first-degree murder, concurrent with forty years imprisonment on the second count.511 The court declared that the life sentence was unconstitutional under Graham’s bright-line
rule, reasoning “that attempted murder is a nonhomicide offense because
death, by definition, has not occurred.”512 Accordingly, the court vacated the
juvenile’s life sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.513 The First
and Fourth Districts have followed Manuel to hold that attempted murder is a
nonhomicide offense.514
In Arrington v. State,515 the Second District decided that “felony murder
is not a ‘nonhomicide’ offense for purposes of the categorical rule announced
in Graham,” even when someone other than the juvenile offender actually
committed the killing.516 Nevertheless, the court held that in this context, the
trial court must have discretion to prevent a “grossly disproportionate” sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.517 To this end, courts should
engage in the three-prong, case-specific proportionality analysis endorsed in
Graham, comparing: (1) “[t]he gravity of the offense . . . to the severity of
the sentence;” (2) the mandatory sentence “for juveniles involved in felony
508. See Arrington v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D155, D156 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 18,
2012); Washington v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D154, D155 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012);
Thomas v. State, 78 So. 3d 644, 646 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam); Manuel v.
State, 48 So. 3d 94, 95–97 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review denied, 63 So. 3d 750 (Fla.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 446 (2011).
509. See Arrington, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D156; Washington, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D155;
Manuel, 48 So. 3d at 97.
510. 48 So. 3d 94 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010), review denied, 63 So. 3d 750 (Fla. 2011),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 446 (2011).
511. Id. at 96.
512. Id. at 97.
513. Id. at 97–98.
514. Cunningham v. State, 74 So. 3d 568, 569–70 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citing
McCullum v. State, 60 So. 3d 502, 504 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.) (per curiam), review denied,
67 So. 3d 1050 (Fla. 2011); Manuel, 48 So. 3d at 97); McCullum, 60 So. 3d at 503–04 (holding that, under Graham and Manuel, the juvenile’s life sentence for attempted second-degree
murder was unconstitutional).
515. 37 Fla. L. Weekly D155 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012).
516. Id. at D156 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)).
517. Id. at D158.
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murders with the sentences received by other [defendants] in Florida;” and
(3) the mandatory sentence for juveniles involved in felony murders “with
the sentences imposed for the same crime in other [states].”518 Applying this
analysis to the facts of Arrington’s case, the Second District reversed and
remanded on the ground that the mandatory life-without-parole sentence for
felony murder was grossly disproportionate in this juvenile’s case.519 In LaFountain v. State,520 the Second District declined to apply Arrington retroactively.521
Finally, in Washington v. State,522 the Second District considered Graham’s “exception for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses in conjunction with homicide offenses.”523 Here, the defendant appealed his sentences of life-without-parole for kidnapping and felony murder offenses
committed when he was a juvenile.524 In contrast to the juvenile in Arrington, “Washington was nearly eighteen at the time of [his crimes],” and he
participated extensively in acts of exceptional cruelty.525 The appellate court
remanded for resentencing, holding that the trial “court [was] required to
resentence [the defendant] to life without possibility of parole for these homicides unless it determines under the facts of this case that such a penalty is
disproportionate.”526 However, the court reversed the sentences for the kidnapping offenses, finding that their constitutionality “probably hinges on
whether the trial court, on remand, imposes life-without-parole for felony
murders.” 527 In other words, after determining the appropriate sentences for
the felony murders, the trial court might find the homicides to be “aggravating factor[s] in the sentencing of the [kidnapping] offense[s].”528 Until such
a determination is made, however, the Second District was required to hold
that the sentences of life-without-parole for kidnapping, a nonhomicide
crime, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under Graham.529 Thus, the
court reversed Washington’s sentences and directed the trial court to resen-

518. Id. at D157.
519. Id. at D158.
520. 83 So. 3d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
521. Id. at 883.
522. 37 Fla. L. Weekly D154 (2d Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012).
523. Id. at D155 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010)).
524. Id. at D154.
525. Id. at D155 (contrasting Arrington v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D155, D156 (2d Dist.
Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2012)).
526. Id. (citing Arrington, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D158).
527. Washington, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at D155.
528. Id. (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023).
529. See id (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030).
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tence for the kidnapping convictions after ascertaining appropriate sentences
for the felony murders.530
Florida’s appellate courts have also considered whether a term-of-years
sentence for a juvenile is the “functional equivalent” of a life sentence.531 In
Thomas v. State,532 the First District held that a fifty-year sentence was not a
de facto sentence of life-without-parole because if Thomas served his entire
sentence, he “would be in his late sixties when he [wa]s released from prison.”533 The court reached the same result in Gridine v. State (Gridine I)534
regarding a seventy-year sentence but later certified the following question
as one of great public importance: “Does the United States Supreme Court
decision in Graham v. Florida prohibit sentencing a fourteen-year-old to a
prison sentence of seventy years for the crime of attempted first-degree murder?” 535
In Floyd v. State,536 the First District held that an eighty-year sentence
was the functional equivalent of a life sentence without parole and thus constituted cruel and unusual punishment.537 However, in Henry v. State,538 the
Fifth District concluded that a ninety-year aggregate term-of-years sentence,
without the possibility of parole, for multiple nonhomicide offenses was not
a de facto life sentence under Graham.539 The court did make the following
observation:
There is language in the Graham majority opinion that suggests
that no matter the number of offenses or victims or type of crime, a
juvenile may not receive a sentence that will cause him to spend
his entire life incarcerated without a chance for rehabilitation, in
which case it would make no logical difference whether the sentence is “life” or 107 years. Without any tools to work with, how-

530. Id.
531. Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d 45, 47 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam); Gridine v.
State (Gridine I), 89 So. 3d 909, 911 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Thomas v. State, 78 So. 3d
644, 646 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
532. 78 So. 3d 644 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
533. Id. at 646.
534. 89 So. 3d 909 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
535. Gridine v. State (Gridine II), 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1264, D1264 (1st Dist. Ct. App.
May 29, 2012) (per curiam) (citations omitted); see also Gridine I, 89 So. 3d at 911; Graham
v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
536. 87 So. 3d 45 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
537. Id. at 45, 47; see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
538. 82 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
539. Id. at 1086, 1089; see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
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ever, we can only apply Graham as it is written. If the Supreme
Court has more in mind, it will have to say what that is.540

The issue was reframed by Judge Padovano in a concurring opinion in
Smith v. State,541 where he criticized judicial efforts to determine whether a
particular sentence of a term-of-years without parole is a de facto life sentence.542 These efforts are misdirected, he wrote, because the question under
Graham is not whether a defendant “will . . . have a meaningful portion of
his life left” upon release or “a significant part of his life remaining at the
end of the sentence.”543 Instead, the question is “whether the defendant will
have a reasonable opportunity to show that he has been rehabilitated during
the course of the sentence and is therefore deserving of release at some point
before the sentence expires.”544
In Miller v. Alabama (Miller II),545 the Supreme Court of the United
States held, in a five-to-four decision, that mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole are unconstitutional for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide.546 Such sentences violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, the Court wrote, because they disallow individualized sentencing that considers the age and maturity of the
offender, the “family and home environment,” and the nature and circumstances of the crime.547 Absent these considerations, the Court explained,
mandatory life-without-parole “poses too great a risk of disproportionate
punishment.”548 Both cases addressed on appeal were remanded to the state
courts to make individualized sentencing decisions.549 While not ruling out
the possibility that such individualized sentencing might result in a lifewithout-parole sentence, the Court opined that “appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”550

540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
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Henry, 82 So. 3d at 1089 (footnote omitted); see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034.
93 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
See id. at 375 (Padovano, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
Id. at 2460, 2475, 2477.
Id. at 2460, 2468.
Id. at 2469.
Id. at 2475.
Miller II, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
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Double Jeopardy
1. Oral Sentencing Error

An oral sentencing error did not subject a defendant to double jeopardy
in Dunbar v. State (Dunbar II),551 the Supreme Court of Florida held.552 This
case began when “the trial court orally pronounced a life sentence for [Dunbar’s conviction for] robbery with a firearm” without mentioning “the tenyear mandatory minimum sentence” for that crime.553 The judge corrected
the error in a written order on the same day.554 On appeal, the defendant argued that the late addition of the mandatory minimum violated his double
jeopardy rights.555 The Fifth District disagreed, explaining that “the later
addition of harsher terms” did not implicate double jeopardy concerns “because the original sentence was invalid.”556 Dunbar sought review of this
decision for express and direct conflict with the Second District’s decision in
Gardner v. State.557 The Supreme Court of Florida held that double jeopardy
concerns were not implicated in Dunbar’s case because defendants have “no
legitimate expectation of finality” of invalid sentences.558 “[I]f the prosecution had properly appealed the sentence as orally pronounced, the sentence
would have been reversed and remanded with instructions to impose the
term,” the court observed.559 Nevertheless, the court remanded the case for
resentencing on the ground that the defendant had a due process right to be
present when the terms of his sentence were increased even though no new
evidence would be produced at that hearing.560 Chief Justice Charles T. Canady dissented from this latter part of the majority’s opinion, writing that the
defendant’s presence would not “‘contribute to the fairness of the proce-

551. 89 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 2012).
552. Id. at 906–07.
553. Id. at 903 (citing FLA. STAT. § 775.087(2) (2012); Dunbar v. State (Dunbar I), 46 So.
3d 81, 82–83 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (en banc), review granted, 58 So. 3d 260 (Fla.
2011), and approved in part, quashed in part, 89 So. 3d 901 (Fla. 2012)).
554. Id. (citing Dunbar I, 46 So. 3d at 82).
555. Id. at 904.
556. Dunbar II, 89 So. 3d at 903 (citing Dunbar I, 46 So. 3d at 83).
557. Id. at 902–03 (citing Gardner v. State, 30 So. 3d 629, 632 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2010)).
558. Id. at 906.
559. Id. (citing State v. Scanes, 973 So. 2d 659, 661 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Couch, 896 So. 2d 799, 799–800 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam); State v. Strazdins, 890 So. 2d 334, 334 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Brendell, 656 So. 2d 594, 594
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
560. Id. at 907 (citing Jackson v. State, 767 So. 2d 1156, 1160 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam)).
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dure,’”561 but rather would be useless in light of the sentencing court’s duty
to impose the minimum sentence. 562
2. Separate Offenses
Although the rule of double jeopardy “prohibits subjecting a person to
multiple prosecutions, convictions, and punishments for the same criminal
offense, . . . no constitutional prohibition [exists] against multiple punishments for different offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction as
long as the Legislature intends to authorize separate punishments.”563 Absent
clear legislative intent, however, courts utilize section 775.021(4)(b) of the
Florida Statutes to determine whether separate offenses exist.564 That section
sets out three exceptions to the general rule that the legislature intends “‘to
convict and sentence for each criminal offense committed in the course of
one criminal episode or transaction and not to allow the principle of lenity as
set forth in subsection (1) to determine legislative intent.’”565
One of these exceptions, section 775.021(4)(b)(2), precludes multiple
convictions for offenses that are “degrees of the same offense as provided by
statute.”566 In Valdes v. State,567 the Supreme Court of Florida interpreted
this section to preclude multiple convictions for crimes arising from the same
criminal transaction if these crimes are “degrees of the same offense” as provided by statute.568 Shortly after Valdes was decided, however, a conflict
arose between two district courts of appeal.569 In Shazer v. State,570 the
Fourth District held that “dual convictions for robbery with a deadly weapon
561. Dunbar II, 89 So. 3d at 908 (Canady, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer,
482 U.S. 730, 745 (1987)).
562. Id. (citing Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745).
563. Valdes v. State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 2009) (citing Hayes v. State, 803 So. 2d
695, 699 (Fla. 2001)).
564. Hayes, 803 So. 2d at 700 (citing Sirmons v. State, 634 So. 2d 153, 153–54 (Fla.
1994) (per curiam)). Section 775.021(4)(b) prohibits multiple convictions and punishments
for “(1) [o]ffenses which require identical elements of proof; (2) [o]ffenses which are degrees
of the same offense as provided by statute; [and] (3) [o]ffenses which are lesser offenses the
statutory elements of which are subsumed by the greater offense.” FLA. STAT. §
775.021(4)(b)(1)–(3) (2012).
565. Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1072 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)).
566. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(2).
567. 3 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 2009).
568. Id. at 1077 (construing FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)(2)).
569. See id. at 1078; McKinney v. State (McKinney I), 24 So. 3d 682, 683–84 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 66 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 527 (2011);
Shazer v. State, 3 So. 3d 453, 454 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
570. 3 So. 3d 453 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam).
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and grand theft violate[d] double jeopardy rights because the same property
formed the basis for both convictions.”571 However, in McKinney v. State
(McKinney I),572 the Fifth District disagreed, holding that the rule against
double jeopardy is not violated by dual convictions for grand theft and robbery with a firearm arising out of “a single taking of cash and a cell phone at
gunpoint.”573 Reasoning that “robbery is not a degree of theft nor is theft a
degree of robbery,” the court upheld McKinney’s convictions and certified
express and direct conflict with Shazer.574
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted jurisdiction in McKinney v.
State (McKinney II),575 affirmed the Fifth District’s decision in McKinney I,
and disapproved Shazer.576 The latter decision, the court wrote, “failed to
follow Valdes in its decision, or to note a reason for its departure from controlling precedent.”577 In so ruling, the court addressed three of McKinney’s
arguments.578 First, the court dismissed his claim “that robbery and theft are
simply aggravated forms of the same underlying offense.”579 Because “robbery is not a degree of theft [and theft is not] a degree of robbery,” section
775.021(4)(b)2. did not bar McKinney’s dual convictions for these crimes.580
Second, McKinney’s convictions were not exempt under section
775.021(4)(b)1., which precludes multiple convictions for offenses requiring
identical elements of proof.581 “Robbery requires that the State show that
‘force, violence, assault, or putting in fear was used in the course of the taking,’ and grand theft requires that the State show the value of the property
taken,” the court wrote.582 For the same reason, the court rejected his third
argument that section 775.021(4)(b)3. barred his dual convictions because
grand theft was a lesser-included offense of robbery, reasoning that “neither
offense is wholly subsumed by the other.”583
Justice Lewis wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Quince
joined, criticizing the court’s decision in Valdes as “wrong when this Court
571. Id. at 454 (reversing the grand theft conviction and remanding with directions to the
trial court to vacate the conviction and sentence).
572. 24 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009), aff’d, 66 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 527 (2011).
573. Id. at 683–84.
574. Id. at 684 (citing Shazer, 3 So. 3d at 454).
575. 66 So. 3d 852, 853 (Fla.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 527 (2011).
576. Id.
577. Id. at 856 n.4.
578. See id. at 856–57 (quoting McKinney I, 24 So. 3d at 683–84).
579. Id. (citing McKinney I, 24 So. 3d at 684).
580. McKinney I, 24 So. 3d at 684; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)2. (2012).
581. See McKinney II, 66 So. 3d at 854, 856–57; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)1.
582. McKinney II, 66 So. 3d at 857 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 812.13(1)).
583. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.021(4)(b)3.
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issued it, and . . . wrong in application today.”584 Valdes, he stated, “departed
from decades of well-established law” when it discarded the primary evil
approach to double jeopardy challenges “[w]ithout reference to any decisional law from this Court or Florida’s district courts of appeal that exhibited the
impracticality of that approach, any necessity to abrogate it, or any miscarriage of justice . . . .”585 Grand theft and robbery “involve the same evil,” he
continued, because each crime punishes the defendant for depriving another
person of property.586 Therefore, according to the dissent, dual convictions
for grand theft and robbery “in a single episode and single act punish[] an
individual twice for the same evil and violate[] double jeopardy.”587
In Ivey v. State,588 the Third District considered Valdes in the context of
convictions for leaving the scene of a fatal accident, vehicular homicide, and
DUI manslaughter.589 Holding “that Valdes did not overrule the well-settled
principle that a single death cannot give rise to dual homicide convictions,”
the court concluded that the dual homicide convictions arising from a single
death violated double jeopardy.590 The court therefore “vacate[d] the convictions for vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of a fatal accident, and
affirm[ed] the DUI manslaughter conviction and sentence.”591
In Avila v. State,592 the Second District held that double jeopardy did not
preclude a defendant’s retrial after the jury deadlocked on that charge at the
defendant's first trial.593 In this case, the defendant was charged, inter alia,
with sexual battery with a deadly weapon.594 After a preliminary vote, the
first jury sent a note to the court advising that there was unanimous agreement to a lesser charge on the sexual battery count, but no agreement on the

584. See McKinney II, 66 So. 3d at 857, 859 (Lewis, J., dissenting); see also Valdes v.
State, 3 So. 3d 1067, 1078 (Fla. 2009).
585. McKinney II, 66 So. 3d at 857–58 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (citing Valdes, 3 So. 3d at
1075).
586. Id. at 859.
587. Id.
588. 47 So. 3d 908 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam).
589. See id. at 910–11; see also Valdes, 3 So. 3d at 1078.
590. Ivey, 47 So. 3d at 911.
591. Id.; see also State v. Merriex, 42 So. 3d 934, 936 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for third-degree felony murder barred him from being
convicted for vehicular homicide for the death of the same victim).
592. 86 So. 3d 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
593. Id. at 516; see also Blueford v. Arkansas, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2012) (holding that
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial on murder charges where a trial judge declared a mistrial after a jury reported that it had unanimously voted to acquit on murder
charges but had reached an impasse on a charged lesser-included offense).
594. Avila, 86 So. 3d at 512.
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false imprisonment count.595 At the court’s request, the jury returned to deliberations, ultimately deadlocking on the sexual battery count.596 The defendant was convicted on that count when he was retried.597 On appeal, Avila
argued that this conviction violated double jeopardy because the jury's note
in the first trial reflecting unanimity should be binding.598 The Second District disagreed, concluding that double jeopardy could be triggered only by
an “actual verdict,” which must be “announced in the courtroom in the presence of the jurors and the defendant.”599 Neither the jury’s preliminary vote
in the jury room nor its deadlock on the lesser charge constituted an actual
verdict, the court ruled, so double jeopardy did not prevent the State from
retrying Avila on the sexual battery charge.600 Accordingly, the court affirmed Avila’s convictions and sentences.601
In Headley v. State,602 the Third District held that a defendant could be
convicted of an “aggravated white collar crime and the underlying predicate”
crimes without violating double jeopardy guarantees.603 Analyzing the language, structure, and legislative intent of the white collar crime statute, the
court concluded that the statute sought to enhance punishment by establishing “a separate and distinct offense” from the predicate crimes.604 This conclusion was reinforced by cases holding that double jeopardy is not violated
when separate punishments are imposed for RICO crimes and the predicate
crimes that comprise the racketeering pattern, the court explained.605
In State v. Morse,606 the Fifth District held that conviction and punishment for two charges of attempted second-degree murder of the same person
in two different counties did not violate the defendant’s constitutional right
595. Id.
596. Id. at 512–13.
597. Id. at 513.
598. Id.
599. Avila, 86 So. 3d at 514; see also Delgado v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 659 F.3d 1311,
1326–27 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the Supreme Court of Florida’s setting aside of a defendant's original convictions for a “legal ‘error in the proceedings,’” rather than for factual
insufficiency, did not constitute an acquittal that triggered double jeopardy protection) (quoting United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964)).
600. Avila, 86 So. 3d at 516.
601. Id.
602. 90 So. 3d 912 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam).
603. Id. at 915.
604. Id. (citing State v. Traylor, 77 So. 3d 224, 226–27 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per
curiam)).
605. See id.; see also Gross v. State, 728 So. 2d 1206, 1208 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 741 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1999); Haggerty v. State, 531 So. 2d 364, 365 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
606. 77 So. 3d 748 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam).
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against double jeopardy where each attempt was a separate criminal episode.607 Morse’s crimes were committed in both Orange County and Seminole County in the course of a police chase.608 During the chase in Orange
County, he repeatedly turned from the wheel of his vehicle to shoot at the
pursuing officer, reloaded his firearm, and then fired again after both vehicles crossed into Seminole County.609 He was “convicted and sentenced in
Seminole County for the [crime] he committed there.”610 After his conviction in Orange County, however, the trial judge ruled that double jeopardy
considerations entitled Morse to a new trial.611 On appeal by the State, the
Fifth District held that the two shootings were separate criminal episodes
because they were separated by “obvious time and distance,” and the defendant had numerous opportunities “to pause and reflect on his actions as he
repeatedly ceased and then restarted” shooting at his pursuers.612 Thus, punishments for both shootings would not violate defendant's right against
double jeopardy.613
C.

Due Process
1.

Uncharged Crimes

In Jaimes v. State (Jaimes II),614 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
a jury instruction resulting in the defendant's conviction for an uncharged
crime violated his due process rights and constituted fundamental error.615 In
this case, the defendant was charged with aggravated battery with a deadly
weapon but the jury convicted him of the uncharged crime of aggravated
battery causing great bodily harm.616 On appeal, Jaimes argued that it was an
error to convict him of an uncharged crime.617 The Second District affirmed,
however, because the failure to object to the flawed jury instructions and

607. Id. at 751.
608. Id. at 749.
609. Id. at 751.
610. Id. at 749.
611. Morse, 77 So. 3d at 749.
612. Id. at 751 (citing Beahr v. State, 992 So. 2d 844, 846 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008),
abrogated on other grounds by Smith v. State, 41 So. 3d 1041 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010)).
613. Id. (citing Beahr, 992 So. 2d at 846).
614. 51 So. 3d 445 (Fla. 2010).
615. Id. at 449, 451 (citing State v. Gray, 435 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1983)).
616. Id. at 447 (emphasis omitted); see also FLA. STAT. § 784.045(1)(a) (2012).
617. Jaimes II, 51 So. 3d at 447 (citing Jaimes v. State (Jaimes I), 19 So. 3d 347, 348 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per curiam), review granted, 29 So. 3d 291 (Fla. 2010), and rev’d, 51
So. 3d 445 (Fla. 2010)).
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verdict form did not constitute fundamental error.618 Jaimes sought review
on the ground that the Second District’s decision was in conflict with the
decision of the state high court in State v. Weaver.”619
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed, holding that the defendant’s conviction for aggravated battery violated his due process rights because it was
based on causing great bodily harm, “which requires an element not contained in the charging document” and therefore not addressed at trial.620 The
erroneous jury instruction that resulted in this conviction constituted fundamental error “by definition,” the court held, and was subject to correction on
appeal even in the absence of contemporaneous objection.621 In so ruling, the
court distinguished its decision in Weaver, which held that a trial court’s
error in instructing on an alternative theory does not constitute fundamental
error when that alternative theory is never at issue in the trial and “it may be
assumed that the defendant was convicted of the form of the offense on
which the state actually based its arguments.”622 In Jaimes II, however, the
verdict was based specifically on the jury’s determination that Jaimes had
caused the victim great bodily harm, and so the court could not assume, as it
had done “in Weaver, that the improper instruction had no effect on the
jury’s decision.”623 In such case, the fundamental error exception is justified
based on a violation of the defendant’s due process rights.624 Accordingly,
the court directed entry of a verdict for the lesser included crime of simple
battery, which was “supported by the charging document and the proof at
trial, and each element of the offense was determined by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.”625
The Second District followed Jaimes II in Harris v. State,626 where the
defendant was charged with attempted robbery with a firearm but convicted
of robbery with a firearm after evidence was presented at trial that the robbery had been completed.627 On appeal, the court reversed and remanded for
a new trial, citing Jaimes II as authority for the conclusion that due process is
denied when a defendant is convicted “of a crime that the State has not
618. Id. (quoting Jaimes I, 19 So. 3d at 348).
619. Id. at 447–48 (citing State v. Weaver, 957 So. 2d 586, 589 (Fla. 2007), abrogated by
Sanders v. State, 959 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007), overruled by Beasley v. State,
971 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
620. Id. at 449.
621. Id.
622. Jaimes II, 51 So. 3d at 451 (citing Weaver, 957 So. 2d at 589).
623. Id.; see Weaver, 957 So. 2d at 589.
624. Jaimes II, 51 So. 3d at 451 (citing State v. Gray, 435 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1983)).
625. Id. at 452 (citing State v. Sigler, 967 So. 2d 835, 842 (Fla. 2007)).
626. 76 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
627. Id. at 1081 (citing Jaimes II, 51 So. 3d at 451).
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charged.”628 The court rejected the State’s argument that the case should be
remanded for sentencing on attempted robbery because there was no evidence or finding that the robbery was incomplete, as would be required for
an attempt conviction.629 The court cautioned that, on remand, “the State
may not be limited to proceeding on the existing charge of attempted robbery
with a firearm.”630 In other words, the State could charge Harris with the
completed robbery, thereby exposing him “to the same mandatory life sentence he is currently serving.”631
2.

Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act

Section 893.13 of the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act (the Act) provides that, except as otherwise authorized, “it is
unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance” or “to be in actual or constructive possession of a controlled substance.”632 Section
893.101 specifies “that knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance is not an element of” a drug possession or distribution charge.633 Instead, the accused may establish lack of knowledge as an affirmative defense.634 When this affirmative defense is raised, actual or constructive possession “shall give rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew
of the illicit nature of the substance.”635 In Shelton v. Secretary, Department
of Corrections,636 the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida held that section 893.13 violates due process and is unconstitutional
on its face.637 In arriving at this conclusion, Judge Scriven characterized
Florida’s law as a “draconian” approach that subjects an innocent actor to
“the Hobson’s choice of pleading guilty or going to trial where he . . . must

628. Id. at 1081, 1083 (citing Jaimes II, 51 So. 3d at 448); see also Deleon v. State, 66 So.
3d 391, 394–95 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that, where the defendant was charged
with carjacking with a firearm, it was fundamental error to instruct the jury on the uncharged
offense of carjacking with a deadly weapon, which was not a lesser-included crime of the
charged offense).
629. Harris, 76 So. 3d at 1082–83.
630. Id. at 1083.
631. Id. (Villanti, J., concurring).
632. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(1)(a), (6)(a) (2012).
633. Id. § 893.101(2).
634. Id.
635. Id. § 893.101(3).
636. 802 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (M.D. Fla. 2011), rev’d, 691 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2012).
637. Id. at 1297; see also FLA. STAT. § 893.13.
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then prove his innocence for lack of knowledge against the permissive presumption the statute imposes that he does in fact have guilty knowledge.”638
Almost immediately, Florida’s trial courts were inundated with “Shelton motions” seeking to dismiss drug possession and trafficking charges on
the ground that section 893.13 was unconstitutional.639 The district courts of
appeal were quick to respond, uniformly concluding that section 893.13 does
not violate the requirements of due process.640 In State v. Adkins (Adkins
I),641 however, the Second District declined to consider the merits of Shelton
and instead certified the constitutional issue to the Supreme Court of Florida
for immediate resolution.642 The court accepted jurisdiction and rendered its
opinion on July 12, 2012.643 Concluding that section 893.13 is constitutional,
the court deferred to the legislature’s broad authority to define the elements
of a crime, while “recogniz[ing] that due process ordinarily does not preclude the creation of an offense without a guilty knowledge element.”644 The
court then considered “the limited circumstances in which the absence of a
guilty knowledge element has resulted in a holding that the requirements of

638. Shelton, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1295, 1308.
639. See e.g., State v. Washington (Washington I), 18 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 1129, 1129,
1133 (11th Cir. Ct. Aug. 17, 2011) (finding Shelton to be binding on state trial courts and
dismissing thirty-nine cases on the ground that section 893.13 was unconstitutional), rev’d, 37
Fla. L. Weekly D1535 (3d Dist. Ct. App. June 27, 2012); State v. Barnett, No. 11-CF-003124,
slip op. at 3, 6 (Fla. 13th Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011) (finding Shelton to constitute persuasive
authority in state trial courts, but holding that the legislature had not entirely eliminated the
element of knowledge from section 893.13 because a “general intent [element] remains intact”); see also FLA. STAT. § 893.13; State v. Anderson, No. F99-12435(A), slip op. at 3, 6
(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Aug. 11, 2011) (holding that state trial courts are barred from following
Shelton because the state appellate courts have upheld the constitutionality of section 893.13).
640. State v. Washington (Washington II), 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1535, D1538 (3d Dist. Ct.
App. June 27, 2012); Maestas v. State, 76 So. 3d 991, 993–94, 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2011); Lanier v. State, 74 So. 3d 1130, 1131 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Flagg v.
State, 74 So. 3d 138, 141 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011)); see McCain v. State, 84 So. 3d 1284,
1284 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Flagg, 74 So. 3d at 141); Holcy v.
State, 83 So. 3d 778, 778 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Flagg, 74 So. 3d
at 141); Williams v. State, 45 So. 3d 14, 15–16 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam),
review denied, 53 So. 3d 1022 (Fla. 2011); Harris v. State, 932 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam); see also FLA. STAT. § 893.13; Mack v. State, 91 So. 3d 868, 869
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming the denial of the defendant’s motion for postconviction relief because Shelton applied only to the amended version of section 893.13 and
not to the version of statute that governed his actions in 2001).
641. 71 So. 3d 184 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.) (per curiam), review granted, 71 So. 3d 117
(Fla. 2011).
642. Id. at 185–86.
643. State v. Adkins (Adkins II), 37 Fla. L. Weekly S449, S449 (July 12, 2012).
644. Id. at S450.
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due process were not satisfied.”645 The statutes were found unconstitutional
in those cases, the court explained, because they penalized omissions that
otherwise amounted to innocent conduct, criminalized constitutionally protected conduct, or were not rationally related to achieving a legitimate legislative purpose.646
The court advanced several reasons in support of its conclusion. First,
because the State is required to prove the defendant’s “affirmative act of
selling, manufacturing, delivering, or possessing a controlled substance,” the
statute does not punish inaction.647 Second, the statute does not penalize
innocent conduct without notice, given that lack of knowledge may be asserted as an affirmative defense.648 Third, sections 893.13 and 893.101 do
not impinge on any constitutionally protected rights or freedoms, particularly
as “[t]here is no [protected] right to possess contraband” or “to be ignorant of
the nature of the property in one’s possession.”649 Fourth, “‘common sense
and experience’” support a conclusion that “possession without awareness of
the illicit nature of the substance is highly unusual.”650 Fifth, section 893.13
is “rationally related to the Legislature’s goal of controlling substances that
have a high potential for abuse” because it is narrowly tailored to permit
medical use and handling of controlled substances and “to prohibit nonmedically necessary uses of those substances.”651 Finally, the “decision to
[define] lack of . . . knowledge as an affirmative defense does not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof of a criminal offense to the defendant” because it does not require the defendant to refute an element that the State is
required to prove in order to convict.652 To the contrary, the court wrote, the
affirmative defense provides the defendant with the opportunity to concede
the elements of the crime while explaining why the crime should not be punished.653 Accordingly, the court reversed the circuit court’s order granting
the motions to dismiss.654

645. Id.
646. Id. at S451.
647. Id. at S452.
648. Adkins II, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S452.
649. Id. (citing Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417 (1970)); see FLA. STAT. §§
893.101, .13 (2012).
650. Adkins II, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S452 (quoting Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837,
845 (1973)) (citing United States v. Bunton, No. 8:10-cr-327-T-30EAJ, 2011 WL 5080307, at
*8 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2011)).
651. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 893.13.
652. Adkins II, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S452.
653. Id. at S453.
654. Id.
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Justice Pariente concurred in the result but wrote separately to state that
she would not rule out a successful “as-applied challenge . . . on due process
grounds” if criminalizing the innocent conduct of a specific defendant would
subject that individual to a substantial prison term.655 The relevant standard
jury instruction supports such a challenge, she explained, because it allows a
jury to presume a defendant’s guilty knowledge once “the affirmative defense is raised.”656 Justice Perry dissented, writing that the majority’s decision “shatters bedrock constitutional principles and builds on a foundation of
flawed ‘common sense.’”657 Innocent possession is more common than the
court stated, he wrote, and the permissive presumption of guilty knowledge
requires an innocent defendant “to shoulder the burden of proof and present
evidence to overcome that presumption.”658 This, he concluded, “makes neither legal nor common sense, . . . offends all notions of due process, and
threatens core principles of the presumption of innocence and burden of
proof.”659
D.

Ex Post Facto Laws

In Shenfeld v. State (Shenfeld II),660 the Supreme Court of Florida examined the constitutional provision prohibiting ex post facto laws.661 At issue was whether an amendment to a probation tolling statute, which allows
adjudication of a probation violation without an arrest warrant, “may constitutionally be applied to a probationer who was placed on probation before
the amendment became effective.” 662 In this case, based on the new tolling
law and alleged probation violations, the trial court revoked Shenfeld’s probation and sentenced him to fifteen years.663 The Fourth District affirmed,
holding that the amendment was merely procedural and did not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction to revoke Shenfeld’s probation and to sentence

655. Id. (Pariente, J., concurring).
656. Id. at S455 (citing FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRIM.) 25.2 (2007)).
657. Adkins II, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S456 (Perry, J., dissenting).
658. Id. at S457 (citing Stimus v. State, 995 So. 2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2008)).
659. Id. at S458.
660. 44 So. 3d 96 (Fla. 2010).
661. Id. at 98; see also FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
662. Shenfeld II, 44 So. 3d at 98; see also FLA. CONST. art 1, § 10; FLA. STAT. § 948.06(1)
(2001) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 948.06(1)(a) (2012)).
663. Shenfeld II, 44 So. 3d at 99; see also Shenfeld v. State (Shenfeld I), 14 So. 3d 1021,
1023 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 29 So. 3d 292 (Fla. 2009), and aff’d, 44 So. 3d
96 (Fla. 2010).
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him.664 Approving this decision, the Supreme Court of Florida concluded
that the amended tolling provision did not fall within any of the four categories of ex post facto laws because it did not criminalize an act that was innocent when the law passed, aggravate a crime previously committed, inflict a
greater punishment than that in effect when the crime was committed, or
change the proof necessary to convict.665 Instead, the court held, it merely
modified the applicable tolling procedures.666 The amendment was analogous to a “statutory extension of a statute of limitations” that takes effect before prosecution is time-barred, the court wrote, concluding that if the limitations period for prosecution “may constitutionally be extended before the
prosecution has been time-barred, it follows that a [tolling provision] may be
applied to [an unexpired] probationary term.”667
In Witchard v. State,668 the Fourth District held that retroactive imposition of mandatory electronic monitoring provisions to the defendant’s crimes
violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws.669 In this case, the relevant statute took effect after Witchard’s crimes were committed.670 Because
it mandated a greater punishment than that in effect when he committed his
crimes, its retroactive application violated the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws.671 The court remanded the case “‘for resentencing
to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion to determine whether electronic monitoring should be imposed.’”672
E.

Freedom of Speech and Association

The constitutionality of Florida’s vehicle noise statute was the subject
of two district court opinions during the survey period.673 Section 316.3045,
the statute at issue, makes it unlawful for the sound from a car stereo system
to be “[p]lainly audible at a distance of 25 feet or more from the motor vehicle,” except when that vehicle uses sound making devices in the normal
664. Shenfeld I, 14 So. 3d at 1024.
665. Shenfeld II, 44 So. 3d at 100–02 (citing Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 612
(2003)).
666. Id. at 101.
667. Id.
668. 68 So. 3d 407 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
669. Id. at 409, 411.
670. Id. at 408; see FLA. STAT. § 948.063(1) (2012).
671. Witchard, 68 So. 3d at 409, 410–11.
672. Id. at 411 (quoting Donohue v. State, 979 So. 2d 1060, 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008) (per curiam)).
673. Montgomery v. State, 69 So. 3d 1023, 1031–32 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011); State
v. Catalano, 60 So. 3d 1139, 1141–42 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
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course of “business or political purposes.”674 In State v. Catalano,675 the
Second District held that the statute is unconstitutional for two reasons.676
First, it is not content-neutral because it “does not ‘apply equally to music,
political speech, and advertising.’”677 Second, no compelling governmental
interest requires the different treatment of amplified music and political or
commercial speech.678 Accordingly, the court denied the petition and certified the following question of great public importance: “Is the ‘plainly audible’ language in section 316.3045(1)(a), Florida Statutes, unconstitutionally
vague, overbroad, arbitrarily enforceable, or impinging on free speech
rights? ”679
The Fifth District reached the same result in Montgomery v. State,680
where the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence
obtained when his vehicle was stopped for a noise violation.681 The appellate
court rejected Montgomery’s vagueness challenge on the ground that the
statute “provides fair notice of the prohibited conduct” and clear guidelines
to those charged with its enforcement.682 The overbreadth challenge was
meritorious, however, because the statute “distinguish[es] between different
types of recorded noise or particular viewpoints.”683 The court nevertheless
upheld Montgomery’s conviction on the ground that the officer’s good faith
reliance on the statute was objectively reasonable and could not serve as an
exception to the exclusionary rule.684
In Enoch v. State,685 the First District struck down section 874.11 of the
Florida Statutes, which prohibits certain electronic communication by criminal gangs, but upheld section 874.05(1), which makes it a felony to recruit
new gang members if commission of a crime is a condition of membership or
continued membership.686 The court first addressed the question whether
674. FLA. STAT. § 316.3045 (2012), declared unconstitutional by Montgomery v. State, 69
So. 3d 1023 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011), State v. Catalano, 60 So. 3d 1139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2011).
675. 60 So. 3d 1139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
676. Id. at 1144, 1146.
677. Id. at 1146 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428
(1993)).
678. Id. at 1144.
679. Id. (emphasis added).
680. 69 So. 3d 1023 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
681. Id. at 1025–26, 1033.
682. Id. at 1027–28; see also FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 15B-13.001 (2006).
683. Montgomery, 69 So. 3d at 1031–32.
684. Id. at 1033.
685. 95 So. 3d 344 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
686. Id. at 347–48. The court also held that, because Enoch actually “engaged in specific
conduct each statute proscribes,” he lacked standing to raise a vagueness challenge “as applied
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these statutes violate the freedoms of speech and association.687 Both statutes
were subject to a strict scrutiny analysis, the court stated, because they are
content-based laws that focus on the recruiter’s words and conduct.688 The
court concluded that both statutes serve compelling state interests, because
they were aimed at preventing crime.689 However, only the gang recruitment
statute was narrowly tailored to achieve this goal “without impermissibly
intruding upon the rights of law-abiding persons or, for that matter, the discrete lawful activities of gang members.”690 Moreover, because the statute is
limited to speech that intentionally furthers criminal activity, it did not dispense with a scienter requirement or reach protected speech as Enoch
claimed.691 Finally, the recruitment statute did not violate the freedom of
association, the court held, because “whatever associational rights a criminal
gang may have, such rights do not extend to the inevitable and imminent
criminal or delinquent conduct proscribed in section 874.05(1).”692 The First
District, therefore, affirmed Enoch’s conviction and sentence under section
874.05(1).693
On the other hand, the court held that section 874.11, the electronic
communications statute, was unconstitutionally overbroad and offended
substantive due process.694 Because its “sweeping language” criminalizes
innocent communications “without reference to actual or imminent criminal
activity,” it impermissibly prohibits expressive and associational activity that
seeks “to benefit, promote, or further even the non-criminal interests of a
criminal gang.”695 Accordingly, the court reversed Enoch’s conviction and
sentence under section 874.11.696

to the hypothetically innocent conduct of others.” Id. at 365–66 (citing Bryant v. State, 712
So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
687. Id. at 350.
688. Id. at 350, 357 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811–
13 (2000); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1944)).
689. Enoch, 95 So. 3d at 351–52, 357 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757
(1982); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1116–17 (Fla. 2004); State v. T.B.D., 656 So. 2d 479,
482 (Fla. 1995)).
690. Id. at 355 (citing FLA. STAT. § 874.02(1) (2012)).
691. Id. at 352–53; see also FLA. STAT. § 874.05(1).
692. Enoch, 95 So. 3d at 357 (citing State v. Beasley, 317 So. 2d 750, 753 (Fla. 1975));
see also FLA. STAT. § 874.05(1).
693. Enoch, 95 So. 3d at 366; see also FLA. STAT. § 874.05(1).
694. Enoch, 95 So. 3d at 358, 364; see also FLA. STAT. § 874.11 (2012), declared unconstitutional by Enoch v. State, 95 So. 3d 344 (2012).
695. Enoch, 95 So. 3d at 358, 364 (citing City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 264
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996)).
696. Id. at 366; see also FLA. STAT. § 874.11.
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The Right to Bear Arms

In a brief opinion in Epps v. State,697 the First District upheld the constitutionality of a Florida statute making possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon unlawful.698 The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the statute violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms and found that recent
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States did not undermine state
precedent upholding the constitutionality of section 790.23(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes.699 Those cases were distinguishable, the court wrote, because
they involved broad state prohibitions against possession of handguns by
“general populations . . . within the home for self-defense.”700 They did not
call into question the validity of “‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms
by felons.’”701 The First District therefore affirmed Epps’ conviction.702
V.

CONCLUSION

During the survey period, the Supreme Court of Florida settled several
conflicts among Florida’s District Courts of Appeal and interpreted a number
of statutes, defenses, common law doctrines, and constitutional principles.
The district courts were active as well, certifying several conflicts and questions of great public importance to the court. The appellate courts also
struggled with the proper application of Montgomery II to myriad issues involving the jury instructions for manslaughter and attempted manslaughter.
The resulting confusion will not be resolved until the court approves separate
jury instructions for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.

697. 55 So. 3d 710 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
698. Id. at 711 (citing FLA. STAT. § 790.23(1)(a)).
699. Id. (citing McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047, 3050 (2010); District
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)); see also FLA. STAT. § 790.23(1)(a).
700. Epps, 55 So. 3d at 711 (citing McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047, 3050; Heller, 554 U.S.
at 635).
701. Id. (quoting McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047; Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).
702. Id.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Don King, a well-known boxing promoter, sued ESPN, Inc. for defamation based on certain statements made in a television program—
ESPN Sports Century—broadcast about King’s life and career.1 In Don
King Productions, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,2 the Florida Fourth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for
the broadcaster, holding that the promoter had failed to establish that the

* Robert A. Rosenberg, Circuit Judge, Retired Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida
(Fort Lauderdale), 1996, 1999–2012; Member Florida Bar, six Federal Courts of Appeals, and
The Supreme Court of the United States; Former Assistant United States Attorney and Chief
of the Civil Division (Eastern District of Michigan and Southern District of Florida); Adjunct
Professor, Nova Southeastern University, for 25 years teaching courses in Ethics, Administrative Law, and Informal Logic in the Huizenga Graduate School of Business (M.B.A. and
M.P.A. Programs) and the Undergraduate Program; Guest lecturer, instructor, and/or panel
member for The Florida Bar, American Bar Association, United States Department of Justice,
and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center; A-V rated by Martindale-Hubbell, Inc.;
J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School (1967); B.A., Economics, University of Michigan
(1964); Visiting Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at Ramkhamhaeng University,
Bangkok, Thailand (2008).
1. Don King Prods., Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 40 So. 3d 40, 42 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2010). Don King and Don King Productions, Inc. are referred to as “King.” Id. ESPN, Inc.,
ESPN Productions, Inc., and ESPN Classic, Inc. are referred to as “ESPN.” Id.
2. 40 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

81

Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1

NOVA LAW REVIEW

70

[Vol. 37

defendant broadcaster had acted with actual malice—with reckless disregard for the truth—in broadcasting the challenged statements.3
II.

THE CASE

[Don King], an admitted public figure . . . had the burden
of establishing—[by] clear and convincing record evidence—that ESPN published the SportsCentury biography program . . . with actual malice—i.e., that ESPN
knew the challenged statements were false or in fact entertained serious doubts about their probable falsity. . . .
[The First Amendment] require[s] that summary judgment be “liberally granted” [against plaintiffs] in public
figure defamation cases [brought] against media defendants.4
In this case, the trial court evaluated King’s actual malice arguments,
found them deficient as a matter of law, and granted ESPN’s motion for
summary judgment in its entirety.5
Specifically, the trial court concluded that ESPN had not “published
the statements with actual malice.”6 It concluded that “a failure to investigate or a failure to investigate sufficiently, does not constitute actual
malice,” but found that ESPN had, in fact, sufficiently investigated the

3. Id. at 42, 46.
The contents of the . . . statements at issue consist of the following:
1. [Don] Elbaum indicated that King organized a benefit exhibition fight for Forest City
Hospital. The hospital only received $1,500 out of the $85,000 in ticket sales.
2. [Don] Elbaum described a private conversation he had with Meldrick Taylor in which
they discussed Taylor being owed $1,300,000 for a fight, and King giving Meldrick a check
for only $300,000.
3. [Don] Elbaum asserted that King threatened to have Meldrick Taylor killed.
4. [Don] Elbaum stated that King convinced doctors to invest $250,000 in a movie about
his life that was never made; [and]
5. [Jack] Newfield described an encounter he had with King at a press conference where
King went crazy and threatened to kill him.

Id. at 42–43.
4. Appellees’ Answer Brief at 1, Don King Prods., Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 40 So. 3d
40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (No. 4D08-3704) (footnote omitted); see also Don King
Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 43 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).
5. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 43–44; see also Order at 4–8, Don King Prods.,
Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., No. 05-000524(02) (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. July 28, 2008) [hereinafter
Order for Summary Judgment].
6. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 43.
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King story.7 The court also held that “casting doubt on the credibility of
a journalist’s source is insufficient to sustain the burden of proving actual
malice,” but in any event, found that ESPN’s sources were sufficiently
credible.8 Finally, the trial court concluded that “[i]ll-will, spite, and negativity are wholly irrelevant to actual malice.”9 The trial court also
granted summary judgment in favor of ESPN on the ground that “King
had failed to establish the falsity of [certain] statements.”10
On appeal, however, the Fourth District Court of Appeal directed its
attention solely to the lack of actual malice—the second basis for the trial
court's grant of summary judgment—affirming on the ground that the
lower court determination “was proper because there [was] no record
evidence . . . that a jury could find, by clear and convincing evidence,
that ESPN acted with actual malice in publishing the five [challenged]
statements.”11
A.

The Factual Context

“The sworn affidavits and testimony from the ESPN producers [reflected] . . . the[ir] belie[f] [that] everything contained in the [broadcast]
was true and accurate. This testimony also . . . show[ed] that ESPN had
no doubt . . . about the truth of the [p]rogram.”12 “King’s principal argument focuse[d] on one [source], Don Elbaum. King claim[ed] that Elbaum was so incredible that there were ‘obvious reasons’ to doubt
him.”13 The undisputed record evidence, however, showed that ESPN’s
producers had no reason to doubt Elbaum.14
7. Order for Summary Judgment, supra note 5, at 6 (citing St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 733;
Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50, 52–53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)
(per curiam)).
8. Id. at 6–7 (citing Thomas v. Patton, 34 Media L. Rptr. 1188, 1191 (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct.
2005)).
9. Id. at 8 (citing Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 334 So. 2d at 52–53).
10. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 43.
11. Id.
12. Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 4, at 2; see also Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So.
3d at 45. “King ha[d] no evidence to the contrary . . . .” Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note
4, at 2; see also Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 45. The record testimony reflected that
ESPN repeatedly tried to interview King. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 46. He refused.
Id. “As part of the editorial process, [a] senior member of the production team [actually]
deleted many [negative] items . . . he viewed as inadequately substantiated and added several
positive statements about King.” Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 4, at 3.
13. Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 4, at 3; see also Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So.
3d. at 45–46.
14. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 45; Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 4, at 3.
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[Elbaum had known] King intimately for over [thirty] years and
had been personally involved in each of the statements he made
[in the broadcast]. In addition, everything Elbaum said was
consistent with what other interviewees had said and what prior
[publications] had reported for decades. Extensive interview
tape[s] and scores of [media] of all kinds . . . repeatedly stated
that King was a huckster who had threatened, intimidated, and
cheated, or underpaid many, including boxers.
Faced with this . . . evidence, King[] . . . attempt[ed] to
“thread the needle” with the hope of finding something that
constitute[d] actual malice. . . . King, [thus] claim[ed] that one
ESPN producer expressed doubts about certain statements,
which were ignored.15

“But the record actually show[ed] each of those statements was deleted”
and each was not in the final broadcast.16
King also claim[ed] that ESPN, [in fact, did] doubt[] Elbaum[’s] [veracity] because ESPN’s fact-checker Larry
Schwartz . . . testif[ied] that he “noticed” that Elbaum was a
“con artist.” But Schwartz’ [sic] videotaped deposition makes
clear that [he] actually stated the exact opposite: “I never said
he [Elbaum] was a con artist.”
King [next] argue[d] that ESPN published five of 183
statements in the [broadcast] with actual malice because (i)
ESPN’s producers were out “to get” King, (ii) [ESPN’s investigation was insufficient], (iii) two of ESPN’s 45 sources were
not credible . . . and (iv) ESPN exhibited poor journalism in
putting together the Program.17

None of these arguments satisfied King’s burden of proving actual malice
by clear and convincing evidence.18 “In light of the . . . record [about]
King’s . . . history, [his] focus on just seconds of the Program itself reveal[ed],” at best, a marginal defamation claim.19 The program had 178

15. Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 4, at 3–4; see also Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So.
3d at 42, 44–45.
16. Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 4, at 4.
17. Id. (citing Exhibit 83, Don King Prods., Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 40 So. 3d 40 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (No. 4D08-37004)).
18. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 45.
19. Appellees’ Answer Brief, supra note 4, at 5.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss1/1

84

: Nova Law Review 37, 1

2012]

PUBLIC FIGURE DEFAMATION CLAIMS IN FLORIDA

73

unchallenged statements.20 ESPN submitted (with its summary judgment
motion), a video of the broadcast, excluding the five challenged statements.21 “[A]s a matter of law, the gist of the Program [was determined
to be] the same, with or without the five statements.”22
B.

The Rationale of the Appellate Court

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reasoned that King failed to establish that ESPN acted with actual malice.23 Writing for that court,
Judge Dorian K. Damoorgian began by explaining the general principle
that governs claims for defamation.24 He then analyzed the heightened
standard concerning public figure defamation actions—“more than mere
negligence on the part of the publisher” is required and the public figure
“must prove that the publisher acted with actual malice.”25
In the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,26 the Supreme Court of the United States defined “actual malice” as knowledge
by a publisher that a statement is false or that it was made in “reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.”27 As Judge Damoorgian observed, “[r]ecklessness may be found where ‘there are obvious reasons to
doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports.’ Under
these circumstances, the publisher’s profession that he published the defamatory statements in good faith is generally insufficient to obtain a
summary judgment.”28 “Publishing with such doubt[] [may] show[] reck-

20. Id.
21. Id. (citing Exhibit 86, Don King Prods., Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 40 So. 3d 40 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (No. 4D08-3704)).
22. Id.
23. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 42 (“At issue in this appeal are five of the statements made during the course of the Sports Century program, which King alleges are actionable defamatory statements.”).
24. Id. at 43 (citing Mile Marker, Inc. v. Petersen Publ’g, L.L.C., 811 So. 2d 841, 845
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)) (“A common law claim for defamation requires the unprivileged publication (to a third party) of a false and defamatory statement concerning another,
with fault amounting to at least negligence on behalf of the publisher, with damage ensuing.”).
25. Id. at 43 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)); see also
Mile Marker, Inc., 811 So. 2d at 845.
26. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
27. Id. at 280; Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82–83 (1967) (per
curiam) (quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80); Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Early,
334 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (per curiam) (quoting N.Y. Times Co., 376
U.S. at 279–80); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (clarifying definition of actual malice).
28. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 43 (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731–32).

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

85

Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1

NOVA LAW REVIEW

74

[Vol. 37

less disregard for [the] truth or falsity” of the statement and may constitute actual malice.29
Although the appellate court did not adopt the trial court’s findings
regarding the factual deficiencies of certain statements, it still found the
defamation claim unsustainable because King failed to establish that
ESPN published the statements with actual malice.30 The court then separately addressed each of King’s contentions in support of his claim that
ESPN had acted with actual malice.31
C.

The Ill Will Contention

King argued “that ESPN harbored ill will towards him and intended
to portray him in a negative light.”32 In support of this argument, he directed attention to unfavorable emails, script notations, and adverse
comments made by ESPN producers.33 The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed and pointed out that ill will is not actual malice under the
standard established in New York Times Co.34 “[A] showing of ill will,
alone, cannot establish actual malice.”35 “[W]hen combined with other
evidence,” however, ill will or motive may be a factor in concluding that
a publisher has acted with actual malice.36 Yet, “[d]espite the relevance
of ill will and motive,” the appellate court emphasized that “‘courts must
be careful not to place too much [relevance] on such factors.’”37
The Fourth District Court of Appeal made clear in its opinion that
“[a]ny ill will or evil intent in the emails and production notations . . .

29. Id. (quoting St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731).
30. Id. at 44–45. In so doing, the appellate court held that “summary judgments are to be
more liberally granted in defamation actions against public figure plaintiffs.” Id. (citing
Dockery v. Fla. Democratic Party, 799 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per
curiam)).
[O]n a motion for summary judgment in a public-figure defamation case, the burden is on the
plaintiff to “present record evidence sufficient to satisfy the court that a genuine issue of material fact exists which would allow a jury to find by clear and convincing evidence the existence of actual malice on the part of the defendant.”

Id. (quoting Mile Marker, Inc., 811 So. 2d at 846–47).
31. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 44–46.
32. Id. at 44.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 45.
35. Id. at 44.
36. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 44 (citing Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667–68 (1989)) (“[A] plaintiff [may prove] the defendant’s state of
mind through circumstantial evidence such as evidence of motive.”).
37. Id. (quoting Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc., 491 U.S. at 668).
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[did] not amount to actual malice.”38 It concluded that “nothing in the
record [indicated] that ESPN [knowingly or] purposely made false statements about King [either] to bolster the theme of the program or to inflict
harm on King.”39
The “intention to portray a public figure in a negative light, even
when motivated by ill will or evil intent, is not sufficient to show actual
malice unless the publisher intended to inflict harm through knowing or
reckless falsehood.”40
Moreover, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded that
“ESPN was not required to present positive statements about King to
balance any negative statements, or to search until it found someone who
would defend King.”41
King argued “that ESPN knew or should have known that [witness]
Elbaum was” a convict, unreliable, and harbored animosity towards
King, and, accordingly, ESPN should have taken additional steps to verify Elbaum’s statements.42 “Unlike Elbaum, [however,] King [did] not
question [Jack] Newfield’s general credibility, but assert[ed] that ESPN
had reason to [question the truth] of Newfield’s statement[s] that King
[had] threatened to kill him.”43 King argued that ESPN “had a copy of
the [subject] videotape which show[ed] . . . the confrontation between
King and Newfield, and which [did] not contain any evidence of a death
threat.”44 The court nonetheless dispensed with King’s contention that
ESPN ignored obvious reasons to doubt witness statements.45
The appellate court responded to the argument by strictly focusing
on the applicable evidentiary standard.46 Thus, it concluded that the
“evidence, even taken as a whole, [was] not sufficient to prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, that ESPN acted with actual malice in publishing the statements about King.”47 King, the court found, “had not pre38. Id.
39. Id. at 45.
40. Id. (citing Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)). “Actual malice under the New York Times standard
should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or a motive arising from
spite or ill will.” Masson, 501 U.S. at 510.
41. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 45 (citing Levan v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 190
F.3d 1230, 1243 (11th Cir. 1999)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 45.
47. Id.
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sented any evidence that ESPN in fact doubted Elbaum’s credibility or
the veracity of Newfield’s statement[s].”48
The court reiterated that the evidence King relied on was “neither
clear nor convincing.”49 Thus, “[a]ssuming ESPN knew of Elbaum’s tax
fraud conviction, or had any duty to perform a criminal background
check on him, a single criminal conviction more than a decade before
publication, [it opined,] does not require a publisher to question a
source’s credibility on all matters.”50 Although the “contentious relationship between King and Elbaum [was] more suspicious, [that was] still
insufficient to show ESPN acted with reckless disregard for the truth.”51
Finally, the Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that
[t]he event that sparked the animosity between King and Elbaum [had] occurred in 1973 [and that] King [had] presented
no evidence that this event created long-lasting tension[s] between himself and Elbaum. Regarding [the] Newfield [matter],
although the . . . video [did] not show King threatening Newfield’s life, Newfield’s account of the confrontation . . . support[ed], at the very least, his perception that King [had] threatened his life. In [his] book, Newfield recounted King’s long tirade against him . . . . After King walked away from Newfield,
someone associated with King approached [the author] and
whispered, “Better watch your back, Jack. This is Don’s
town.”52

In the court’s view, “[i]t was not unreasonable for Newfield to interpret
this comment as a threat, nor did [it conclude that] ESPN ha[d] reason to
doubt Newfield’s perception of the comment. . . . ESPN producers testified . . . that they believed the events may have occurred off-camera.”53
The court accepted that as a reasonable conclusion.54 “Moreover, King
[had] declined ESPN’s attempts to interview him . . . and thus provide . .
. his version of the confrontation. [Although] King [wa]s under no obligation to participate in the production . . . the fact that ESPN did not have

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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access to [his] version of the event[] [wa]s a factor . . . support[ing] . . .
Newfield’s account.”55
D. The Contention that ESPN Failed to Conduct a Thorough Investigation
“King contend[ed] that ESPN should have conducted a more searching investigation into the challenged statements, [in particular,] interviewing additional sources to verify the statements.”56 By its failure to
do so, “King assert[ed] that ESPN [had] deviated from accepted standards of journalism.”57 Again, the court disagreed.58 The law in this regard, in the view of the appellate court, is well established: “[T]he failure to investigate, without more, does not constitute actual malice.”59
“Although a publisher’s departure from accepted standards of journalism is not entirely irrelevant,” the court noted that “‘[a]ctual malice
requires more than a departure from reasonable standards of journalism.’”60 However, in this case, ESPN did produce evidence that it had
“interviewed people with direct knowledge of the events” at issue, and
thus, did satisfy professional standards.61 It also attempted more than
once to interview King, but was rebuffed.62 In the record, “[t]here were
no obvious reasons” to doubt the information that ESPN had compiled
and used for the broadcast.63 “[I]ts failure to conduct a more searching
investigation” did not, in the court’s view, constitute the requisite actual
malice required to overcome the motion for summary judgment.64
III. THE RULING
After reviewing the record and considering King’s arguments, Judge
Damoorgian, writing for a unanimous panel, determined that King could
not meet his burden “that a genuine issue of material fact exist[ed] which
55. Id. at 46.
56. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 46.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 733 (1968); Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (per curiam)).
60. Id. at 46 (quoting Levan v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 190 F.3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir.
1999)).
61. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 46.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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would allow a jury to find actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.”65
The appellate court held that none of the following evidentiary scenarios presented by King constituted actual malice.66 None were sufficient to satisfy the constitutional test set forth in New York Times Co.
showing that a publisher acted with reckless disregard for the truth or
without regard to the truth or falsity of a statement when publishing about
a public figure.67 The Fourth District Court of Appeal ultimately rejected
King’s contentions that there is “actual malice” when a plaintiff shows
(1) negativity or ill will;68 (2) the failure to investigate or to interview
every person with knowledge;69 (3) use of sources who are biased or who
have been convicted of crimes;70 and (4) a “‘departure from reasonable
standards of journalism.’”71
IV. CONCLUSION
In Don King Productions, Inc., the Fourth District Court of Appeal
followed the standard set forth in New York Times Co.72 In so doing, it
reiterated clear guidelines supported by governing precedent for the uniform application of law regarding the determination of actual malice
where a public figure sues a media publisher in Florida.73

65. Id. at 46.
66. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 44–46.
67. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Don King Prods., Inc., 40
So. 3d at 43, 46.
68. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 44–45.
69. Id. at 46 (citing St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 733 (1968); Palm Beach
Newspapers, Inc. v. Early, 334 So. 2d 50, 52–53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976)); see Levan v.
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 190 F.3d 1230, 1243 (11th Cir. 1999).
70. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 45; see also Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp.
779, 794 (D.D.C. 1990); Sunshine Sportswear & Elecs., Inc. v. WSOC Television, Inc., 738 F.
Supp. 1499, 1508–09 (D.S.C. 1989); Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp.,
655 A.2d 417, 433–34 (N.J. 1995).
71. Don King Prods., Inc., 40 So. 3d at 46 (quoting Levan, 190 F.3d at 1239).
72. Id. at 43 (citing N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80; Mile Marker, Inc. v. Petersen
Publ’g, L.L.C., 811 So. 2d 841, 845 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
73. Id. (citing N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279–80).
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The question has arisen, on many occasions, about when a candidate for
public office in Florida is considered “officially elected.”1 Governors have
requested opinions from the Supreme Court of Florida on the issue, since
judicial vacancies occurred for various reasons, and the governors were unsure of whether they had the authority to appoint replacements or whether
they had to wait for the election process to select them.2 In addition, county
supervisors of elections have requested opinions determining the specific
date a candidate is elected, from either the Florida Attorney General or Florida Department of State Division of Elections, for various other elected offices.3 This article will review the Florida Constitution, Florida Statutes, advisory opinions, and case law in an attempt to determine, with as much specificity as possible, the date when a candidate for public office in Florida is
considered officially elected.
I.

FLORIDA ELECTIONS AND THE SUNSHINE LAW

The word “election,” when standing alone, is defined as the
act of choosing; choice; the act of selecting one or more from oth* Paul D. Asfour, J.D., M.B.A., C.P.A. is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies at
Florida Gulf Coast University. He received his law degree from the University of Miami
School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Advisory Op. to the Governor re Sheriff & Judicial Vacancies Due to Resignations, 928 So. 2d 1218, 1220–21 (Fla. 2006); see also 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 1
(2010) (letter from Donald L. Palmer, Dir., Div. of Elections, to The Honorable Deborah
Clark, Pinellas Cnty. Supervisor of Elections, July 26, 2010), available at
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/new/2010/de1009.pdf.
2. E.g., Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So.
3d 795, 796 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam); Advisory Op. to the Governor re Appointment or Election of Judges, 983 So. 2d 526, 528 (Fla. 2008).
3. See 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 1–2.
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ers. Hence, appropriately, the act of choosing a person to fill an
office or employment by any manifestation of preference, as by
vote, uplifted hands, or viva voce.4

Once elected, the candidate becomes a “candidate elect” and, therefore,
subject to Florida’s Sunshine Law, which prohibits members of the same
elected body (board, commission, council, etc.) from discussing matters that
may foreseeably come before that elected body for a vote.5 As soon as the
candidates-elect become subject to the Sunshine Law, they are also subject to
penalties for violating it.6 However, there must be proof of scienter for there
to be a criminal violation of the Sunshine Law.7 As a result, a violation
could not occur by accident.8
Some may question why a candidate, immediately upon being elected,
is subject to the Sunshine Law. Why not wait until the individual takes the
oath of office, and actually begins his term? That seems logical, and would
obviously avoid the issue about which date controls when the candidate becomes subject to the Sunshine Law.
That issue was addressed by the Third District Court of Appeal in the
case of Hough v. Stembridge.9 Following a special election in the City of
North Miami Beach, meetings were held between an incumbent councilman
who was elected mayor, and two other individuals who were elected to the
office of city council but were not incumbents.10 One of the meetings took
place before the individuals had taken their respective oaths of office.11 The

4. Alexander v. Booth, 56 So. 2d 716, 719 (Fla. 1952) (citing State v. Hirsch, 24 N.E.
1062, 1063 (Ind. 1890); Brown v. Phillips, 36 N.W. 242, 247 (Wis. 1888)).
5. See FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (2012); Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288, 289–90
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or of any agency or
authority of any county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision, except as otherwise
provided in the Constitution, including meetings with or attended by any person elected to
such board or commission, but who has not yet taken office, at which official acts are to be
taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times, and no resolution, rule,
or formal action shall be considered binding except as taken or made at such meeting. The
board or commission must provide reasonable notice of all such meetings.

FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (emphasis added).
6. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(3); see Pub. Officers-Elect & Sunshine Law, 74-40 Fla. Op.
Att’y Gen. 1 (1974).
7. Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969); see also FLA.
STAT. § 286.011(3).
8. See Bd. of Pub. Instruction v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969); see also FLA.
STAT. § 286.011(3).
9. 278 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d Dist Ct. App. 1973).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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trial court found that all three individuals had violated Florida Statutes section 286.011.12
The appellants argued that the trial court erred in ruling that they had
violated the statute since the first meeting between them took place when
two of them were councilmen-elect, and only one of them was an elected
official subject to the statute.13 Consequently, they claimed that they were
not members of a governing body subject to the Sunshine Law.14
The court stated:
We find the position untenable to hold on the one hand that
Florida Statute[s] [section] 286.011 is applicable to elected board
or commission members who have been officially sworn in and on
the other hand inapplicable to members-elect who as yet merely
have not taken the oath of public office. An individual upon immediate election to public office loses his status as a private individual and acquires the position more akin to that of a public trustee.
Therefore, we hold that members-elect of boards, commissions, agencies, etc. are within the scope of the Government in the
Sunshine Law. To hold otherwise would be to frustrate and violate the intent of the statute which “having been enacted for the
public benefit, should be interpreted most favorably to the public.”15

As stated previously, the Sunshine Law does not apply to candidates for
office prior to the date on which they are considered elected, “unless the
candidate is an incumbent seeking reelection.”16 However, it would not necessarily be considered a violation of the Sunshine Law if an incumbent candidate in attendance at a candidates’ forum expressed his or her opinion on a
matter that “may foreseeably come before” that elected body for a vote.17
Furthermore, a non-incumbent may express his opinion on a matter that
could foreseeably come before the elected body for a vote as long as there
was no discussion taking place between an incumbent and another member
of the board who happened to be in attendance at the forum.18
12. Id. at 289–90 (citing FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1); Canney v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 278
So. 2d 260, 263 (Fla. 1973)).
13. Id. at 289.
14. Hough, 278 So. 2d at 289.
15. Id. at 289–90 (quoting Canney, 278 So. 2d at 263); see also FLA. STAT. § 286.011.
16. Sunshine Law, Candidates’ Night/Political Forum, 92-05 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 2
(1992); see also FLA. STAT. § 286.011.
17. 92-05 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 2; see also FLA. STAT. § 286.011.
18. 92-05 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 2.
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DATE OF ELECTION

The most logical date a candidate could be considered elected is the
date of the general election,19 assuming there was more than one candidate
who qualified for the race, votes were counted, and a winner declared. But
what about a candidate who qualified for the seat, but ran unopposed, whether or not he was the incumbent? Would it be the date the qualifying period
ended, the date of the election, the date the election results are certified as
official, or the date the term begins? Unfortunately, a 2010 Supreme Court
of Florida advisory opinion, discussed below, complicated the issue.20
Florida Statutes section 100.041 details how various Florida officials
shall be elected and in one case, when an officer of one elective office—
county commissioner—is considered elected.21 It would be an overstatement
to consider it the definition of clarity.22
Florida Statutes section 100.041(2)(a) provides that “[a] county commissioner is ‘elected’ for purposes of this paragraph on the date that the
county canvassing board certifies the results of the election pursuant to
s[ection] 102.151.”23 However, no mention is made of when other officers
listed in that section are considered elected.24
What is puzzling about the language in Florida Statutes section
100.041(2)(a) is that, according to the court in Morse v. Dade County Canvassing Board,25 (1) the county canvassing board does not have “standing to
challenge . . . election results,” and (2) the circuit court does not have jurisdiction unless there is a challenge to “an election result filed by [either] a
candidate or an elector qualified to vote in the election.”26
Although Florida Statutes section 102.112(2) provides that a canvassing board must certify the results by the twelfth day after the general elec-

19. See FLA. STAT. § 100.031.
A general election shall be held in each county on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in
November of each even-numbered year to choose a successor to each elective federal, state,
county, and district officer whose term will expire before the next general election and, except
as provided in the State Constitution, to fill each vacancy in elective office for the unexpired
portion of the term.

Id.
20. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d
795, 798 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam).
21. FLA. STAT. § 100.041, 100.041(2)(a).
22. See id. § 100.041.
23. Id. § 100.041(2)(a).
24. See id. § 100.041.
25. 456 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
26. Id. at 1314; see also FLA. STAT. § 100.041(2)(a).
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tion, it can do so before then.27 Consequently, a county commissioner from
one county could be considered elected at a time different than a county
commissioner from another county, even though the election was held on the
same day and the results were clear.28 That result would appear to conflict
with Florida Statutes section 97.012(2), which mandates “uniform standards
for the proper and equitable implementation of the registration laws.”29 The
Morse decision, coupled with both Florida Statutes section 97.012(2), and
the fact that the various county canvassing boards can meet at different
times, mandates a careful review of the language in Florida Statutes section
100.041(2)(a).30
The question about when an unopposed candidate is considered elected
is even more unsettled. Florida Statutes section 101.151(7) provides: “Except for justices or judges seeking retention, the names of unopposed candidates shall not appear on the general election ballot. Each unopposed candidate shall be deemed to have voted for himself or herself.”31 The implication
is that the unopposed candidate voted for himself or herself at the general
election and not at any other time during the election process, such as on the
date the qualifying period ended, or on the date of the primary election.32
Therefore, is the person elected on that date, or on the date the canvassing
board meets to certify the election results?
III. JUDICIAL VACANCIES
The Supreme Court of Florida further muddied the waters in an advisory opinion to Governor Charlie Crist in 2010.33 Although the advisory
opinion concerns a judicial vacancy and is specific to the facts of the case, it
complicated the matter for the Florida Department of State, which renders
advisory opinions to Florida Supervisors of Elections and other interested
parties regarding when a candidate is considered elected.34
27. See FLA. STAT. § 102.112(2).
28. See id.
29. Id. § 97.012(2). Compare id. § 102.112(2), with id. § 97.012(2).
30. See FLA. STAT. §§ 97.012(2), 102.112(2), 100.041(2)(a); Morse, 456 So. 2d at 1314–
15.
31. FLA. STAT. § 101.151(7).
32. See id.
33. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d
795, 798 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam).
34. See id.; 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 1–2 (2010) (letter from Donald L. Palmer,
Dir., Div. of Elections, to The Honorable Deborah Clark, Pinellas Cnty. Supervisor of Elections, July 26, 2010), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/new/2010/
de1009.pdf.
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In that case, incumbent Escambia County Court Judge David Ackerman
qualified for the seat on April 28, 2010.35 The qualifying period ran from
noon on April 26, 2010 to noon on April 30, 2010.36 Since no other candidate qualified, the judge was unopposed at the time the qualifying period
ended.37
Judge Ackerman’s current term was to expire on January 3, 2011, with
his new term beginning on January 4, 2011.38 However, he submitted a resignation letter to Governor Crist on May 24, 2010, which was accepted by
the Governor on May 28, 2010.39 That resignation created a judicial vacancy
that would last for approximately seven months—until his new term began
on January 4, 2011—if the Governor could not name a replacement prior to
the date of the election.40 To compound the uncertainty, Judge Ackerman
stated that he would not “resume his judicial duties until February 1, 2011.”41
The first question that must be answered is when the vacancy occurred.
Article X, section 3 of the Florida Constitution states:
Vacancy in office shall occur upon the creation of an office,
upon the death, removal from office, or resignation of the incumbent or the incumbent’s succession to another office, unexplained
absence for sixty consecutive days, or failure to maintain the residence required when elected or appointed, and upon failure of one
elected or appointed to office to qualify within thirty days from the
commencement of the term.42

Consequently, the vacancy created by Judge Ackerman’s resignation occurred on the date Governor Crist accepted the resignation, May 28, 2010.43
Unfortunately, the Florida Constitution contains two sections that address “judicial” vacancies.44 Article V, section 11(b) states:

35. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d at
795–96.
36. Id. at 795.
37. Id. at 796.
38. Id. at 795.
39. Id.
40. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d at
796.
41. Id.
42. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 3 (emphasis added).
43. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d at
795, 796.
44. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 10(b)(1)–(2), 11(b).
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The governor shall fill each vacancy on a circuit court or on a
county court, wherein the judges are elected by a majority vote of
the electors, by appointing for a term ending on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in January of the year following the next
primary and general election occurring at least one year after the
date of appointment, one of not fewer than three persons nor more
than six persons nominated by the appropriate judicial nominating
commission. An election shall be held to fill that judicial office
for the term of the office beginning at the end of the appointed
term.45

On the other hand, article V, section 10(b)(1) provides that:
The election of circuit judges shall be preserved . . . unless a
majority of those voting in the jurisdiction of that circuit approves
a local option to select circuit judges by merit selection and retention rather than by election. The election of circuit judges shall be
by a vote of the qualified electors within the territorial jurisdiction
of the court.46

Section 10(b)(2) states the same for county judges, substituting the term “circuit” with “county.”47
The Supreme Court of Florida previously determined that how a judicial
vacancy should be filled depended upon when the vacancy occurred.48 The
vacancy would be filled by appointment if it occurred before the qualifying
period began and would be filled by election if the vacancy occurred after the
election process began.49 The court determined that the election process began at the beginning of the statutory qualifying period.50 That date was chosen to promote consistency in the process of filling judicial vacancies, since
it was a fixed point marking the commencement of the election process.51
In Judge Ackerman’s case, the court stated that since his candidacy
45. Id. § 11(b).
46. Id. § 10(b)(1).
47. Id. § 10(b)(2).
48. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Sheriff & Judicial Vacancies Due to Resignations,
928 So. 2d 1218, 1220 (Fla. 2006) (citing Advisory Op. to the Governor re: Appointment or
Election of Judges, 824 So. 2d 132, 136 & n.9 (Fla. 2002)).
49. Id. (citing Advisory Op. to the Governor re: Appointment or Election of Judges, 824
So. 2d at 136).
50. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Appointment or Election of Judges, 983 So. 2d 526,
529 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Advisory Op. to the Governor re Sheriff & Judicial Vacancies Due to
Resignations, 928 So. 2d at 1221).
51. Id. at 530 (citing Advisory Op. to the Governor re: Appointment or Election of
Judges, 824 So. 2d at 136).
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was uncontested, pursuant to section 105.051 [of the] Florida Statutes, he was deemed elected to serve as a judge on the Escambia
County Court for the term beginning January 4, 2011. Thus, this
particular election process ended on April 30, 2010, when the qualifying period ended, and no individual other than Judge Ackerman
can now fill the vacancy by election.52

The language in Florida Statutes section 105.051(1)(a) is similar to the
language in Florida Statutes section 101.151(7).53 Section 105.051(1)(a)
states: “The name of an unopposed candidate for the office of circuit judge,
county court judge, or member of a school board shall not appear on any
ballot, and such candidate shall be deemed to have voted for himself or herself at the general election.”54 Once again, the implication is that the unopposed candidate voted for himself or herself at the “general election,” and not
at any other time during the election process.55 If the legislature did not intend for the date of the general election to be the determining date for election of an unopposed candidate for office, it could have so stated by providing a different date. It did not.56
The court continued:
[A]n incumbent office holder resigned after the election process
had effectively concluded. A vacancy was thus created at a time
when the election process had ceased. There is no issue here with
regard to preserving the right of the people to elect county court
judges. Instead, the issue is whether an incumbent judge who had
been reelected without opposition may then retire from office and
leave a judgeship vacant for an extended period before resuming
the duties of the office when it is convenient for him to do so.57

IV. CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS POSITION
The Supreme Court of Florida distinguished the Ackerman case from
others that it had addressed previously regarding whether a judicial vacancy

52. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d
795, 797 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam) (emphasis added); see also FLA. STAT. § 105.051(1)(a)
(2012).
53. Compare FLA. STAT. § 105.051(1)(a), with FLA. STAT. § 101.151(7).
54. FLA. STAT. § 105.051(1)(a) (emphasis added).
55. See id.
56. See id. §§ 101.151(7), 105.051(1)(a), 105.051(1)(c).
57. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d at
797.
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should be filled by appointment or election.58 The Ackerman decision also
appears to contradict both an earlier supreme court opinion and an earlier
attorney general opinion concerning when a “county commission” candidate
is elected.59
In opinion 74-293, the attorney general was asked to answer the following four questions posed by the attorney for Clay County.60 Only the first
three are relevant to the issue presented here: (1) Whether “a county commissioner [must] be a resident of the . . . district in which he [was] elected;”
(2) whether he must be a resident at the time of election or at the time he
qualified for the position; (3) when the candidate must become a resident of
the district to which he was elected, if not at the time of qualifying; and (4)
whether “the name of [the] candidate . . . [must] be removed from the ballot
if it [was] determined that [he] did not reside in the district [to] which he
[was] elect[ed] at the time” he qualified for the position.61
The attorney general relied on article VIII, section 1(e), of the Florida
Constitution, which provides:
(e) Commissioners. Except when otherwise provided by county
charter, the governing body of each county shall be a board of
county commissioners composed of five or seven members serving
staggered terms of four years. After each decennial census the
board of county commissioners shall divide the county into districts of contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as practicable. One commissioner residing in each district shall be
elected [by the electors of the county].62

58. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re Appointment or Election of Judges, 983 So. 2d
526, 529–30 (Fla. 2008) (holding that a vacancy created “during a qualifying period in which
any candidate qualifies for the judicial office is to be filled by election” where the vacancy
arose due to the involuntary retirement of a county court judge during the qualifying period);
Advisory Op. to the Governor re Sheriff & Judicial Vacancies Due to Resignations, 928 So.
2d 1218, 1219–20 (Fla. 2006) (holding that vacancy occurred when the Governor accepted the
resignation of a circuit court judge on April 14, 2006, and that because the vacancy was
created before the qualifying period commenced on May 8, 2006, the position was to be filled
by appointment); Advisory Op. to the Governor re: Appointment or Election of Judges, 824
So. 2d 132, 135–36 (Fla. 2002) (holding that a vacancy created when a judge involuntarily
retired after the conclusion of the qualifying period—in which the incumbent judge did not
qualify for election but three other candidates did qualify—was to be filled by election).
59. Compare Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42
So. 3d at 796–98, with State v. Grassi, 532 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 1988), and Residency
Requirements for Cnty. Comm’rs, 74-293 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 1–3 (1974).
60. 74-293 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 1.
61. Id.
62. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (emphasis added).
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Therefore, the attorney general concluded, in the answer to the second question posed in opinion 74-293, that “a candidate did not have to meet the residence requirements at the time of qualifying for office.”63
However, the attorney general raised an interesting caveat in the answer
to the second question, which could obviously pose other problems for a
candidate.64
[T]he execution of the candidate oath at a time when the candidate
is not a resident of the appropriate district raises the possibility of
conflict with statutory provisions relating to false swearing and
perjury and, therefore, the suggested practice would be for a candidate to establish his residence in the appropriate district prior to
qualifying for office.65

In response to the third question posed in opinion 74-293, the attorney
general stated:
[T]he language of [article VIII, section 1(e) of the Florida Constitution] requires residence in the appropriate county commission
district as of the day of the election. Accordingly, in order to be
sure of complying with this constitutional provision, a candidate
should establish his residence in the district he seeks to represent
by no later than the day before the election.66

Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court of Florida reinforced the decision reached in opinion 74-293.67 In State v. Grassi,68 William Grassi was
charged with violating a statute imposing residency qualifications.69 Grassi
intended to run for Broward County commissioner in District 4, but decided
to run in District 3 when he “learn[ed] that the seat in District 4 was not
open.”70 Grassi was charged
with knowingly and unlawfully qualifying as a candidate for Broward County Commissioner, District 3, without being a resident
thereof, in violation of section 99.032, Florida Statutes (1983).
Section 99.032 requires that “[a] candidate for the office of county
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss1/1

74-293 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 3.
See id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
See State v. Grassi, 532 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 1988).
532 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1988).
Id. at 1055.
Id.
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commissioner shall, at the time he qualifies, be a resident of the
district from which he qualifies,” violation of which is a firstdegree misdemeanor.71

The trial court held that section 99.032 was inconsistent with article
VIII, section 1(e) of the Florida Constitution and dismissed the case against
Grassi.72 The district court affirmed the order to dismiss.73 The supreme
court approved the district court’s ruling, stating, “if article VIII, section
1(e), of the Florida Constitution provides qualifications for the office of
county commissioner, the legislature is prohibited from imposing any additional qualifications.”74 The court concluded by stating that “[t]he Florida
Constitution requires residency at the time of election. Therefore, section
99.032 [of the] Florida Statutes is unconstitutional as it imposes the additional qualification for the office of county commissioner of residency at the
time of qualifying for election.”75
The Supreme Court of Florida, based upon its decision in Grassi, confirmed that a candidate for county commission was not considered elected on
the date he qualified for the position.76
With that decision in hand, the obvious question is why the Supreme
Court of Florida decided that Ackerman was considered elected after the
qualifying period ended without any other candidate having qualified. The
decision is especially puzzling considering that it appears to conflict with
Florida Statutes section 105.051(1)(a), as previously stated.77 It may have
something to do with the reason behind Ackerman’s resignation coupled
with his intention to reclaim his seat on his own terms.78 In other words, the
court may have sent a message to all public officials who wanted to use the
system to their own advantage.

71. Id. at 1055–56 (second alteration in original); see also FLA. STAT. § 99.032 (1983)
(repealed 1991).
72. Grassi, 532 So. 2d at 1056; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e); FLA. STAT. §
99.032.
73. Grassi, 532 So. 2d at 1056.
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §1(e); FLA. STAT. § 99.032.
76. See Grassi, 532 So. 2d at 1056.
77. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text; see also FLA. STAT. § 105.051(1)(a)
(2012); Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d 795,
796–98 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam).
78. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d
at 797–98.
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According to published reports, Ackerman resigned so he could collect
a lump sum retirement payout of nearly $1.3 million.79 He informed the
same reporter that he intended to return to the bench “next year” as a result
of his de facto reelection.80 However, if he returned to the bench before an
unspecified date in 2011, he would be required to return the lump sum payment.81
With that in mind, the court made it clear that it did not appreciate what
it may have perceived as Judge Ackerman’s attempt to manipulate the system, especially when it had a negative impact on the citizens Judge Ackerman was sworn to serve.82 “The consideration that must predominate here is
the right of the people of Escambia County to the services of a county judge
when the incumbent has presented himself to the people for reelection but
then has laid aside the duties of his office.”83 The court continued by stating,
“[a] judgeship is not an office that may be temporarily forsaken at will for
personal benefit. When a vacancy arises from such circumstances, the Governor may properly fill the vacancy by appointment pursuant to article V,
section 11(b).”84
The “from such circumstances” portion of the last sentence quoted
above seems to indicate that the situation was unique, and if the circumstances warrant, a different outcome may be in the offing.85 Nevertheless, the
decision that an unopposed candidate was deemed elected at the conclusion
of the qualifying period has compounded the problem for those who provide
opinions on such matters such as the Florida Attorney General and the Florida Department of State Division of Elections.86

79. Kris Wernowsky, Judge’s Quick Exit Nets $1.3 Million, PENSACOLA NEWS J., May
27, 2010, at 1A.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d
at 797–98.
83. Id. at 797 (citing In re Advisory Op. to the Governor (Judicial Vacancies), 600 So. 2d
460, 462 (Fla. 1992)).
84. Id. at 798 (emphasis added); see also FLA. CONST. art. V, §11(b).
85. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So. 3d
at 798.
86. See id. at 797; see also 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 2 (2010) (letter from Donald
L. Palmer, Dir., Div. of Elections, to The Honorable Deborah Clark, Pinellas Cnty. Supervisor
of Elections, July 26, 2010), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/new/
2010/de1009.pdf; Requirements for Qualification for Legislative Office, 72-224 Fla. Op.
Att’y Gen., 384–85 (1972).
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MOST RECENT ADVISORY OPINION

A July 26, 2010 letter from the Division of Elections highlights the dilemma faced by those who render opinions on election matters.87 The Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections requested an interpretation of the Election
Code as it pertained to when state legislators and county commissioners were
considered elected.88
The Pinellas County Supervisor of Elections asserted that it was logical
that a candidate be considered “officially elected on the date when the election results are certified as official.”89 The Division of Elections’ response
highlighted the uncertainty created by the Ackerman decision: “While this
may be a proper conclusion under some circumstances, it is not possible or
practicable for the Division to definitively establish this as the election date
for all purposes under the Election Code.”90
Addressing the Ackerman decision, the Division of Elections stated that
when a candidate is considered elected depends on the facts presented.91
“[A] candidate could be deemed elected on Election Day, on the date when
the final canvassing board certifies the election results, on a date specified by
a court in an election case, or some other date as dictated by the particular
factual circumstances at issue.”92
A candidate elected on the date that the canvassing board meets to certify the results of the election is impractical, “consider[ing] that an ‘election’ .
. . trigger[s] . . . deadlines and activities that occur both before and after Election Day.”93

87. See 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 1–2.
88. Id. at 1.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1, 2 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 2, 4; see also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10; FLA. STAT. § 100.181 (2012).
92. 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 2.
93. Id. at 3; see also FLA. CONST. art. III, § 3(a) (stating that the legislature shall convene
“[o]n the fourteenth day following each general election . . . [for] organization and selection of
officers”); FLA. STAT. § 101.68(2)(a) (2009) (amended 2011) (“The county canvassing board
may begin the canvassing of absentee ballots at 7 a.m. on the sixth day before the election, but
not later than noon on the day following the election.”); FLA. STAT. § 101.657(d) (2009)
(amended 2011) (“Early voting shall begin on the 15th day before an election and end on the
2nd day before an election.”); FLA. STAT. § 97.053(6) (2006) (amended 2007) (stating that a
“provisional ballot shall be counted . . . if the applicant presents evidence . . . sufficient to
verify [certain information provided on the application by] 5 p.m. of the second day following
the election”).
Obviously, these constitutionally and statutorily-mandated activities depend on an election taking place on a date certain, and that date being Election Day. If an election ends when the results are certified, it would be meaningless for a voter applicant to submit information to verify
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The Division of Elections letter concludes by providing that it may be
practical, although not legal, to consider a candidate as being elected when
the results are certified.94 As a matter of fact, opinion 82-26 by the Division
of Elections opined that very fact.95 Unfortunately, “[h]owever, the Florida
Constitution, Florida Election Code, and related authorities conclusively
establish that a candidate may be deemed ‘elected’ on another day, e.g., the
day of an ‘election’ under a particular factual situation.”96 “In fact, section
100.181 [of the Florida Statutes] entitled ‘Determination of person elected,’
without mentioning the certification of results, merely states: ‘The person
receiving the highest number of votes cast in a general or special election for
an office shall be elected to the office.’”97
VI. CONCLUSION
It is imperative that the uncertainty surrounding when a candidate for
public office in Florida is considered elected be resolved. That should be
done, not only for the candidates, but also for the Division of Elections, the
county supervisors of elections, and city and county attorneys charged with
advising candidates and elected officials about what may constitute a violation of the Florida Sunshine Law, among other things.
The uncertainty should, and could, be easily remedied if the Florida
Legislature simply reviewed the various election statutes and made them
consistent, or simply wrote an additional election statute that addressed the
issue.98 Of course, it is essential that any new statutes, or amendments to
existing statutes, do not conflict with the Florida Constitution.99 In addition,

his or her application on the second day following the election, or to allow the county canvassing board to begin canvassing absentee ballots on the day following the election.

10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 3.
94. 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 3–4; see also FLA. STAT. § 100.181.
95. 82-26 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections (1982) (letter from Div. of Elections to Mr. Martin J.
Hanna, Assistant City Attorney, City of Coral Gables, Nov. 10, 1982), available at http://
election.dos.state.Fl.us/opinions/new/1982/de8226.pdf.
96. 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 3–4; see also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11; FLA. STAT. §
105.051(1)(c); Advisory Op. to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So.
3d 795, 796 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam).
97. 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 4 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 100.181).
98. See Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288, 289–90 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 1973) (examining the interpretation of FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1)); see also 10-09 Fla. Op. Div. of Elections 3–4.
99. See State v. Grassi, 532 So. 2d 1055, 1056 (Fla. 1988); see also FLA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1(e).
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a constitutional amendment would also be in order if there were provisions in
the Florida Constitution that conflict with one another.100
Finally, the answer to when a candidate for public office in Florida is
considered officially elected can be boiled down to the first two words a
first-year law student learns when asked a question…“it depends.”

100. See Advisory Op. to the Governor re: Appointment or Election of Judges, 824 So. 2d
132, 136 (Fla. 2002).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Article I, section 11 of the Florida Constitution states: “No person shall
be imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.”1 This provision has been
* Jeannette M. Watkin, Esq., J.D., Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law
Center, 2012, B.A., Florida International University, 1999. Ms. Watkin practices at JWatkin
Law, P.A. where she concentrates her practice in family and marital law matters. The author
dedicates this paper to her wonderful children for believing in their mom, her remarkable
parents for their unconditional love, her exceptional boyfriend and kids for their encouragement, and the rest of her family for their patience and support. The author wishes to extend a
special thank you to Professors Brion Blackwelder and Ross Baer for their advice and guid-
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judicially interpreted to exempt child support and alimony.2 The public policy rationale behind this exception is that it is a duty owed to the child, the
spouse, and to society as a whole.3 Florida does not enforce equitable distribution awards through contempt because such awards are considered debt
among spouses and the Florida Constitution prohibits imprisonment for
debt.4 Other states—like Arkansas, Iowa, Texas, North Carolina, New York,
Oklahoma, and Ohio—have constitutional prohibitions against imprisonment
for debt, but differ from Florida’s judicial interpretation of debt and the use
of contempt for the willful violation of an equitable distribution award, within the context of child support and alimony.5 This paper proposes the idea
that equitable distribution awards in Florida should not fall within the constitutional definition of “debt” and should therefore not be exempted from being enforced through contempt proceedings.
In 1981, Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”) tried to obtain some guidance as to what “debt” means for purposes of family law.6
The court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida as one of
great public importance: Whether a spouse can be held in contempt of court
for failing to pay a bank loan that was unrelated to alimony.7 The high court
did not issue an opinion.8 Without any guidance as to this matter, Florida’s
district courts have interpreted the constitutional provisions to include equitable distribution in the definition of “debt.”9
ance in writing this paper. Lastly, the author wishes to thank the Nova Law Review for their
hard work.
1. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
2. Gibson v. Bennett, 561 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1990) (citing State ex rel. Krueger v.
Stone, 188 So. 575, 576 (Fla. 1939)).
3. Fishman v. Fishman, 656 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1995) (citing Gibson, 561 So. 2d at
570).
4. Kea v. Kea, 839 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Schminkey v.
Schminkey, 400 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981)); see also FLA. CONST. art. I, §
11; Burke v. Burke, 336 So. 2d 1237, 1238 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Jeff Lefkowitz,
Note, Property Division Obligations and the Constitutional Prohibition of Imprisonment for
Debt, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1310 (1980).
5. Compare Kea, 839 So. 2d at 904 (citing Schminkey, 400 So. 2d at 122), with ARK.
CONST. art. II, § 16, and IOWA CONST. art. I, § 19, and OHIO CONST. art. I, § 15, and OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 13, and Intrator v. Intrator, 929 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Div. 2011), and
Cobb v. Cobb, 282 S.E.2d 591, 594 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (citing N.C. CONST. art. I, § 28), and
Ex parte Anderson, 541 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, §
18; Ex parte Sutherland, 526 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. 1975)).
6. See Schminkey, 400 So. 2d at 121–22; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
7. Schminkey, 400 So. 2d at 122.
8. See id.
9. See Kea, 839 So. 2d at 904 (citing Hobbs v. Hobbs, 518 So. 2d 439, 440–41 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Marks v. Marks, 457 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
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Florida’s rationale for disallowing contempt for equitable distribution is
based on the concept that transfer of money among spouses in the form of
cash,10 securities and bonds,11 repayment of a mortgage,12 or repayment of a
debt to a third party13 pursuant to a final judgment, is considered debt among
spouses.14 The end result is an unfair situation where spouses—who have
jointly acquired assets throughout the duration of their marriage—are afforded only creditor-debtor remedies to enforce otherwise equitable distribution awards.15
II.

THE TERM “SUPPORT” PURSUANT TO THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION

For more than a century, the Supreme Court of Florida has recognized
child support and alimony as exceptions to the no imprisonment for debt
clause.16 As early as 1901, the court in Bronk v. State,17 recognized the right
of alimony and child support as the responsibility of the spouse with the
higher ability to maintain the other spouse “arising out of the duties incident
to the marital status.”18 These exceptions are enforced through contempt
because the court is not enforcing a debt, rather a duty owed to the former
spouse,19 the children, and a “personal duty” from the payor spouse to society
as a whole.20

Ball v. Ball, 440 So. 2d 677, 679 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983)); La Roche v. La Roche, 662
So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Hertrich v. Hertrich, 643 So. 2d 115,
116 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam); Veiga v. State, 561 So. 2d 1335, 1336 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)).
10. See Braswell v. Braswell, 881 So. 2d 1193, 1198–99 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
11. See Lakin v. Lakin, 901 So. 2d 186, 189–90 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing
FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6) (2012)).
12. Kea, 839 So. 2d at 904.
13. Schminkey, 400 So. 2d at 122.
14. Kea, 839 So. 2d at 904; Schminkey, 400 So. 2d at 121.
15. Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citing DeSantis v. DeSantis, 714 So. 2d 637, 638 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
16. See, e.g., Bronk v. State, 31 So. 248, 252 (Fla. 1901) (analyzing FLA. CONST. art. I, §
11).
17. 31 So. 248 (Fla. 1901).
18. See id. at 251–52.
19. Riley v. Riley, 509 So. 2d 1366, 1368–69 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (citing State
ex rel. Krueger v. Stone, 188 So. 575, 576 (Fla. 1939); Bronk, 31 So. at 252; Howard v. Howard, 118 So. 2d 90, 94 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1960)).
20. Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Alfred A. Colby, Some Proposed Changes to the Florida
Constitution, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1519, 1521–22 (1994).
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Equitable distribution in Florida is enforced through contempt when the
basis is in the nature of support,21 or in cases that include transfer of real
property.22 Over the years, Florida has broadened its contempt powers but
not far enough to include equitable distribution awards.23 In Pabian v. Pabian,24 the Fourth DCA found that car payments pursuant to the final judgment were in the form of support.25 The husband was held in contempt for
failure to make the car payments and the court explained that a car is in the
nature of support, just like food and shelter, because of the important “role
which an automobile plays in our daily lives.”26 In Cummings v. Cummings,27 the Fourth DCA found the first two lump sum equitable distribution
payments were contemplated as support payments for the wife and the children.28 The husband had the ability, but willfully failed to pay, and therefore,
contempt was appropriate.29
III. CONTEMPT OF TRANSFER OF MONEY PAYMENTS VS. PROPERTY
INTEREST
In Florida, when enforcing equitable distribution awards, relief is usually limited to the ordinary claims between debtor and creditor.30 However,
many courts will use contempt when the interest being conveyed is a property interest, and not a monetary payment.31 Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.570(c)(2) allows a court to enforce its orders, requiring performance of an
act through contempt.32 Florida Family Law Rule of Procedure 12.570 incorporates Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.570, which means that a family

21. E.g., Cummings v. Cummings, 37 So. 3d 287, 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(citing Pabian v. Pabian, 480 So. 2d 237, 238 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985)); Zuccarello v.
Zuccarello, 429 So. 2d 68, 69 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
22. See, e.g., Pennington v. Pennington, 390 So. 2d 809, 809–10 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
23. See Marks & Colby, supra note 20, at 1525–26.
24. 480 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
25. Id. at 238.
26. Id.
27. 37 So. 3d 287 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
28. Id. at 290–91.
29. Id. at 291.
30. Carlin v. Carlin, 310 So. 2d 403, 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (per curiam)
(citing Howell v. Howell, 207 So. 2d 507, 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968)).
31. 3 BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 9:17, at 64–65 (3d ed.
2005).
32. FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.570(c)(2).
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judge “may hold a spouse in contempt for fail[ure] to [abide by] a specific
act” as stated in a final judgment.33
For example, in Riley v. Riley,34 the trial court held the husband in contempt for failing to abide by the settlement agreement that required the husband to name the “former wife, as [the] beneficiary of a life insurance policy.”35 The Fifth DCA affirmed that contempt was appropriate because the
husband was required to do a specific act as required by the final dissolution
of marriage, rather than pay money.36 Likewise, in Burke v. Burke,37 the final
judgment of dissolution ordered the husband to execute and deliver various
documents necessary to release the wife’s interest in a note and mortgage
and to transfer securities to the wife.38 The husband was held in contempt for
failing to execute and deliver the documents.39 The Fourth DCA affirmed,
stating that “the trial court’s order of compliance, was in effect a mandatory
order for the specific performance of that act.”40 The husband was not required to pay money, but rather perform an act, and his refusal to abide by
the court order “was willful and deliberate and not caused by his inability to
comply.”41 Similarly, in Firestone v. Ferguson,42 the final judgment ordered
the sale of the parties’ farm at a specific price.43 The wife refused to execute
the sale documents and was held in contempt.44 The Third DCA affirmed,
explaining that the wife was required to perform the act of executing the sale
documents.45
In contrast, when a final divorce judgment requires one spouse to pay
monies not in the nature of support, then the constitutional provisions of article I, section 11 are implicated.46 In McQuady v. McQuady,47 the parties
borrowed $15,000 for a business loan using as collateral the wife’s separate

33. Roth v. Roth, 973 So. 2d 580, 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008), review dismissed, 36
So. 3d 84 (Fla. 2010); see also FLA R. CIV. P. 1.570; FLA. FAM. L. R. P. 12.570.
34. 509 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
35. Id. at 1367.
36. Id. at 1370.
37. 336 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
38. Id. at 1238.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 372 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
43. Id. at 491.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 492.
46. McQuady v. McQuady, 523 So. 2d 785, 786 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (citing
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11).
47. 523 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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property.48 In a separate agreement, the husband agreed to indemnify the
wife and pay back the loan without any duty on her part.49 The final divorce
judgment ordered the wife to pay the loan and ordered “the husband to pay
the wife $15,000 ‘as lump sum alimony’ at $250 per month” over five
years.50 The husband appealed and argued that he should not be forced to
pay alimony “as a tool to accomplish an equitable distribution,” and the appellate court held that the husband could not be held in contempt for failing
to pay the wife $15,000 because it violated Florida’s imprisonment for debt
clause, despite their prior agreement.51
IV. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION DECREES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
“DEBTS” WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 OF FLORIDA’S
CONSTITUTION FOR PUBLIC POLICY REASONS
Successful marriages usually require spouses to forego certain career
opportunities for the benefit of one another.52 The law recognizes those sacrifices, and therefore, acknowledges that one spouse may be more financially independent and successful than the other.53 Courts usually compensate
for this disparity by granting unequal property awards and any other relief
they find equitable in light of the circumstances.54 “Specific obligations of
one party to deliver property to an ex-spouse should be viewed in light of
this underlying purpose.”55 The law should not view final divorce decrees as
a common commercial affair, but rather take into account the nature of the
marriage relationship.56 It seems only logical that the assets accumulated
through joint efforts and joint economies of the parties during their marriage
be enforced in the same manner as child support and alimony.57 Public policy supports the idea that final judgment decrees be enforced through contempt since it involves rights and obligations from one spouse to the other.58
The reality is that without contempt of court to compel compliance with
equitable distribution awards, the courts are powerless to compel transfers of

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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Id. at 786.
Id.
Id.
Id. 786–87 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11).
Lefkowitz, supra note 4, at 1315.
Id.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 61.075(1)(a)–(j) (2012).
Lefkowitz, supra note 4, at 1315.
Id. at 1314.
See id. at 1313.
See id. (citing Ex parte Davis, 111 S.W. 394, 396 (Tex. 1908)).
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cash, stocks, bonds, or property, which are unrelated to support.59 Jailing a
party who refuses to comply with a court order by contempt is “the most
effective [remedy] of enforcing divorce judgments.”60 Contempt and jail
time are unpleasant affairs, and therefore, people will usually comply with a
court order to avoid incarceration.61 The following are public policy reasons
why the judiciary, through case law, should except equitable distribution
from Florida’s no imprisonment for debt clause.
A. Delivery of an Asset Pursuant to a Final Divorce Judgment Should Not
Be Considered Payment of a Debt
Florida Statute section 61.075 defines marital assets as
(a) Assets acquired . . . during the marriage, individually by either
spouse or jointly by them; (b) [t]he enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital assets resulting either from the efforts of
either party during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or other forms of marital assets,
or both; (c) [i]nterspousal gifts during the marriage; (d) [a]ll vested
and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during the marriage in retirement, pension . . . and insurance plans and pro62
grams.

Marital assets, as defined by statute, previously belonged to both husband and wife, however titled.63 Derivation of the marital property may have
been from enhancement, active appreciation, non-interspousal gifts or joint
efforts during the marriage.64 Upon entry of a final judgment, Florida case
law states that if the equitable distribution is not in the form of support, it is a
debt, and the violating spouse cannot be incarcerated via the contempt power
for non-payment.65 The enforcement problem begins when the equitable
distribution is characterized as a debt.66 The court has previously established
that debt is a marital asset for purposes of equitable distribution.67 This cha59. See, e.g., Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(citing La Roche v. La Roche, 662 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995)).
60. Lefkowitz, supra note 4, at 1307.
61. See id.
62. FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6)(a)1.a.–d. (2012).
63. Id. § 61.075(6)(a)1.a.
64. Id. § 61.075(6)(a)1.b.
65. See Cummings v. Cummings, 37 So. 3d 287, 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010);
Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
66. See Kea v. Kea, 839 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
67. See Kadanec, 765 So. 2d at 886.
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racterization is contrary to the modern conception of what a debt is.68 First,
parties to a dissolution of marriage are joint owners of certain assets classified as marital property in the equitable distribution.69 Upon dissolution, a
duty to separate assets is obligatory among the spouses and should not imply
the creation of a debt because the assets previously belonged to both.70 To
comply with constitutional provisions, the court should inquire whether an
ability to pay the equitable distribution exists.71 If the court finds that a
spouse willfully refuses to comply, then contempt is appropriate since the
payor spouse holds “the key to his [own jail] cell.”72
Second, a marital duty to deliver or pay is not the same as a debtor’s obligation to a creditor.73 The Supreme Court of Florida stated in State ex rel.
Lanz v. Dowling74 that debt is within the meaning of the Florida Constitution,75 and debt “must be those arising exclusively from actions ex contractu.”76 Black’s Law Dictionary defines ex contractu as “[a]rising from a contract.”77 The general idea of dividing property belonging to spouses is very
different than “the arm’s length transaction between the [commercial] debtor
and creditor.”78 “Marriage . . . is not a matter of commerce, nor . . . a contract” in which debts are incurred.79 Rather, it “is a basic social institution of
the highest type and importance, in which society at large has a vital interest.”80 The constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt was meant
to apply to debts arising under the law, not from marital status.81 The obliga68. Compare id., with State ex rel. Lanz v. Dowling, 110 So. 522, 525 (Fla. 1926), and
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 648 (9th ed. 2009).
69. See FLA. STAT. § 61.075(6)(a)2.
70. See, e.g., Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. 1979).
71. See id.
72. Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1977) (citing Demetree v. State ex rel.
Marsh, 89 So. 2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1956); Faircloth v. Faircloth, 321 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1975); In re S.L.T., 180 So. 2d 374, 379 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965)); see also
Pabian v. Pabian, 480 So. 2d 237, 238–39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
73. See Dowling, 110 So. at 525 (citing Carr v. State, 17 So. 350, 352 (Ala. 1895)); Kea
v. Kea, 839 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
74. 110 So. 522 (Fla. 1926).
75. Id. at 525 (noting that “the [F]ederal Constitution [has] no such provision” regarding
imprisonment for debt and suggesting that one must look to state definitions to interpret the
definition); see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
76. Dowling, 110 So. at 525 (citing Carr, 17 So. at 352).
77. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 648 (9th ed. 2009).
78. Lefkowitz, supra note 4, at 1315.
79. Holloway v. Holloway, 198 N.E. 579, 580 (Ohio 1935).
80. Id.
81. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Lenger, 336 N.W.2d 191, 193 (Iowa 1983) (quoting
Roberts v. Fuller, 229 N.W. 163, 167 (Iowa 1930)); Viajes Lesana, Inc. v. Saavedra, 15 P.R.
Offic. Trans. 927, 929 (P.R. 1984).
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tion to comply with equitable distribution awards is a duty that “arises out of
the marital relationship and not [from] a business [negotiation].”82 Therefore, when the Florida Constitution speaks about debt, the term should be
construed and defined as a contract arising out of business relationships, and
is not applicable in the marriage context.83
B. Incarceration Is a Means to Punish the Willful Violation of a Court
Order, Not for the Debt
The Florida Constitution currently prohibits the incarceration of a person due to debt,84 and the courts have construed the refusal to abide by the
equitable distribution within a final judgment decree as debt.85 This is because under the judicial construction of the Florida Constitution, the surrendering of marital assets not related to support is ordinary debt.86 Therefore,
courts protect a willful violator in the same sense that they protect an indigent person from contempt regarding child support, or commercial debtors
from creditors.87
How is a court to enforce an equitable distribution award against a willful violator without contempt of court? Historically, courts need the power
to enforce their own rulings; otherwise:
[W]ithout the power our judicial system would become a mere
mockery for a party to a cause could make of himself a judge of
the validity of orders which had been issued and by his own acts of
disobedience set them aside, thereby ultimately producing the
88
complete impotency of the judicial process.

As stated by the Riley court, “[t]oo restrictive a view of a court’s contempt
powers would render it impotent like a toothless lion, who can only roar in
dismay at the disobedience of his decrees.”89

82. California Divorce Agreements—Alimony or Property Settlement?, 2 STAN. L. REV.
731, 739–40 (1950).
83. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11; California Divorce Agreement—Alimony or Property
Settlement?, supra note 82, at 739–40.
84. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
85. See, e.g., Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886–87 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(citing DeSantis v. DeSantis, 714 So. 2d 637, 638 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
86. See, e.g., id.
87. See Demetree v. State ex rel. Marsh, 89 So. 2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1956); Kadanec, 765
So. 2d at 886.
88. Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 501.
89. Riley v. Riley, 509 So. 2d 1366, 1370 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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When a former spouse is imprisoned, it is for the willful violation of a
court order, not for the inability to pay the debt.90 The imprisonment is a
consequence of the blatant disregard for a court order and does not violate
constitutional provisions since he “‘carries the key of his prison in his own
pocket.’”91 This means that upon the compliance of the court order, the
jailed party is immediately released.92
In Florida, the courts do inquire as to whether the alleged contemnor
has the ability to pay.93 Recognition that the Florida Constitution allows
contempt to enforce equitable distribution awards promotes respect for the
courts and the judicial system.94 Contempt powers are useful because they
“enable[] courts to persuade parties to obey a prior order or decree of the
court so that such prior order will not be rendered ineffectual by recalcitrant
litigants.”95 The Florida Constitution allows supreme court judges, appellate
judges, and circuit court judges the jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus.96 It states that the courts “[m]ay issue . . . all writs necessary [or proper]
to the complete exercise of [their] jurisdiction.”97 Therefore, it defies logic
that the courts would be rendered powerless to execute their own orders in
the family context, and allow willful violators to disregard the court order
without any consequence.
C.

Unjust Enrichment

“The doctrine [of unjust enrichment] is a recognition that a person is accountable to another on the ground that if the former were not required to do
so, he would unjustly benefit, or the other would unjustly suffer loss.”98 The
willful violator is unjustly enriched when he fails to comply with the equitable distribution award while the payee spouse has to spend money to enforce
the award by hiring lawyers to pursue a civil remedy. Contempt of court is
90. Id. at 1368 (citing State ex rel. Krueger v. Stone, 188 So. 575, 576 (Fla. 1939); Bronk
v. State, 31 So. 248, 251 (Fla. 1901); Howard v. Howard, 118 So. 2d 90, 94 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1960)).
91. Id.; Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 501 (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir.
1902)).
92. Demetree, 89 So. 2d at 501.
93. Elliott v. Bradshaw, 59 So. 3d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (per curiam)
(citing Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So. 2d 1274, 1277 (Fla. 1985)).
94. See Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d 841, 843 (Tex. 1979) (citing Ex parte Browne, 543
S.W.2d 82, 86 (Tex. 1976)).
95. Id. at 844 (citing Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 545 (Tex. 1976)).
96. FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 3(b)(9), 4(b)(3), 5(b).
97. Id. § 3(b)(7); see also id. §§ 4(b)(3), 5(b).
98. Golden v. Woodward, 15 So. 3d 664, 669 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (alterations in
original) (citing Circle Fin. Co. v. Peacock, 399 So. 2d 81, 84 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981)).
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an easy remedy, for both the courts and for the spouse seeking to enforce the
award. The public policy for allowing contempt is twofold: First, it would
avoid unnecessary litigation in civil court to enforce a domestic matter, and
second, it would allow an effective and quick remedy to enforce the courts’
orders.
Civil law has carved out statutes of limitations, causes of action, and
remedies for unjust enrichment.99 The purpose of unjust enrichment is “‘to
prevent the wrongful [custody] of a benefit, . . . money, or property [that
belongs to someone else] in violation of good conscience and fundamental
principles of justice or equity.’”100 The family court stands as the lone exception to the enforcement of unjust enrichment by failing to enforce equitable distribution awards.
It is a waste of resources for a spouse to file a civil suit to enforce a marital obligation and only be afforded a creditor-debtor remedy.101 Further, the
payee spouse may not have the financial means to pursue a civil remedy, and
therefore the equitable distribution award will be uncollectable, thereby
enriching the payor spouse.102 In Murphy v. Murphy,103 the Third DCA held
that the husband could not be held in contempt for failing to pay over
$108,000 in special equity to the wife without explicit findings that he “‘had
the [financial] ability to comply with the order and [had] willfully refused to
do so.’”104 In Kadanec v. Kadanec,105 the husband failed to pay the wife
“$20,945 as equitable distribution of the [h]usband’s profit sharing plan,”
and was held in contempt by the trial court.106 The Second DCA “reversed
because property division awards may not be enforced by contempt.”107 In
the case at bar, the wife was denied alimony and only received half of the
husband’s pension valued at $20,945.108 The court ordered a money payment
of $20,945, which the wife was unable to enforce through contempt.109 The
99. See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.110(a)–(b); 1 NORM LACOE, LA COE’S PLEADINGS UNDER THE
FLORIDA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WITH FORMS R. 1.110(427), at 590–91 (2011 ed.).
100. Golden, 15 So. 3d at 670 (quoting Henry M. Butler, Inc. v. Trizec Props., Inc., 524
So. 2d 710, 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
101. See Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Murphy
v. Murphy, 370 So. 2d 403, 409 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
102. See Murphy, 370 So. 2d at 409.
103. 370 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
104. Id. at 409 (quoting Adams v. Adams, 357 So. 2d 264, 265 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1978)).
105. 765 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
106. Id. at 886.
107. Id. (citing La Roche v. La Roche, 662 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1995)).
108. Id. at 885.
109. Id. at 886.
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consequence of lack of contempt was to deprive the wife of the asset, as if
she had not received anything at all, and to unjustly enrich the husband by
keeping the full pension valued at $41,890.110 Contempt is an efficient and
effective tool for enforcing family court laws.111 When contempt is unavailable, the remedies become very expensive for the payee spouse (i.e. hiring an
attorney to enforce through specific performance or creditor-debtor remedy,
or even worse, not enforcing at all).112
D.

Undermining Settlement Agreements

Under certain circumstances, parties in mediation or in private agreements waive certain benefits to obtain others.113 For example, a spouse may
waive years of alimony for a quicker and more immediate equitable distribution payment.114 However, if enforcements of property settlement agreements are not upheld by Florida courts, the quicker and more immediate
payment of money, as originally bargained for, is a fictitious proposition.
The spouse that trades his right to alimony forever waives the claim, and is
left with neither alimony nor equitable distribution monies.
In Randall v. Randall,115 the former wife, in an open court agreement,
waived alimony in exchange for a one-half ownership and one-half equity
value in the parties’ business valued at $500,000, which was titled in the
husband’s name.116 The husband was responsible for getting the business “in
order,” otherwise, the wife would take over the operations.117 The husband
was given permission to pay certain debts of the parties from the cash flow
of the business.118 Five months after the final judgment was ordered, the
court entered an order finding that the husband had “violated virtually every
provision of the final” divorce decree, and left the business worthless.119 The
court ordered the husband to report whether he had paid the wife $250,000 or
110. See Kadanec, 765 So. 2d at 886.
111. See Family Law Blog: Power of Contempt in Post Judgment Enforcement Cases, L.
OFFS. JAMES S. CUNHA, P.A. (June 26, 2012), http://jcunhalaw.com/lawyer/2012/06/26
/Post_Judgment_Enforcement/Power_of_Contempt_in_Post_Judgment_Enforcement_Cases_
bl4488.htm.
112. E.g., Kadanec, 765 So. 2d at 886 (citing DeSantis v. DeSantis, 714 So. 2d 637, 638
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
113. See Randall v. Randall, 948 So. 2d 71, 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
114. See id.
115. 948 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
116. Id. at 71.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 71–72.
119. Id. at 72.
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sold the warehouse.120 If he did not, he would be held in contempt and could
only purge himself of contempt by complying with the order.121 In Randall,
we see a spouse who took advantage of the fact that his wife waived alimony
for a larger equitable distribution award.122 The husband sought to avoid
paying his wife by making the asset worthless.123 In this case, the appellate
court provided equity to the wife.124 Had the court not used its contempt
power, the husband would have been able to take advantage of his wife and
the court by simply not complying with the agreement without any repercussion.
V.

ALLOWING CONTEMPT FOR FINAL DIVORCE DECREES—THE
EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS

In Florida, there are minimal remedies available to enforce equitable
distribution,125 and therefore the wise thing to do is to include the source of
payment in the final judgment. Another possible solution is to enter an injunction preventing dissipation of those assets when one spouse owes money
to the other or when a judge makes findings as to the existence of property or
assets.126 These remedies would enforce the payment to the payee spouse,
and save the judicial system time from hearing these matters. In addition, the
Florida Statutes should enforce equitable distribution with the same remedies available for child support and alimony: “Attachment or garnishment,”127 “suspension or denial of professional licenses and certificates,”128
and “[s]uspension of driver’s licenses and motor vehicle registrations.”129
Enforcement of equitable distribution awards is unnecessarily problematic
without action by the courts or the legislature.

120. Randall, 948 So. 2d at 72–73.
121. Id. at 73.
122. See id. at 71–72.
123. Id. at 72.
124. See id. at 74–75.
125. 2 JUDGE RENEE GOLDENBERG, FLORIDA FAMILY LAW & PRACTICE § 21:05, at 21-8
(rev. 6 2011).
126. See Benjamin M. Ellis, Note, Protecting the Right to Marital Property: Ensuring a
Full Equitable Distribution Award with Fraudulent Conveyance Law, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
1709, 1740 (2009).
127. FLA. STAT. § 61.12 (2012).
128. Id. § 61.13015.
129. Id. § 61.13016.
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VI. CONTEMPT ARISING OUT OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN
OTHER STATES DO NOT VIOLATE THE STATE CONSTITUTION’S “NO
IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT” CLAUSE
Various states endorse the view that contempt proceedings should be
enforced when one party willfully fails to comply with an equitable distribution award.130 In Brown v. Brown,131 an Arkansas case, the parties had “incorporat[ed] a property settlement agreement” into the divorce decree, which
required the husband to pay the wife $50,000.132 “[P]rior to [the] divorce,
[the husband] filed for voluntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy” and claimed that he
was financially unable to pay his wife, but he never rendered a Chapter 11
plan, nor informed the court about a farming partnership he held with his
mother.133 The trial court found that the husband “willfully fail[ed] to comply with” the order and held him in contempt of court.134 The husband appealed, arguing that his imprisonment violated article II, section 16 of the
Arkansas Constitution for imprisonment of debt.135 The Supreme Court of
Arkansas stated that “neither the bankruptcy [court] nor, . . . the chancellor,
believed” that the husband was unable to pay the wife.136 The husband
created his own inability to pay; therefore contempt was proper and did not
violate the Arkansas Constitution.137
The Supreme Court of Iowa similarly found in In re Marriage of Lenger,138 that the husband was in contempt of court when he willfully failed to
pay any part of the property settlement agreement to the wife, which consisted of a car and $55,000 payable in installments.139 The court held that
contempt was appropriate and would not violate article I, section 19 of the
Iowa Constitution for imprisonment of debt because it is necessary to enforce
provisions of a divorce decree, despite it being independent from child support and alimony matters.140 The court reasoned that a debt, as referenced in
130. E.g., Brown v. Brown, 809 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Ark. 1991); Intrator v. Intrator, 929
N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Div. 2011).
131. 809 S.W.2d 808 (Ark. 1991).
132. Id. at 808.
133. Id. at 808–09.
134. Id. at 808.
135. Id.
136. Brown, 809 S.W.2d at 809.
137. Id. (citing Ex parte Coffelt, 389 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Ark. 1965)).
138. 336 N.W.2d 191 (Iowa 1983).
139. Id. at 191.
140. Id. at 192–93 (citing Callenius v. Blair, 309 N.W.2d 415, 418–19 (Iowa 1981); Roach
v. Oliver, 244 N.W. 899, 902 (Iowa 1932) (per curiam); Roberts v. Fuller, 229 N.W. 163,
167–68 (Iowa 1930)); see IOWA CONST. art. I, § 19.
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the Iowa Constitution, is defined as “an obligation growing out of a business
transaction, and not to an obligation arising from the existence of the marital
status.”141 Last, the court stated that the imprisonment was not only a punishment for the owing of monies, but also for the willful violation of a court
order.142 Contempt of court was proper and not rendered a debt within the
meaning of the Iowa Constitution.143
In Conrad v. Conrad,144 the husband failed to transfer over stock certificates and monies to the wife pursuant to a final judgment.145 The Court of
Appeals of North Carolina allowed the husband to be released from jail upon
the transfer of the property to the wife.146 The court further obliged the husband to pay for the wife’s attorney’s fees, as well as compensate her for the
stock split and the dividends that occurred due to his failure to comply with
the final judgment while he was incarcerated.147
New York also endorses the view that contempt orders are enforceable
when parties violate equitable distribution orders.148 In Intrator v. Intrator,149
the court made an equitable distribution that mandated the husband to pay
the wife, among other things, half of the proceeds of their boat if sold and
half of the equity if not sold.150 The husband refused to do so for a period of
over two years, and the wife filed for contempt of court for arrears as well as
the boat payment.151 Subsequently, the parties entered into a stipulation
where the husband was going to use his best efforts to pay the wife a settlement amount of $131,000, as well as sell the boat.152 In the stipulation, even
though the wife waived her ability to hold the husband in contempt of court
for failing to pay the judgment amount, the husband’s refusal to sell the boat
was not waived by the stipulation.153 He was therefore held in contempt of
court for failing to pay the wife her portion of the equal distribution.154
Similarly, Oklahoma has a no imprisonment for debt clause in its constitution under article II, section 13.155 In McCrary v. McCrary,156 the Su141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

In re Marriage of Lenger, 336 N.W.2d at 193 (quoting Roberts, 229 N.W. at 167).
Id. (quoting Roberts, 229 N.W. at 167); see Roach, 244 N.W. at 902.
In re Marriage of Lenger, 336 N.W.2d at 193 (quoting Roberts, 229 N.W. at 167).
348 S.E.2d 349 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
See id. at 350.
See id. at 349–50 (citing Blair v. Blair, 173 S.E.2d 513, 514 (N.C. Ct. App. 1970)).
Id. at 350.
See Intrator v. Intrator, 929 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (App. Div. 2011).
929 N.Y.S.2d 587 (App. Div. 2011).
Id. at 588.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 589.
Intrator, 929 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 13.
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preme Court of Oklahoma found no constitutional violation when the former
wife filed contempt for the former husband’s failure to comply with a final
divorce judgment to pay the couple’s back income tax liability.157 The court
stated that the Oklahoma Constitution expressly provides for contempt as a
means of punishment, and its purpose is twofold: First, as punishment for
willful violation of a court order, and second, by obtaining compliance of a
court order.158 Furthermore, the court explained that when a spouse has the
means to comply with the final divorce decree, “and fails to do so, [the court
finds] a willful disobedience” that takes it out of the constitutional provision
against imprisonment for debt.159
Another state supporting this proposition is Ohio.160 In Harris v. Har161
ris, the Supreme Court of Ohio ratified that contempt proceedings do not
violate the no imprisonment for debt clause162 for willful violations of a final
divorce judgment.163 The husband failed in his obligation164 to transfer a
Buick automobile to the wife and pay the debts owed on the car, plus
$60,000.165 The wife filed for contempt and the husband argued violation of
state constitutional provisions.166 The court affirmed the contempt order and
reasoned that to enforce contempt based on the label of the terms in a divorce
agreement, whether it is property settlement, alimony, or child support, is
arbitrary and artificial.167 Property settlement agreements, child support, and
alimony all fall under the marital exceptions in the Ohio Constitution.168
Furthermore, the use of contempt to enforce final divorce judgments supports
the public policy of allowing the distribution of assets that have been accumulated throughout the marriage by the parties.169
In Ex parte Gorena,170 the Supreme Court of Texas analyzed whether its
no imprisonment for debt clause in article I, section 18 of the Texas Consti156. 723 P.2d 268 (Okla. 1986).
157. Id. at 270–71.
158. Id. at 271 (citing Burnett v. State, 129 P. 1110, 1117–18 (Okla. Crim. App. 1913)).
159. Id.
160. Pugh v. Pugh, 472 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (Ohio 1984) (citing Harris v. Harris, 390
N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ohio 1979)).
161. 390 N.E.2d 789 (Ohio 1979).
162. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 15.
163. Harris, 390 N.E.2d at 794.
164. Id. at 791.
165. Id. at 794 n.1 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 791 (majority opinion).
167. Id. at 792–94 (quoting Hogan v. Hogan, 278 N.E.2d 367, 368–69 (Ohio Ct. App.
1972)).
168. Harris, 390 N.E. 2d at 792, 794; see OHIO CONST. art. I, § 15.
169. Harris, 390 N.E. 2d at 793.
170. 595 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1979).
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tution171 was violated in the family context.172 The former husband was incarcerated after refusing to pay the former wife almost half of his military
retirement benefits every month, pursuant to a final judgment decree.173 The
judge questioned whether incarcerating him for non-payment was imprisonment for debt.174 The Supreme Court of Texas reasoned that incarcerating
him was not unconstitutional since the court was merely requiring him to
surrender property that was previously joined by the spouses pursuant to the
final divorce judgment.175 Similarly, in Ex parte Anderson,176 a Texas trial
court ordered Mr. Anderson to pay his former wife a portion of his military
proceeds as long as he received it.177 When he failed to do so and was incarcerated, he alleged imprisonment for debt pursuant to the Texas Constitution,
article I, section 18.178 The court first reasoned that “he is not paying a debt
to [his wife] but is surrendering the share to which [she] is legally entitled.”179 Additionally, the court reasoned that his status as trustee does not
change into that of a debtor when he pays directly to the wife instead of depositing directly into the court registry to then forward it to his wife.180 Lastly, the court held that a huge burden would be placed on the district clerk if
they were obliged to receive and disburse all payments, such as this.181
VII. CARVING OUT THE RELIEF THROUGH CASE LAW
Child support and alimony are exceptions, which have been carved out
from the no imprisonment clause of the Florida Constitution.182 However,
these basic exceptions have not yet been expressly accounted for in the Constitution.183 They have become common knowledge and have been recog-

171. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
172. Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d at 846; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
173. Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d at 843.
174. Id. at 846; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
175. Ex parte Gorena, 595 S.W.2d at 846 (citing Ex parte Sutherland, 526 S.W.2d 536,
539 (Tex. 1975)).
176. 541 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
177. Id. at 287.
178. Id.; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 18.
179. Ex parte Anderson, 541 S.W. 2d at 287.
180. Id. at 288.
181. Id.
182. See Gibson v. Bennett, 561 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1990) (citing State ex rel. Krueger
v. Stone, 188 So. 575, 576 (Fla. 1939)); Bronk v. State, 31 So. 248, 252 (Fla. 1901); see also
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
183. Marks & Colby, supra note 20, at 1521 n.7.
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nized through case law.184 Similarly, if courts recognize equitable distribution awards pertaining to support obligations as another exception to article I,
section 11, the exception will be carved out through judicial interpretation
until the Constitution is revised.185
VIII. CONCLUSION
Florida should use contempt as a means of enforcing equitable distribution awards in the same way it allows for enforcement of child support and
alimony.186 It constitutes public policy to enforce the division of assets that
were accumulated through joint efforts during an intact marriage.187 Florida
should join the numerous other states that enforce final divorce decrees
through contempt.188 In so doing, the Florida family courts will send a message that the surrendering of marital assets is obligatory upon a spouse and
the violation of the courts’ rulings will be enforced through contempt.189

184. See Gibson, 561 So. 2d at 570 (citing Stone, 188 So. at 576); Bronk, 31 So. at 252;
Marks & Colby, supra note 20, at 1521 n.7.
185. See Marks & Colby, supra note 20, at 1526–27; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
186. See Marks & Colby, supra note 20, at 1521.
187. Harris v. Harris, 390 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ohio 1979).
188. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 809 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Ark. 1991) (citing Ex parte Coffelt,
389 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Ark. 1965)); In re Marriage of Lenger, 336 N.W.2d 191, 192 (Iowa
1983); Conrad v. Conrad, 348 S.E.2d 349, 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986).
189. See Brown, 809 S.W.2d at 809; In re Marriage of Lenger, 336 N.W.2d at 192–93;
Conrad, 348 S.E.2d at 350. But see Kadanec v. Kadanec, 765 So. 2d 884, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (citing La Roche v. La Roche, 662 So. 2d 1018, 1019 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1995)).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Competence,1 advocacy,2 and ethics3 are the pillars of the practice of
law; almost every professional obligation an attorney has flows from one of
these three core concepts.4 An attorney must know the law.5 An attorney
must advance his client’s position.6 An attorney must do so within the confines of what his colleagues and community find acceptable.7 The concept of
a lawyer has not changed much, but how we perceive the larger legal community’s adherence to these pillars frequently shifts.8

1. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2012).
2. See id. R. 3.1–3.9.
3. See id. scope para. 16.
4. See id. R. 1.1, 3.1–3.9, scope para. 16.
5. E.g., id. R. 1.1 (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
6. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 2 (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”); see also id. R.
1.2(a) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation . . . .”).
7. See, e.g., id. pmbl. para. 5 (“A lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system
and for those who serve [in] it, including judges, other lawyers, and public officials.”). “Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer’s responsibilities to
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an ethical person
while earning a satisfactory living.” Id. pmbl. para. 9.
8. See Donald E. Campbell, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining
Civility as an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 103–07 (2011–
2012) (focusing on the rise and fall of civility and how it should be enforced going forward).
Whether the increased size of the bar has decreased collegiality, or the legal profession has become only a business, or experienced lawyers have ceased to teach new lawyers the standards
to be observed, or because of other factors not readily categorized, we observe patterns of behavior that forebode ill for our system of justice.

Dondi Props. Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 286 (N.D. Tex. 1988)
(per curiam)); see also Campbell, supra note 8, at 102. In fact, as the economy has downshifted, firms have switched practice areas or taken cases on in bulk, which has led to the
same firms being penalized or sanctioned for failing to practice in an appropriate manner.
See,e.g., Martha Neil, Federal Judge’s Unusual Order Puts Well-Known Bankruptcy Law
Firm Under Fla. Bar Scrutiny, A.B.A. J. (June 16, 2011, 5:15 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/federal_judges_unusual_order_puts_wellknown_bankruptcy_law_firm_under_fla./ (firm banned from bankruptcy court for improper
practice); Matt Chandler, Baum Settles with AG; Will Pay $4M, BUFFALO BUS. FIRST (Mar.
22, 2012, 10:38 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/buffalo/news/2012/03/22/baum-settles-
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In theory, competence, advocacy, and ethics are all equally important—
each must be given due consideration and rarely should one be considered
paramount to the other.9 But the way this practice paradigm has evolved
sometimes leaves good lawyers—and some less than good lawyers—
struggling to find a balance between what can be done and what should be
done.10
This struggle comes into clear relief when considering the tension between advocacy and ethics. An attorney may defame a party in a proceeding,
as long as such defamation has some relation to the legal proceeding, and be
immune from civil liability.11 Even if false statements were knowingly made
with malice, the immunity protects the attorney in the name of unfettered
zealous advocacy.12 The Rules of Professional Conduct, however, prohibit
an attorney from “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”13 Professionalism demands even more—honesty and fair dealing.14 Is
it fair to ask an attorney to weigh these competing interests without the benefit of clear guidance, indeed, should an attorney be required to make these
choices at all?
Three competing but complementary obligations balance with these
three core pillars of practice.15 The first obligation is to the client: to zealously represent the client, to hold that client’s confidences inviolate, and to
serve the client’s needs.16 Second, an attorney has an obligation as an officer
of the court.17 An attorney must understand that the overarching need for
justice may come before an individual client’s needs, and that the attorney
has a personal obligation to support and defend the judicial system.18 Third,
with-ag-will-pay-4m.html?page=all (firm improperly conducted high-volume foreclosure
practice by improperly authenticating documents and taking other inappropriate shortcuts).
9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 3.1–3.9, pmbl. paras. 2, 9, scope para.
16.
10. See id. scope para. 16; Campbell, supra note 8, at 104–07.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977).
12. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at
817 (5th ed. 1984); T. Leigh Anenson, Absolute Immunity from Civil Liability: Lessons for
Litigation Lawyers, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 915, 918 (2004).
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d). One would think defaming someone
with malice would be prejudicial to the administration of justice, even if the purpose was to
engage in the most complete form of advocacy.
14. See id. R. 8.4(b)–(e).
15. Id. pmbl. paras. 1, 8; see Mike Hoeflich & J. Nick Badgerow, The Regulation of
Courtesy: Does Kansas Need a Code of Professionalism?, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 413, 416
(2011).
16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), pmbl. paras. 2, 8.
17. See id. R. 3.3.
18. See, e.g., id. R. 3.3(b).
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the attorney has an obligation to the public.19 The attorney should embrace
his obligation to serve those who would not otherwise have access to the law,
and to create in the public a confidence in those who serve as attorneys.20
Reconciling these affirmative obligations to three very distinct audiences can be difficult. Over the years, rules of professional conduct have
evolved from little more than civility codes to a complete body of law that
helps define the outer boundaries of how these relationships interact with one
another.21 More importantly, the rules of professional conduct, as they have
evolved, have given guidance to lawyers to offer the floor below which no
lawyer may fall.22 But, because the rules only provide a floor, the legal
community has acknowledged that professionalism requires more than mere
compliance.23 Since the rules do not define an ideal standard of professionalism, lawyers must step up from the minimum requirements in executing their
19. Id. R. 6.1 (encouraging voluntary pro bono public service), R. 6.2 (accepting appointments by the court to represent indigent clients), pmbl. para. 6.
20. Id. R. 6.1, pmbl. paras. 6–7.
21. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 128–37. In his article, Campbell traces the evolution
of codes of professional conduct. See id. The first professional code of conduct in 1908 was
ethos based, and generally an attempt to codify morality and behavior. Id. at 128. It was
aspirational. Id. at 133. The 1960s saw a shift to a more practical approach with an emphasis
on resolving ethical issues that arose in practice in addition to creating an enforcement mechanism. See id. at 134–35. The code was set out in three parts. Campbell, supra note 8, at
135. The Canons offered “axiomatic norms.” Id. Ethical considerations were identified but
again, adherence was aspirational. Id. Finally, disciplinary rules were incorporated that set a
floor for proper conduct. Id. The final significant shift occurred in 1983 when the rules
evolved into black letter law with rules and comments to guide behavior and to impose discipline as necessary. Id. at 136.
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT scope paras. 14–16 (explaining the proper
interpretation of the rules, including the words “shall,” “shall not,” “may,” and “should” when
used in conjunction with the rules or the comments; setting the rules in a larger context of law
and licensure; and clarifying the rules are not exhaustive of a lawyer’s moral and ethical obligations); see also Campbell, supra note 8, at 128–37.
23. Keith W. Rizzardi, Defining Professionalism: I Know It When I See It?, FLA. B.J.,
July-Aug. 2005, at 38, 38. See Deasonlaw, Ethics and Professionalism, TAMPA BAY BUS. L.
(Mar.
16,
2012),
http://tampabaybusinesslaw.wordpress.com/2012/03/16/ethics-andprofessionalism/.
No code or set of rules can be framed which will particularize all the duties of the lawyer. . . .
The . . . canons of ethics are . . . a general guide, yet the enumeration of particular duties
should not be construed as a denial of the existence of others equally imperative, though not
specifically mentioned.

CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS pmbl. (1908); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl.
para. 7.
Many of a lawyer’s professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of Professional
Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience . . . . A lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the
law and the legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession’s ideals of public service.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 7.
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duties to client, court, and community.24 The rules, however, cannot dictate
all of an attorney’s conduct or address every situation.25 Thus, they represent
a starting point, not an end goal.26 This means, however, that there is a gap
between what is required and what is expected.27 The problem occurs when
that gap exposes a lawyer to divergent choices that serve competing interests
—advocacy and protection of a client versus serving the goals of justice or
professional conduct.
To truly satisfy her ethical obligation, a lawyer must do more than the
minimum.28 Indeed, professionalism as a concept arose out of an acknowledgement that the rules were not enough.29 Somewhere between the floor
and the ceiling, there must be a happy medium where competing obligations
of practice and professionalism can be woven together to build a stronger,
more complete foundation for the practice of law that provides clearer expectations for those who practice.
There has been a modern movement within the legal community to capture the ideals of professionalism and civility and articulate them as aspirations and goals for the practicing bar.30 The American Bar Association
24. See id. “Each lawyer must find within his own conscience the touchstone against
which to test the extent to which his actions should rise above minimum standards.” MODEL
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1983).
25. See 4 FLA. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 97 (2008). “The standards of professional
conduct to be observed by members of the Florida Bar are not limited to the observance of
rules and avoidance of prohibited acts, and . . . the failure to specify any particular act of misconduct [will not] be construed as tolerance thereof.” Id.
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 7.
27. See id.
28. See id. scope para. 16.
29. See Deasonlaw, supra note 23.
Professionalism differs from ethics in the sense that ethics is a minimum standard . . . while
professionalism is a higher standard expected of all lawyers. Professionalism imposes no
official sanctions. It offers no official reward. Yet, sanctions and rewards exist unofficially.
Who faces a greater sanction than lost respect? Who faces a greater reward than the
satisfaction of doing right for right's own sake?

Id. (quoting John W. Spears, Interview with Harold G. Clark, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of
Georgia, DECATUR-DEKALB B. Q., May 24, 1990).
30. See Kez U. Gabriel, The Idealist Discourse of Legal Professionalism in Maryland:
Delineating the Omissions and Eloquent Silences as a Progressive Critique, 41 U. BALT. L.F.
120, 123–24 (2011) (reviewing the newly-adopted Ideals of Professionalism in Maryland).
This movement is by no means new. See Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 414–15.
As multiple scholars have pointed out, almost any generation of lawyers has a previous generation that bemoans their inability to conduct themselves professionally and civilly. See id. at
413; Campbell, supra note 8, at 103. Neil Hamilton notes that “[t]he critical question at any
point in the legal profession’s history is not whether the profession had more civility or a
deeper sense of calling at an earlier period” but rather, it is “whether the profession and each
individual lawyer can do better than they are doing today in realizing the profession’s public
purpose, core values, and ideals.” Neil Hamilton, Professionalism Clearly Defined, 18 PROF.
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(“ABA”), the federal government, and several states have implemented aspirational goals related to professionalism, civility, or behavior in the practice
of law over the last twenty or so years.31 The problem, however, is that these
aspirational goals lack any real effectiveness because, unlike laws or mandatory rules of professional conduct, there is no consequence for failure to
comply above and beyond community reaction.32 So, while these goals help
articulate clearer guidance for attorneys of what is expected, they do little to
alleviate the tension between zealous advocacy and professionalism.33 However, the Florida Bar has proposed rules for enforcing professionalism based
on its preexisting professionalism goals.34 Recent law review articles discussing the twin necessities of professionalism and civility offer studies,
LAW, no. 4, 2008, at 4, 4. But this movement has changed from simple complaint to action
with the advent of codes of professionalism, creeds of professionalism, both aspirational and
now regulatory, that seek to shape how lawyers behave while practicing law. See, e.g., Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, FLA. B. NEWS, May 15, 2012,
http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf/Articles/4496E3E1F2882611852579F
4006DF11E.
31. See Professionalism Codes, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ professional_responsibility/resources/professionalism/professionalism_codes.html (last updated Aug.
2012) [hereinafter Professionalism Codes]. According to the ABA’s website, to date, fortytwo states and the District of Columbia have professionalism codes, civility codes, or some
other standard of conduct set apart from the rules of professional conduct that have been
promulgated by either that state’s bar, Supreme Court, or commission on professionalism. See
id. Several smaller bars within many states also have their own codes. See id. But these
codes, whether state or local, are aspirational and some, like Louisiana and Virginia’s, specifically provide that failure to comply will not be used as a basis for sanctions or discipline. LA.
SUP. CT. GEN. ADMIN. R. pt. G, § 11, pmbl.; Professional Guidelines, VA. ST. B.,
http://www.vsb.org/pro-guidelines/index.php/principles (last updated Dec. 22, 2009) (“Having
been unanimously endorsed by Virginia’s statewide bar organizations, the Principles [articulate] standards of civility to which all Virginia lawyers should aspire. The Principles of Professionalism shall not serve as a basis for disciplinary action or for civil liability.”). The
ABA, as well as many of its sections, has also adopted aspirational professionalism standards.
E.g., SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, CIVILITY STANDARDS (2006), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/family/reports/standards_civility.authc
heckdam.pdf. Other national organizations, including the American Board of Trial Advocates
and the American College of Trial Lawyers, have adopted professionalism codes. AM. BD. OF
TRIAL ADVOCATES, PRINCIPLES OF CIVILITY, INTEGRITY, AND PROFESSIONALISM pmbl. (n.d.),
available at https://www.abota.org/index.cfm?pg=Civility (follow “download” hyperlink);
AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, CODE OF PRETRIAL AND TRIAL CONDUCT 2 (2009), available at
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=All_publications&Template=/CM/contentDi
splay.cfm&contentID=4380.
32. See LA. SUP. CT. GEN. ADMIN. R. pt. G, § 11, pmbl.; Professional Guidelines, supra
note 31.
33. Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 416; see LA. SUP. CT. GEN. ADMIN. R. pt. G,
§ 11, pmbl.; Professional Guidelines, supra note 31.
34. Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.
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suggestions, and salvos against the fall of standards within the legal profession.35 Like Florida, other state bars may consider taking aspirational goals
for attorney conduct and turning them into actionable rules.36
This is a “new professionalism” borne of a constant refrain that the
newest generation of lawyers fails to uphold the standards of those who came
before;37 the difference now is that this new professionalism will have teeth,
and more closely resemble a marriage between mandatory legal ethical standards and what have been, for the most part, aspirational goals for professionalism.38
But this shift to a more professional practice must be examined against
the historical backdrop of advocacy,39 the role of a lawyer in litigation,40 and
the attorney client relationship.41 It remains a tension between advocacy and
ethics,42 client and court,43 and attorney and community.44 In some ways, it

35. See Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Professionalism’s Triple E Query: Is Legal Academia
Enhancing, Eluding, or Evading Professionalism?, 55 LOY. L. REV. 517, 556–57 (2009) [hereinafter Boothe-Perry, Professionalism’s Triple E Query] (asserting the importance of academia’s roll in molding professionalism in the legal community); Gabriel, supra note 30, at
121–27, 146–47 (reviewing the newly adopted “Ideals of Professionalism” in Maryland and
discussing the gaps within those ideals); Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 413 n.1,
415; Dennis A. Rendleman, Pogo Professionalism: A Call for a Commission on Truth and
Professionalism, 2012 J. PROF. LAW. 181, 185, 199–200; Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Professionalism and Academia, PROFESSIONAL, Summer 2010, at 6, 6–7, [hereinafter Boothe-Perry,
Professionalism and Academia] (discussing professionalism and learned behavior in the law
school setting). Hoeflich and Badgerow cite a two-fold crisis: “[T]he general public neither
understands nor appreciates the skill, dedication, and public service exhibited by the vast
majority of Kansas lawyers” and “it seems that civility, decency, and cooperation among
Kansas lawyers is on the decline, based on personal experience, case reports, and anecdotal
evidence.” Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 414; see also Hamilton, supra note 30, at
4.
36. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30. However, not everyone believes enforceable professionalism codes are necessary, positing that the
current rules of professional conduct, the inherent powers of the court, and more education
can be used effectively to cure what ails our profession. See Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra
note 15, at 414–15 (advocating for using existing means to control objectionable behavior,
“mandatory ‘professionalism’ education for law students, . . . and . . . annual continuing education for lawyers”); see also Gabriel, supra note 30, at 123, 136.
37. See Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 414.
38. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.
39. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 134.
40. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 cmt. c (1977).
41. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 2.
42. Compare Anenson, supra note 12, at 922–23 (advocacy), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 cmt. a (ethics).
43. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9 (client), and id. R. 1.2
(client), with id. R. 3.3 (court).
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seems that this move toward professionalism could be setting attorneys up
for failure no matter what the context.
Regulating a certain level of behavior is problematic at best. Normally,
this would be something left to an attorney’s community to regulate,45 but the
constant refrain that professionalism is lacking seems to indicate otherwise.46
Lawyers are nothing more than their reputation.47 So, when a lawyer behaves badly, is rude, or is otherwise inappropriate on a professional level, the
community reacts accordingly.48
Judges and colleagues react differently depending on a person’s behavior.49
“A lawyer who seriously offends against widely held professional
norms faces unofficial but nonetheless powerful interdictions.
Those include sanctions such as negative publicity and other expressions of peer disapproval, the cutting off of valuable practice
opportunities . . . denial of access to centers of power and prestige .
. . and [the] preclusion from judicial posts.”50

The community, however, can also respect the difference between a
good lawyer that may be difficult to deal with at times, and a nice lawyer that
may not have the same skills. The problem with trying to require the prickly
lawyer to hew to a “nicer” practice of law is that it may serve no purpose in
the larger scheme of things, and may in fact harm the underlying principles
of practice that have been indelibly inked on our profession.
In some instances, the tension between the common law and rules of
professional conduct may also force an attorney to make difficult ethical or
strategic choices in the name of advocacy.51 The shift to mandatory profes44. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 9 (attorney), with id. pmbl.
para. 6 (community).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. para. 10.
46. Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 414–15.
47. See Professional Guidelines, supra note 31.
48. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 101.
49. Hamilton, supra note 30, at 12.
50. Id. (first and second alterations in original) (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 22 (student ed., 1986)).
51. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 137; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.6 cmt. 12. For example, a lawyer must keep evidence of a past crime confidential if it is
disclosed by his client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 8. It is the quintessential dilemma, not being able to tell someone where the body is buried. See id. The same can
be said of permitting a criminal defendant to testify on his own behalf, thereby exercising his
constitutional rights when the attorney suspects, but does not know for sure, that the defendant
will lie on the witness stand. See id. R. 3.3 cmt. 8. Comment 9 “prohibits a lawyer from
offering evidence the lawyer knows to be false, [but] permits the lawyer to refuse to offer
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sionalism creates an additional tension between a lawyer’s need to represent
a client professionally and to legitimately take advantage of those tools
available to do so, even where they do not entirely embrace the ideals of professionalism.52 The backlash that a zealous lawyer may receive in the name
of regulating civility and codifying professionalism will not sting any less
simply because the lawyer may not face civil liability for her actions.53 As
proposed in Florida, there is still an intake, review, and grievance process for
professionalism complaints, just as there is for any other bar grievance.54
The concern is how to reconcile a lawyer’s obligations: To create a
meaningful relationship between a lawyer’s role as a practitioner, a lawyer’s
role as a colleague, and a lawyer’s role as a member of the larger legal community. This must be done in the larger context of both ethics and mandatory professionalism. These concerns come into sharper focus when considering the lawyer’s litigation privilege, also known as absolute immunity.55
According to several courts, even though an attorney is not subject to civil
liability for defamation or other related torts that bear some relation to a legal
proceeding, an attorney is still subject to court sanctions or to disciplinary
action for defamatory conduct.56 The problem is that it appears to be rare

testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.” Id. cmt. 9 (emphasis
added). However, the “Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of [a
criminal defendant] where the lawyer reasonably believes but does not know that the testimony [is] false.” Id.
52. See Campbell, supra note 8, at 139; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586
(1977). For example, attacking a witness’s credibility, or being permitted to make defamatory
statements in a judicial proceeding. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 cmt. c.
53. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Cunningham, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422, 428 (Ct. App. 1981).
54. Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.
55. See Anenson, supra note 12, at 916.
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in
communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it
has some relation to the proceeding.

Id. at 918 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586). “The privilege applies
regardless of malice, bad faith, or any nefarious motives on the part of the lawyer so long
as the conduct complained of has some relation to the litigation.” Id.
56. Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla.
2007) (noting “the trial court’s contempt power [and] the disciplinary measures of the state
court system and bar association” address this type of misconduct); Levin, Middlebrooks,
Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608–09 (Fla.
1994); O’Neil, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 428 (acknowledging that while the attorney could not be
subject to civil liability for a breach of trust, it “may subject him to disciplinary action”);
Higgs v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 840, 865 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (Erickson, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with the majority that alternate remedies are available in absolute immunity cases);
Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) (citing Rubertson v. Gabage, 654 A.2d
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that those sanctions are imposed, particularly with respect to disciplinary
action.57 As professionalism becomes a subject of discipline, these newly
enforceable “aspirations” could alter the balance struck between a person’s
right to be free from harmful statements and acts such as defamation, and an
attorney’s need to have wide latitude to protect his client and proceed with
his case.58 The extent of this problem cannot be understated. Only two
states do not recognize absolute immunity.59 Even the two states that do not
recognize absolute immunity have simply adopted a qualified version of the
same immunity.60 It is not that these contradictory concepts cannot coexist,
but the crux of the problem is deciding how to strike a balance that properly
acknowledges the value of each.
Part II of this article will discuss “professionalism” as a concept, and
discuss how it has been defined by scholars and various bar associations.
Part III will examine how there has been a shift from aspirational professionalism goals, to a move to enforceable standards of professionalism based on
these goals in Florida. As an example of the tension that may be created by
1002, 1006–07 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950–51
(Okla. 1990)).
57. See Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis of
Process and Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 235 (2011). The Seventh Circuit has even
acknowledged that while disciplinary action and court sanctions have always been available
remedies to redress an attorney’s improper conduct during litigation, “the likelihood of these
sanctions being invoked is speculative at best.” Auriemma v. Montgomery, 860 F.2d 273,
278–79 (7th Cir. 1988) (discussing the balance between a person’s rights and the attorney’s
need to be unfettered). It is curious why cases, where defamation or a related claim is made,
do not make their way to disciplinary proceedings. Perhaps it is a two-fold problem. First, a
defamation plaintiff seeks to be made whole—either by receiving some sort of retraction,
apology, or money—and disciplinary proceedings may not accomplish that. Oral Argument at
26:30, DelMonico v. Traynor, No. SC10-1397, (Fla. June 9, 2011), available at
http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/archives/flash/viewcase.php?case=10-1397. Second, disciplinary
proceedings, and discipline itself, generally cannot be used as “a basis for civil liability.”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT scope para. 20 (2012). So maybe there is some unwritten
corollary that it is unfair to discipline an attorney for strategic choices that are otherwise permissible and not subject to civil liability.
58. Anenson, supra note 12, at 920–21, 925–26; see also Campbell, supra note 8, at 100.
59. Anenson, supra note 12, at 917.
60. Id. at 917 n.6. Louisiana recognizes immunity, but qualifies it such that it is only
available when “the statement [is] material, . . . made with probable cause, and without malice.” Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So. 2d 355, 359 (La. 1982) (citing Waldo v. Morrison, 58 So.
2d 210, 211 (La. 1952)); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:49 (2012), declared unconstitutional by Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); id. § 14:50. The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in rejecting the absolute nature of the immunity, observed that the immunity is “not a
license to impugn the professional integrity of opposing counsel or the reputation of a litigant
or witness;” it is designed to protect those “who are merely performing their duties.” Freeman, 414 So. 2d at 359.
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these new rules, absolute immunity is reviewed and discussed in Part IV. In
Part V, the author highlights how absolute immunity has been applied in a
recent defamation case on writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida.
Against this backdrop, the author then considers the contradictions inherent
in protecting lawyers from what would otherwise be considered unprofessional conduct in the name of zealous representation of the client. Finally,
Part VI considers how legal theories such as absolute immunity should be
viewed within the context of a potential movement toward enforcing mandatory professionalism standards in the practice of law.
II.

PROFESSIONALISM, A CONCEPT DEFINED

“‘[P]rofessionalism’ seems to encompass practically all concerns
about what lawyers do and the way in which they do it.”61
A.

Scholars Approach to Professionalism

There are as many definitions of “professionalism” as there are people
who seek to define it.62 It has been defined by author and organization
alike.63 Quite often, it is distinguished as a step above the professional rules,
an ideal to aspire to and behavior that should be expected.64 However, some
definitions have chosen to frame it as a minimum standard as well, just as the
rules of professional conduct are framed.65 In that instance, professionalism
is conceived as “the minimum level of civility in word and action that law61. Donald Hubert, Competence, Ethics, and Civility as the Core of Professionalism:
The Role of Bar Associations and the Special Problems of Small Firms and Solo Practitioners,
in TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 113, 115 (1996) (emphasis added).
62. See Hamilton, supra note 30, at 5. Neil Hamilton sought to classify these definitions,
noting that there are three varieties of scholarship on professionalism. Id. The first makes “no
attempt to affirmatively state [the] definition of the concept itself,” but rather presumes the
definition is “self-evident or meant to be implicitly understood within the context of the article’s main focus.” Id. (footnote omitted). The second “focus[es] on one or more characteristics that are the ‘core’ of professionalism,” more specifically enumerating the requisite values,
standards, and “commitment[s] to public service.” Id. Finally, a third “dismisses [it] as a
misguided concept.” Id.
63. See Hamilton, supra note 30, at 5; Burnele V. Powell, Essay, Lawyer Professionalism
as Ordinary Morality, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 275, 277–80 (1994); Timothy P. Terrell & James H.
Wildman, Rethinking “Professionalism”, 41 EMORY L.J. 403, 424 (1992) (listing six values
that comprise the elements of a professional tradition); Ideals and Goals of Professionalism,
B.,
FLA.
http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBProfess.nsf/5d2a29f983dc81ef85256709006a486a/deafda73
c03233e985256b2f006ccd5e?OpenDocument (last updated May 26, 2011).
64. See Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 415–16.
65. Id. at 415.
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yers believe every lawyer should show every other lawyer, the minimum
level of cooperation expected among lawyers in adversarial and nonadversarial situations, and the minimum degree of courtesy one would expect
lawyers to show each other.”66 Still, another posits that while “ethical obligations can be seen as the shall-nots of lawyering, . . . professionalism
[should be seen] as creating affirmative obligations of the lawyer to the
broader society.”67
Another author has distilled professionalism down to five principles—
focusing on personal conscience, ethics of duty, ethics of aspiration, holding
colleagues to the same standards, and reflective engagement, including contemplating income and wealth balanced by public obligation.68 Interestingly,
at least one scholar has attempted to identify the core concepts of civility as
distinct obligations separate from legal ethics and professionalism.69 Campbell identifies ten common concepts including “maintain[ing] honesty and
personal integrity . . . avoid[ing] actions taken merely to delay or harass . . .
act[ing] with dignity and cooperation in pre-trial proceedings, [and] act[ing]
as a role model to the client and public.”70
B.

Organizational Definitions of Professionalism

The Kansas Bar has conceived professionalism as a focus on actions
that are grounded in “civility, respect, fairness, learning, and integrity” that
encompass the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court “and as a public citizen
with special responsibilities for the quality of justice.”71 The Florida Bar has
defined professionalism, in its broadest terms, as a commitment to “ensure[]
that concern for the desired result does not subvert fairness, honesty, respect
and courtesy for others with whom one comes into contact . . . [including]
opponents.”72 The ABA has defined a “professional lawyer” in the context
of professionalism as “an expert in law pursuing a learned art in service to

66. Id.
67. Campbell, supra note 8, at 139. Campbell carries this notion of a larger societal
obligation further positing that “morality represents a personal conscience, whereas professionalism represents a social conscience.” Id. at 141.
68. Hamilton, supra note 30, at 8.
69. Campbell, supra note 8, at 99, 128, 142.
70. Id. at 109.
71. Hoeflich & Badgerow, supra note 15, at 416.
72. Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, supra note 63. Maryland defines it as “the
combination of the core values of personal integrity, competency, civility, independence, and
public service that distinguish lawyers as the caretakers of the rule of law.” MD. R. app. Ideals
of Professionalism.
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clients and in the spirit of public service; and engaging in these pursuits as
part of a common calling to promote justice and public good.”73
C.

A Working Definition

No matter what definition is used, professionalism is universally considered to be something separate from the rules themselves, even if it is also
complementary to them.74 Perhaps professionalism is best captured as that
intangible space between “shall” and “may,” and an understanding that society demands more than that which is required by “must.” Where a lawyer
ends up on the spectrum between what you must do, what you can do, and
what you should do, is going to be impacted by the definition of professionalism that is adopted in his community and potentially codified into enforceable standards. As legal communities continue to articulate and refine the
new professionalism, norms will shift to raise the bar for desired behavior.
III. PROFESSIONALISM, A CONCEPT ENFORCED
“‘To opposing parties and their counsel, I pledge fairness, integrity,
and civility, not only in court, but also in all written and oral communications.’”75
A.

Florida

The Oath of the Florida Bar was changed in 2011 to add the language
quoted above.76 The move was designed to emphasize a shift in conscious73. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, TEACHING AND
LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM: REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE 6 (1996) (emphasis omitted). The ABA notes the following “[e]ssential characteristics of [a] professional
lawyer . . . : 1) [l]earned knowledge; 2) [s]kill in applying the applicable law to the factual
context; 3) [t]horoughness of preparation; 4) [p]ractical and prudential wisdom; 5) [e]thical
conduct and integrity; [and] 6) [d]edication to justice and the public good.” Id. at 6–7. This
Report is based on two earlier reports commissioned by the ABA: The 1986 Stanley Commission Report and the 1992 MacCrate Commission Report. Id. at 1.
74. See, e.g., AM. BD. OF TRIAL ADVOCATES, supra note 31, at pmbl.
75. Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, FLA. B., http://www.floridabar.org/tfb
/TFBProfess.nsf/basic+view/04E9EB581538255A85256B2F006CCD7D?OpenDocument
(last updated Sept. 13, 2011) (emphasis added).
76. In re Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, 73 So. 3d 149, 150 (Fla. 2011) (per
curiam); Jan Pudlow, Revised Admission Oath Now Emphasizes Civility, FLA. B. NEWS, Oct.
1, 2011, http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa
900624829/f0058f33ea1ffefc8525791700476e37!OpenDocument; see also Oath of Admission
to The Florida Bar, supra note 75.
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ness from baseline legal ethics to a higher standard of conduct, particularly
with respect to civility.77 At the same time, the Florida Board of Bar Examiners announced that professionalism would be tested as a separate subject
on the Florida Bar beginning in 2013.78 Finally, recommendations were
made to begin addressing professionalism complaints much in the same way
ethics complaints are currently processed by the Florida Bar.79 At the most
recent Florida Bar Convention, former Florida Bar President Scott Hawkins
told an audience assembled to discuss the matter of enforcing professionalism standards in Florida that “‘this topic is ground zero for our . . . efforts of
the next 10 years. . . . [I]t will not go away.’”80 Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Florida’s Commission on Professionalism tentatively adopted guidelines for
disciplining substantial and repeated violations of the professionalism standards in Florida.81 These proposed guidelines are based on the professionalism standards set forth in Florida’s Creed of Professionalism, Ideals and
Goals of Professionalism, and the Oath of Attorney.82

77. Pudlow, supra note 76.
78. In re Amendments to Rules of the Supreme Court Relating to Admissions to the Bar,
51 So. 3d 1144, 1145 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam), reh’g granted, 54 So. 3d 460 (Fla. 2011). The
Bar has defined the subject matter for testing “professionalism” as that information mainly
contained in three documents: Florida’s Creed of Professionalism, Guidelines for Professional Conduct developed by the Trial Lawyers Section of the Florida Bar, and the Ideals and
Goals of Professionalism. Kirsten Davis, Assessing Aspiration: Florida Bar Exam to Test
Professionalism Guidelines (AALS Professional Responsibility Section Newsletter, D.C.),
Spring 2011, at 28, 28–29. Davis noted that this is “a compliance first-step—requiring . . .
that lawyers know the professionalism guidelines.” Id. at 31. Another byproduct of such
action, is a “de facto ‘codif[ication]’ [of] uniform, customary expectations of professional
practice in Florida.” Id. Finally, such action has elevated professionalism to the level of other
subject matter and “branded” it with “intellectual and practical legitimacy.” Id. at 32.
79. Gary Blankenship, Lapses in Professionalism May Lead to Disciplinary Sanctions,
FLA. B. NEWS, July 15, 2012, http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01.nsf
/RSSFeed/F3B6FE3E910088D685257A3600436181 [hereinafter Blankenship, Disciplinary
Sanctions]; see Gary Blankenship, Putting ‘Teeth’ in Professionalism: Comments Sought on
Proposed Professionalism Rules, FLA. B. NEWS, May 15, 2012, http://www.floridabar.org/
divcom/jn/jnnews01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829/92c1e519c6934a8e852579f4006
c11cb!OpenDocument [hereinafter Blankenship, Putting ‘Teeth’ in Professionalism].
80. Blankenship, Disciplinary Sanctions, supra note 79 (first alteration in original).
81. Id.
82. Id.; Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.
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Development of New Professionalism Standards
a.

Ideals and Goals

In 1990, the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar adopted the Ideals
and Goals of Professionalism.83 There are seven ideals and each one contains corresponding goals.84 Professionalism is broadly defined, and it includes a commitment to “ensur[e] that concern for the desired result does not
subvert fairness, honesty, respect, and courtesy for others with whom one
comes into contact . . . [including] opponents.”85 Ideal two provides that “[a]
lawyer should at all times be guided by a fundamental sense of honor, integrity, and fair play, and should counsel his or her client to do likewise.”86 In
furtherance of this ideal, a stated goal is that “[a] lawyer should abstain from
conduct calculated to detract or divert the fact-finder’s attention from the
relevant facts or otherwise cause it to reach a decision on an impermissible
basis.”87
b.

Florida’s Creed of Professionalism

The Creed of Professionalism followed the Ideals and Goals of Professionalism and was adopted in 1989.88 Developed by the Florida Bar, the
Creed of Professionalism sought to memorialize the professional obligations
that underlie an attorney’s obligations to his client, the judiciary, and the
administration of justice.89 It provides in part that an attorney
will strictly adhere to the spirit as well as the letter of [the] profession’s code of ethics, . . . be guided by a fundamental sense of
honor, integrity, and fair play, . . . [and] not knowingly misstate,

83. Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, supra note 63.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Professionalism Codes, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ professional_responsibiliity/committees_commissions/standingcommitteeonprofessionalism2/profession
alismhomepage/profesionalsimcodes.html (last visited .Oct. 28, 2012) [hereinafter Professionalism Codes and Year].
89. See Creed of Professionalism, FLA. B., http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/ TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/82D119A3382C40F185256FFD0072FC8C/$FILE/CreedOfProfessio
nalism.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
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distort, or improperly exaggerate any fact or opinion and will not
improperly permit my silence or inaction to mislead anyone.90

c.

Guidelines for Professional Conduct

The Guidelines for Professional Conduct, first promulgated in 1994 and
most recently revised in 2008,91 are more detailed and address administrative
issues such as: Scheduling, continuances, and extensions of time; service of
papers; written submissions to the court; as well as litigation matters including discovery, motions practice, and trial conduct.92
2.

Imposing Discipline for Issues Related to Professionalism Under the
Rules of Professional Conduct

Florida’s move to regulate professionalism does not mean that an attorney could not previously be subjected to discipline for unprofessional conduct.93 Prior to the Florida Bar’s move to develop enforceable professionalism standards, attorneys were simply more likely to be disciplined under
catch-all provisions of Rule 4-8.4(d), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar,
which makes it a violation to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.94 Because it is so broadly written, this rule has been
applied to a variety of circumstances and has been used to address egregious
breaches of professionalism that in and of themselves flirt with the “musts”
of the rules of professional conduct.95
90. Id.
91. Guidelines for Professional Conduct, FLA. B., http://www.floridabar.org/tfb
/TFBProfess.nsf/5d2a29f983dc81ef85256709006a486a/2f2668cdfd7b99e085256b2f006ccd15
(last updated Sept. 8, 2011).
92. Id.
93. See id.; R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(d) (2012).
94. See Fla. Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 621 So. 2d 1032,
1049 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam); R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(d). Rule 4-8.4(d) provides
that:
A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct in connection with the practice of law that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice, including to knowingly, or through callous indifference, disparage, humiliate, or discriminate against litigants, jurors, witnesses, court personnel,
or other lawyers on any basis, including, but not limited to, on account of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, national origin, disability, marital status, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic
status, employment, or physical characteristic.

Id.
95. See Fla. Bar v. Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S508, S509 (July 12, 2012) (per curiam);
Fla. Bar v. Mitchell, No. SC10-637, slip op. at 1 (Fla. Oct. 5, 2010); Referee Report at 1–2,
Fla. Bar v. Mitchell, 46 So. 3d 1003 (Fla. 2010) (No. SC10-637) [hereinafter Mitchell Report]; Complaint at 1, 3, Fla. Bar v. Mitchell, 46 So. 3d 1003 (Fla. 2010) (No. SC10-637)
[hereinafter Mitchell Complaint]; see also R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(d).
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Lawyers Behaving (Very) Badly

In one instance, two attorneys, Kurt Mitchell and Nicholas Mooney,
who could not even maintain a professional relationship with each other for
more than the length of an e-mail, were disciplined for violating Rule 48.4(d).96 The e-mail exchanges between counsel were exceedingly unpleasant and on more than one occasion would escalate to outright name calling
and other childish behavior.97 And although both attorneys were equally
guilty of inappropriate, completely unprofessional remarks, Mooney finally
reported Mitchell to the Florida Bar when Mitchell made disparaging remarks about his disabled child including the statement, “[w]hile I am sorry to
hear about your disabled child; that sort of thing is to be expected when a
retard reproduces . . . I would look at the bright side at least you definitely
know the kid is yours.”98 Mitchell received a ten-day suspension and was
required to attend the Florida Bar’s Anger Management Workshop.99 Mooney received a public reprimand for his behavior and was required to attend a
professionalism program.100
More recently, an attorney was suspended for a year for, among other
things, disparaging her client after she was fired.101 The attorney filed a Mo-

96. Mitchell, No. SC10-637, slip op. at 1; Mitchell Report, supra note 95, at 1, 2; Mitchell Complaint, supra note 95, at 1, 3; Fla. Bar v. Mooney, No. SC10-640, 2010 WL
4685407, at *1 (Fla. Nov. 16, 2010); Referee Report at 1, 2, Fla. Bar v. Mooney, 49 So. 3d
748 (Fla. 2010) (No. SC10-640) [hereinafter Mooney Report]; Complaint at 1, 3, Fla. Bar v.
Mooney, 49 So. 3d 748 (Fla. 2010) (No. SC10-640) [hereinafter Mooney Complaint]. The
complaints against Kurt D. Mitchell and Nicholas Mooney also cited them for violating Rule
3-4.3, “commission of any act that is unlawful or contrary to honesty and justice.” Mitchell
Complaint, supra note 95, at 3; Mooney Complaint, supra note 96, at 3; see also R.
REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-4.3.
97. See Mitchell Complaint, supra note 95, Ex. A, at 1. For example, Mooney continually referred to Mitchell as “Junior” and Mitchell to Mooney as “Old Hack.” Id. In addition, at
one point Mooney stated that “the fact that you are married means that there truly is someone
for everyone, even a short/hairless jerk!!! Moreover, the fact that you have pro-created is
further proof for the need of forced sterilization!!!” Id. Ex. B, at 1.
98. Id. Ex. C, at 1.
99. Mitchell, No. SC10-637, slip op. at 1. However, it is interesting to note that Mitchell
had two other pending disciplinary cases that served as an additional underlying basis for his
discipline—one for failure to pay a deposition transcription bill and one for sending disparaging and humiliating emails to his landlord when the two became embroiled in a conflict.
Mitchell Report, supra note 95, at 2.
100. Mooney, 2010 WL 4685407, at *1; see Mooney Report, supra note 96, at 2.
101. Fla. Bar v. Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S508, S508–10 (July 12, 2012) (per curiam).
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tion to Withdraw four days before an immigration hearing on the ground that
the client had paid her with a check that bounced.102
In her motion, the attorney also stated “that she regretted helping her
client, who [was] right[fully] convicted [of] grand theft, and that [she] had
received reports from the [client’s] community that [the] client had robbed
them.”103 The motion was withdrawn when the attorney and client resolved
the matter.104 Another motion was filed to withdraw after the client retained
new counsel, and at the same time, the attorney advised an assistant state
attorney that “she had reason to believe her client would lie to the Immigration Court at an upcoming hearing.”105
The referee found the attorney violated Rule 4-8.4(d) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, for “conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.”106 The Supreme Court of Florida commented separately on this
violation, addressing its egregious nature:
Respondent filed two motions on separate occasions in which she
disparaged her client’s character in a reprehensible fashion. Respondent attacked her client’s integrity with regard to her alleged
failure to honor checks and fulfill contracts. Respondent further
stated that she had heard reports that her client had robbed members of the Romanian community. Finally, and most egregiously,
Respondent brazenly asserted that her client had been rightfully
convicted for grand theft, and that Respondent actually regretted
having helped her client. Such disparaging language is needless
and has no place in a public court pleading, especially when the
statements are made by an attorney and are directed at the attorney’s own client. Unbridled language of this sort harms the client
and causes the public to lose faith in the legal profession. Respon-

102. Id. at S508. In fact, counsel implied in her motion that the funds were for an immigration matter when in fact they were for another case in which she was representing the same
client. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S508.
106. Id. at S509; see also R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(d) (2012). The referee observed
that:
“regardless of intent, the very act of filing such a motion with such language is so prejudicial
to the client so as to be actionable.” The referee stated that it was inconceivable that anyone
knowing the rules of ethics would think such statements would be appropriate. Accordingly,
the referee recommended that Respondent be found guilty of violating rule 4-8.4(d).

Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S509 (quoting Referee Report at 7, Fla Bar. v. Knowles, 37
Fla. L. Weekly S508 (July 12, 2012) (No. SC10-1019)).
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dent’s conduct was highly prejudicial to the administration of justice and cannot be tolerated.107

b.

Making the Crime Fit the Punishment

The attorneys’ unprofessional conduct in each of these cases was found
to violate Rule 4-8.4(d) and these attorneys were subject to discipline as a
result.108 Discipline was appropriate in both circumstances and certainly
keeps with the purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct.109 However,
similar conduct could now be regulated under the proposed enforceable professionalism standards because although the new professionalism standards
require substantial or repeated offenses, the same was likely true of the use
of Rule 4-8.4(d).110 For example, in Mitchell’s and Knowles’ respective cases, had the attorneys’ statements not been so extreme, or repeated, and had
other factors not been present, it is unlikely that a disciplinary action would
have been filed or punishment would have been imposed.111
107. Id.
108. Id. at S509–10; Mitchell Report, supra note 95, at 2–3; Mooney Report, supra note
96, at 2; see also R. REGULATING FLA. BAR, 4-8.4(d).
109. See Mitchell Report, supra note 95, at 3; Mooney Report, supra note 96, at 2; see
also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT scope para. 14 (2012). The Supreme Court of Florida
has continuously acknowledged that the appropriate considerations for imposing discipline are
threefold:
[(1)] the judgment must be fair to society, both in terms of protecting the public from unethical
conduct and at the same time not denying the public the services of a qualified lawyer as a result of undue harshness in imposing penalty; [(2)] the judgment must be fair to the respondent,
being sufficient to punish a breach of ethics and at the same time encourage reformation and
rehabilitation; [and (3)] the judgment must be severe enough to deter others who might be
prone or tempted to become involved in like violations.

Fla. Bar v. Behm, 41 So. 3d 136, 150 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Cohen, 919
So. 2d 384, 388 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Barrett, 897 So. 2d 1269, 1275–76 (Fla.
2005) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Spear, 887 So. 2d 1242, 1246 (Fla. 2004) (per curiam); Fla.
Bar v. Lord, 433 So. 2d 983, 986 (Fla. 1983) (per curiam)); see also Fla. Bar v. Liberman, 43
So. 3d 36, 39 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Fla. Bar v. Pahules, 233 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla.
1970) (per curiam)). Imposing discipline for unprofessional conduct in and of itself is in
keeping with these goals of discipline. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism
Complaints, supra note 30.
110. See Mitchell Report, supra note 95, at 1–2; Mooney Report, supra note 96, at 1–2
(supporting proposition that rule 4-8.4(d) implicitly requires substantial or repeated offenses);
Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30; see also R.
REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-8.4(d).
111. Mitchell Complaint, supra note 95, at 1–4; see Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S508;
Fla. Bar v. Mitchell, No. SC10-637, slip op. at 1 (Fla. Oct. 5, 2010). For example, Knowles’
punishment was actually enhanced from a ninety-day suspension because it was not her first
offense. Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly at S508. Also, in Knowles’ case, she was not attacking
another attorney or a witness, but was disparaging her own client. Id. at S510. The Supreme

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

143

Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1

NOVA LAW REVIEW

132

[Vol. 37

Under newly proposed rules for enforcement of professionalism, recourse to formal and informal sanctions may be much more readily available
than before.112 Instead of relying on the catch-all provisions under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct or the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, the
proposed rules set additional, distinct standards that all attorneys must
meet.113 Although these professionalism standards are only a step above the
minimum requirements, it raises the bar for all practitioners. While heightened professionalism is commendable, as explained later, Florida—and other states like it—need to be mindful to promote and advance the cause of
professionalism without compromising an attorney’s competing obligations
to the client, the court, and the public.114
3.

A Proposed Florida Model for Resolving Complaints of Unprofessional
Conduct

Florida is one step closer to enforcing its proposed professionalism
guidelines and disciplining those lawyers who fail to comply.115 The Florida
Bar’s Commission on Professionalism has approved proposed rules for resolving professionalism complaints.116 The Commission approved the Attorney Consumer Assistance and Intake Program Model (“ACAP Model”).117
The ACAP Model involves a very simple rule, which then relies upon previously adopted professionalism goals and decisions from the Supreme Court
of Florida for definition and form.118 The Standard of Professionalism, as set
forth in the proposal, is that “[m]embers of The Florida Bar shall not engage
in unprofessional conduct,” defined as “substantial or repeated violations of
the Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, The Florida Bar Creed of Professionalism, The Florida Bar Ideals and Goals of Professionalism, The Rules
Court of Florida justifiably took a very dim view of Knowles’ actions because her actions,
offensive in and of themselves, were that much worse because her defamatory remarks were
directed at her own client. See id. at S508, S510.
112. Compare R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-2.1, with Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.
113. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30; see
also R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-2.1; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT scope para. 19.
114. See SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note
73, at 6 & n.22, 7.
115. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.
116. Id. The Commission on Professionalism approved this model at its February 16,
2012 meeting, and proposed these rules and regulations for public comment and approval by
the Supreme Court of Florida, but they have not yet been formally adopted. Id.
117. Id.; Blankenship, Disciplinary Sanctions, supra note 79.
118. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30; Blankenship, Disciplinary Sanctions, supra note 79.
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Regulating The Florida Bar, or the decisions of The Florida Supreme
Court.”119 What is evident at first glance is that this standard does not contemplate violation by the commission of a single act, unless that act is “substantial or repeated.”120 The reliance on prior Supreme Court of Florida decisions, in addition to the professionalism guidelines that have been adopted by
the Florida Bar, should assist in guiding the committees as these new rules
evolve and are put into practice.121
The proposal adopts existing bar grievance procedures to handle bar
complaints and violations of The Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, which
will make the rules easy to implement.122 Once a complaint is filed, the proposal uses the intake attorney as a gatekeeper with initial discretion to resolve matters informally, including referral of a respondent attorney to appropriate remedial professionalism programs.123 After an investigation, the
complaint may be dismissed or forwarded “to the appropriate branch office
of The Florida Bar’s Lawyer Regulation Department for further” review.124
If a complaint is referred forward, the appropriate branch counsel has
the discretion to “dismiss the [complaint] . . . , recommend Diversion . . . in
accordance with Rule 3-5.3(d) of The Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, or
refer to a Grievance Committee for further [consideration].”125 Rule 3-5.3(d)
119. Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.
120. Id.
121. See Fla. Bar v. Ratiner, 46 So. 3d 35, 41–42 (2010) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Abramson, 3 So. 3d 964, 969 (2009) (per curiam); Fla. Bar v. Martocci, 791 So. 2d 1074, 1078
(2001) (per curiam); Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note
30.
122. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30; see
also R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.3(d) (2012). There is also a local option that would permit
judicial circuits to adopt Local Professionalism Panels to resolve some complaints of unprofessional conduct within that circuit’s own legal community. Proposed Rules for Resolving
Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30. The idea was to permit circuits to decide how
much involvement they wanted to have—and likely had the resources to support—with respect to dealing with professionalism complaints. See id. Under the current ACAP Model
proposal, the Local Professionalism Panel would receive referrals of cases that the ACAP
attorney determines could be handled informally. Id.
123. Id. In this context, remedial professionalism programs are identified as “Practice and
Professionalism Enhancement Programs,” which are “[p]rograms operated either as a diversion from disciplinary action or as a part of a disciplinary sanction that are intended to provide
educational opportunities to members of the bar for enhancing skills and avoiding misconduct
allegations” either with no investigation or determination of whether an investigation is required where a potential violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct may exist. R.
REGULATING. FLA. BAR 3-2.1(i); see Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.
124. Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30.
125. Id.; R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.3(d).
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provides that “[t]he bar shall not offer a respondent the opportunity to divert
a disciplinary case that is pending at staff or grievance committee level investigations to a practice and professionalism enhancement program unless
staff counsel, the grievance committee chair, and the designated reviewer
concur.”126 Rule 3-5.3(b) contemplates “diversion to practice and professionalism enhancement programs” in cases where the case would be subject to a
“finding of minor misconduct or by a finding of no probable cause with a
letter of advice.”127 A lawyer may be referred to diversion only once every
seven years.128
The Grievance Committee is the final stop in the review process.129
Upon review and consideration, the Grievance Committee makes one of five
findings: 1) “No probable cause;” 2) “No probable cause [with] a letter of
advice to the Respondent;” 3) “Recommendation of Diversion to [a] Practice
and Professionalism Enhancement Program[];” 4) “Recommendation of Admonishment for Minor Misconduct;” or 5) “Probable cause under Rule 3-2.1,
[which] is a finding of guilt justifying disciplinary action.”130
B. Examples of Other States’ Approaches to Discipline and Enforcement
with Respect to Professionalism Issues
Unlike Florida’s proposed rules for regulating professionalism, most
states simply have aspirational goals for professionalism and civility.131
Most do not intend for those goals to be enforceable through disciplinary
proceedings.132 For example, Minnesota’s aspirational professionalism stan126. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.3(d).
127. Id. R. 3-5.3(b).
128. Id. R. 3-5.3(c).
129. See Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30. These
options track with the traditional role of the Grievance Committee in Bar Proceedings for
other violations. See R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-7.4(j), (k), (m), (o). Rule 3-2.1(j) provides
that probable cause is defined as “[a] finding by an authorized agency that there is cause to
believe that a member of The Florida Bar is guilty of misconduct justifying disciplinary action.” Id. R. 3-2.1(j).
130. Proposed Rules for Resolving Professionalism Complaints, supra note 30; see R.
REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-2.1(j), 3-7.4(j), (k), (m), (o).
131. See generally Professionalism Codes, supra note 31 (listing the states that have professionalism or civility codes or goals); see also Gary J. Leppla, Professional Responsibilty:
The Move from Bright Line Rules to Aspirational Disciplinary Standards, ALL RISE, Spring
2008,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/news/allrise/2008/05/professional-responsibility-the-movefrom-bright-line-rules-to-aspirational-disciplinary-standards/.
132. E.g., LA. SUP. CT. GEN. ADMIN. R. pt. G, § 11, pmbl.; Professional Guidelines, supra
note 31. As noted earlier, Louisiana and Virginia’s codes specifically provide that failure to
comply will not be used as a basis for sanctions or discipline. LA. SUP. CT. GEN. ADMIN. R. pt.
G, § 11, pmbl.; Professional Guidelines, supra note 31.
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dards specifically state that they “are not intended to be used as a basis for
discipline.”133 Yet Minnesota has sanctioned attorneys for unprofessional
conduct.134 Like Minnesota, Maryland has also addressed unprofessional
conduct without the benefit of enforceable professionalism standards.135 But,
as with similar cases in Florida,136 the courts tend to rely on the catch-all provision of behavior that “is prejudicial to the administration of justice,” rather
than being able to point to specific standards of professionalism or civility.137
Often, the attorney disciplined has also violated a more specific rule of professional conduct as well.138
The Court of Appeals in Maryland suspended an attorney from the practice of law for ninety days based on conduct that was related to marital difficulties, but resulted from him using vulgar language directed at colleagues
and court staff, failing to cooperate with law enforcement in several situations, and otherwise behaving in a less than professional manner.139 On the
one hand, the court acknowledged that an “[a]ttorney[] who cannot maintain
[a] level of professional performance [that includes common courtesy and
civility] must be disciplined,” but the court also acknowledged that
“[a]ttorneys are not prohibited from using profane or vulgar language at all
times and under all circumstances.”140 Instead, such language can be curbed
when it “would be prejudicial to the administration of justice.”141
A New Jersey court sanctioned an attorney for repeated instances of the
use of vulgar name-calling, threatening, and abusive language toward opposing counsel, a New Jersey Transit investigator, and a trial judge’s law
clerk.142 This was not Mr. Vincenti’s first appearance before the Disciplinary

133. Professionalism
Aspirations,
MINN.
ST.
B.
ASS’N
(2001),
http://www2.mnbar.org/committees/professionalism/aspirations-final.htm.
134. See In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 314–15, 325 (Minn. 1990) (per curiam); In re
Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 395 (Minn. 1987) (per curiam).
135. Compare In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d at 395, with Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 664, 668 (Md. 1989).
136. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Knowles, 37 Fla. L. Weekly S508, S509 (July 12, 2012) (per
curiam); see also Standards for Lawyer Sanctions, FLA. B., www.floridabar.org (follow
“Standards for Lawyer Sanctions” hyperlink under “Lawyer Regulation”) (last updated June
6, 2011).
137. See Alison, 565 A.2d at 666.
138. See id. at 664.
139. Id. at 661–64, 668.
140. Id. at 666–67 (citing In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d at 397).
141. Id. at 667.
142. In re Vincenti (In re Vincenti II), 554 A.2d 470, 471 (N.J. 1989) (per curiam). Vincenti told the trial judge’s law clerk to “get real,” that she did not know what she was doing,
and that he was “not taking this fucking shit.” Id. at 473. He apparently called the Deputy
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Review Board, nor before the Supreme Court of New Jersey, as he had been
suspended from practice for similar conduct several years earlier.143
The court found that Vincenti, again, had engaged in conduct that was
prejudicial to the administration of justice and suspended him from the practice of law for three months.144 The court stated that “[c]onduct calculated to
intimidate and distract those who, though in an adversarial position, have
independent responsibilities and important roles in the effective administration of justice cannot be countenanced” and that such conduct would subject
an attorney to discipline.145 The court explained that while “‘[u]nder some
circumstances it might be difficult to determine precisely the point at which
forceful, aggressive trial advocacy crosses the line into the forbidden territory of an ethical violation,’” Vincenti’s conduct, in both cases, clearly crossed
that line.146
Both of these cases involved extreme behavior issues, attorneys who
were on some level “out of control.”147 And both reflect a desire to address
professionalism issues that were underlying the designated offense of engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.148 Clearly, these
are attorneys who were unlikely to behave, no matter what rules were in
place. But, in terms of helping attorneys whose unprofessional conduct does
not rise to this level, it is worth considering whether enforceable standards,
which would give clearer guidance as to the type of “civility” and “professionalism” required, would not be more beneficial and reach beyond cases
with such extreme behavior.149 As Chief Justice Warren E. Burger observed:
Lawyers who know how to think but have not learned how to behave are a menace and a liability not an asset to the administration
of justice. . . . I suggest the necessity for civility is relevant to lawyers because they are the living exemplars—and thus teachers—
every day in every case and in every court; and their worst conduct
will be emulated . . . more readily than their best.150

Attorney General who was serving as opposing counsel a “piece of shit,” challenged him to
fight on at least two occasions, and used a threatening tone while dealing with him. Id. at 472.
143. Id. at 470–71; In re Vincenti (In re Vincenti I), 458 A.2d 1268, 1274–75 (N.J. 1983)
(per curiam).
144. In re Vincenti II, 554 A.2d at 473, 476.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 475–76 (quoting In re Vincenti I, 458 A.2d at 1268).
147. See id. at 473; Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Alison, 565 A.2d 660, 666–68 (Md.
1989).
148. See In re Vincenti II, 554 A.2d at 473–74; Alison, 565 A.2d at 668.
149. See Hubert, supra note 61, at 118–19, 121.
150. Id. at 113 (quoting Warren E. Burger).
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A Parallel System Considered⎯the Military

Military attorneys, such as the Judge Advocate General Corps, are subject to the same type of Rules of Professional Conduct as civilian attorneys.151 In addition to the rules that guide the professional conduct of military attorneys, the Department of Defense has promulgated ethical requirements that apply to all service members, including attorneys.152 Thus, ethics
and professionalism for the military community as a whole are addressed
from the top down.153
Military employees are directed to “carefully consider ethical values
when making decisions as part of official duties.”154 “Primary Ethical Values” are enumerated: Truthfulness (which is required); straightforwardness;
candor; integrity; loyalty; accountability (“includ[ing] avoiding even the
appearance of impropriety”); fairness; caring; respect; promise keeping; responsible citizenship; and the pursuit of excellence.155 The Joint Ethics Regulation then provides that “job-related decisions . . . should be preceded by a
consideration of ethical ramifications,”156 and a framework for an ethical
decision-making plan is offered.157 Part of the ethical decision-making plan
provides that a decision maker should “[b]e prepared to fall somewhat short
of some goals for the sake of ethics and other considerations.”158 At the end
of the day, The Joint Ethics Regulation indicates that unethical options
should be eliminated.159 And, further, that the decision maker should commit
to and implement the best ethical solution.160
151. AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT introduction (2005).
152. See DEP’T OF DEF., THE JOINT ETHICS REGULATION § 2-200, at 18 (2011), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/550007r.pdf.
153. See AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT introduction. Having said this, clearly
attorneys and other divisions may have additional ethical and professional conduct rules, but
the Department of Defense guidelines provide a baseline from which the entire military community must proceed. See DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 152, § 2-200, at 18. For example, the
Air Force Rules of Professional Conduct are adapted from the ABA Model Rules and are, for
the most part, simply modified to reflect the realities of practice before military courts. AIR
FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT introduction. The Introduction to the Air Force Rules
indicates that: “Beyond establishing minimum standards, the Rules are designed to meet three
important objectives. They provide workable guidance to Air Force lawyers, they are specific
to the problems and needs of our practice, and they are accessible to Air Force lawyers assigned throughout the world.” Id.
154. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 152, § 12-400, at 118.
155. Id. § 12-401, at 118–19.
156. Id. § 12-500, at 119.
157. See id. § 12-501, at 120–21.
158. Id. § 12-501, at 120.
159. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 152, § 12-501, at 120.
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While a member of the Judge Advocate General Corps has familiar obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct for that specific branch,
the attorney also has ethical obligations as part of the larger military community.161 Those obligations stress the importance of ethics first.162 And, failure
to comply with the requirements of The Joint Ethics Regulation can result in
administrative, criminal and civil sanctions.163
IV. DEFAMATION AND THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY164
Other than Louisiana and Georgia, every state has adopted a version of
“absolute immunity for lawyers.”165 The Restatement of Torts Second provides that:
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory
matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a
proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the

There may be solutions that seem to resolve the problem and reach the goal but which are
clearly unethical. Remember that short term solutions are not worth sacrificing our commitment to ethics. The long term problems of unethical solutions will not be worth the short term
advantages. Eliminate the unethical solutions.

Id.
160. See id. at 121.
161. AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT introduction (2005); DEP'T OF DEF., supra,
note 152, § 1-406, at 10.
162. See AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT introduction.
163. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 152, § 1, at 105. Clearly, the military has an advantage
over the ABA, the best comparator here, in that it has control over its employees. See About
the American Bar Association, AM. B. ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/utility/
about_the_aba.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). The ABA is a voluntary organization, so it
would be impossible to adopt mandatory professionalism standards. See id. However, states
could accomplish this much in the way Florida has chosen to do so. See R. REGULATING FLA.
BAR 3-1.2 (2012).
164. This concept has been identified as the lawyer’s litigation privilege, the absolute
litigation privilege, and absolute immunity. Anenson, supra note 12, at 917–18, 920, 928–29;
Douglas R. Richmond, The Lawyer’s Litigation Privilege, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 281, 283
(2007). While there are underlying reasons why one term may be preferable to the other,
those reasons are tangential to the discussion in this article. See id. Here, the author uses the
terms absolute immunity and privilege interchangeably, referring to the doctrine as one of
absolute immunity, but when necessary, discussing it in the appropriate context as a “privilege” as well. For a more complete discussion regarding the use of the terms of privilege and
immunity as they relate to absolute immunity, see Douglas R. Richmond’s, The Lawyer’s
Litigation Privilege.
165. Anenson, supra note 12, at 917 & n.6.
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course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding.166

“The privilege applies regardless of malice, bad faith, or any nefarious
motives on the part of the lawyer, so long as the conduct complained of has
some relation to the litigation.”167 Generally, the immunity granted is absolute, but it may also be qualified under certain circumstances.168
Such broad immunity from defamation is arguably necessary because
there is a need to protect an attorney who is trying to protect his client’s interest—often under the most dire circumstances—from the specter of collateral litigation aimed at his own behavior during trial.169 Imagine, for example, a criminal defense attorney is faced with a sympathetic victim, a dead
toddler, and a defendant, the toddler’s mother, who has a history of telling

166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
586 (1938) (“An attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory matter of another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the
institution of, or during the course and as a part of a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation thereto.”). Defamation is generally defined as a communication that “‘tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation
of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.’” Paul T.
Hayden, Reconsidering the Litigator’s Absolute Privilege to Defame, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 985,
988 (1993). But see N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring
actual malice for public officials). Both Louisiana and Georgia offer qualified versions of
absolute immunity. See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-7(7) (2012) (“Comments of counsel, fairly
made, on circumstances of a case in which he or she is involved and on the conduct of parties
in connection therewith” is deemed privileged.); Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So. 2d 355, 356, 359
(La. 1982) (citing Waldo v. Morrison, 58 So. 2d 210, 211 (La. 1952)) (proposing that “in
order for privilege to apply, the statement must be material . . . with probable cause and without malice”).
167. Anenson, supra note 12, at 918. Louisiana has emphatically rejected the absolute
nature of the privilege. Id. at 917 n.6; see also Freeman, 414 So. 2d at 359. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana specifically held that such a policy of permitting malicious statements by
counsel to be protected “‘has no place in the system of law prevailing in Louisiana.’” Freeman, 414 So. 2d at 359 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sabine Tram Co. v. Jurgens, 79 So. 872,
873 (La. 1918)).
168. See Richmond, supra note 164, at 284; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
586 (1977). “A privilege is [considered] absolute when it cannot be [defeated] by a defendant’s malic[ious]” behavior but, if the privilege is qualified, then a plaintiff may defeat it and
strip a defendant of immunity if the plaintiff can prove malicious conduct. Richmond, supra
note 164, at 284.
169. Green Acres Trust v. London, 688 P.2d 617, 621 (Ariz. 1984) (quoting Van Vechten
Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 463, 482
(1909)). Or, put another way, “‘[t]o subject him to actions for defamation would fetter and
restrain him in the fearless discharge of the duty which he owes to his client, and which the
successful administration of justice demands.’” Id. (quoting Veeder, supra note 169, at 482).
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lies; intricately involved lies.170 His client is accused of first-degree premeditated murder.171 She is portrayed in the media as cold and uncaring—a
mother who “fail[ed] to report her daughter missing for [thirty-one] days.”172
There is no real physical evidence tying her to the death, it is mostly circumstantial, and there is no proof to show how the child died.173 The attorney needs to tell the jury something—needs to offer a theory of the case that
explains the dead toddler, his client’s behavior, and his client’s innocence.174
These are significant obstacles in defending his client.175 Thus, the defense
team crafts a theory of the case, and in doing so, draws others into the story
accusing them of unspeakable crimes.176
In his opening statement, attorney Jose Baez offered the following explanation for Caylee Anthony’s death.177 Caylee disappeared on the morning
of June 16, 2008, and was discovered by George Anthony, Casey Anthony’s
father, in the family’s swimming pool.178 He yelled at Casey and told her she
170. Anthony Colarossi, Casey Anthony’s Avalanche of Lies: Jury Left to Decide What’s
True, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 26, 2011, at A1.
171. Register of Actions, ORANGE COUNTY CLERK CTS., http://myclerk.orangeclerk.com/
default.aspx (follow “Criminal and Traffic Case Records” hyperlink; then search “Last Name”
for “Anthony” and “First Name” for “Casey” and “Middle Name” for “Marie;” then click
“Search;” then follow “2008-CF-015606-A-O” hyperlink) (last visited October 28, 2012).
172. See The Detail That Could Doom Casey Anthony, NBCNEWS.COM (July 5, 2011,
11:04 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43639517/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/detailcould-doom-casey-anthony#ulmDM9fcwy.
173. Gregory Kane, Anthony Verdict May Signal Death of Circumstantial Evidence,
WASH. EXAMINER, July 6, 2011, http://washingtonexaminer.com/anthony-verdict-may-signaldeath-of-circumstantial-evidence/article/40352#.UDu-YaBQS7o.
174. See The Detail That Could Doom Casey Anthony, supra note 172.
175. See id.
176. See Jessica Hopper & Ashleigh Banfield, Casey Anthony Trial: Defense Team
Claims Caylee Anthony Drowned in Family Pool, ABC NEWS (May 24, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/casey_anthony_trial/casey-anthony-trial-defense-claims-cayleeanthony-drowned/story?id=13674375#.UDvElaBQS7o. The author presumes that this is
information provided to Baez by his client, and that he relied upon her information because
confirming it would have been difficult under the circumstances if no documentation existed.
177. CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning: Opening Statement Part 1 (of 2), YOU TUBE, at
0:35 (June 6, 2011), http://www.youtube.com (search “Defense Winning: Opening Statement
Part 1 (of 2),” then choose the video by CochiseLiberty) [hereinafter CochiseLiberty, Defense
Winning: Opening Statement Part 1 (of 2)].
178. Id. at 1:00; CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning: Opening Statement Part 2 (of 2), YOU
TUBE, at 7:07 (June 6, 2011), http://www.youtube.com (search “Defense Winning: Opening
Statement Part 2 (of 2),” then choose the video by CochiseLiberty) [hereinafter CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning: Opening Statement Part 2 (of 2)]. But see Sunsentinelmobile, George
Anthony Called as First Witness, Denies Molesting Casey, YOU TUBE, at 0:03 (May 24, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com (search “George Anthony Called as First Witness, Denies Molesting
Casey,” then choose the video by Sunsentinelmobile).
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would be blamed.179 Father and daughter covered up the death, failing to
report it or otherwise give any indication Caylee was dead to anyone else.180
The problem, of course, was that Casey was a liar and George Anthony,
while not without some suspicion, would deny this.181 Then Baez introduced
his explanation for Casey’s behavior and why she was not culpable—she had
been taught from an early age to lie.182 Baez told the jury, and the watching
world, that “it all began when Casey was eight years old and her father came
into her room and began to touch her inappropriately.”183 “She could be thirteen years old, have her father’s penis in her mouth, and then go to school
and play with the other kids as if nothing ever happened.”184 Baez went so
far as to accuse Casey’s brother of the same incestuous behavior, indicating
that he was “follow[ing] in his father’s footsteps.”185 At no point did Baez
have to prove the truth of these allegations, and at no point did he have to
corroborate the story of Casey’s sexual abuse.186 The only response would
come from George Anthony, who denied that Caylee drowned in the pool
and denied that he sexually abused his daughter.187
If Baez had been subject to civil liability, would he have taken the same
approach? Could Baez risk making such allegations against a prosecution
witness without being cloaked in the protection offered by absolute immunity? Perhaps not. But this scenario is the quintessential reason why such protection exists. At trial, at the moment when a lawyer must be unfettered in
his ability to fully represent his client, this immunity cloaks his actions in
order to realize complete, zealous representation.188 The argument is that the
collateral damage it may cause is an acceptable byproduct that serves the

179. CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning: Opening Statement Part 2 (of 2), supra note 178,
at 6:05, 7:23.
180. See id. at 7:48.
181. See Sunsentinelmobile, supra note 178, at 0:51, 2:12; CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning: Opening Statement Part 1 (of 2), supra note 177, at 3:22, 7:04; CochiseLiberty, Defense
Winning: Opening Statement Part 2 (of 2), supra note 178, at 4:35.
182. CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning: Opening Statement Part 1 (of 2), supra note 177,
at 4:55–7:12.
183. Id. at 5:00.
184. CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning: Opening Statement Part 2 (of 2), supra note 178,
at 4:44.
185. Id. at 3:00. Baez even dragged Cindy Anthony into the web of lies, claiming she
deliberately lied to friends and family about Casey being pregnant. Id. at 0:47.
186. Curt Anderson, Attorney: Casey Anthony Rejected Early Plea Deal, SALON (July 5,
2012,
8:55
AM),
http://www.salon.com/2012/07/05/attorney_casey_anthony_rejected_early_plea_deal/.
187. See Sunsentinelmobile, supra note 178, at 0:16, 1:10.
188. Hayden, supra note 166, at 1038.
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larger purpose of administering justice.189 But, as was noted at the outset of
this section, other jurisdictions have managed to tether this immunity in a
manner that may strike a better balance between overzealous, disingenuous
trial tactics and zealous advocacy that remains truthful to the best of its ability.190
Those jurisdictions that recognize absolute immunity in its purest form
will apply it to defamation claims and other tortious claims191 made against
attorneys.192 In order to invoke absolute immunity, there must first be litigation or a proceeding pending, or the same must be “contemplated in good
faith.”193 Second, the attorney needs to be participating as counsel.194 Third,
the communication, or in some cases the conduct, needs to have “‘some relation to the proceeding’” or contemplated proceeding.195
189. See id. at 1026, 1038.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 165–69. As a practical matter, requiring reasonable inquiry may not be a bad thing. Thinking through how to approach what may otherwise
be defamatory statements while still preserving a client’s best interests is not impossible, as
Louisiana has demonstrated.
191. Courts have extended this immunity beyond defamation to other types of torts, including tortious interference with business relationships, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligence, conspiracy, and invasion of privacy. Richmond, supra note 164, at 296–
97. Richmond notes that only malicious prosecution, fraud claims, and now potentially Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act actions have been held to fall outside the privilege. Id. at 297.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the privilege, while initially developed to protect against
liability for defamatory acts, has “been extended to cover all acts related to and occurring
within judicial proceedings.” Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1274 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citing Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire
Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 607–08 (Fla. 1994)). Similarly, the court in Thornton v. Rhoden
justified extending the privilege to other tortious acts, stating that “[t]he salutary purpose of
the privilege should not be frustrated by putting a new label on the complaint.” Thornton v.
Rhoden, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706, 719 (Ct. App. 1966). Hayden noted that the privilege has been
applied to quasi-judicial proceedings as well, including “a board of funeral directors and embalmers, . . . a school board [proceeding], . . . [and] a state labor commission.” Hayden, supra
note 166, at 994.
192. See Stepanek v. Delta Cnty., 940 P.2d 364, 368 (Colo. 1997) (en banc) (citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983)); Mozzochi v. Beck, 529 A.2d 171, 173 (Conn. 1987)
(citing Petyan v. Ellis, 510 A.2d 1337, 1338 (Conn. 1986)); Ferry v. Carlsmith, 23 Haw. 589,
591 (1917); Libco Corp. v. Adams, 426 N.E.2d 1130, 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (citing Weiler
v. Stern, 384 N.E.2d 762, 763 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Macie v. Clark Equip. Co., 290 N.E.2d
912, 913 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 (1977)). Instead,
Louisiana applies a modified version of absolute immunity, allowing such protection as long
as the statement is material, and “made with probable cause and without malice.” Freeman v.
Cooper, 414 So. 2d 355, 359 (La. 1982) (citing Waldo v. Morrison, 58 So. 2d 210, 211 (La.
1952)).
193. Richmond, supra note 164, at 301.
194. Id. at 284.
195. Id. at 284, 301 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss1/1

154

: Nova Law Review 37, 1

2012]

RECONCILING ATTORNEY CONDUCT

143

For the most part, the courts focus on a relevant nexus between the
communication made and a pending or potential judicial or quasi-judicial
proceeding.196 If the communication or conduct is too far removed from the
official proceedings—either in time, content, or audience—then it may not
be protected.197 For example, courts found that statements made by attorneys
during a press conference are not protected by absolute immunity because
“the news media [generally] lacks a sufficient relationship to [the] . . . proceeding[].”198 But, many courts permit statements made both pre-litigation
and post-litigation to be immune, as long as the statements bear the requisite
relation to the proceeding itself.199
196. Adams v. Ala. Lime & Stone Corp., 142 So. 424, 425 (Ala. 1932) (quoting Moore v.
Mfrs.’ Nat’l Bank, 25 N.E. 1048, 1049 (N.Y. 1890)); Rosenfeld, Myer & Susman v. Cohen,
194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 200 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
106 Cal. Rptr. 718, 722 (Ct. App. 1973)) (requiring that a statement have a logical nexus to
the proceeding)). Relevance is a qualification. Adams, 142 So. at 425 (quoting Moore, 25
N.E. at 1049). The privilege “‘extends only to such matters as are relevant or material to the
litigation, [declining to] protect slanderous imputations plainly irrelevant and impertinent,
voluntarily made, and which the party making them could not reasonably have supposed to be
relevant.’” Id. (quoting Moore, 25 N.E. at 1049); see also Green Acres Trust v. London, 688
P.2d 617, 621 (Ariz. 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 586 cmt. c) (citing
Bailey v. Superior Court, 636 P.2d 144, 146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981)) (holding that “the defamatory publication must relate to, bear on, or be connected with the proceeding,” but “need not
be ‘strictly relevant;’ [it] . . . need only have ‘some reference to the subject matter’”); Pogue v.
Cooper, 680 S.W.2d 698, 700 (Ark. 1984) (quoting Westridge v. Wright, 466 F. Supp. 234,
237 (E.D. Ark. 1979)) (providing that statements must be “‘relevant and pertinent’” to the
proceeding); Malmin v. Engler, 864 P.2d 179, 182–83 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
“communications [arose] ‘in the due course of a judicial proceeding,’ [and they] . . . ‘were
reasonably related to that . . . proceeding’”).
197. See Adams, 142 So. at 425; Green Acres Trust, 688 P.2d at 622, 624 (citing Asay v.
Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594 F.2d 692, 697 (8th Cir. 1979)); Malmin, 864 P.2d at 182.
198. Green Acres Trust, 688 P.2d at 622 (citing Asay, 594 F.2d at 697); Bradley, 106 Cal.
Rptr. at 724; Kennedy v. Cannon, 182 A.2d 54, 58 (Md. 1962); Barto v. Felix, 378 A.2d 927,
931 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977); see also Meier v. Hamilton Standard Elec. Sys., Inc., 748 F. Supp.
296, 302 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that absolute privilege may be waived by circulation of
defamatory material to parties not involved in a grievance process).
199. See Asay, 594 F.2d at 697; Bradley, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 724; Fridovich v. Fridovich,
598 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1992) (quoting Ange v. State, 123 So. 916, 917 (Fla. 1929)). Courts
have limited immunity to some extent when dealing with pretrial investigations, such as the
limitation placed upon private individuals who make statements to police or to a state attorney’s office before criminal charges are filed. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69. But even in those
instances, attorneys often still enjoy immunity, where it simply becomes qualified rather than
absolute. See id. (noting immunity in the context of statements to police officers, and that the
majority of states that have addressed this issue have embraced qualified immunity). But see
Moore v. Bailey, 628 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Spain v. Connolly, 606
S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)). While it might seem that qualified immunity might
limit protection, as a practical matter, “a plaintiff would [still] have to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defamatory statements were false and uttered with common
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The touchstone for absolute immunity is the relationship between the
communication, the audience to which it is made, and the proceeding to
which it arguably attaches.200 In determining whether the “proceeding” requirement of the nexus is met, courts have often set the outer boundaries
differently.201 For example, in Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecommunications,202
the Eleventh Circuit noted that both New Jersey and California would include settlement negotiations and agreements as part of a “proceeding,” but
in at least one Florida case, the court only extended qualified immunity to
pre-suit settlement discussions.203
The problem with all of this, as courts have noted, is that, the further
removed an immune statement is from the actual proceeding, the less protection is available to the party that is defamed or injured by tortious conduct.204
Jose Baez made statements about George Anthony in front of a judge,205 on
the record, and Anthony was able to take the witness stand and respond to
those allegations.206 The same cannot be said for statements made by an attorney in a pretrial investigation of a case, including interviews with potential witnesses.207 The harm identified is deemed acceptable because as many
courts point out, the court still has the power to sanction attorneys, attorneys
are still subject to disciplinary action, and criminal sanctions are also possi-

law express malice.” Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69 (citing Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803,
806–07 (Fla. 1984)). So, a plaintiff is still left with the burden of demonstrating that the “primary motive in making the statements was the intent to injure the reputation of the plaintiff.”
Id. (citing Nodar, 462 So. 2d at 806).
200. See Richmond, supra note 164, at 285.
201. Compare Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1275–76 (11th Cir.
2004), with Pledger v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1323, 1325–27 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (quoting Ange, 123 So. at 917).
202. 372 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2004).
203. Id. at 1275 & n.26, 1276 (citing Pledger, 432 So. 2d at 1326–28). The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit’s holding that “‘the negotiation of a settlement is a part
of a judicial proceeding,’” and the “non-party insurer was absolutely immune from a defamation claim based on statements made at a settlement conference.” Id. at 1276 (quoting Petty v.
Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1966)). But, the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeals had found that
statements made during settlement discussions before suit was filed were subject only to qualified immunity. Id. at 1275 n.26 (citing Pledger, 432 So. 2d at 1326–28).
204. Fridovich, 598 So. 2d at 69; Moore v. Bailey, 628 S.W.2d 431, 431 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981).
205. See CochiseLiberty, Defense Winning: Opening Statement Part 1 (of 2), supra note
177, at 5:05–9:15.
206. Sunsentinelmobile, supra note 178, at 0:01–2:34.
207. See Moore, 628 S.W.2d at 431 (citing Spain, 606 S.W.2d at 543).
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ble.208 However, if the likelihood is minimal that these remedies will be invoked, how can a balance of rights be maintained? Once again, there is a
gray zone—that intangible place between what can be done and what should
be done—where the outer limits of absolute immunity intersect with the
heightened standards of new professionalism requirements presenting a practical problem for lawyers as they try to discern how to reconcile these competing interests.
V.

ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY AT ODDS WITH NEW PROFESSIONALISM–A CASE
STUDY
I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and
will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false
statement of fact or law.
....
I will abstain from all offensive personality and advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged.209

The protection of absolute immunity will likely always be available to
protect attorneys from civil liability.210 And it is unlikely that an attorney
will be disciplined for the same conduct under the rules of professional responsibility for defamation alone.211 The question becomes, however, how to

208. Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) (citing Ruberton v. Gabage, 654
A.2d 1002, 1007 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Kirschstein v. Haynes, 788 P.2d 941, 950–
51 (Okla. 1990)); see also O’Neil v. Cunningham, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422, 428 (Ct. App. 1981)
(acknowledging that while an attorney could not be subject to civil liability for a breach of
trust, it “may subject him to disciplinary action”); Higgs v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 840, 865
(Colo. 1985) (en banc) (Erickson, J., dissenting) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
515–16 (1978)) (agreeing with the majority that alternate remedies are available in absolute
immunity cases); Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barret & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So. 2d 380,
384 (Fla. 2007) (citing Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S.
Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 608–09 (Fla. 1994)) (finding that a trial court’s contempt power
and disciplinary measures in the state court system and bar association are remedies to address
this type of misconduct).
209. Oath of Admission to The Florida Bar, supra note 75 (emphasis added).
210. See Anenson, supra note 12, at 918–20.
211. See, e.g., DelMonico v. Traynor, 50 So. 3d 4, 7–8 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.) (citing
Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608; Fernandez v. Haber & Ganguzza, LLP, 30 So. 3d 644, 647 (Fla. 3d
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reconcile this common law protection, and the practices associated with it,
with a focus shifting to enforcing professionalism. Will this shift mean that
state bars and courts will begin to do what they have apparently been unwilling to do in this context: Impose disciplinary consequences for attorneys
who go too far even if the law imposes no comparable consequence and instead affirmatively permits the behavior?
The Supreme Court of Florida recently heard a case, which serves as a
perfect example of when an attorney’s otherwise permissible and immune
conduct may exceed the standards of professionalism.212 The case of DelMonico v. Traynor213 offers a glimpse of how an attorney’s conduct went too
far, but no mechanism was available to reach behind the cloak of immunity
to correct clearly unprofessional actions.214
Daniel DelMonico, the owner of MYD Marine Distributor, sued Donovan Marine and Tony Crespo, for defamation alleging that Crespo told others
that DelMonico stole business from Donovan by supplying prostitutes to
prospective clients.215 Arthur Traynor, an experienced litigator,216 was hired
to defend Donovan Marine.217 During his pre-trial investigation, Traynor
spoke to several potential witnesses about the suit, including two of DelMonico’s ex-wives, a former employee, and “principals of other marine services
companies.”218
According to DelMonico’s defamation complaint against Traynor,
Traynor had advised the potential witnesses that DelMonico used prostitutes
to get business.219
Specifically, DelMonico alleged that Traynor did the following: 1)
Traynor told one of DelMonico’s ex-wives that DelMonico took business
“away from Donovan by enticing [Donovan’s] purchasing agent with prostitutes;” 2) Traynor told another ex-wife “that DelMonico was being prosecuted for using prostitution to get business;” 3) Traynor contacted one of DelMonico’s former employees and told “him that DelMonico’s method to take
an account was to supply a prostitute to the owner.” Traynor then “encourDist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam); Stucchio v. Tincher, 726 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1999)), review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010).
212. See Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 13:12.
213. 50 So. 3d 4 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010).
214. See id. at 12 (Warner, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 6 (majority opinion). Both DelMonico’s company, MYD Marine Distributor,
and Donovan Marine, are marine services companies. See id.
216. See A. Rodger Traynor Jr., AKERMAN, http://www.akerman.com/bios/bio.asp?id=
466&name=Traynor,Jr. (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
217. See DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 6.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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aged the . . . employee to provide additional examples of DelMonico’s ‘unethical business practices;’” 4) Traynor contacted a former business owner
and told him “that DelMonico was ‘being prosecuted for prostitution;’” and
5) Traynor “contacted principals of other marine services companies” and
conveyed to them that DelMonico was being prosecuted “for procuring prostitutes and illegal business dealings,” further representing to these potential
witnesses that he was part of the prosecution.220
Traynor sought summary judgment in the defamation case based on absolute immunity because all of the communications with the potential witnesses were in furtherance of his defense of his client during pending litigation.221 DelMonico argued that absolute immunity was inapplicable because
developing a witness for litigation was not encompassed with the concept of
“in the course of judicial proceedings.”222
The trial court found that absolute immunity attached to Traynor’s
statements and that DelMonico could not maintain a civil cause of action for
defamation or tortious interference based on those statements as a matter of
law.223 The trial court, relying on the Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in
Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire
Insurance Co.,224 held that absolute immunity reached interviews with potential witnesses in a pending case.225
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court and held
that absolute immunity applied because the statements complained of “bore
‘some relation’ to the proceeding” and were made “while [Traynor] was acting as defense counsel.”226 And, as many courts before it have done, the

220. Id.
221. See id.
222. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 9:54, 17:08 (discussing Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. 1994)).
223. See DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 5–6.
224. 639 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1994).
225. DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 7 (citing Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608).
226. Id. at 7 (quoting Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608). The appellate court clarified that absolute
immunity extended to interviews of potential witnesses connected to pending litigation. Id.
(citing Stucchio v. Tincher, 726 So. 2d 372, 373–75 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)). The court
also noted that other jurisdictions had come to similar conclusions, and in some instances,
gone even further, finding that the doctrine applies to statements made before suit is even
initiated. Id. at 7–8 (citing Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1276 (11th Cir.
2004); Pettitt v. Levy, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650, 654 (Ct. App. 1972); Jones v. Coward, 666 S.E.2d
877, 880 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Russell v. Clark, 620 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981);
Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 376 (Utah 2007)).
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court noted that “‘[t]here could be ‘discipline of the courts, the bar association, and the state’ if there was misconduct.’”227
The Supreme Court of Florida heard oral arguments in this matter on a
Petition for Writ of Certiorari after the Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of Traynor.228 The case remains pending before the Supreme Court of Florida.229
While the court in DelMonico focused on the application of the law and
the reach of absolute immunity, there is another underlying question that
remains, one that speaks directly to professionalism.230 Did Traynor need to
employ these methods to appropriately represent his client? In other words,
just because he could say these things and avoid civil liability, does that
mean he should have or that there should be no consequences for his decision?231 If you accept the balancing test offered as a rationale for absolute
immunity, there should nevertheless be some consequence for behavior that
is unprofessional. Inasmuch as such behavior is rarely addressed through
disciplinary proceedings, don’t the new professionalism standards present an
opportunity to rectify that oversight? Indeed, there is a strong argument that
the proposed professionalism standards in Florida will require action.
From Traynor’s perspective, is it fair to second guess his decisions and
strategy in preparing for his client’s defense? Is it fair to subject him to discipline? The answer here has to be yes because the argument for permitting
such far-reaching immunity is that the same behavior is kept in check by the
227. Id. at 8 (quoting Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608). Other than the obvious irony that such
discipline is not often visited upon attorneys in these circumstances, it is difficult to conceive
of how a court could discipline or otherwise correct statements made prior to litigation being
filed since the jurisdiction of the court has yet to be invoked when pre-suit statements are
contemplated. See Pledger v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1323, 1326–27 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Curtis, supra note 57, at 235; Erno D. Lindner, Comment, Torts—Simpson
Strong-Tie v. Stewart: Balancing the Protection of Individuals with the Freedom of the Judicial Process in Tennessee Attorney Solicitations, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1093, 1101 (2009). On
the other hand, when confronted with unprofessional behavior or flat-out deceit by an attorney, even if cloaked by the protection of absolute immunity, how can a court not take action
and report the matter?
228. See DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 6; see also Oral Argument, supra note 57.
229. DelMonico v. Traynor Case Docket, FLA SUPREME CT., http://jweb.flcourts.org
/pls/docket/ds_docket_search (search by “case number,” then select “SC10” for “FSC case
number” field, enter “1397,” then select “submit”) (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
230. See DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 5–8.
231. To be clear, Traynor denied saying that DelMonico was being prosecuted for prostitution, which was easily the most egregious statement he allegedly made, but for the purposes
of this discussion, the author assumes all of the statements were made by Traynor. Id. at 6.
Additionally, even if Traynor did not indicate that DelMonico was being prosecuted, there is
something about the way he chose to conduct his interviews and the way he approached the
witnesses. Id.
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consequences constantly enumerated by the courts, namely, inherent power
of the trial courts, bar discipline, and even procedural rules, such as Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11.232
VI. HOW CAN THE ATTORNEY’S OBLIGATIONS TO HIS CLIENT AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF NEW PROFESSIONALISM STANDARDS BE RECONCILED?
Enforcing professionalism is yet another way that improper conduct is
addressed by the self-regulating legal profession. Inherently, these standards
stand for the proposition that certain types of attorney conduct are subject to
a heightened level of regulation and scrutiny—including honesty, fair dealing, and courtesy. In and of themselves, they are laudable goals that should
be given form to move the entire legal community forward to a better place
and better clarify expectations—professional and otherwise—for the legal
community.
The problem, however, is that these same provisions create a tension
between what a lawyer can do, and what a lawyer should do. Absolute immunity provides a perfect example of this tension.233 In effect, “the privilege’s . . . immuniz[ation] [of] lawyer conduct is at odds with many other
legal provisions that condemn the very same conduct.”234
In Traynor’s case, clearly he did not have to convey to any potential
witnesses that DelMonico was being prosecuted for prostitution.235 If this
were true, then Traynor would have independent verification of that fact
from another source, such as a police investigation, a police report, or other
232. Hayden, supra note 166, at 1037–38; Ronald E. Mallen & James A. Roberts, The
Liability of a Litigation Attorney to a Party Opponent, 14 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 387, 393
(1977–1978). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) provides that “[b]y presenting . . . a
pleading, written motion, or other paper [to the court]—whether by signing, filing, submitting,
or later advocating it—an attorney . . . certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief,” after reasonable inquiry, “it is not being presented for [an] improper
purpose;” there are no frivolous legal claims and facts, contentions, or denials have evidentiary support. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). This rule has been enforced in the federal courts when an
attorney has filed a factually deficient pleading and it does not appear justice has ground to a
halt. Robeson Def. Comm. v. Britt (In re Kunstler), 914 F.2d 505, 514–15, 525 (4th Cir.
1990); Coates v. United Parcel Servs., 933 F. Supp. 497, 499–500 (D. Md. 1996). Surely, an
attorney could be held to a comparable standard of reasonable inquiry in matters where defamation may be a factor without significant repercussions to absolute immunity if the only
sanctions were disciplinary in nature. See, e.g., In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn.
1990) (per curiam) (citing In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind. 1979) (per curiam)).
233. Hayden, supra note 166, at 1037.
234. Id.
235. See DelMonico v. Traynor, 50 So. 3d 4, 6 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review granted,
47 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2010).
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official source. Traynor also should not have represented or permitted the
impression that he was involved in the prosecution.236 Not only does this run
afoul of the standards of professional conduct, but it arguably created a different dynamic when he was interviewing presumably unrepresented lay
witnesses.237
It is easy to imagine that Traynor could have obtained similar results by
simply telling each potential witness that DelMonico was suing Crespo and
Donovan for telling others he was using prostitutes to gain business.238
Traynor could also have asked the witnesses if they were aware of DelMonico’s business practices.239 If Traynor determined the witnesses knew nothing, he need not have conveyed further information about the alleged use of
prostitutes. And, if he was unsure, Traynor could have chosen to depose
those witnesses affording DelMonico and his counsel an opportunity to participate in the process.240
Regardless of what Traynor could or should have done, the bigger question is whether Traynor should be subject to disciplinary sanctions for his
unprofessional conduct even if what he did was otherwise protected by absolute immunity and, perhaps, not even in violation of the rules of professional
conduct. Courts that are presented with these cases in the context of civil
liability raise the issue of enforcement and balance,241 but it does not appear
that they act even when directly confronted with an attorney’s unprofessional
behavior. If professionalism becomes enforceable, then the new question
will be whether an attorney’s behavior was sufficiently substantial or repeated to necessitate discipline, and how discipline should be imposed.
There is a need for zealous representation, and there is a need to thoroughly
vet potential witnesses in a pending case.242 But when does it cross the line,
and how do you regulate those judgment calls? Such judgment calls are
clearly made in the moment. While it would be difficult to fashion a bright
line rule for this sort of conduct, clearer guidance would be helpful.
The treatment of another type of immunity—from defamation—in disciplinary cases may offer some insight into how to fashion a rule for discipli-

236. See id.
237. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012); see DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 12
(Warner, J., dissenting).
238. See DelMonico, 50 So. 3d at 6 (majority opinion).
239. See id.
240. Id. at 12 (Warner, J., dissenting).
241. Oral Argument, supra note 57, at 24:41–27:09.
242. See Levin, 639 So. 2d at 608.
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nary proceedings that will balance the current application of absolute immunity with newly enforceable professionalism standards.243
In In re Graham,244 Graham filed an action for injunction in federal
court alleging that the County Attorney, Rathke, filed a criminal action
against his client as retaliation against Graham.245 The Federal Magistrate,
McNulty, found in favor of the County Attorney.246 Graham then sent a letter to the United States Attorney alleging that Rathke, Rathke’s attorney,
another Federal Judge, Spellacy, and McNulty conspired to fix the result of
the criminal action.247 Graham made the accusations of judicial misconduct
public, so the Chief Judge of the Eighth Circuit reviewed Graham’s complaint and found no evidence that even suggested judicial misconduct.248
Ultimately, a referee concluded that Graham’s statements regarding the
integrity of the federal judge, the magistrate, and the county attorney were
made without basis and fact, and with reckless disregard for their truth or
falsity.249 The Supreme Court of Minnesota considered Graham’s claims of
absolute immunity under the First Amendment and the Petition Clause.250
The court apparently considered the matter in this context because the defamatory statements were made about public officials—a judge, a magistrate,
and a county attorney—and Graham was charged with violating Rule 8.2(a),
Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct.251
The court found that First Amendment protection for an attorney’s criticism of judges’ integrity or conduct was limited and subject to an application
of an objective standard to determine actual malice when related to attorney
disciplinary proceedings, rather than the subjective standard generally ap-

243. See, e.g., In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d 313, 322 (Minn. 1990) (per curiam) (quoting In
re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95 (Ind. 1979) (per curiam)).
244. 453 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 1990) (per curiam).
245. Id. at 316–17.
246. Id. at 317.
247. Id. at 317–18.
248. Id. at 318 n.3. Graham made similar accusations in a motion to recuse the magistrate
from hearing an attorney’s fees motion, but these were found to be false by the referee in the
disciplinary proceeding as well. In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 319.
249. Id.; see also MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a), 8.4(d) (2011).
250. In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 319–20; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
251. In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 314–15, 319–20; see also MINN. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.2(a). Graham was also charged with violating Rules 3.1 and 8.4(d), Minnesota
Rules of Professional Conduct. In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 314–15; MINN. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1, 8.4(d). Rule 8.2(a) deals with false statements or statements made
with reckless disregard for the truth about judges and other public officials. In re Graham,
453 N.W.2d at 315, 324; MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a).
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plied to actual malice in criminal or civil defamation actions.252 Other courts
have come to a similar conclusion, finding that an objective standard is applicable under these circumstances.253
In In re Graham, an attorney’s immunity under the First Amendment
was limited based on the nature of a disciplinary proceeding because the
interests protected by “regular” legal proceedings for defamation and attorney disciplinary proceedings are not the same.254 The Supreme Court of
Minnesota cited the distinction made by the Supreme Court of Indiana:
Defamation is a wrong directed against an individual and the remedy is a personal redress of this wrong. On the other hand, the

252. In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 322. Normally, the First Amendment provides limited
immunity from civil or criminal defamation when public officials are criticized for their official conduct. Id. at 320 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 282–83
(1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Even if the statements made are false, “the public official cannot recover unless the statements
[are] made with ‘actual malice,’” requiring “knowledge that the statements were false or made
with reckless disregard [for] their truth or falsity.” In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 320 (quoting
N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80). The court did not, however, address whether Graham’s
statements were protected by absolute immunity. See id. at 319–20. Given the specific nature
of the disciplinary complaint, and the fact that it deals with a special population of public
officials with a specific rule of professional conduct connected thereto, absolute immunity was
likely not an appropriate consideration. See id.
253. U.S. Dist. Court v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 867 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Green, 11 P.3d
1078, 1084, 1086 n.7 (Colo. 2000) (per curiam) (en banc) (stating “‘the inquiry focuses on
whether the attorney had a reasonable factual basis for making the statements’” that the “judge
was ‘drunk on the bench’” (quoting Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430,
1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1995))); In re Cobb, 838 N.E.2d 1197, 1212 (Mass. 2005) (noting a
majority of states that have considered this question have expressed “the standard [a]s whether
the attorney had an objectively reasonable basis for making the statements”); see also Gentile
v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991) (“[L]awyers in pending cases [are] subject to
ethical restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be” (citing In re Sawyer,
360 U.S. 622, 646–47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring))). The Supreme Court also stated that
lawyers in these circumstances “may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that
established for regulation of” other protected speech under the First Amendment. Gentile, 501
U.S. at 1074; see also U.S. Const. amend. I. While In re Green focused on the application of
First Amendment protection to an attorney’s opinions about a judge, which were conveyed to
that judge, including the fact that the attorney believed the judge to be racist, the court also
stated that it “neither condone[d] the tone of . . . [the] letters nor agree[d] with the conclusions
. . . he drew.” In re Green, 11 P.3d at 1086–87; see also U.S. Const. amend. I. It bears considering whether Green’s actions may have been subject to different treatment under enforceable professionalism standards instead of First Amendment defamation protection when only
the tone and nature of his conduct might be at issue. See In re Green, 11 P.3d at 1086–87; see
also U.S. Const. amend. I.
254. See In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 321–22 (quoting In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d 94, 95
(Ind. 1979) (per curiam)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Code of Professional Responsibility encompasses a much broader
spectrum of protection. Professional misconduct, although it may
directly affect an individual, is not punished for the benefit of the
affected person; the wrong is against society as a whole, the preservation of a fair, impartial judicial system, and the system of justice as it has evolved for generations.255

While recognizing that the regulation of professional conduct has different goals, creating a way to balance those goals is slightly different than
the justification usually given for permitting absolute immunity for civil liability.256 This becomes increasingly relevant when the conduct at issue is not
a direct violation of the rules of professional conduct as it was in In re Graham.257 Where professionalism itself is enforceable, the courts should consider adopting a qualification of absolute immunity and not permitting the
use of immunity unless an attorney can satisfy an objective standard that
considers what a reasonable attorney would have done in the same circumstance. Similar to Louisiana’s application of the privilege, it could require
that an attorney demonstrate the “statement [was] material . . . , made with
probable cause, and [that it was, in fact, made] without malice.”258
Absolute immunity is not going away. While some federal rules and
qualifications imposed upon such immunity have created limits, the reality is
that attorneys will always have unfettered discretion to act in a manner that
255. See In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 322 (quoting In re Terry, 394 N.E.2d at 95). Interestingly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in adopting an objective standard,
agreed with the logic that application of the subjective standard to actual malice “‘would
immunize all accusations, however reckless or irresponsible, from censure as long as the attorney uttering them did not actually entertain serious doubts as to their truth’”and that such a
system, without the check of an objective standard, would “permit[] an attorney . . . to challenge the integrity, and thereby the authority, of a judge presiding over a case elevat[ing]
brazen and irresponsible conduct above competence and diligence, hallmarks of professional
conduct.” In re Cobb, 838 N.E.2d at 1213–14 (quoting In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 34
(N.Y. 1991) (per curiam)).
256. Compare Anenson, supra note 12, at 920–21, with Terrell & Wildman, supra note
63, at 424, 426–28.
257. See In re Graham, 453 N.W.2d at 314–15, 320 (citing MINN. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.1, 8.2(a), 8.4(d) (2011)). The criticism of public officials and judges raises
different concerns than defamation that may affect a party to a legal proceeding. See id. at
322. The former has a direct impact on the administration of justice and depending on whether such statements are made public, can have a much more far-reaching effect. See id. However, in balance, absolute immunity is designed for the benefit of the attorney to protect him
from needless litigation so that he may do his job, which also impacts the administration of
justice. Anenson, supra note 12, at 920.
258. Freeman v. Cooper, 414 So. 2d 355, 359 (La. 1982) (citing Waldo v. Morrison, 58
So. 2d 210, 211 (La. 1952)).
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may be dishonest and harmful to a third party under certain circumstances.259
This has always been an accepted part of the advocacy system.260 However,
as more and more states may consider adopting enforceable professionalism
standards, perhaps this is a perfect time to shift the balance away from the
broadest reading of absolute immunity, or at least start truly imposing the
balance that is supposed to be imposed by discipline as an available remedy.
Professionalism, and the bench and the Bar’s demand for more, may offer a perfect opportunity to finally put some teeth in the sanctions available
to curb and correct attorney behavior under these circumstances.261 It also
offers a relatively low threat alternative, with due process, a diversionary
program (in the case of Florida), and a chance to change attorney attitudes
and behavior without hampering an attorney’s obligation to zealously
represent a client. Given these limitations, plus the protection of an educated
audience, it may be the perfect way to shape up the profession itself, giving a
new spin to an old problem and, more importantly, sending a clear message
to new attorneys about where the limits are for acceptable behavior. It may
also serve as guidance for similar situations where what a lawyer could do
conflicts with what a lawyer should do.

259. See Anenson, supra note 12, at 918–20; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I.
260. See Anenson, supra note 12, at 918–19.
261. See Fla. Bar v. Barrett, 897 So. 2d 1269, 1273, 1277 (Fla. 2005) (per curiam); Hubert,
supra note 61, at 117; Blankenship, Putting ‘Teeth’ in Professionalism, supra note 79.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1996, Massachusetts enacted a law banning the state government
from conducting business with companies associated with the country of
Burma.1 The law took aim at Burma based on the country’s human rights
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violations and forced labor issues.2 Less than five years after its enactment,
the Supreme Court of the United States found the law unconstitutional, as it
violated the Supremacy Clause.3 Namely, the Court found the law unconstitutional because of congressional intent to grant the President “discretion . . .
to develop a comprehensive, multilateral strategy” in dealing with the government of Burma.4
In 2012, Governor of Florida, Rick Scott, signed a bill amending a law
very similar to the Burma law in Massachusetts, but instead taking aim at the
nation of Cuba.5 Florida’s Cuba Amendment (“Cuba Amendment”) remains
very controversial and generated international scrutiny even before it was
passed.6 The Cuba Amendment has similar provisions to the Massachusetts
Burma Law (“Massachusetts law”) and “prohibits the State of Florida from
awarding public contracts in excess of one million dollars to companies who
have ‘business operations’ in Cuba.”7 “‘Business operations’ [are] defined
as ‘engaging in commerce in any form . . . .’”8 A Brazilian construction
conglomerate with billions of dollars hinging on the legal fate of the Cuba
Amendment has already filed suit in federal court.9 A federal judge has issued a preliminary injunction against the law being enforced, allowing Odebrecht Construction, Inc. (“Odebrecht”) to resume work on projects in Mi1. Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS 239, 239–41, (codified at MASS.
GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22 G–7:22 M, 40 F 1/2 (1997)), declared unconstitutional by Crosby v. Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
2. HARRISON INST. FOR PUB. LAW, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CENTER, DEFENDING THE
MASSACHUSETTS BURMA LAW 3 (2000).
3. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign
Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999); see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388.
5. FLA. STAT. § 287.135 (2012); Marc Caputo & Patricia Mazzei, Fla. Gov. Rick Scott
Signs Cuba-Crackdown Bill, but Event Turns into a Public Relations Fiasco, MIAMI HERALD,
May 1, 2012, http://www .miamiherald.com/2012/05/01/v-print/2777969/fla-gov-rick-scottsigns-cuba.html.
6. See Patricia Mazzei, Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash If Gov. Scott Signs
New Anti-Cuba Legislation, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 22, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.
com/2012/04/21/v-print/2762957/flas-trading-partners-warn-of.html [hereinafter Mazzei,
Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash].
7. Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at *1
(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012). Compare FLA. STAT. § 287.135(2), with Act of June 25, 1996, ch.
130, 1996 MASS. ACTS 239, 239–41 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22 G–7:22 M, 40 F
1/2 (1997)), declared unconstitutional by Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S.
363 (2000).
8. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 287.135(b)).
9. Id. at *1; Patricia Mazzei, Odebrecht Sues Florida over New Law Banning Government Hiring of Firms Tied to Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, June 4, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.
com/2012/06/04/v-print/2832880/odebrecht-sues-florida-over-new.html.
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ami.10 The Cuba Amendment implicates many of the same constitutional
problems that afflicted the Massachusetts law, and the federal court issuing
the injunction has expressed serious doubts as to the Florida law’s validity.11
The Cuba Amendment is not universally opposed, however, seeing that
the law was approved by an almost unanimous majority of Florida’s Legislature and also received support from many Cuban-American lawmakers in
Miami-Dade County,12 perhaps a sign of the almost fifty-year strife between
the many Cuban exiles in Florida and Communist Cuba. Florida has a history of antagonism toward the rogue island nation, and has tried to enforce
legislation like the Cuba Amendment in the past.13 However, courts in Florida have refused to uphold many of the anti-Cuba laws regardless of the political sensitivity surrounding the issue in the Sunshine State.14 The Cuba
Amendment seems to be headed in the same direction.
This article will first discuss the Massachusetts law, including an analysis of the constitutional issues raised and the Supreme Court’s ruling.15 The
second section will provide a brief history of Florida’s relationship with Cuba regarding various anti-Cuba laws and bills from Florida.16 This section
will also note several federal laws directed at the nation of Cuba.17 The final
section will focus on the recently signed Cuba Amendment and any constitutional issues that go with it.18 This section will also discuss recent litigation
in federal court concerning the Cuba Amendment, compare and contrast the
Massachusetts law with the Cuba Amendment, as well as discuss the reasoning of the Supreme Court decision that found the Massachusetts law unconstitutional.19 This discussion will be in an attempt to predict a result, should
10. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *1; Patricia Mazzei, Miami Federal
Judge Blocks New Florida Anti-Cuba Law from Taking Effect, MIAMI HERALD, June 25, 2012,
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/25/v-print/2867901/miami-federal-judge-blocks-new.
html [hereinafter Mazzei, Miami Federal Judge Blocks New Florida Anti-Cuba Law].
11. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366, 371 (2000), aff’g Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999); Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012
WL 2524261, at *5, *9, *12; see also U.S. CONST art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.
2; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. See Mazzei, Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash if Gov. Scott Signs New AntiCuba Legislation, supra note 6; see also Caputo & Mazzei, supra note 5.
13. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2 n.3, *3; see also Cuban Assets
Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201–.208 (2011).
14. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2 & n.3 (citing Miami Light Project
v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176–77 (S.D. Fla. 2000)).
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.A.1.
17. See infra Part III.A.2.
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See infra Part III.B.
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the Cuba Amendment ascend to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and
ultimately to the Supreme Court.
II.

MASSACHUSETTS AND BURMA (MYANMAR)

Massachusetts has a history of economic boycotts.20 During the American Revolution, the colony of Massachusetts played a key role in “support[ing] the boycott of British goods.”21 Burma—which also gained its independence from Great Britain—maintained a parliamentary democracy
from 1948 until 1962.22 From 1962 to 1988, the Burma Socialist Programme
Party controlled the country and violence against demonstrators in the late
1980s continued into the 1990s.23 Massachusetts, and about twenty-two other states, enacted similar legislation.24 Although the Massachusetts law was
the only one to make it to the Supreme Court, its invalidation by the Court
meant the same for all similar state laws relating to Burma at the time.25
A.

The Massachusetts Law
1.

History

Despite being found unconstitutional, the Massachusetts law was not
without good cause, seeing that Burma’s violations of human rights and systematic political oppression were especially egregious during the late twentieth century.26 According to one study, “forced labor account[ed] for [seven
percent] of [the country]’s economy” and almost six million people were
forced to work against their will during the 1990s.27 Burma’s military also
engaged in the practice of portering, whereby porters were required to advance ahead of soldiers in an attempt to detonate land mines or shield soldiers from enemy fire.28 Millions were also relocated against their will and
put in concentration camps where conditions were abysmal.29

20. See HARRISON INST. FOR PUB. LAW, supra note 2, at 2.
21. Id.
22. Adrienne S. Khorasanee, Note, Sacrificing Burma to Save Free Trade: The Burma
Freedom Act and the World Trade Organization, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1295, 1298 (2002).
23. Id. at 1298–1300.
24. Id. at 1295–96.
25. Id. at 1296.
26. See id. at 1296, 1299–1300.
27. HARRISON INST. FOR PUB. LAW, supra note 2, at 3.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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The call for states and governments to take action came initially from
within Burma when Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a political activist and winner
of the Nobel Peace Prize, encouraged bans on economic investment in the
country.30 Suu Kyi famously said, in 1996, “[p]rofits from business enterprises will merely go towards enriching a small, already very privileged elite.
Companies [that trade in Burma] only serve to prolong the agony of my
country by encouraging the present military regime to persevere in its intransigence.”31 The Massachusetts Legislature decided to heed this calling.32
2.

Implementation and Federal Competition

Initially, the anti-Burma law was successful in that it seemed to effectively draw American companies away from the troubled country.33 Broadly
stated, the Massachusetts law “generally bar[red] state entities from buying
goods or services from any person—defined to include a business organization—identified on a ‘restricted purchase list’ of those doing business with
Burma.”34 The restricted purchase list had about 346 companies by the time
the initial lawsuit was filed.35 The law made exceptions for persons or businesses in Burma related to the press, suppliers of telecommunications goods,
and medical or health suppliers.36 Under the law, all state contracts were
void if entered into with a company listed as having contact with Burma.37
The law applied to “companies already in Burma” as well as “existing contracts or contracts that may be renewed.”38
The same year the Massachusetts law was passed, Congress enacted a
federal statute that looked very similar.39 The many overlaps between the
two laws were largely responsible for the Massachusetts law being found

30. See Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1299–1300.
31. HARRISON INST. FOR PUB. LAW, supra note 2, at 3.
32. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1300.
33. Id. at 1301.
34. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367 (2000) (citing Act of June
25, 1996, ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS 239, 241–42 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22G–
7:22M, 40 F1/2 (1997)), declared unconstitutional by Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council,
530 U.S. 363 (2000)), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.
1999).
35. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1301.
36. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 367 (citing Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 241–42).
37. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1301; see also Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 242.
38. Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 243; Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1303.
39. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1302; see also Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(a)–(e), 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-166 to 3009-167 (1997); Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 243.
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unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause.40 The federal statute “restricted aid to the government of Burma, . . . required federal representatives
of ‘international financial institutions’ to vote against proposed financial
assistance to Burma, . . . prohibited the issuance of visas to Burmese government officials, . . . [and] gave discretion to the Executive Office in determining when the sanctions may be lifted.”41 The main difference between
the federal statute and the Massachusetts law was that the federal statute
primarily targeted new money going to Burma and not necessarily contracts
in effect at the time.42 The federal statute took on “a more political [and] less
economic”43 tone, directing the President to “develop ‘a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to . . . improve human rights . . . in Burma.’”44 The President was also to work with neighboring countries and groups such as the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to work towards a
solution.45 This federal law would become the topic of several lawsuits
brought against Massachusetts on constitutional grounds.46
B.

Court Decisions

The Massachusetts state law resulted in a series of court opinions, starting in federal court in Massachusetts and ending in the Supreme Court.47
The following section will provide a general discussion of these cases.
1.

United States District Court, District of Massachusetts

The legal action against the Massachusetts law occurred in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.48 The suit started
when the National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) sued the two state offi-

40. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388. Compare § 570(a)–(e), 110 Stat. at 3009-166 to 3009-167,
with Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 239–43.
41. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1302; see also § 570(a)–(e), 110 Stat. at 3009-166 to
3009-167.
42. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1303. Compare § 570(a)–(e), 110 Stat. at 3009-166 to
3009-167, with Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 243.
43. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1303.
44. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369 (quoting § 570(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-166).
45. Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1303.
46. See, e.g., Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366; Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d
38, 44–45 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999).
47. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366; Natsios, 181 F.3d at 45; Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v.
Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289 (D. Mass. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Foreign Trade
Council v. Natsios, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999).
48. See Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 289.
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cials charged with administering the Massachusetts law at issue,49 however,
this article will refer to the defendant as the State of Massachusetts. In its
opinion, the court noted that there were amicus briefs filed in support of the
NFTC that came from around the world.50
Initially, Massachusetts defended the law on the basis that a state can
intrude into foreign affairs, so long as the result is indirect.51 Massachusetts
also argued that the law did not create
a direct contact between the state and the Nation of Myanmar [and
that] important state interests embodied in the First and Tenth
Amendments justify the statute; and . . . the foreign affairs’ doctrine is itself “vague,” [and therefore] the court should leave to the
legislative branch the issue of whether to invalidate the Massachusetts . . . [l]aw and similar state procurement statutes.52

While trying to analogize the Massachusetts law with other state statutes that
were sustained, the state cited case law from federal courts that held in that
manner.53 However, the district court distinguished these cases in that the
statutes involved, unlike the Massachusetts law, “did not single out a particular foreign country for particular treatment.”54 The district court also noted
that not all “Buy American” statutes are necessarily constitutional.55
The court acknowledged that the Massachusetts law did not fashion any
direct contact with Burma, but that this was irrelevant for purposes of the
law’s constitutionality.56 Referring to the Supreme Court of the United

49. Id.
50. Id. at 291.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 291. Massachusetts cited cases from several United States
district courts upholding state statutes, such as one requiring that the state governments purchase products made in the United States for construction, another requiring a city to cease
investing in South Africa, as well as other “Buy American” statutes. Id. at 291–92 (citing
Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 742 F. Supp. 900, 901, 903 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Bd. of Trs.
of Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 562 A.2d 720, 723, 757 (Md. 1989);
K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 381 A.2d 774, 789
(N.J. 1977)).
54. Id. at 292.
55. Id. (citing Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Dep’t of the Water & Power,
80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802–03 (Ct. App. 1969)). “Buy American” statutes are laws usually requiring that states only purchase materials originating or produced in the United States or that
states only contract with companies that purchase and use United States materials. See id.
56. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (citing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434–35
(1968)).

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

173

Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1

NOVA LAW REVIEW

162

[Vol. 37

States’ decision in Zschernig v. Miller57—also cited in the most recent opinion regarding Florida’s Cuba Amendment mentioned later58—the district
court explained that only a substantive impact is necessary.59 The court also
stated the principle that the nobility of the state law bears no effect on foreign affairs infringement analysis.60
The NFTC also argued that the Massachusetts law was preempted and
violated the Foreign Commerce Clause.61 However, the district court refused
to address either of these issues directly, as neither would have any consequential effect on the court’s ultimate decision.62 The district court did note
that in order for a state law to be preempted by federal legislation, there must
be intent on behalf of Congress to regulate in the area that the state law affects.63 The court only stated that because the NFTC argued that Congress
impliedly intended to exercise its authority in the area, the NFTC had a higher burden than if arguing express preemption.64 The court also refused to
address the Foreign Commerce Clause issue and the possible market participant exception, and finally held that the law was unconstitutional because of
its “infringement [on the] federal government’s . . . foreign affairs” authority.65
2.

First Circuit Court of Appeals Decision

In National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios,66 the First Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to hold for the law’s challengers.67 The NFTC—the plaintiff nonprofit organization comprised of
companies involved in international business—filed suit in the federal trial
court of Massachusetts and was granted summary judgment in its initial suit
against Massachusetts.68
57. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
58. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at
*7–8 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012).
59. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (citing Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434).
60. Id. (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233–34 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937)).
61. Id. at 293; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A.,
441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
62. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
63. Id. (citing Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 1997)).
64. Id. at 293 (citing Philip Morris Inc., 122 F.3d at 79).
65. Id.
66. 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999).
67. Id. at 45, 78; see also Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 371
(2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999).
68. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 48–49.
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Upon granting review, the First Circuit first analyzed the Massachusetts
law and its constitutionality under the federal government’s foreign affairs
power,69 which was the basis for the lower federal court finding for the
NFTC.70 The court rejected many of the state’s arguments, including that the
First and Tenth Amendments protected the law.71 Generally, the court found
that foreign affairs are to be handled by the federal government and that the
Massachusetts Burma law was in violation of this principle of federalism.72
Namely, that the state law crossed a line into what should be the federal government’s jurisdiction of power by passing a law dealing with a foreign
country in that the state law had more than an “‘incidental or indirect effect
in [that] foreign countr[y].’”73
The second area of the court’s focus was on Congress’s Commerce
Clause power.74 The court rejected the state’s argument that the Burma law
was a constitutional exercise of power under the market participant exception
of the Commerce Clause.75 The First Circuit reasoned that the state was regulating because it was “impos[ing] on companies with which it does business conditions that appl[ied] to activities not even remotely connected to
such companies’ interactions with Massachusetts.”76 The court also refused
to rule that the market participant exception even applied to the Foreign
Commerce Clause, as the Supreme Court has not yet resolved this issue.77
The third and final analysis dealt with whether the Massachusetts law
was preempted by the federal statute.78 The court rejected the argument that
the law was impliedly authorized and not preempted simply because Congress knew of the state law and never specifically preempted it.79 Instead,
the court found that federal sanctions preempted the state law.80

69. Id. at 50–52 (construing Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968)).
70. Id. at 51 (quoting Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 291); see also Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434–
35.
71. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 60–61.
72. Id. at 49, 77 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920)).
73. Id. at 52 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
74. Id. at 61; see Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 371 (2000), aff’g
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999).
75. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 62; see also White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460
U.S. 204, 214–15 (1983) (holding that when a state spends its own money while acting as a
participant in the market the Commerce Clause is not violated).
76. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 63.
77. Id. at 65.
78. See id. at 71.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 77.
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Preemption will be more easily found where states legislate in
areas traditionally reserved to the federal government, and in particular where state laws touch on foreign affairs. The test which
should be applied is set forth in Hines . . . [holding] that “[n]o state
can add to or take from the force and effect of [a] treaty or statute.”81

Therefore, because Massachusetts enacted a law regulating trade with Burma
at the same time that federal sanctions did the same, but to a lesser extent, the
state law was preempted.82 Perhaps, what is most notable about the First
Circuit’s decision is its breadth, when compared to the narrow district court
and later Supreme Court decisions.83 Ultimately, the court refused to uphold
the law under the principle that it was the federal government’s, and not
Massachusetts’s job to dictate the nation’s foreign policy agenda.84
3.

Supreme Court of the United States Decision

In 2000, the Massachusetts law advanced to the Supreme Court in
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,85 where the Court unanimously
held to strike it down.86 Massachusetts appealed the First Circuit’s decision
on the three grounds the court considered.87 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to clarify legal issues afflicting several other states as well.88
Justice David Souter began his opinion by stating a maxim of American
constitutionalism: “Congress has the power to preempt state law. Even
without an express provision for preemption, we have found that state law
must yield to a congressional [a]ct . . . .”89 Justice Souter continued by noting that this primarily occurs when Congress intends to “occupy the field” or
when it is impossible for actors to comply with a federal statute and a state

81. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 73 (alterations in original) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 63 (1941)).
82. Id. at 75.
83. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000), aff’g Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999); Natsios, 181 F.3d at 77; Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1998), cert. granted sub
nom. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999).
84. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 77.
85. 530 U.S. 363 (2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st
Cir. 1999).
86. Id. at 371–72, 388.
87. Id. at 371.
88. Id. at 371–72.
89. Id. at 372 (citations omitted).
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law concurrently.90 With the Massachusetts law in place, a barrier was
placed before the federal government and its goals.91 In fact, the Court’s
decision to strike down the Massachusetts law rested solely on the basis that
the state law was preempted.92 Specifically, the Massachusetts law adversely
affected the President’s discretion, went further in its terms than the federal
law, and contrasted with Congress’s intent for the President to be diplomatic
in dealing with Burma.93
Justice Souter first analyzed the degree of discretion that the federal law
afforded the President.94 The federal law gave the President broad discretion
to end any United States sanctions on Burma if and when human rights and
political reforms took place there.95 Most importantly in this regard, the
Court noted Congress’s intent that the President may “waive, temporarily or
permanently, any sanction.”96 The principle that the President has the most
latitude to maneuver when Congress explicitly authorizes his actions has
been firmly established by the Court.97 By way of the federal law, Congress
gave the President the “authority not merely to make a political statement but
to achieve a political result, and the fullness of his authority shows the importance in the congressional mind of reaching that result.”98 The Massachusetts law would act as a roadblock by implementing state sanctions against
Burma, different from those imposed by the federal government.99 Perhaps
most notably, the Massachusetts law did not provide for a termination provision unlike the federal law.100 Therefore, enforcement of the Massachusetts
law would effectively diminish the President’s discretion as intended by
Congress.101
90. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 372–73 (citing California v. Arc Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101
(1989); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963)).
91. See Khorasanee, supra note 22, at 1307.
92. Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, International Decisions: Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 750–51 (2000).
93. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373–74; Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 752.
94. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374; see Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(a), (e), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166 to
3009-167 (1997).
95. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374; see § 570(a), (e), 110 Stat. at 3009-166 to 3009-167.
96. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374 (quoting § 570(e), 110 Stat. at 3009-167).
97. Id. at 375 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
98. Id. at 376.
99. See id. Compare Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS 239, 241 (codified
at MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22G–7:22M, 40 F 1/2 (1997)), declared unconstitutional by Crosby
v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), with § 570(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-166.
100. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 376–77 (citing Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 242).
101. Id. at 377.
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Next, the Court focused on the conflicting scopes of the two laws.102
Justice Souter noted that the federal law was limited to “United States persons, . . . immediate sanctions, . . . [only] ‘new investment’ . . . and [did not
apply to] . . . contracts to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology.”103
On the contrary, the Massachusetts law applied to “individuals and conduct
that Congress . . . [specifically] exempted or excluded from sanctions.”104
However, it should be noted that the Massachusetts law operated by employing indirect economic sanctions through limiting business contracts while the
federal law’s implementation was more direct by way of the executive.105
Justice Souter noted not only that the Massachusetts law was broader than
the federal law, but also emphasized how broad in fact it was, seeing that
foreign companies would be subjected to the Massachusetts law’s provisions.106 Because of the Massachusetts law’s broad provisions and the inability for many entities to comply with the federal law at the same time, the
federal law preempted the Massachusetts law.107
Lastly, the Court reasoned that the Massachusetts law was preempted
by federal legislation because of its effect on “the President’s capacity . . . for
effective diplomacy.”108 Congress not only intended that the President have
discretion in dealing with Burma, but also that he act as the sole representative of the United States on the world stage in dealing with Burma.109 Nowhere is there evidence that Congress intended that the President’s voice be
“obscured by state or local action.”110 The President’s inability to work undisturbed with other countries was evidenced when many United States allies
formally protested the Massachusetts law.111

102. See id. at 377–78.
103. Id. at 377 (citations omitted) (quoting Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(f)(2), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009167 (1997)).
104. Id. at 378.
105. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 378; see Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 241.
106. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 379; Ch. 130, 1996 MASS. ACTS at 239–241; § 570(b), (f)(2), 110
Stat. at 3009-166 to 3009-167.
107. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366, 388.
108. Id. at 381.
109. See id. at 380–81 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3;
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)).
110. Id. at 381.
111. Id. at 382 (citing Brief for the European Communities and Their Member States et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at *4, Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363 (2000), 2000 WL 177175).
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The most notable of these were the European Union (EU), members of
ASEAN, and Japan.112 Japan and the EU also filed formal complaints with
the World Trade Organization, although these complaints were dropped after
action in the United States District Court.113 Actions taken by these allies
made it clear that the Massachusetts law could not exist side by side with the
Federal Act.114 “In this case, repeated representations by the Executive
Branch supported by formal diplomatic protests and concrete disputes are
more than sufficient to demonstrate that the state Act stands in the way of
Congress’s diplomatic objectives.”115 In his conclusion, Justice Souter noted
that failure to expressly state that a federal law is preempting state law does
not mean that preemption cannot be implied.116
It has been noted that the Court’s opinion was very narrow, especially
in comparison to the district court’s opinion.117 The fact that the opinion can
be read so narrowly has led some to argue that states are free to enact legislation similar to the Massachusetts law so long as there is no congressional act
imposing similar or competing sanctions.118 It has also been said that the
Crosby decision is unlikely to prevent other states from passing similar
laws,119 and the recent amendment in the State of Florida is evidence of this
proposition.120
III. FLORIDA
A.

Florida and Cuba

Florida and the nation of Cuba have had a contentious relationship evidenced by the Florida Legislature’s zeal for enacting many laws affecting
112. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 382 (citing Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,
47 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999)).
113. Id. at 383 & n.19; Natsios, 181 F.3d at 47.
114. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 383 (citing Brief for the European Communities and Their
Member States et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 111, at *7).
115. Id. at 386.
116. Id. at 387–88 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67–68 (1941)).
117. Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 753. Compare Crosby, 530 U.S. at 387–88,
with Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 293 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing
Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58, 67 (1st Cir. 1997)), cert. granted sub nom.
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 528 U.S. 1018 (1999).
118. Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 754; see Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 130, 1996
MASS. ACTS 239, 239–43 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22G–7:22M, 40 F 1/2 (1997)),
declared unconstitutional by Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
119. Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 754; see also Crosby, 530 U.S. at 371–72.
120. See FLA. STAT. § 287.135 (2012); see also Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at *1 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012).
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travel and the use of taxpayer money.121 Congress has also behaved similarly.122 This section will focus on Florida and federal legislation related to
Cuba.
1.

State Action

Florida has consistently implemented legislation affecting Cuba, much
of which has been upheld.123 This becomes clear when one looks at the
number of court opinions in federal courts over the past decade.124 In Faculty Senate of Florida International University v. Winn,125 the Eleventh Circuit
held that a state law directing universities not to use state funds for travel to
Cuba was constitutional and not preempted by federal law.126 In Faculty
Senate of Florida International University, the court distinguished the case
from Crosby by reasoning that the Florida law at issue only placed restrictions on taxpayer dollars and not on individuals or companies trying to travel
or trade.127 The court concluded that states have a reasonable amount of discretion in deciding how to spend taxpayer money in education programs.128
In 2008, a federal judge for the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida issued an order enjoining a state representative
from enforcing a Florida law affecting businesses providing travel to Cuba.129
The court reasoned that because the federal government had demonstrated
intent to occupy the field, the Florida law was likely preempted.130 Eight
years earlier, the same court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of a law very similar to the Cuba Amendment, which is a main
121. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2 n.3 (citing Faculty Senate of
Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 80
U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 25, 2012); ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272,
1280 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176
(S.D. Fla. 2000)).
122. See id. at *2–4.
123. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2 n.3 (citing Faculty Senate of
Fla. Int’l Univ., 616 F.3d at 1207; ABC Charters, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d at 1280; Miami Light
Project, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1176).
124. See id.
125. 616 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S.
June 25, 2012).
126. Id. at 1207–08, 1212.
127. Id. at 1209–10 (distinguishing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
378–79 (2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999)).
128. Id. at 1208, 1210–11.
129. ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280–81, 1312 (S.D. Fla.
2008).
130. Id. at 1304.
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focus of this article.131 The law was signed by Governor Scott in 2012 and is
the most recent anti-Cuba legislation from Florida.132
2.

Federal Action

The federal government has also been fairly active in enacting legislation imposing sanctions on Cuba.133 Many of these regulations are highly
relevant to the recent litigation regarding the Cuba Amendment, and are discussed by the federal court in Florida, where litigation recently occurred.134
The Cuban Assets Control Regulations—passed in 1963—are a set of federal
regulations that generally limit exports, imports, and travel by United States
persons and entities to Cuba.135 Almost thirty years later, the federal government enacted the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) as a reaction to Cuba’s
“consistent disregard for internationally accepted standards of human rights
and . . . democratic values.”136 The CDA provided significant discretion to
the President, allowing him “to waive the sanctions imposed by the CDA
should [he] determine that the Cuban government has taken action consistent
with the promotion of democracy as specifically delineated by the CDA.”137
In 1996, the federal government passed another act “after the Cuban
government downed two private planes [with] anti-Castro Cuban-Americans
[onboard].”138 The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act
of 1996 contains four titles authorizing the President and others to take certain action.139 The first title authorizes “the President to oppose Cuba[’s]
131. Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176 (S.D. Fla.
2000). The law at issue in this case contained several restrictions including prohibiting the
county of Miami-Dade from entering into business contracts with companies that had done
business with Cuba. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 287.135(2) (2012).
132. Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at *2
(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012); see also FLA. STAT. § 287.135.
133. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *2–4; see, e.g., Cuban Assets Control
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201–.208 (2011).
134. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *5; see also FLA. STAT. §
287.135.
135. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201–.208, .560. This federal law generally places limitations on
persons inside the United States and their ability to transact for credit, gold or silver, or import
merchandise that has been made in Cuba, been transported through Cuba, or made from material produced or grown in Cuba. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.201–.208.
136. Cuban Democracy Act of 1922, 22 U.S.C. § 6001(1) (2006); see also 31 C.F.R. §
515.201.
137. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *5 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6007(a)).
138. Id. at *3 (citing Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22
U.S.C. § 6046(a)(7)–(8) (2006); Tim Weiner, Clinton Considers Punishing Cubans for Plane
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1996, at A1).
139. Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–91).
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membership [in] various international organizations and institutions.”140 The
second title authorizes the President to consult with Congress and provide
assistance in the event a democratic government is established in Cuba.141
The third title creates a right of action against people who traffic property
confiscated from United States citizens or businesses by the Cuban government.142 The final title
excludes from the United States . . . any alien who “traffics in confiscated property, a claim to which is owned by a United States national,” or any “corporate officer, principal, or shareholder with a
controlling interest of an entity which has been involved in the
confiscation of property or trafficking in confiscated property, a
claim to which is owned by a United States national.”143

The third section was initially controversial on the world stage because it
affects foreign countries.144 However, this situation was diffused when President Clinton exercised the section’s waiver provision that is to be used
whenever “the President determine[s] ‘the suspension is necessary to the
national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.’”145 To date, every successive President has invoked the
waiver provision meaning that section three has never legally been in effect.146
The final piece of federal legislation at issue in recent litigation relating
to Cuba, and that this article will briefly mention, is the Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.147 This Act actually loosened
sanctions on Cuba relating to agriculture, medicine, and medical devices.148
Specifically, this law makes exceptions so that agricultural products and
medical devices may be free of sanctions limiting their “provision or use.”149
The Obama Administration has also lowered restrictions, allowing religious

140. Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–46).
141. Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 6061–67).
142. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *3 (citing 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081–85).
143. Id. (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 6091(a)(2)–(3)).
144. Id. (citing Clyde H. Farnsworth, Canada Warns U.S. on Law Penalizing Cuba Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1996, at D6).
145. Id. at *5 (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 6085(b)(1)).
146. Id.
147. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *6 (citing Trade Sanctions Reform &
Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201–09 (2006)).
148. Id. at *4; see also 22 U.S.C. §§ 7202, 7203(2)(A)–(C), 7204, 7205(a)(1)–(2),
7207(b)(1), 7208–09(a).
149. 22 U.S.C. § 7203(2).
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individuals to travel to Cuba from the United States;150 perhaps an indication
of sanctions becoming more and more lenient.
B.

The Florida Law

The next part of this article will proceed by discussing the Cuba
Amendment in more specificity while focusing on the most recent federal
court order barring its enforcement because of the law’s questionable constitutionality. This discussion will include comparisons and analogies to the
Massachusetts law and relevant constitutional issues raised by the Crosby
decision. There will also be a brief analysis of the political aspect of the
Cuba Amendment.
1.

Odebrecht Construction, Inc. v. Prasad

The plaintiff in this recent legal suit argued that the Cuba Amendment is
unconstitutional for many of the same reasons the Massachusetts law was
found unconstitutional.151 Odebrecht Construction, the plaintiff, is a contractor headquartered in Coral Gables with a parent company in Brazil.152 Odebrecht was founded in 1990 and has a close history with the State of Florida
and local governments throughout.153 Perhaps the most recent relationship is
the plaintiff’s contract with Broward County to refurbish Fort Lauderdale
International Airport, a contract worth over two hundred million dollars.154
The plaintiff’s parent company, Odebrecht S.A., is headquartered in
Brazil and conducts business on almost every continent.155 It is actually
another company owned by parent Odebrecht S.A., COI Overseas, that has
given rise to the current controversy for the Coral Gables based subsidiary.156
COI Overseas Ltd. is currently contracting with Cuba and working on the
Port of Mariel.157 As signs of the project’s significance to Brazil, a major
150. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *4 (citing MARK P. SULLIVAN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 31139, CUBA: U.S. RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL AND REMITTANCES 4–6
(2011)).
151. Id. at *1, *4–5 (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74,
376, 379–81 (2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.
1999)).
152. Id. at *1 (quoting Amended Complaint at 6, Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No.
12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012), ECF No. 4).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *1 (citing Amended Complaint, supra
note 152, at 6).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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bank in the country is providing financing and “President Dilma Rousseff
[recently] traveled to the Port of Mariel to view [its] progress.”158
The defendant in the suit was the Secretary of the Florida Department of
Transportation, Ananth Prasad, as it is his duty to administer the Cuba
Amendment.159 However, this discussion will refer generally to the State of
Florida as the defendant.
In the opinion following the order granting a preliminary injunction, the
court analyzed the plaintiff’s likelihood of success in its argument that the
law is unconstitutional.160 Judge K. Michael Moore of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida discussed the Supremacy
Clause and whether the Cuba Amendment is preempted by federal legislation.161 In the opinion following the order, Judge Moore noted the Massachusetts law, discussed earlier, and the reasons a unanimous Supreme Court
found the law unconstitutional—namely, that the Massachusetts law interfered with the President’s discretion, was broader in scope than the federal
law, and conflicted with a directive issued to the President by Congress.162
Judge Moore went on to state that “the Cuba Amendment suffers from the
same shortcomings and . . . is likely unconstitutional.”163
a.

Preemption

The first reason Judge Moore doubted the constitutionality of the Cuba
Amendment is it directly interferes with Presidential discretion under the
CDA and is likely preempted.164 As the sole representative of the United
States on the world stage, the President has the discretion to waive sanctions
placed on Cuba by way of the CDA, should Cuba go through a political
reform and construct a democratic government.165 Judge Moore also noted
the controversial aspect of the Libertad Act and the fact that every President
has waived enforcement of the right of action provision; thereby evidencing
congressional intent not to punish foreign entities with business contracts in

158. Id.
159. Id. at *2.
160. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *4–7, *9.
161. Id. at *4–7.
162. Id. at *5 (citing Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373–74, 381
(2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999)).
163. Id. at *5.
164. Id. (citing Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373–74); Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §
6007 (2006).
165. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *5 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6007).
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Cuba.166 Alternatively, the Cuba Amendment forces businesses “to choose
between doing business with Florida [or] Cuba.”167
Next, Judge Moore noted that the Cuba Amendment goes further than
federal sanctions on Cuba because of the fact that companies located in the
United States suffer merely because of the relationships maintained by their
corporate owners.168 The Cuba Amendment also imposes greater penalties
than federal legislation in that offenders may be required to pay civil fines
and are banned from making a bid to the State of Florida for three years after
violating the law.169
Lastly, “the Cuba Amendment interferes with the President’s directive
under the Libertad Act” to work at establishing a democratic government in
Cuba.170 Judge Moore, quoting Justice Souter in Crosby, stated that the President should be able to work on the world stage and use his power to “‘bargain for the benefits of access to the entire national economy without exception for enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political tactics.’”171
Judge Moore characterized this effect as a diminishment in the President’s
bargaining power in the realm of foreign policy.172
Judge Moore next criticized Florida’s counterarguments starting with
the first that the Cuba Amendment is not preempted because federal law does
not prohibit any of its terms.173 However, this is contrary to Crosby where
Justice Souter noted that “‘[s]anctions are drawn not only to bar what they
prohibit but to allow what they permit, and the inconsistency of sanctions
here undermines the congressional calibration of force.’”174 This is one of
the reasons that the Massachusetts law was preempted.175 Florida’s argument
that the President lacks broad discretion to adjust Cuba sanctions was re166. Id. (citing Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22
U.S.C. § 6085 (2006)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at *8.
169. Id. at *6.
170. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *6; see also 22 U.S.C. §
6062(b)(2)(A).
171. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *6 (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000), aff’g Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181
F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999)).
172. Id.
173. Id. at *6–7.
174. Id. at *6 (quoting Crosby, 530 U.S. at 380).
175. Id. at *5. “The federal sanctions imposed direct sanctions on Burma, vested the
President with the power to impose further sanctions subject to certain conditions, and directed the President to develop a multilateral strategy to foster democracy and improve human
rights in Burma.” Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *5 (citing Crosby, 530 U.S.
at 368–69).
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jected as flatly wrong by Judge Moore, who noted that for years Presidents
have exercised considerable discretion in this area.176 Finally, Judge Moore
stated that Florida is wrong in arguing that the case is not ripe in that no
complaint has been lodged with the World Trade Organization, because the
court need not wait for such a complaint in order to invoke a preliminary
injunction against a law that is likely preempted.177
In his analysis, Judge Moore discussed the various ways in which the
Cuba Amendment clashes with federal law.178 Responding to Florida’s argument that there is no conflict, Judge Moore clearly stated that “[f]ederal
law regulates all aspects of commerce with Cuba, including but not limited to
the importation and exportation of various goods and services, travel between the United States and Cuba, and private rights of action against the
Cuban government.”179 This demonstrates a clear congressional intent to
occupy the field, and therefore, casts serious doubt on the constitutionality of
the Cuba Amendment.180 In Faculty Senate of Florida International University mentioned earlier, the Eleventh Circuit found that a Florida law limiting
state money from being used by state universities for travel to Cuba was not
preempted.181 Judge Moore distinguished this case by noting that the law at
issue in Faculty Senate of Florida International University did not prohibit
trading by anyone, while the Cuba Amendment obviously is intended to reduce trade.182
b.

Federal Foreign Affairs Power

Judge Moore’s order next discussed the Cuba Amendment in light of
the federal government’s foreign affairs power.183 The American system of
governance necessitates that the federal government reign over all foreign
affairs so that the states themselves do not become involved in foreign affairs
potentially at the expense of other states.184 Judge Moore noted Zschernig,
176. See id. at *6; Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6007 (2006); Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6085 (2006).
177. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *6.
178. Id. at *5–6.
179. Id. at *7 (citing ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1304 (S.D.
Fla. 2008)).
180. Id. at *7.
181. Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206, 1207–08, 1212 (11th Cir.
2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3707 (U.S. June 25, 2012).
182. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *7 (quoting Faculty Senate of Fla.
Int’l Univ., 616 F.3d at 1210); see also FLA. STAT. § 287.135 (2012).
183. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *7.
184. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).
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where the Supreme Court held that state laws that interfere with the federal
government’s foreign affairs power may cause “‘disruption or embarrassment.’”185 The Zschernig court also noted that a state law must have more
than an “‘incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries’” in order to cross
the line into the federal government’s jurisdiction.186 The test a court must
employ to determine whether a state law has this effect was formulated in the
familiar Natsios opinion.187 These factors include the state law’s intent, effects on purchasing power, effects on other states’ decisions to implement
similar legislation, international reaction, and the difference when compared
to federal law.188
However, Judge Moore declined to apply this test and instead merely
stated that it was enough that the Cuba Amendment is probably unconstitutional in that it clashes with Zschernig because of the impact on foreign
countries that trade with Cuba and Florida, such as Brazil and Canada.189
Thus far, several countries have already voiced concern over the Cuba
Amendment because of how it affects them.190 It is for these reasons that
Judge Moore believed the Cuba Amendment unconstitutionally delved into
the federal government’s foreign affairs power.191 Although not addressed
directly by the Supreme Court, the First Circuit employed similar reasoning
when examining the Massachusetts law under the federal government’s foreign affairs power.192
c.

Commerce Clause

The final constitutional analysis undertaken by Judge Moore related to
the Commerce Clause located in Article I of the Constitution.193 The federal
government has the power “to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign [n]ations’”
and the Supreme Court has acknowledged a negative implication, namely the
185. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *7 (quoting Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429, 434–35 (1968)).
186. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434–35 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
187. See Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 53 (1st Cir.), cert. granted,
528 U.S. 1018 (1999).
188. Id.
189. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *8; see also Zschernig, 389 U.S.
at 434–35; Natsios, 181 F.3d at 53.
190. Mazzei, Miami Federal Judge Blocks New Florida Anti-Cuba Law, supra note 10.
Canada and Brazil are two of Florida’s largest trading partners. Id.
191. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *8, *12.
192. See Natsios, 181 F.3d at 49.
193. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *9; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3.
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Dormant Commerce Clause.194 Judge Moore noted the importance of the
Commerce Clause in that when conducting trade with foreign nations “‘the
people of the United States act through a single government.’”195 Quoting
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,196 Judge Moore stated “the Supreme Court held that a state law violates the Foreign Commerce Clause
when it ‘impair[s] federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is
essential,’ and ‘prevents this Nation from “speaking with one voice” in regulating foreign trade.’”197 Judge Moore stated this to express that the Foreign
Commerce Clause is a greater power for the federal government than the
Interstate Commerce Clause.198 The Court in Japan Line, Ltd. noted that a
state law will violate the Foreign Commerce Clause if it clashes with a federal law and causes the United States to be heard speaking with more than
“‘one voice’” in dealing with foreign policy.199
Next, Judge Moore stated the reasons that the Cuba Amendment possibly violates the Foreign Commerce Clause.200 Describing the law as facially
discriminatory because the law discriminates against entities doing business
with Cuba by its very terms, Judge Moore noted how international companies and countries that conduct legitimate business with Cuba are prohibited
by Florida from doing business with it.201 The effect on the federal government’s power to conduct foreign economic activity is obvious according to
Judge Moore, who drew parallels between the Cuba Amendment and the
Massachusetts law in that they both “impede[] the federal government’s ability to speak with one voice in regulating foreign trade.”202 Further, Judge
Moore expressed that there is no justification for the Cuba Amendment because the regulatory mechanism of the federal government is already in effect.203

194. Quill Corp. v. N.D. ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
195. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *9 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty.
of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)).
196. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
197. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *9 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd., 441
U.S. at 448, 452).
198. See id. at *9–10 (citing Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 448).
199. Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276, 285 (1976)).
200. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *9–10.
201. Id. at *9.
202. Id. (citing Mazzei, Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash, supra note 6); see also
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 69 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 528 U.S.
1018 (1999).
203. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *11.
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The State of Florida responded to the initial suit by arguing that the Cuba Amendment is a legitimate exercise of the state’s power under the market
participant exception, relying on Supreme Court precedent.204 Florida argued
that as an actor in the market, it could choose not to do business with companies linked to Cuba based on this exception.205 Judge Moore disagreed and
explained that while the exception may be applicable, the Cuba Amendment
would not be subject to it for the reason that it markedly affects companies
outside of Florida’s market.206 Because the law has this effect on companies
outside of Florida, namely those doing business with Cuba, the Cuba
Amendment constitutes Florida regulating downstream activity, which it may
not do under the market participant exception.207 Similarly, a federal court
found that the Massachusetts law was unconstitutional under the market participant exception for comparable reasons.208
d.

Political Facet

Florida’s decision to pass the Cuba Amendment also entails a delicate
political balancing act with the South Florida Cuban exile community on one
hand, and foreign countries and companies with business interests in the state
on the other.209 Odebrecht, the subsidiary of a large Brazilian corporation,210
could lose hundreds of millions of dollars in business if the courts ultimately
uphold the law.211 The fact that the Cuba Amendment will essentially punish
Brazilian company Odebrecht for its ties to Cuba is especially awkward considering the fact that tourists from that country make up one of the largest

204. Id. at *10 (citing Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 14–15, Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM,
2012 WL 2524261 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012), ECF No. 15); see White v. Mass. Council of
Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206–07 (1983).
205. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *10 (citing Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 204, at 14–
15); see also Mass. Council of Const. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. at 206–07.
206. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *10.
207. Id.; see also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 820–21 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177,
185 (1938)).
208. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 62–63 (1st Cir.), cert. granted,
528 U.S. 1018 (1999).
209. See Mazzei, Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash, supra note 6.
210. Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524262, at *1 (citing Amended Complaint, supra
note 152, at 6).
211. Doreen Hemlock, Congress Considers Ban on U.S. Military Contracts for Companies
Doing Business in Cuba, MCCLATCHY-TRIB. BUS. NEWS (Wash.), July 11, 2012.
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groups of Florida visitors.212 Florida Governor Scott even traveled to Brazil
in early 2012 to encourage trade.213 Canada has also complained about the
Cuba Amendment because of concerns for Canadian companies that operate
in Florida and Cuba.214 However, the law has garnered considerable support
in parts of Florida, such as heavily populated Cuban areas like Hialeah.215
When the legislation was still being considered, there was very little opposition to Miami lawmakers who favored it.216
However, not everyone who is anti-Cuba approves of the law or believes that it will be effective.217 Generally, pro-business organizations, like
the Florida Chamber of Commerce, have criticized the new law.218 Some
believe that the law will help bolster the Cuban government by creating
sympathy for a regime that many detest.219 Despite the law’s controversy,
Florida expressed an intent not to retreat and has recently announced that it
will be appealing Judge Moore’s order.220 The State of Florida has expressed
interest in having the Eleventh Circuit overrule Judge Moore.221
e.

Other Concerns

It is worth briefly mentioning some other issues that are raised by the
Cuba Amendment. Relating specifically to Odebrecht, but potentially affecting other entities, is the issue of injury.222 Because of the constitutional bar
against states being sued for money damages, Odebrecht would have virtually no way of recovering its substantial losses caused by the law’s enforcement.223 In fact, the losses to Odebrecht alone would be almost four billion
212. See id.; Paul Graham, Portals and Rails, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA (Aug. 13,
2012), http://portalsandrails.frbatlanta.org/2012/08/tourism-traffic-boosts-prepaid-cards.html.
213. Mazzei, Fla.’s Trading Partners Warn of Backlash, supra note 6.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See, e.g., Andres Oppenheimer, Florida Law Against Cuba May Help Cuba, MIAMI
HERALD, May 2, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/05/02/v-print/2780050/florida-lawagainst-cuba-may-help.html. The Dean of Saint Thomas University School of Business called
the Cuba Amendment “a black eye on Florida” because of his belief that the law is unconstitutional. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id.
220. Fla. Appeals Ruling Blocking Cuba Contracts Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 25,
2012,
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/fla-appeals-ruling-blocking-cuba145338038.html;_ylt=A2kJNTteCBQTEMA48L_wgt.
221. See id.
222. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at
*11 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012).
223. See id.
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dollars.224 If the Cuba Amendment is fully enforced, companies doing business with Cuba—as well as the State of Florida—may lose a substantial sum,
seeing that contracts that have already been negotiated will have to be abandoned and the state may be forced to contract with companies that cost
more.225
2.

Lessons and Implications from Crosby

One thing to be noted about the Crosby opinion is that it was unanimous.226 While the members of the Court today are different than in 2000, five
of the Justices are still serving.227 Provided the similarities between the two
laws, it seems improbable that any of the five Justices would change their
minds. However, it is not impossible that new members could be appointed
before and if Odebrecht advances that far.228
IV. CONCLUSION
The Massachusetts law and the Florida Cuba Amendment have many
common provisions.229 Both laws have targeted an unpopular regime and
attempted to put pressure on that government by way of economic sanctions,
whereby the state enacting the legislation refuses to contract with entities
associated with the country targeted by the law.230 While the First Circuit did
not hesitate to call the Massachusetts law unconstitutional for a variety of
reasons,231 the Supreme Court was very specific that it was striking it down
on the basis that federal law preempted it.232
It is uncertain whether the Cuba Amendment will advance to the Supreme Court like the Massachusetts Law. However, if the law does advance

224. Id. at *11 n.13.
225. See, e.g., id. at *11.
226. Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 750–51.
227. Members of the Supreme Court of the United States, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
228. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, An Aging Court Raises the Stakes of the Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2012, at A18.
229. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc., 2012 WL 2524261, at *5.
230. See FLA. STAT. § 287.135(2), (5) (2012); Act of June 25, 1996, ch. 130, 1996 MASS.
ACTS 239, 239–43 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS §§ 7:22G–7:22M, 40 F1/2 (1997)), declared
unconstitutional by Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
231. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 77 (1st Cir.), cert. granted, 528
U.S. 1018 (1999).
232. Denning & McCall, supra note 92, at 750–51.
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to the Supreme Court, the Court’s opinion in Crosby should be a strong indicator of the likely result.233
The future of Cuba’s government is also uncertain, given its aging leader. President Raul Castro recently announced that his government might
even be willing to talk with the United States about plans for the future.234 If
the two governments formally meet, it would be the first time in fifty
years.235 However, given the Obama Administration’s less contentious attitude towards Cuba, it appears that the present time is about as good as any in
the past fifty years for the two countries to make amends.236 Of course Florida’s Cuba Amendment has done little to help the two countries move forward, and the state government may pose an obstacle to this occurring.237

233. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 386–88 (2000), aff’g Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999).
234. Peter Orsi, Raul Castro: Cuba Willing to Sit Down with US, SALT LAKE TRIB., July
28, 2012.
235. Id.
236. See Odebrecht Constr. Inc. v. Prasad, No. 12-cv-22072-KMM, 2012 WL 2524261, at
*4 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2012).
237. See Caputo & Mazzei, supra note 5.
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INTRODUCTION

Recent developments in adoption rights for homosexuals in Florida
have dramatically changed the legal landscape for same-sex couples hoping
to secure property rights for each other after death.1 Prior to 2010, no homosexual person could adopt any child or adult in Florida, thus rendering adult
adoption generally inapplicable to same-sex couples.2 With the Third District Court of Appeal’s (“Third District”) authorization of a homosexual
adoption in Florida Department of Children & Families v. Adoption of
X.X.G. & N.R.G.,3 came the possibility of adult adoption as a way to ensure
the surviving partner would receive property and assets in accordance with
the decedent’s intent.4
While adult adoption provides same-sex couples with a safer way to
plan their estates pursuant to their wishes, it comes with a rather steep price:
The adoptee’s right to inherit his or her biological family’s intestate estate is
severed.5 When an individual is legally adopted, he or she relinquishes his or
her right to inherit from relatives through intestacy, therefore potentially los1. See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So.
3d 79, 81, 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that Florida’s ban on homosexual adoption served no rational basis and therefore violated Florida’s Constitution), aff’g In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
2. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2012), declared unconstitutional by Fla. Dep’t of Children &
Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
3. 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. App. 2010), aff’g In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL
5006172 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
4. See George D. Karibjanian, Estate Planning for Same-Sex Partners, FLA. B.J., June
2012, at 91, 95. While section 63.042(3) of the Florida Statutes has not been officially invalidated by the Supreme Court of Florida, the State has said that it will not appeal the decision in
Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., perhaps reflecting a growing statewide trend of permitting and
honoring homosexual adoptions. See id.; see also Adoption of X.X.G & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d at
99 (Salter, J., concurring).
5. Madeleine N. Foltz, Comment, Needlessly Fighting an Uphill Battle: Extensive
Estate Planning Complications Faced by Gay and Lesbian Individuals, Including Drastic
Resort to Adult Adoption of Same-Sex Partners, Necessitate Revision of Maryland’s Intestacy
Law to Provide Heir-at-Law Status for Domestic Partners, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 495, 511–12,
515–16 (2011).
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ing out on considerable assets in the future.6 Thus, Florida forces same-sex
couples to choose, quite literally, between their partner and their family.7
This article will first discuss the history of same-sex couples in regards
to the legal obstacles they face in Florida.8 Specifically, this section will
focus on the same-sex marriage controversy and the evolution of homosexual
adoption rights in Florida.9 Second, this article will explore adult adoption
generally.10 This section will address many different aspects of adult adoption, for instance, its statutory basis in Florida, other reasons behind it, and
its key differences as compared to child adoption.11 The next section will
discuss adult adoption as a legal tool for same-sex partners planning an estate
in Florida.12 This section will weigh the benefits of adult adoption with regard to intestate succession, will contests, and rights to homestead against the
irrevocable nature of adoption, and the resulting severance of the adoptee’s
inheritance rights to his or her family’s intestate estate.13 The next section
will consider a possible solution to the problems associated with same-sex
couples and adult adoption in Florida: Trusts.14 This section will discuss
Florida trusts generally, and which types would likely be the most beneficial
to same-sex couples interested in long-term, financially stable futures together.15 Finally, this article will illustrate why trusts could provide a far
more sensible method by which same-sex couples in Florida can confidently
control their assets during life and after death.16
II.
A.

SAME-SEX COUPLES IN FLORIDA

The Right to Marry

The fundamental right to marry has been a major focal point of gay
rights activists both statewide and nationwide for many years.17 Same-sex
couples fight for the right to marry and share equal marital benefits enjoyed
6. See id. at 515–16.
7. See Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 95; Foltz, supra note 5, at 515–16.
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Part II.A–B.
10. See discussion infra Part III.
11. See discussion infra Part III.A–C.
12. See discussion infra Part IV.
13. See discussion infra Part IV.A–C.
14. See discussion infra Part V.
15. See discussion infra Part V.A–B.
16. See discussion infra Part VI.
17. See Robert Nolin, Florida Gay Rights Fight Buoyed by Big Wins in West, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 11, 2012, at A1 (describing the recent developments across the country in
the fight for marriage equality).
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by heterosexual couples, while those in opposition fear this would taint the
traditional definition of marriage.18 Florida is notorious for being one of the
most hostile states toward same-sex couples from a legal standpoint.19 The
controversy over same-sex marriage in Florida finally boiled over with the
passage of the Florida Defense of Marriage Act (“Florida DOMA”).20
The Florida Legislature passed Florida DOMA in 1997, thereby officially renouncing same-sex marriage throughout the state.21 Florida DOMA
mirrors the Federal Defense of Marriage Act (“Federal DOMA”) in that Florida DOMA circumvents the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution.22 According to Florida DOMA: “Marriages between persons
of the same sex entered into in any jurisdiction . . . either domestic or foreign
. . . are not recognized for any purpose in this state.”23 Furthermore, Florida
DOMA defines marriage as “only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife.”24 Therefore, Florida DOMA not only prohibits same-sex couples from getting legally married in Florida, it also, and perhaps more importantly, refuses to recognize valid same-sex marriages from
another state or country for purposes of, including but not limited to, divorce,
child-rearing, and posthumous asset distribution.25 Florida DOMA is considered by many to be an enormous setback in the fight for homosexual equality
within the state.26
B.

The Right to Adopt

A logical progression from the fundamental right to marry is the fundamental right to have and raise children.27 In Florida, same-sex couples
have also experienced considerable hardship in their quest to legally adopt
children because according to Florida law, same-sex couples are nothing
18. See Joel Marino, Ban on Gay Marriage Debated, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 8,
2008, at B6 (explaining the reasoning behind those who oppose marriage equality in Florida).
19. See About Equality Florida, EQUALITY FLA., http://eqfl.org/about/ (last visited Oct.
28, 2012).
20. See FLA. STAT. § 741.212 (2012); Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155, 157–58 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
21. FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1); Kantaras, 884 So. 2d at 157.
22. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); FLA. STAT. § 741.212.
23. FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1).
24. Id. § 741.212(3).
25. See id. § 741.212(1).
26. See generally Buddy Nevins & Jim Davis, Same-Sex Marriage Ban Gains in Florida
Baptists Back Amendment to Constitution, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 10, 2004, at 1B
(summarizing the anti-gay sentiment behind Florida DOMA and gay activists’ reactions).
27. See generally Nolin, supra note 17 (recognizing that despite Florida and Federal
DOMA, many states, including Florida, are recognizing homosexuals’ right to adopt).
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more than two unrelated, single, homosexual individuals—and until recently,
were outright prohibited from adopting statewide.28 The tables turned dramatically in 2008 with In re Adoption of Doe,29 and in 2010 with Adoption of
X.X.G. & N.R.G.—landmark cases that resulted in the Third District’s authorization of Florida’s first homosexual adoption.30
Pursuant to section 63.042(3) of the Florida Statutes: “No person eligible to adopt . . . may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”31 In other words,
prior to 2008, even though an individual would otherwise be fully qualified
and permitted to adopt, he or she would be prohibited based solely on his or
her sexual orientation.32 Until 2008, Florida was the only state that banned
homosexual adoptions outright, with no exceptions.33 The effect of this statute was likely devastating to many individuals and families in Florida.34 The
inability to legally adopt means that the relationship between the parties
lacks critical legal authority, for instance, with regard to posthumous asset
distribution.35
Gay rights activists statewide felt the sting of section 63.042(3) in
1995’s Cox v. Florida Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services (Cox
II).36 In this case, a homosexual couple, while attending a voluntary parenting class, disclosed to the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services (“HRS”) their sexual orientation and desire to adopt a mentallydisabled foster child.37 The HRS promptly sent the couple a letter advising
them that the HRS would not accept their application for adoption pursuant

28. See FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
29. 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Fla. Dep’t of
Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
30. See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d
79, 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010), aff’g In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla.
11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008); In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *21, *29.
31. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
32. See id.
33. John Schwartz, Florida Court Calls Ban on Gay Adoptions Unlawful, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2010, at A18.
34. See Lindsay Ayn Warner, Note, Bending the Bow of Equity: Three Ways Florida
Can Improve Its Equitable Adoption Policy, 38 STETSON L. REV. 577, 609–10 (2009) (describing the unfortunate consequences of the ban on homosexual adoption in Florida with regard to
minor children and intestate succession).
35. See Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 92 (describing the numerous advantages to a legally
recognized marriage).
36. 656 So. 2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995) (per curiam); see also FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
37. Cox II, 656 So. 2d at 903; Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox (Cox
I), 627 So. 2d 1210, 1212 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review granted, 637 So. 2d 234 (Fla.
1994), and quashed in part, 656 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1995).
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to section 63.042(3).38 The couple filed suit in a Sarasota trial court seeking
the statute declared unconstitutional.39 The trial court found for the couple,
and held that section 63.042(3) was void.40 The HRS appealed to the Second
District Court of Appeal (“Second District”), and the court reversed, declaring the statute constitutional.41 The court surmised that homosexual rights
were, at that time, an issue for the Florida Legislature, and not the courts, to
handle.42 The couple appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida in 1995.43
The Supreme Court of Florida held for the HRS, affirming the constitutionality of section 63.042(3).44 Unfortunately for homosexuals and gay rights
supporters throughout the state, this outright prohibition lay dormant until
2010.45
The tables finally turned on homosexual adoption laws in Florida, when
the Third District affirmed the 2008 ruling of In re Adoption of Doe in its
2010 decision of Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G.46 In In re Adoption of Doe, a
Miami trial court allowed a homosexual man to legally adopt two foster children that had been living with him for four years.47 The trial court determined, based on expert testimony, that because the children and the man had
presumably developed strong and healthy parent-child relationships, legal
adoption would certainly be in the best interests of the children.48 The only
factor impeding the adoption was the man’s sexual orientation.49 As a homosexual man, he was outright prohibited from legally adopting the children in
Florida.50 The trial court not only granted him the adoption, but it also determined that there was no rational basis for section 63.042(3) and declared it
unconstitutional.51 The State of Florida appealed this decision but the Third
38. Cox I, 627 So. 2d at 1212; see also FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
39. Cox I, 627 So. 2d at 1212.
40. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
41. See Cox I, 627 So. 2d at 1212, 1220.
42. Id. at 1220.
43. Cox v. Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. (Cox II), 656 So. 2d. 902, 902
(Fla. 1995) (per curiam).
44. Id. at 903; see also FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3).
45. See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d
79, 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010), aff’g In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla.
11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
46. Id. at 92; In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *29 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov.
25, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G.,
45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
47. In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172, at *1, *29.
48. Id. at *4.
49. See id. at *1.
50. Id.
51. Id. at *29.
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District affirmed in Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G.52 Florida has since said it
will not appeal the Third District’s ruling, and that section 63.042(3) will not
bar homosexual adoptions in the Third District.53 Gay rights activists across
the country consider Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G. an enormous triumph for
homosexual equality in Florida.54
III. ADULT ADOPTION GENERALLY
A.

The Florida Statutory Basis

While the idea of a capable, mature adult being adopted by a fellow
adult seems somewhat unconventional, many people have chosen this method to, for instance, carry out their rather complicated financial plans.55 Section 63.042(1) of the Florida Statutes provides: “Any person, a minor or an
adult, may be adopted.”56 Probably unbeknownst to many, Florida law unequivocally and expressly authorizes adult adoption.57 Furthermore, while
the courts have not expressly forbidden older-younger same-sex partner adult
adoption, the Third District’s decision to honor a homosexual adoption in
Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G. is still just two years old, so only time will tell
how courts will respond.58
B.

Other Reasons to Adopt an Adult

There are many reasons why one would choose to adopt an adult other
than to protect someone from an unfortunate consequence of intestate suc-

52. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010), aff’g In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. 11th Cir.
Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
53. Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 95.
54. See Jerome Hunt & Jeff Krehely, State Antigay Adoption Policies Need to Go,
CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org
/issues/lbgt/news/2010/10/12/8493/state-antigay-adoption-policies-need-to-go/;
see
also
Schwartz, supra note 33.
55. Sarah Ratliff, Comment, Adult Adoption: Intestate Succession and Class Gifts Under
the Uniform Probate Code, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1777, 1780–84 (2011) (describing different
reasons and methods by which people utilize adult adoption).
56. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(1) (2012), declared unconstitutional by Fla. Dep’t of Children &
Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
57. See id.
58. See Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d
79, 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010), aff’g In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla.
11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008); see also Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 95.
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cession.59 Certain situations involving benefits that are restricted to specific
classes of family members may call for adult adoption as the only feasible
way to direct funds in accordance with one’s financial goals.60 Additionally,
adult adoption can be a valid way to become a member of a designated class
for class gift purposes.61
1.

Generation-Specific Benefits

Two interesting examples of cases in which adult adoption was used for
generation-specific financial benefits are Florida’s In re Adoption of Holland62 and Tennessee’s Coker v. Celebrezze.63
In re Adoption of Holland offers a look at a relatively unusual situation
in which a Florida adult adoption was used for a purely financial purpose.64
In In re Adoption of Holland, a grandfather sought to adopt his consenting
adult grandson.65 The grandfather, a disabled veteran, wished “to confer [to
his grandson] financial aid available to the children (but not grandchildren)
of disabled veterans.”66 The court approved the adoption, making the grandfather’s former grandchild his new legal child and allowing the financial aid
benefits to pass to him.67 The court in In re Adoption of Holland seemed to
have no problem authorizing the legal adult adoption, despite the fact that the
grandfather had a strictly financial motive in the adoption.68
Coker provides a look into an adult adoption in Tennessee that also took
place solely for the financial benefit of the adopted party.69 In Coker, a
grandfather attempted to adopt his twenty-three year old mentally-disabled
grandson to confer to him the grandfather’s social security benefits as his
lineal descendant.70 Tennessee’s adoption statute was vague with regard to
whether adult adoptions were permissible.71 Due to the fact that the grandson lived with his grandfather since he was a toddler and that the grandson
59. See Ratliff, supra note 55, at 1778 (describing other reasons why an adult would
adopt another adult).
60. See id. at 1782–83.
61. Id.
62. 965 So. 2d 1213, 1214 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
63. 241 F. Supp. 783, 783–84, 787 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
64. See In re Adoption of Holland, 965 So. 2d at 1214.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See Coker v. Celebrezze, 241 F. Supp. 783, 783–84, 787 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
70. Id. at 783–84.
71. See id. at 787 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(3)(A) (2012)).
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was clearly incapable of taking care of himself financially, the court honored
the adoption, and the benefits were passed to the grandson as the grandfather’s adopted son.72 The court also interpreted the Tennessee statute as not
prohibiting adult adoption.73 In this case, one can see another example of a
state court honoring an adult adoption with a purely financial motive.74
2.

Access to Class Gifts

Florida law defines a class gift as: “[A] gift of an aggregate sum to a
group of persons whose exact identity and number are to be determined
sometime after the execution of the will.”75 The class gift—often given to
the decedent’s children—is designed to accommodate the potential change in
identity and number.76 Florida recognizes children as all natural born and
adopted children.77 Therefore, class gifts may include current natural born
and adopted children as well as future natural born and adopted children.78
An individual may, as an adult, still be adopted and considered part of the
group to be given the class gift upon the testator’s death.79 Courts seem to
interpret adult adoptions, for purposes of class gifts, differently across the
country.80 In re Estate of Fortney81 and Davis v. Neilson82 illustrate such
contrasting interpretations.83
In In re Estate of Fortney, married Kansas couple Asa and Adaline died,
leaving their estate first to their children and then to their living and future
grandchildren as a class gift.84 One of their children, John, legally adopted
his wife’s sixty-five-year-old nephew, Amspacker.85 Therefore, Amspacker
gained an interest in Asa and Adaline’s estate through the adoption, as he
72. See id. at 783–85, 787.
73. Id. at 787 (interpreting TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(3)(A)).
74. See Coker, 241 F. Supp. at 787.
75. In re Estate of McCune, 214 So. 2d 56, 57 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
76. See id. at 57–58; Ratliff, supra note 55, at 1790, 1796, 1798.
77. See FLA. STAT. § 732.108(1) (2012).
78. See Ratliff, supra note 55, at 1796.
79. Id. at 1782–83.
80. Compare In re Estate of Fortney, 611 P.2d 599, 605 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (stating
that adult adoptees are heirs of their adopting parents under the plain meaning of the applicable statute), with Davis v. Neilson, 871 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (suggesting that
certain factors should be considered by a court when determining whether familial ties are
created by the adoption).
81. 611 P.2d 599 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980).
82. 871 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
83. Compare In re Estate of Fortney, 611 P.2d at 605, with Davis, 871 S.W.2d at 39.
84. In re Estate of Fortney, 611 P.2d at 600–01.
85. Id. at 600.
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became their legal grandchild.86 Asa and Adaline’s brothers’ and sisters’
descendants, the remaindermen and would-be takers after John, were unsatisfied with losing their share to Amspacker, and questioned the legitimacy of
the adoption.87 In its ruling, the court focused on “the intent of Asa . . . when
he executed [his] will.”88 The court first determined that Asa’s devise to his
son John and John’s children included John’s potentially adopted children, as
well as biological.89 The court then held that:
[A]nyone of any age can be a child of another as long as a blood or
legal relationship exists. One does not lose his or her status as a
child of its parents when the age of majority is reached. . . . [T]o
construe the adoption statutes to mean that adult adoptees have no
rights would make adopting an adult a meaningless ritual. Certainly the legislature would not have intended that result.90

Thus, the court honored the adult adoption and allowed Amspacker to
inherit from Asa and Adaline’s estate.91 Fortney is a good example of a case
in which a court strictly interpreted its state’s adoption statutes to include
adult adoptees in class gift situations, regardless of age.92
Davis, a Missouri case, offers a somewhat contrasting view of adult
adoptees and class gifts.93 In this case, Neilson, a beneficiary of a trust,
adopted six adults—all of whom were essentially strangers—to take the remainder of his share as a class gift when the trust terminated upon his fortieth birthday.94 Neilson also had two natural children with his ex-wife, who
were also entitled to a portion of the class-gifted trust.95 After the adoption,
Neilson’s natural children’s share under the trust estate was considerably
depleted by their six new siblings.96 The trustee of the estate refused to distribute the funds to the six adult adoptees, claiming the adoptions were a
sham.97 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment to the six adult adoptees.98 The court explained that to determine
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
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See id. at 601, 605.
Id. at 600–01.
Id. at 602.
In re Estate of Fortney, 611 P.2d at 602.
Id. at 604–05.
See id. at 605.
See id. at 604–05.
See Davis v. Neilson, 871 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
Id. at 36–37.
Id. at 37.
See id.
Id. at 36.
Davis, 871 S.W.2d at 36, 39.
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whether the adoptions were valid, the trial court should look to the following
factors:
[W]hether the adopter has assumed responsibility for the adoptee;
whether the adoptee has taken the adopter’s surname; whether the
adoptee entered the adopter’s home, and, if so, at what age; the
length of time the adopter and adoptee lived together; and the nature and extent of [the] adopter’s and [the] adoptee’s parent-child
relationship.99

Thus, Davis sets out factors that courts may use to determine the validity of an adult adoption for class gift purposes.100 In contrast to the Fortney
court’s textual interpretation of the Kansas adoption statutes, the court in
Davis seemed to employ a more liberal interpretation of the Missouri adoption statutes.101
C.

Differences Between Adult & Child Adoption

Other than the discrepancy in age of the adoptee, adult and child adoptions have a few key differences that motivate courts to rule in very different
ways.102 Virtual adoption—an equitable doctrine and exception to the formal
legal adoption process—is one example of how courts distinguish between
adult and child adoptions.103 Furthermore, beneficiaries to residuary trusts
are sometimes thwarted in their efforts to reap the benefits of the heir-at-law
status adult adoption provides.104

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Compare In re Estate of Fortney, 611 P.2d 599, 604–05 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that “anyone of any age can be a child of another as long as a blood or legal relationship
exists,” and that adult adoptees have rights), with Davis, 871 S.W.2d at 39 (concluding that
courts must “look to several factors” in “determin[ing] whether the persons adopted . . . have
the familial ties” that are necessary to have rights).
102. See, e.g., Miller v. Paczier, 591 So. 2d 321, 322 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per
curiam) (denying a virtual adoption to an adoptee because he was an adult when the adoption
took place, and therefore the equitable doctrine did not apply).
103. See id. at 323.
104. Armstrong v. Hixon, 206 S.W.3d 175, 183 (Tex. App. 2006).
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Virtual Adult Adoption

Virtual adoptions are thought of as an exception to the standard method
by which one legally adopts another.105 A virtual adoption in Florida is defined as:
[A]n equitable doctrine designed to protect the interests of a person who was supposed to have been adopted as a child but whose
adoptive parents failed to undertake the legal steps necessary to
formally accomplish the adoption. . . . The doctrine is invoked in
order to allow the supposed-to-have-been adopted child to take an
intestate share.106

One key difference in how courts treat child versus adult adoption is the
way the courts treat virtual adoptions in each situation.107 Miller v. Paczier108
offers a look into how Florida courts treat virtual adult adoption.109
In Miller, an adult man claimed that he had formed a relationship with
his now-deceased aunt and uncle such that he should be considered virtually
adopted for purposes of inheriting from their intestate estate.110 The Florida
court held that declaring the nephew virtually adopted would offend the traditional purpose of virtual adoption.111 Specifically, the court explained that
because the nephew was an able-bodied adult, perfectly capable of taking
care of himself financially, imputing a virtual adoption would open up the
floodgates to future fraudulent claims against other intestate estates.112 The
court further stated that virtual adoption was meant “to protect the interests
of minors, who . . . were given by their natural parents to adoptive parents
based upon an oral agreement to allow the child to inherit from the adoptive
parents, if they died intestate.”113 Miller illustrates how Florida courts seem
to be reluctant to honor virtual adult adoptions as compared to virtual child
adoptions.114

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
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Miller, 591 So. 2d at 323.
Id. at 322 (citations omitted).
See id. at 322–23.
591 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
See id. at 322–23.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323.
Id. (citing Thompson v. Moseley, 125 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Mo. 1939)).
Miller, 591 So. 2d at 323.
See id.
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Residuary Trust Beneficiaries

Another interesting example of a case in which an adopted adult was
not afforded the same rights that a natural adult child would have been is
Armstrong v. Hixon.115 Armstrong, a Texas case, addressed whether unrelated adopted adults can be possible beneficiaries to residuary trusts.116
In Armstrong, a Texan decedent’s residuary trust was to pass to his
brother’s children—John, Tobin, and Lucie—according to a codicil executed
shortly before his death.117 Then, upon each child’s death, assuming the trust
had yet to terminate, the remaining assets were to pass to that child’s own
children.118 At the time the case was decided, John was deceased but had
children of his own who were entitled to his share.119 Tobin was still living
but also had children.120 Lucie never married and never had children.121
Lucie did, however, adopt an adult woman, Katherine.122 Tobin, individually, and John’s children—the entitled parties to the residuary trust—brought
suit against Lucie to preclude Katherine from “tak[ing] as a descendant under
the [w]ill.”123 The entitled parties were unhappy with the fact that they
would have to share the residuary with Katherine, should Lucie die.124 Lucie
argued that the Supreme Court of Texas had already decided, in a prior case,
that an adopted adult was not precluded from inheriting from collateral relatives.125 After considering the legislative history, however, the court rejected
this argument.126 The court explained that Texas law permits adopted children to inherit from adoptive parents in the same way biological children do,
but it does not permit inheritance “‘through’ the adoptive parents.”127 Therefore, Katherine was not entitled to a share of the residuary trust after Lucie’s
death.128 This case illustrates Texas’s contrasting interpretation of adult
adoption versus child adoption with respect to residuary trust beneficiaries.129
115. 206 S.W.3d 175, 183 (Tex. App. 2006).
116. Id. at 179.
117. Id. at 178.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 178–79.
120. Armstrong, 206 S.W.3d at 179.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. Armstrong, 206 S.W.3d at 181 (citing Lehman v. Corpus Christi Nat’l Bank, 668
S.W.2d 687, 688–89 (Tex. 1984)).
126. Id. at 182.
127. Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
128. Id.
129. See id.
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IV. SAME-SEX COUPLES, ADULT ADOPTION, & ESTATE PLANNING
Because the Third District deemed section 63.042(3) of the Florida
Statutes unconstitutional, many same-sex couples, that still cannot enjoy the
benefits of a legally recognized marriage under Florida DOMA, have begun
to use adult adoption as a way to circumvent frustrations and uncertainties in
estate planning.130
A.

The Good: Securing Assets & Homestead

The Uniform Probate Code was adopted by and became effective in
Florida as the Florida Probate Code (the “FPC”) in 1976.131 The FPC governs probate and intestacy rules throughout the state.132 According to section
732.101(1) of the FPC: “Any part of the estate of a decedent not effectively
disposed of by will passes to the decedent’s heirs . . . .”133 If one fails to
make a will, makes an invalid will, or makes a will that is later contested and
invalidated, his or her assets will pass through intestacy.134 In each of these
scenarios, the surviving partner will inherit nothing, as he or she is not a protected class in Florida’s per stirpes distribution scheme for intestacy.135
Adult adoption, however, may move the surviving partner from an unprotected class of heirs into a protected class of heirs, thus fulfilling the decedent’s wishes.136 This is possible because the FPC affords the same legal
status to adopted children and adults as natural children—lineal descendants—a protected class of heirs.137
1.

Intestate Succession

Under the FPC, if a same-sex couple fails to use a will to dispose of
property upon death, everything wholly-owned by the decedent will pass
through intestacy.138 Florida uses a per stirpes distribution scheme, which

130. See FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1) (2012); Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 91, 95.
131. FLA. STAT. §§ 731.005, .011; Uniform Commercial Code Locator, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/probate.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
132. See FLA. STAT. §§ 731.005, .011.
133. Id. § 732.101(1).
134. See id.
135. See id. §§ 732.103–.104.
136. Id. § 732.108(1) (stating that adopted children have the same legal rights as natural
children for purposes of intestate succession).
137. See FLA. STAT. § 732.108(1).
138. See id. § 732.101(1).
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determines the order of heirs that will inherit an intestate estate.139 The first
taker under the per stirpes distribution scheme is the surviving spouse.140
Because same-sex couples in Florida may not legally marry pursuant to Florida DOMA,141 the surviving spouse status is unavailable.142 The second takers are the decedent’s lineal descendants.143 If a same-sex couple chooses
adult adoption, the surviving partner and adoptee will be the technical lineal
descendant and will inherit the entire estate.144
2.

Will Contests

Another situation that may arise after someone’s death is if his or her
will is contested and later invalidated.145 This is different than the previous
example in that the testator did make a will, presumably to show intent contrary to Florida’s per stirpes distribution system.146 The only parties who
have standing to contest and invalidate a will are parties who stand to inherit
from a decedent’s intestate estate should the will be invalidated.147 Adult
adoption is the key here because if the surviving partner becomes the only
lineal descendant, and therefore the only taker through intestacy, no other
relative has standing to contest the will, as no other relative stands to inherit
anything if the will is invalidated.148 Therefore, if a couple chooses adult
adoption, the surviving partner will be safeguarded by not only the will itself,
but also from will contests, as there would be no one available to contest and
invalidate it.149

139. Id. §§ 732.102–.104.
140. Id. § 732.102.
141. Id. § 741.212(1), (3).
142. FLA. STAT. § 732.102.
143. Id. § 732.103(1).
144. See id. § 732.108(1).
145. Gwendolyn L. Snodgrass, Note, Creating Family Without Marriage: The Advantages and Disadvantages of Adult Adoption Among Gay and Lesbian Partners, 36 BRANDEIS
J. FAM. L. 75, 78–79 (1997) (explaining that homosexuals’ wills are more likely to be contested than heterosexuals’ wills).
146. See id. at 78–79; see also supra Part IV.A.1.
147. Ratliff, supra note 55, at 1782.
148. See id.
149. See id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

207

Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1

NOVA LAW REVIEW

196

3.

[Vol. 37

Rights to Homestead

A surviving spouse’s right to inherit the decedent’s homestead is fundamental in Florida.150 According to Article X, section 4 of the Florida Constitution, real property owned by the decedent, upon which the decedent or
decedent’s family lived, is passed to the decedent’s surviving spouse and
descendants and is “exempt[ed] from forced sale” by most creditors.151 Because Florida DOMA makes the surviving spouse’s status unavailable to
same-sex couples, homestead cannot be passed to the decedent’s partner in a
traditional manner.152 Adult adoption offers an elementary way for homestead to be passed to the decedent’s partner as his or her lineal descendant.153
If the decedent dies without a will, homestead will pass through intestacy
first to his or her surviving spouse, and then to his or her lineal descendants.154 Therefore, if the same-sex couple chooses adult adoption, homestead will pass through intestacy to the surviving partner as the decedent’s
lineal descendant.155 Without adult adoption, the surviving partner will not
receive homestead if the decedent dies intestate.156
B.

The Bad: Irrevocability & Severed Inheritance

While on its face adult adoption seems like a foolproof option for samesex couples who wish to secure their assets, there are several major drawbacks.157 The irrevocable nature of adoptions and severed familial inheritance rights are the two most pressing issues that may plague same-sex couples that choose adult adoption.158
1.

Adoption Is Irrevocable

As with child adoptions, adult adoptions are generally protected from
annulment.159 Courts honor adult adoption annulments only in extreme situa-

150.
tution).
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
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See generally FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (the homestead provision of the Florida ConstiId. § 4(a)–(b).
See id. § 4(b)–(c); FLA. STAT. § 741.212(1) (2012).
See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1); Foltz, supra note 5, at 513.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(b); FLA. STAT. §§ 732.101(1), .103(1).
See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(b); FLA. STAT. § 732.101(1).
Foltz, supra note 5, at 513; see FLA. STAT. § 732.103.
Foltz, supra note 5, at 514–16.
Id.
Id. at 514.
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tions; for example, when there is evidence of fraud or undue influence.160
Therefore, if a same-sex couple chooses adult adoption to secure assets and
then ends their relationship, probably much to their chagrin, their legal relationship remains valid and intact.161
2.

Extinguished Familial Inheritance Rights

The second major drawback to adult adoption is the severance of the
adoptee’s inheritance rights to his or her natural family’s intestate estate.162
Section 732.108(1) of the Florida Statutes maintains:
For the purpose of intestate succession by or from an adopted person, the adopted person is a descendant of the adopting parent and
is one of the natural kindred of all members of the adopting parent’s family, and is not a descendant of his or her natural parents,
nor is he or she one of the kindred of any member of the natural
parent’s family . . . .163

Unfortunately, none of the three exceptions to this rule apply to save
familial inheritances in cases of adult adoption between same-sex partners.164
Put simply, the future adoptee must choose to inherit from either his or her
partner, or his or her natural family’s intestate estate, because once adopted,
he or she is not legally entitled to both in Florida.165
C.

The Ugly: Post-Adoption Trouble in Paradise

The worst-case scenario for same-sex couples that choose adult adoption would begin with a relationship going south, post-adoption.166 A bad
breakup, coupled with the adoptee’s parents dying intestate and a bitter expartner with a valid will, could possibly result in the adoptee being effectively disinherited from both parties.167

160. Id.; see, e.g., Lambert v. Taylor, 8 So. 2d 393, 394–95 (Fla. 1942) (per curiam) (holding that an adoption procured through fraud was invalid, and therefore, annulled).
161. Foltz, supra note 5, at 514–15.
162. Id. at 515–16.
163. FLA. STAT. § 732.108(1) (2012).
164. Id. § 732.108(1)(a)–(c).
165. See id. § 732.108(1).
166. See Foltz, supra note 5, at 514–16.
167. See id. at 515–16.
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Double Disinheritance?

In a situation involving a difficult split between same-sex partners who
have chosen adult adoption, the adoptee has agreed to relinquish his or her
rights to his familial intestate inheritance due to the adoption itself.168 Therefore, if his or her parents die intestate, he or she will inherit nothing from
them.169 Furthermore, if the couple does not split amicably, the adoptive
partner may disinherit the adoptee in a will.170 In summary: If the adoptee’s
parents die intestate, and the scorned adoptive partner dies with a will that
disinherits the adoptee, he or she may inherit nothing from either party.171
This situation seems to put considerable pressure on same-sex couples to
decide well before the adoption whether they will stay together long-term,
and if things do not work out, to stay amicable.172 This may, perhaps, call for
a written agreement that after the adoption, the adoptive partner vows not to
disinherit the adoptee in a will, regardless of the circumstances underlying
the breakup.173
V.

THE BETTER OPTION: TRUSTS

It may be that the best option same-sex couples have to secure assets for
posthumous distribution in Florida does not actually lie with adult adoption.174 With adult adoption, there are far too many pitfalls, and from a legal
standpoint, the benefits generally do not seem to outweigh the drawbacks.175
Most significantly, adult adoption forces same-sex couples to choose whether to inherit from their partner or their family through intestacy.176 Most
people would probably not be able to make the choice, depending on the size
of each party’s respective estate. Instead, same-sex couples might be better
off using a different legal tool to plan their estates: Trusts.177

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss1/1

Id. at 515.
Id.
Id.
See Foltz, supra note 5, at 515–16.
See id.
See id. at 508–09, 515–16.
See Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 94–95; Foltz, supra note 5, at 517.
See Foltz, supra note 5, at 514–17.
See id. at 515–16.
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Florida Trusts Generally

Trusts offer a far more workable tool for planning estates for same-sex
couples than wills.178 Where wills are strict and rigid in Florida, trusts are
flexible with regard to issues like execution formalities and amendments.179
The Florida Trust Code (“FTC”)180 governs trust laws throughout the
state.181 Pursuant to section 736.0401(1) of the FTC, a trust may be created
in Florida by “[t]ransfer[ring] . . . property to another person as trustee during the settlor’s lifetime or by will or other disposition taking effect on the
settlor’s death.”182 In other words, unlike wills, trusts may be created to take
effect while the settlor is still alive, and the beneficiary’s interest is not necessarily restricted to vest only after the settlor dies.183
The general requirements to create a trust in Florida are that “[t]he settlor has [the] capacity to create a trust; [t]he settlor [has the] intent to create
[a] trust; [and] [t]he trust has a definite beneficiary.”184 Trusts in Florida also
must have a trustee with duties to perform.185 Trustees are assigned to manage the trust in the interest of the beneficiary or beneficiaries.186 The property—or res—being transferred into the trust must be presently identifiable.187 Finally, the trust must have a valid trust purpose that is both lawful
and feasible.188 A key restriction on trusts in Florida is that one “person
[may] not [be both] the sole trustee and sole beneficiary.”189
1.

Inter Vivos v. Testamentary Trusts

Trusts in Florida come in two basic forms: Inter vivos and testamentary.190 Inter vivos trusts are the types of trusts formed and made effective
178. See id. (describing the different types of trusts that may be used to help same-sex
couple clients confidently plan their estates).
179. Compare FLA. STAT. § 732.502 (2012), with id. § 736.0403.
180. FLA. STAT. §§ 736.0101–.1303.
181. Id. § 736.0102.
182. Id. § 736.0401(1).
183. Id.; see Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 94.
184. FLA. STAT. § 736.0402(1)(a)–(c).
185. Id. § 736.0402(1)(d).
186. Id. § 736.0801.
187. Id. § 736.0401(2); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1420 (9th ed. 2009).
188. FLA. STAT. § 736.0404.
189. Id. § 736.0402(1)(e).
190. See id. § 689.075(1) (explaining that a validly executed inter vivos trust shall not be
considered a failed attempt at a testamentary disposition for several reasons; revealing the
clear distinction between Florida inter vivos and testamentary trusts); Donna Litman, Revocable Trusts Under the Florida Trust Code, 34 NOVA L. REV. 1, 4 (2009).
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during a settlor’s lifetime.191 In contrast, testamentary trusts are more like
wills in that the beneficiary’s interest does not vest until the death of the settlor.192 Because inter vivos trusts avoid probate altogether, inter vivos trusts
seem to be the better option for same-sex couples over testamentary trusts.193
Additionally, inter vivos trusts may include testamentary aspects that
dispose of the remaining estate to the surviving partner upon the settlor’s
death in the same way a will or purely testamentary trust would.194 Using an
inter vivos trust, the settlor may retain an interest in the trust for himself or
herself, and also tailor the inter vivos trust throughout the course of the relationship to meet the couple’s eventual posthumous asset distribution goals.195
Purely testamentary trusts, on the other hand, lay dormant until the settlor’s
death.196 Inter vivos trusts are therefore perhaps the best of both worlds for
same-sex couples that choose to utilize a trust because they offer a way to
control assets both during life and secure them after death.197
2.

Revocable v. Irrevocable Trusts

Inter vivos trusts in Florida may be either revocable or irrevocable.198
Revocable trusts leave the settlor with room to amend and/or terminate the
trust at any time during his or her lifetime.199 In contrast, irrevocable trusts
leave the settlor essentially powerless—he or she has relinquished his or her
right to amend or terminate the trust and the trust itself is solely in the hands
of the trustee and/or beneficiaries.200 Therefore, if a same-sex couple chooses to use an inter vivos trust to control assets during life and after death, it
would certainly be more beneficial to select a revocable trust rather than an
irrevocable trust.201 This way, the couple may decide over the span of their
relationship whether they need to change anything in the trust to accommodate changing income and expenses, acquiring new assets, adopting children,
etc.202
191. Adam Chase, Tax Planning for Same-Sex Couples, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 359, 398
n.230 (1995); Litman, supra note 190, at 4.
192. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b); Litman, supra note 190, at 4.
193. Chase, supra note 191, at 398.
194. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b).
195. Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 94.
196. FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b); Litman, supra note 190, at 4.
197. See Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 94.
198. FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(1).
199. Foltz, supra note 5, at 508.
200. Id. at 508–09.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 508.
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Furthermore, if the relationship ends, the couple may terminate the revocable inter vivos trust and be freed from the relationship altogether.203 This
is in direct contrast to irrevocable inter vivos trusts and adult adoption, in
which the legal relationships are far more certain to remain forever intact in
the eyes of the law.204
B.

“Silver Lining” Trusts

While it is clear that both Federal DOMA and Florida DOMA continue
to impede the efforts of same-sex couples trying to plan their estates, there
remains a specific group of estate planning rules that ironically works in direct favor of same-sex couples, thanks to Congress.205 These rules are a
group of limitations passed by Congress in 1990 and imposed by the Internal
Revenue Service.206 These limitations are sometimes referred to as the related-parties rules.207 Generally, these rules prevent related individuals from
taking advantage of certain federal tax planning techniques.208 Related individuals refer to those who are bound by blood or marriage in the eyes of federal law.209 Since the related-parties rules govern federal tax laws, and samesex couples may not legally marry pursuant to Federal DOMA, same-sex
couples are therefore unrelated parties by definition and may enjoy exemption from this type of estate planning limitation.210 This benefit is a rarity
within federal law, and could be considered the “silver lining” in estate planning for same-sex couples.211 Two specific estate planning techniques that
are likely more attractive to homosexual couples than heterosexual couples
due to this convenient exemption are the Grantor Retained Income Trust
(GRIT) and the Grantor Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT).212

203. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0602(1).
204. See Foltz, supra note 5, at 508–09, 514–15.
205. Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 94; see 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006); FLA. STAT. §
741.212.
206. Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 94; Scott E. Squillace, GRITs for Gays and Other
Unique Planning Opportunities for Same-Sex Couples, J. PRAC. EST. P LAN., Oct.–Nov. 2009,
at 23–24.
207. See Squillace, supra note 206, at 24.
208. See id.
209. 26 U.S.C. § 2701(e)(1)–(2), (4).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C; Squillace, supra note 206, at 24.
211. Squillace, supra note 206, at 24.
212. Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 94.

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

213

Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1

202

NOVA LAW REVIEW

1.

[Vol. 37

GRITs

GRITs have been considered a type of trust that appear almost perfectly
tailored to the same-sex couple living in a DOMA state.213 While statutorily
cut off from use by a heterosexual married couple, same-sex couples are free
to utilize GRITs to develop and secure their estate plans.214 A GRIT is an
irrevocable trust into which the grantor, or adoptive partner, deposits an initial gift of property.215 This property is presumably a slowly and modestly
appreciating asset, or something that will earn interest over time due to sheer
market forces.216 Throughout the trust term, the grantor receives payment for
any interest accrued on this property.217 Then, upon termination of the trust
term, or death of the grantor who has pre-appointed a trustee, the remaining
property vests to a named beneficiary, the adoptee.218
2.

GRATs

GRATs are very similar to GRITs, with the exception of an income requirement and the inevitable failure of the trust should the grantor die prior
to the end of the trust term.219 Unlike GRITs, which expect and embrace
minimal interest and payments to the grantor, GRATs require the initial gifted property to produce steady income for the grantor in the form of a fixed
annuity.220 Furthermore, if the grantor of a GRAT dies before the trust term
expires, the trust automatically fails, whereas in a GRIT, the failing trust may
be saved by granting certain powers to a trustee.221
VI. CONCLUSION
Adult adoption for same-sex couples is a relatively new222 and perhaps
underused legal mechanism in Florida. While Florida DOMA still prohibits
same-sex couples from enjoying the benefits of the all-powerful surviving
spouse status in probate court, the Third District’s authorization of a homosexual adoption in Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G. opened the door for same213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
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Squillace, supra note 206, at 24, 26.
Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 94.
See Squillace, supra note 206, at 26.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 27.
See Squillace, supra note 206, at 26–27.
Id.
See Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 95.
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sex couples to adopt each other as a way to secure assets after death.223
While the Florida Legislature has not stricken section 63.042(3) from the
Florida Statutes, the State’s affirmative decision not to appeal Adoption of
X.X.G. & N.R.G.224 could reflect a statewide trend toward officially and permanently legalizing homosexual adoptions.
With adult adoption, same-sex couples can enjoy a degree of security in
probate court, regardless of situations involving intestacy.225 They are also
protected against will contests and later will invalidation.226 Finally, adult
adoption can guarantee the adoptee’s rights to the adopter-decedent’s homestead, a critical and fundamental principle in Florida.227
Unfortunately, adult adoption is irrevocable, leaving emotionally broken same-sex relationships still legally valid and intact.228 Perhaps more
significantly, adult adoption severs the adoptee’s right to inherit from his or
her family’s intestate estate.229
Therefore, Florida DOMA and the FPC force adoptees to choose between a guaranteed inheritance from his or her adoptive partner and his or
her family through intestacy.230 Heterosexual couples would never be faced
with such a difficult choice, but unfortunately, Florida’s legally hostile environment toward same-sex couples compels it.231
It may be that, instead of adult adoption, trusts are a far better way for
same-sex couples to securely plan their estates for the future.232 An inter
vivos revocable trust would be a much more sensible tool for same-sex couples, as it comes into effect during the settlor’s lifetime, may be amended to
fit the couple’s changing financial and familial status, and is terminable at
223. See id. at 95; see also Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. &
N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010), aff’g In re Adoption of Doe, 2008 WL
5006172 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
224. See Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 95; see also FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2012), declared unconstitutional by Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G. &
N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
225. See FLA. STAT. § 732.103(1) (declaring that without a surviving spouse, assets will
pass through intestacy to the decedent’s lineal descendants; in adult adoption, the adopted
partner becomes the lineal descendant and will receive the assets through intestacy); Ratliff,
supra note 55, at 1781.
226. Ratliff, supra note 55, at 1782.
227. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1), (b).
228. Foltz, supra note 5, at 515.
229. Id. at 515–16.
230. See id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 732.101, .103, 741.212.
231. See Foltz, supra note 5, at 495; About Equality Florida, supra note 19 (describing the
legally hostile environment in Florida toward homosexuals and homosexual relationships).
232. See Karibjanian, supra note 4, at 94 (suggesting different types of trusts that may
benefit same-sex couples that live in states that refuse to recognize same-sex marriage).
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any time should things between the couple go awry.233 Additionally, testamentary aspects may be incorporated into an inter vivos revocable trust to
dispose of residual property upon the death of the settlor, in the same way a
will or purely testamentary trust would.234 Finally, GRITs and GRATs provide specific types of trusts that seem perfectly tailored to the same-sex Floridian couple plagued by Federal and Florida DOMA.235
While most of the attention—media and otherwise—is currently on
equality in homosexuals’ ability to enter into a marriage and ability to adopt
children in Florida, posthumous asset distribution for same-sex couples that
choose adult adoption is an issue that will certainly rear its head in the courts
in only a matter of decades.236 It is important to flesh out issues that will
arise involving same-sex couples that adopt each other before Florida probate courts are left with complicated and speculative adult adoption situations in the near future.237

233. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 736.0602.
234. See FLA. STAT. § 736.0403(2)(b).
235. Squillace, supra note 206, at 24, 27.
236. Nolin, supra note 17 (describing gay rights activists’ focus on homosexual couples’
right to enter into a legally recognized marriage in Florida).
237. See Ratliff, supra note 55, at 1805 (suggesting that the legislature take into account
the fact that same-sex couples now use adult adoption to secure assets posthumously in states
where same-sex adoption is not legally recognized, and tailoring laws to avoid unintended and
unfortunate circumstances in probate courts).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Court congestion in the United States has long been a prominent issue
in the lion’s share of judicial branches at various levels of government.1
However, as America develops into a more litigious society, courts are bu-

* The author is a J.D. Candidate May 2013, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. David earned his Bachelor of Arts in Economics—with a minor in History—from Temple University, College of Arts and Sciences. Furthermore, David is a Florida
Supreme Court Approved Arbitrator. David wishes to thank his family for their support and
encouragement. He would also like to thank the staff of Nova Law Review and the faculty of
the Law Center for their effort and guidance throughout the writing process.
1. See S. 2027, 101st Cong. § 2 (1990) (enacted). Additionally, the author interned with
Judge Robert W. Lee, a County Court Judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, in
Fort Lauderdale, Florida, who regularly expressed concern over the dire state of the judicial
docket.
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ried by a deluge of complaints that reach near cataclysmic levels.2 Congestion is the root of enduring legal conflicts3 and hence skyrocketing legal
fees.4 Fortunately, disputes which cannot be resolved by the parties have
means of alternative legal resolution.5
Arbitration is a technique of alternative dispute resolution outside the
standard judicial process, whereby legal disputes—situations requiring a
binding decision—are taken before neutral third parties, either an arbiter or
panel of arbitrators, whose decision will be binding upon the parties.6 The
intent of arbitration is to have a more efficient and simpler, thus cheaper,
process relative to traditional litigation.7 Arbitration can be either voluntary
or mandatory.8 Mandatory arbitration can arise from state statute, as well as
freely be entered via valid contract,9 where parties agree to resolve prospective confrontations with arbitrative proceedings.10
Generally, arbitration is utilized in commercial transactions both international and domestic,11 yet nothing limits arbitration use to a specific area of
law.12 Unfortunately, as arbitration becomes more popular, courts are chal2. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4, 7–8 (1983). While it may be hyperbole to say that courts are prone to suffer
disaster from a tidal wave of cases being litigated, the increased workload of courts has made
a seemingly slow bureaucratic process move at a snail’s pace. See JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT at x, 317–18
(1989).
3. See Anemona Hartocollis, A Judge Gets Manhattan’s Oldest Divorce Cases Moving,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1997, at B1.
4. See The Costs of the Most Expensive Litigation, CARL E. PERSON, http://www. Carl
person.com/expensive.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
5. George H. Friedman, Dispute Resolution Clauses in Insurance Contracts, in THE
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION INSURANCE ADR MANUAL 102, 103, 110 (1993).
6. Arbitration Defined, U.S. ARB. ASS’N, http://usadr.com/arbitration-defined (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
7. Id.
8. Id.; see Paul T. Milligan, Who Decides the Arbitrability of Construction Disputes?,
CONSTRUCTION LAW., Spring 2011, at 23, 29.
9. FLA. STAT. § 682.02 (2012); Arbitration Defined, supra note 6.
10. FLA. STAT. § 682.02; Arbitration Defined, supra note 6.
11. See Milligan, supra note 8, at 23 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)); Safina Lakhani, Careers in International Commercial Arbitration, 1 INT’L COM. ARB. BRIEF 5, 5 (2011); ROBERT
V. MASSEY, JR., W. VA. UNIV. EXTENSION SERV., HISTORY OF ARBITRATION AND GRIEVANCE
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES para. 2 (2003), available at http://www.laborstudies
andresearch.ext.wvu.edu/r/download/32003.
12. What Types of Disputes Can Be Arbitrated?, ARB. FAQ, http://www.arbitrationfaq.
com/disputesandarbitration.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). Under the common law, no area
of law was prohibited from using arbitration. MASSEY, supra note 11, para. 3; What Types of
Disputes Can Be Arbitrated?, supra. However, bills that would limit arbitration of family law
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lenged by the legality of such arrangements.13 Particularly, in Florida, there
is currently a split among the district courts of appeal regarding the extent of
applicability of arbitration clauses in contracts between parties regarding tort
claims.14 In other words, does a broad and general arbitration clause apply to
a complaint in a tort which may have arisen from a contract but only tenuously touches it? The Supreme Court of Florida recently heard oral arguments in Jackson v. Shakespeare Foundation, Inc. (Jackson II)15 on this exact
issue.16 The Shakespeare Foundation, a Florida company, and its real estate
developer complained in a lawsuit that George Jackson and Kerry Jackson,
along with their real estate company, committed fraud in a property deal between the parties.17 The complaint alleged the Jacksons misrepresented the
presence of wetlands on the property.18 The Jacksons argued that the case
must be dismissed because the sales contracts contained an arbitration provision.19 Although the trial court agreed, the First District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court’s ruling.20 Furthermore, the First District Court of
Appeal certified that its opinion was in direct conflict with an opinion issued
in a substantially similar case from the Fifth District Court of Appeal.21
Florida courts have struggled with the application of the Florida Arbitration Code to arbitration provisions in commercial contracts since it was
enacted by the Florida Legislature in 1957.22 Unfortunately, the assembly of
matters have recently been proposed in Florida. Fla. CS for SB 963 (2012) (Dispute Resolution), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2012/0963 (last visited Oct. 28, 2012);
see also FLA. STAT. § 44.104(14).
13. See, e.g., Shakespeare Found., Inc. v. Jackson (Jackson I), 61 So. 3d 1194, 1196 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011). This argument reached the
court via an arbitration clause in a boiler-plate Florida contract for the purchase and sale of
real property. Id. at 1197.
14. See id. at 1200–01 (citing Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266–67 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 2005)). Compare id. at 1204, with Maguire, 917 So. 2d at 268.
15. 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision).
16. Oral Argument Schedule & Briefs, FLA. SUPREME CT., http://www.floridasupreme
court.org/pub_info/summaries/oa06-12.shtml (last visited Oct. 28, 2012).
17. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits at 1–2, Jackson v. Shakespeare Found.,
Inc., No. SC11-1196 (Fla. Feb. 8, 2012); see also Complaint at 1, Shakespeare Found., Inc. v.
Jackson, No. 09-1399CA, 2010 WL 8747760 (Fla. 14th Cir. Ct. Jan. 27, 2010).
18. Complaint, supra note 17, at 3–4.
19. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2.
20. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 So. 3d
1083 (Fla. 2011); Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2.
21. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1200–01; see also Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 268 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
22. See Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999); Act Effective Oct.
1, 1957, ch. 57-402, § 24, 1957 Fla. Laws 928, 936 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 57.11 (1957)).
Common law arbitration existed in Florida before the enactment of the Florida Arbitration
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Florida lawmakers failed to provide much, if any, guidance to the courts in
defining how to appropriately find boundaries as to the scope of arbitration
clauses.23 As a result, it has been left up to the courts to formulate a test that
can accurately interpret the essence of the law.24 Generally, the courts struggled with whether to interpret the arbitration clauses broadly or narrowly
because it is unclear if the legislature intended for the alternative dispute
provisions to be applicable to claims generally or specifically.25
“The size, vitality, and importance of Florida as a center of commercial
activity and a unique legal jurisdiction explains why a large quantity of disputes over arbitrability26 each year require a Florida Arbitration Code-based
analysis and occur outside of interstate commerce.”27 Therefore, the following discussion regarding arbitration and the complexity of the conceptual
scope of arbitration agreement provisions is strictly limited to Florida law.
This article will narrowly focus on the examination of arbitrational issues that arise between contracting parties when they have an agreement with
a broad arbitration clause and one party wants to sue the other party in tort.
Particularly, this article reviews the major conflicts among the Florida appellate level courts regarding the enforcement of arbitration clauses and the
analysis of their applicability to civil tort claims.28
Part II of this paper will describe the current state of arbitration in Florida, including a description of what legal rules apply to arbitration, and how
arbitration is compelled by the courts of Florida. Part II will also include a
Code; however, there was a strong presumption against arbitration except in complex employment disputes. See A. Dallas Albritton, Jr., Florida Arbitration Law, 31 FLA. B.J. 121,
125 (1957).
23. See FLA. STAT. § 682.02 (2012) (providing that parties can agree to arbitrate future
disputes relating to a contract, but failing to define what “relating to” means).
24. See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636 (citing Terminix Int’l Co. v. Ponzio, 693 So. 2d 104,
106 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
25. See id. at 636–38, 641.
26. For purposes of this article, the term arbitrability refers “to the question of whether a
particular dispute is within the scope of an arbitration provision the parties indisputably agreed
to, as distinct from the question of whether an arbitration provision is unenforceable because
of (for example) fraud, unconscionability, or lack of agreement by all parties.” Certified Coatings of Cal., Inc. v. Shimmick Constr. Co., No. A120531, 2009 WL 311527, at *8 n.8 (Cal.
Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2009) (citing Bruni v. Didion, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395, 407 (Ct. App. 2008)).
For example, Watson v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 408 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1981), was the first case to use the word “arbitrability” within the main text of a judicial opinion written by a Florida court. Michael Cavendish, The Concept of Arbitrability Under the
Florida Arbitration Code, FLA. B.J., Nov. 2008, at 19, 25 n.1.
27. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 19.
28. Questions in tort are singular—relative to other types of contentions within arbitration issues—because tort law encompasses both common law duties as well as contractually
prescribed duties. See VIVIENNE HARPWOOD, MODERN TORT LAW 1–2 (7th ed. 2009).
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brief discussion on the history of arbitration in the Sunshine State, illustrated
by reference to highlights of pertinent jurisprudence on alternative dispute
resolution. Next, Part III will tackle the judiciary’s biggest issue—
determining the arbitrability of a given dispute. This issue will be explained
and examined through the prism of the case sub judice—Shakespeare Foundation, Inc. v. Jackson (Jackson I).29 Part III will discuss the threshold issues
the court must determine. It will diagram, with scrutiny, the pros and cons of
both the petitioners’30 and respondents’31 arguments. Part IV examines the
potential fallout from the decision in Jackson I, continuing with a discussion
of how that decision will shape future arbitration provisions. Finally, this
article concludes that the current test under Florida law is unsatisfactory to
determine arbitrability with consistent results and that the courts in Florida
should craft a new test based on what they deem to be the most controlling
factor—the parties’ intent.32
II.

CURRENT STATE OF ARBITRATION LAW IN FLORIDA

Otis B. Driftwood: It’s all right, that’s in every contract. That’s
what they call a sanity clause.
Fiorello: You can’t fool me! There ain’t no Sanity Claus!33

Arbitration clauses are almost always utilized in commercial contracts
or other types of arrangements, which can be catalysts for complex litigation.34 The right to arbitrate cases within the purview of the Florida Arbitration Code—similar to the Federal Arbitration Act upon which the Florida
Statutes are based—generally turns on a “seemingly simple question: ‘Is this
29. 61 So. 3d 1194 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011).
30. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits at 5–13, Jackson v. Shakespeare Found.,
Inc., No. SC11-1196 (Fla. Jan. 19, 2012).
31. See Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 7–28.
32. See Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20.
33. Memorable Quotes for A Night at the Opera, IMDB, http://www.imdb. com/title
/tt0026778/quotes (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). These lines are from a famous scene, known as
“the contract scene,” where two managers of entertainers are negotiating a contract for performances. A NIGHT AT THE OPERA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1935).
34. See MASSEY, supra note 11, para. 2.
In the United States unionized sector, studies have shown that the number of collective bargaining agreements that contain arbitration clauses as a means of dispute resolution (grievance
arbitration) has been on the rise. In fact, by 1944 the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed that
73% of all labor contracts in America contained arbitration clauses and by the early 1980’s that
figure had grown to 95%. Today, 98% of all collective bargaining agreements in the United
States contain arbitration clauses.

Id. (citations omitted).
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claim arbitrable?’”35 The answer to this question often requires the intricate
dissection of multifaceted legal rationale, which has the ability to lead to
unpredictable results.36 A clear understanding of “the concept of arbitrability
under the Florida Arbitration Code” is a mandatory qualification for adjudicators in contemporary courts to resolve the deft question posed above in one
of their most hotly litigated subject matters—arbitration concerning tort
claims.37
Though there are instances in which a particular controversy is within
the scope of an arbitration agreement between contracting parties, it is also
quite regular that disputes fall into a grey area of whether or not they are
within the scope of the arbitration clause.38 In Florida, this is usually called
into question “in the context of a motion to compel arbitration, when the
court is required to determine, inter alia, whether” a claim is subject to arbitration.39 When adjudicating the issue of whether a claim falls within the
scope of an arbitration clause, the court must glean the intent of the contracting parties through careful examination of the language of the agreement.40
Presumably, the question arises most when the quarrel under review is
whether a civil complaint in tort falls within the defined boundaries of an
agreement to arbitrate or whether such a claim lies solely within the jurisdiction of the courts.41
The preeminent Florida case devoted to this controversy is Seifert v.
U.S. Home Corp.,42 where the court held the suitable test to determine if an
35. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 24–25.
36. Id. at 25.
37. Id.
38. See Milligan, supra note 8, at 23; see generally Joseph L. Daly & Suzanne M. Scheller, Strengthening Arbitration by Facing Its Challenges, 28 QUNNIPIAC L. REV. 67, 67–83
(2009) (discussing and addressing many issues within arbitration).
39. The Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, L. & ARB. OFFS. DONALD T RYCE,
http://floridaarbitrator.net/the_scope_of_arbitration_clauses_in_florida (last visited Oct. 28,
2012).
40. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Seaboard Coast
Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 1982)) (citing Regency
Grp., Inc. v. McDaniels, 647 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam)); The
Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39.
41. See The Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39. Arbitration provisions must have defined boundaries, even if they are vague, because it is illegal for such provisions to oust the jurisdiction of the courts. See id.; 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 315 (2012).
Additionally, “arbitration [agreements and] provisions are contractual in nature [and] construction of such provisions . . . remains a matter of contract interpretation.” Seifert, 750 So.
2d at 636 (citing Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 690 F.2d at 1352; R.W. Roberts Constr. Co.
v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. ex rel. McDonald Electric & Repair Serv., Inc., 423 So.
2d 630, 632 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
42. 750 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1999).
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issue falls within the scope of an arbitration provision is “whether the tort
claim, as alleged in the complaint, arises from and bears such a significant
relationship to the contract between the parties as to mandate application of
the arbitration clause.”43 Simply speaking, the court has to balance the contract incorporating the arbitration provision against the allegations set forth
in the complaint to determine if “a ‘sufficient nexus’ [exists] between the
two.”44 The Supreme Court of Florida, in Seifert, “concluded that the tort
claim in that case” failed to connect via a significant relationship to the contract to merit “submission of the cause to arbitration;” the rationale being that
all of the allegations by the plaintiff failed to assert that any of “the defendant’s duties or obligations arose from or were governed by the contract.”45
Conversely, not too long ago, the Third District Court of Appeal “held that a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty” against a CEO by his former company
was within the arbitration provision of the employment contract “because it
was necessary to examine the contract to ascertain exactly what the CEO’s
duties [were] to the company.”46
A.

A Brief History of Arbitration in Florida

It is impossible to pinpoint the exact genesis of arbitration but scholars
believe alternative dispute resolution is from time immemorial.47 The British
Kingdom had arbitrations dating back before the installation of the common
law system upon which our American courts are based.48 Domestically, Native Americans used arbitration as a means of solving intra and inter tribe
disputes.49 Moreover, even George Washington included a proviso in his
will that “if any dispute [arose] over the [language] of the document that a
panel of three arbitrators [must be utilized] to render a final and binding decision to resolve the dispute.”50

43. Id. at 640.
44. The Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39; see also Seifert, 750 So.
2d at 638.
45. The Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39; see also Seifert, 750 So.
2d at 640, 642.
46. The Scope of Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39; Burke v. Windjammer
Barefoot Cruises, 972 So. 2d 1108, 1111–12 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Seifert, 750
So. 2d at 642).
47. MASSEY, supra note 11, para. 3.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

223

Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 1

NOVA LAW REVIEW

212

[Vol. 37

The first inclusive laws about arbitration in Florida were enacted in
1828.51 The propagation of arbitration law in Florida was put forth by the
unicameral Legislative Council.52 These laws were exceptionally analogous
in many ways to English arbitration law from 1697, which authorized “parties [to] file an agreement to arbitrate with the court that would have jurisdiction over the controversy.”53 Originally, agreements providing for the arbitration of future disputes were unenforceable as executory contracts, which
were voidable by either party.54 Furthermore, it was common for courts to
merely renounce enforcement of arbitration clauses over future disputes as a
matter of public policy against “oust[ing] the jurisdiction of the courts.”55
Judicial hostility combined with the general “reticence of lawyers to venture
into unfamiliar territory” meant arbitration was a rarely utilized process in
Florida.56 In fact, a 1954 study found that only a handful of Florida lawyers
had considerable experience with arbitration and that most lawyers preferred
litigation over arbitration.57
The impetus for the modern era of arbitration was the New York Legislature’s amendment of the Civil Practice Act in 1920.58 This new law supported the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate for the first time.59 New
York’s legislative actions created a buzz about arbitration, which compelled
“the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to release a draft

51. Judith A. Mellman, Comment, Seeking Its Place in the Sun: Florida’s Emerging
Role in International Commercial Arbitration, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 363, 367
(1987–1988).
52. Id. at 367 n.23. During this same session, on November 17, 1828, many of the territory’s civil and criminal laws were established. Id.
53. Id. at 367.
54. Id. at 367 & n.25.
55. Mellman, supra note 51, at 367 n.25.
56. Id. at 367.
57. Id. at 367 n.26.
58. Id. at 367; see also Act of Apr. 19, 1920, ch. 275, § 2, 1920 N.Y. Laws 803, 804
(current version at N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501 (McKinney 1998 & Supp. 2011)).
The statute’s constitutionality was upheld one year later in Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg,
Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 292 (N.Y. 1921). It is interesting to note that the Berkovitz decision was
authored by Judge Cardozo. Just seven years earlier he had written that: If jurisdiction is to be
ousted by contract, we must submit to the failure of justice that may result from these and like
causes. It is true that some judges have expressed the belief that parties ought to be free to
contract about such matters as they please. In this state the law has long been settled to the
contrary. The jurisdiction of our courts is established by law, and it is not to be diminished,
any more than it is to be increased, by the convention of the parties.

Mellman, supra note 51, at 367–68 n.27 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 367.
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Uniform Arbitration Statute (“UAS”) in 1924.”60 The UAS was unfortunately rejected by a majority of states, but it set the stage for the passage of the
United States Arbitration Act, more commonly known as the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).61 Following the lead of the New York law, the FAA
“similarly made agreements to arbitrate future disputes enforceable.”62 The
scope of the FAA was limited to maritime transactions, interstate commerce,
and foreign commerce.63 However, the Supreme Court of the United States’
support of the Act,64 combined with the Act’s nationwide coverage, served to
intensify sponsorship “for the enactment of modern state arbitration laws.”65
Shortly after the end of World War II, a University of Miami School of Law
professor, David S. Stern, undertook crafting a contemporary arbitration statute for Florida for use with commercial arbitration.66 After facing intense
opposition, Professor Stern’s draft was adopted into Florida law in 1957.67
“Following the lead of Congress, many states, including Florida, have
also legislated the field of arbitration.”68 Section 682.02 of the Florida Statutes, which falls within the Florida Arbitration Code,69 expressly affords that
written contractual provisions calling for settlements of any disputes via arbitration “shall be valid, enforceable, and irrevocable without regard to the
justiciable character of the controversy.”70 However, the Florida Arbitration
Code will not apply if the contracting parties exercise the option to specifically stipulate as such in their agreement.71 For example, in Wickes Corp. v.

60. Id. at 367–68; see also HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL
MEETING 21 (1925).
61. Mellman, supra note 51, at 368; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925–1926) (amended 1947).
62. Mellman, supra note 51, at 368; see also 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
63. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
64. Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 279 (1932) (holding the FAA was
constitutional).
65. Mellman, supra note 51, at 368; see also Douglas J. Giuliano, Parochialism in Arbitration? How Some Arbitration Decisions by Florida Courts Are at Variance with Federal
Arbitration Precedent, FLA. B.J., Feb. 2007, at 9, 9 (“The result . . . was that ‘[s]tates can no
longer harbor their historical hostility towards arbitration.’ Indeed, ‘[m]any state legislatures
also have enacted statutes that encourage the use of arbitration and ensure that agreements to
arbitrate will be enforced according to their terms and conditions.’” (alteration in original)).
66. Mellman, supra note 51, at 368.
67. Id.
68. Michael A. Hanzman, Arbitration Agreements: Analyzing Threshold Choice of Law
and Arbitrability Questions, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1996, at 14, 16.
69. FLA. STAT. § 682.01 (2012) (providing that “[s]ections 682.01–682.22 may be cited
as the ‘Florida Arbitration Code’”).
70. FLA. STAT. § 682.02.
71. Mellman, supra note 51, at 369.
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Industrial Financial Corp.,72 where the parties clearly expressed their desire
to not have the Florida Arbitration Code apply, the court held that “their
rights and duties will be decided according to common law principles.”73
Courts in Florida have reluctantly acknowledged that the goal of the Florida
Arbitration Code is to bypass protracted litigation and its accompanying
costs.74 Thus, Florida courts strictly construe arbitration agreements under
the Florida Arbitration Code, and “only matters expressly covered by the
arbitration agreement may be arbitrated.”75
Finally, the “general hostility” of the Florida courts plus the inherent restrictions of the Florida Arbitration Code handicapped the acceptance of arbitration in Florida.76 Thus, twenty years after the passage of the Florida
Arbitration Code, “it was [plausible] for one commentator to write that ‘it is
clear that in Florida arbitration of disputes, other than these [sic] in the labor
area, are fairly rare.’”77 Despite this, the Florida judiciary eventually softened its stance and arbitration is now looked upon favorably in the Sunshine
State.78
B.

What is Arbitration?

Arbitration is one of several modes of alternative dispute resolution.79
Contrary to standard litigation, the adversaries do not resolve their problems
“in a civil courtroom with a judge and jury making the decision.”80 Instead,
the parties sanction their controversy to the authority of a single arbitrator or
a panel of arbiters outside traditional jurisprudential settings—i.e., the courtroom or chambers.81 The arbitrator is not technically “a judge, [but] has
quasi-judicial power[s] to investigate, weigh the evidence presented, and to

72. 493 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1974).
73. Mellman, supra note 51, at 369 n.40; see also Wickes Corp., 493 F.2d at 1175.
74. Mellman, supra note 51, at 369; see, e.g., Merkle v. Rice Constr. Co., 271 So. 2d
220, 221–22 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
75. Mellman, supra note 51, at 369.
76. Id. at 370.
77. Id.; see also Guy O. Farmer II, Introduction to Arbitration, in ARBITRATION IN
FLORIDA 1, 9 (1979).
78. See Robert J. Hauser et al., Re-examining the Presumption in Favor of Arbitration in
Complex Commercial Cases, FLA. B.J., Mar. 2010, at 8, 9.
79. Todd D. Greene, Arbitration: Coming to a Contract Near You, HILL WALLACK LLP,
http://www.hillwallack.com/web-content/news/article_v14n2_08.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2012).
80. Id.
81. Meah R. Tell, Florida Supreme Court Approved Arbitration Training 31 (Feb. 18,
2012) (unpublished training manual) (on file with Nova Law Review); Greene, supra note 79.
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render a final decision to resolve the matter, which is enforceable by a court
judgment.”82
To start “[t]he arbitration process . . . opposing sides select[] a neutral
third party” to adjudicate their dispute.83 Generally, once an arbitrator is
selected, the opposing counsels and judges84 will meet to “discuss the issues
in dispute and decide on a time frame for their resolution.”85 Next, the individuals on either side of the dispute will mutually create a formal Arbitration
Agreement.86 These formal agreements integrate the controversies in their
entirety and the arbitration proceedings are restricted to resolving only those
issues raised in the Arbitration Agreement.87
After these initial deeds are accomplished, the parties each make their
presentations to the arbitrator.88 “The proceedings may or may not be recorded and often do not abide by the rules of evidence used in traditional litigation.”89 Once the parties have completed presenting their respective sides
of the case, the arbitrator is capable of, and “will, render a final decision.”90
The benefits of arbitration are numerous.91 Proponents of the method
allege the process to be more efficient, and thus quicker at resolving disputes
than the courts.92 Arbitration is a private proceeding, which means that “the
timing of the matter is contingent upon the preparation of the parties” as opposed to being subject to the mercy of the court’s caseload.93 An arbitrator
can swiftly reach a decision, potentially within a few months, as opposed to
years of litigation.94 “By limiting discovery and the time it takes to resolve
an issue, the parties often expend less money preparing for and arbitrating a
matter than litigating in court.”95 Additionally, those who choose to arbitrate

82. Greene, supra note 79.
83. Id.
84. Though not officially judges, during arbitration proceedings, the arbitrators are usually referred to directly as judges, and sometimes even “your honor.” See Tell, supra note 81, at
59. This is due to the lack of better title for the arbitrator within the process of arbitration. Id.
However, in some cases, usually involving construction contracts, arbitrators are known as
umpires. Id.
85. Greene, supra note 79.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Greene, supra note 79.
91. See id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.; see, e.g., Tell, supra note 81, at 112–14.
95. Greene, supra note 79.
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have the luxury of selecting an arbitrator.96 “The freedom to choose an arbitrator is especially beneficial to highly technical disputes.”97 Most parties
believe it is to their advantage to employ an arbitrator who maintains a high
level of knowledge or expertise within the field that is the subject of the dispute “because the arbitrator is familiar with the normal course of [business]
and terms [within] the trade.”98
However, arbitration is not without its disadvantages.99 One of the disadvantages of arbitration is the majority of proceedings are based on limited
discovery.100 Limitations on discovery mean that “both sides may never be
able to acquire the facts necessary to accurately evaluate the controversy.”101
Ergo, arbitrators potentially could be issuing fallible decisions based on specious logic resultant from inadequate information.102 Additionally, most ventures forego the rules of evidence, and “while this [may] allow for the free
flow of information, the protections [from] the rules . . . are essentially
waived.”103 Finally, it is seen as a large con by many that most arbitration
decisions are not appealable.104
1.

Playing by the Rules

Through statutory legislation and traditional common law jurisprudence, Florida has evinced an extensive set of rules applicable to understanding the arbitrability of disputes.105 No doubt, the most important of these
rules is in the Florida Arbitration Code.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. Greene, supra note 79.
101. Id.
102. Id.; see Hauser et al., supra note 78, at 16.
103. Greene, supra note 79.
104. Scott D. Marrs & Sean P. Milligan, 10 Major Arbitration Issues Recently Addressed
by Courts, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug.-Oct. 2009, at 38, 42; Barbara Repa, Arbitration Pros and
Cons, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/arbitration-pros-cons-29807.html (last
visited Oct. 28, 2012). Robert Stone, an Adjunct Professor at Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center, expressed very similar sentiment among securities lawyers—who
must regularly arbitrate—during class on August 21, 2012.
105. See FLA. STAT. § 682.01 (2012) (stating Chapter 682 of the Florida Statutes encompasses the entire Florida Arbitration Code); Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636
(Fla. 1999) (providing the three elements to determine arbitrability in Florida); Maguire v.
King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (stating that torts based in common
law may sometimes fall within or outside of an arbitration clause while contractually-created
duties are normally subject to broad arbitration clauses (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 639–41;
Stacy David Inc. v. Consuegra, 845 So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003))).
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Arbitration agreements made valid, irrevocable, and enforceable; scope.—Two or more parties may agree in writing to submit
to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time of
the agreement, or they may include in a written contract a provision for the settlement by arbitration of any controversy thereafter
arising between them relating to such contract or the failure or refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof. This section also
applies to written interlocal agreements under ss. 163.01 and
373.713 in which two or more parties agree to submit to arbitration
any controversy between them concerning water use permit applications and other matters, regardless of whether or not the water
management district with jurisdiction over the subject application
is a party to the interlocal agreement or a participant in the arbitration. Such agreement or provision shall be valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable without regard to the justiciable character of the controversy; provided that this act shall not apply to any such agreement or provision to arbitrate in which it is stipulated that this law
shall not apply or to any arbitration or award thereunder.106

Courts are required to compel arbitration when an agreement to arbitrate
and an issue within the scope of the agreement co-exist, plus neither of the
parties has waived their right to arbitration.107 Though courts now generally
favor compelling arbitration, they can only do so when the provisions in
question comply with the Florida Arbitration Code.108 “[P]arties [who] resort
to the statutory mode of arbitration” must substantially comply with statutory
requirements.109 Thus, if an agreement fails to comply with the Florida Arbitration Code, the courts are unable to enforce or compel specific performance.110 For the Florida Arbitration Code to apply, the parties must either:
(1) “agree in writing to submit to arbitration any controversy existing between them at the time of the agreement” or (2) include a provision for the
settlement of controversies thereafter arising between the parties relative to
the contract or failure to perform or refusal to perform the contract partially
or wholly.111 The second type of agreement does not controvert the constitu106. FLA. STAT. § 682.02.
107. United Healthcare of Fla., Inc. v. Brown, 984 So. 2d 583, 585 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2008) (quoting Miller & Solomon Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Brennan’s Glass Co., 824 So. 2d
288, 290 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (per curiam)).
108. Avid Eng’g, Inc. v. Orlando Marketplace Ltd., 809 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (citing Knight v. H.S. Equities, Inc., 280 So. 2d 456, 459 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1973)).
109. Readdy v. Tampa Electric Co., 41 So. 535, 537 (Fla. 1906).
110. Knight, 280 So. 2d at 459.
111. FLA. STAT. § 682.02.
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tional rights of Floridians112 because parties waive their rights to access the
courts upon “agreeing to arbitration in lieu of litigation.”113 Interestingly, the
arbitration provisions in contracts do not need to be titled as such.114 The
Florida courts prefer to stick to an if it quacks like a duck and walks like a
duck, then it must be a duck analysis.115 The only judicial guidance proffered
is “[t]he provisions in a contract providing for arbitration must sufficiently
identify what particular matters are to be submitted to arbitration, and set
forth some procedures by which arbitration is to be effected.”116 Additionally, the Florida Arbitration Code does not apply retroactively.117 Accordingly,
“only . . . agreements and provisions for arbitration made subsequent to the
effective date of the [Florida Arbitration] Code” are subject to it.118
For example, the Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed the dismissal
of the complaint of a licensee brought against a licensor and the licensor’s
president that asserted tort and statutory claims in Marine Environmental
Partners, Inc. v. Johnson.119 Despite the fact that the licensing agreement
provided that Colorado law was controlling, the parties failed to argue the
applicability of Colorado law at any judicial level and predominantly relied
on Florida law.120 The court held that Florida law was applicable since the
issue of choice of law was waived by the parties, and Florida was the forum
state.121
Jurisdiction over arbitration is conferred to the Florida courts when an
agreement is made subject to the Florida Arbitration Code and provides for
arbitration in the state, regardless of the province in which the accord was
made.122 Among other things, once a court has jurisdiction over a claim the
courts have the authority to enforce arbitration agreements or arbitration

112. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21 (“Access to [C]ourts” states that “[t]he courts shall be
open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial, or delay.”). For further discussion see JOHN F. COOPER & THOMAS C. MARKS JR.,
FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2006).
113. Value Car Sales, Inc. v. Bouton, 608 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
114. See, e.g., Intracoastal Ventures Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 540 So. 2d 162, 163–
64 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
115. See id.
116. Id. at 164.
117. 3A FLA. JUR. 2D Arbitration and Award § 10 (2008).
118. Id.
119. 863 So. 2d 423, 424–25 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
120. Id. at 426.
121. Id. (citing Waner v. Ford Motor Co., 331 F.3d 851, 856 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Neely v.
Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 180 (3d Cir. 1995); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Ponzio,
693 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
122. 3A FLA. JUR. 2d Arbitration and Award § 11 (2008).
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clauses in contracts.123 Though parties are free to contract that laws of any
jurisdiction will be controlling in the result of arbitration, Florida courts will
not enforce such provisions due to the Florida Arbitration Code.124
When making determinations about whether a claim falls within the potential scope of arbitration courts are required to “look beyond the [mere]
legal cause of action and examine the factual allegations of the complaint.”125
The wide gaze of the fact-finder is necessary to ensure that only the claims
the parties intended to arbitrate are compelled.126 Because arbitration agreements are contractual in nature, a trial court’s denial of a motion to compel
arbitration is an issue of contractual interpretation and thus, subject to the
appellate court’s de novo review.127
Arbitration is strictly limited to only the disputes “‘which the parties
have expressly agreed’” to resolve through arbitration.128 Judges shall not
compel arbitration if there is an “‘absence of express language [mandating
such] in the . . . contract’” before the court.129 Any questions about the
123. FLA. STAT. § 682.18 (2012).
124. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 682.02 (West 2003) (referencing provisions for arbitration in
another state).
125. Singer v. Gaines, 896 So. 2d 851, 854 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing In re
Scott, 100 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Tex. App. 2003)). The financial advisors’ claim that the employer and its principals “fraudulently induced him into entering into an employment contract,” arose out of the employment, and thus, the claim was subject to arbitration under National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Code of Arbitration. Id. at 852–53. The
advisors’ claims that the defendants “falsely represented that they would provide him with
ample support staff, significant marketing programs, and guidance from producers who had
made more than $2.7 million in revenue in the prior year,” id. at 852, “necessarily require[d]
evaluation of . . . performance of the defendants as an employer of [a] broker[].” Id. at 855.
126. See Vargas v. Schweitzer-Ramras, 878 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(per curiam).
127. Engle Homes, Inc. v. Jones, 870 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB v. LVWD, Ltd., 766 So. 2d 248, 249 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000)).
128. Vargas, 878 So. 2d at 417 (quoting Atencio v. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co., 676 So. 2d 489, 490
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)) (citing Miller v. Roberts, 682 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996); Regency Grp., Inc. v. McDaniels, 647 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (per curiam)).
129. Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Halliday, 873 So. 2d 400, 404 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 642 (Fla. 1999)) (citing First
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)).
Finally, appellee argues that the trial court was correct to deny the motion to compel arbitration
because there was no agreement that tort claims would be subject to arbitration. We find the
instant case clearly distinguishable. Here, the agreement containing the arbitration clause obligated appellant to provide appropriate care to the decedent, and the dispute alleges that appellant failed to provide appropriate care. It certainly appears to us that there is a strong nexus between the dispute giving rise to the lawsuit and the contract containing the arbitration clause.
That the claim sounds in negligence (failure to exercise reasonable care) rather than breach of
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scope—or questions regarding waiver—should be resolved in favor of arbitration rather than against it.130 In addition, Florida courts should conclude
any and all doubts about the reach of arbitration agreements with favoritism
towards arbitration.131 Remarkably, the courts in Florida fail to mention how
to balance the public policy of favoring arbitration when weighed against the
presumption of mistakes in contractual drafting being held against the drafter.132
Public policy in Florida is partial to arbitration “as an efficient means of
[dispute settlement]” since it generally “avoids the delays and expenses of
litigation.”133 It is important to remember the essential purpose of these quasi-judicial proceedings is “‘freedom from the formality of ordinary judicial
procedure.’”134 Nevertheless, even though courts look upon arbitration
agreements with favor, parties who seek to exercise their arbitrational rights
must safeguard them.135 The appellate court in the Second District reversed a
contract (failure to fulfill a contractual obligation) does not ipso facto sever an otherwise significant relationship between the contractual obligation and the matter in dispute. The trial
court found the dispute to be arbitrable and we do as well.

Consol. Res. Healthcare Fund I, Ltd. v. Fenelus, 853 So. 2d 500, 505–06 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2003) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
130. See EMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Mason, 677 So. 2d 105, 107 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(quoting Ronbeck Constr. Co. v. Savanna Club Corp., 592 So. 2d 344, 346 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992)).
131. Ronbeck Constr. Co., 592 So. 2d at 346–47 (property “owner’s claim for rescission of
[construction] contract [was] subject to arbitration” where property owner's fraud claims that
formed the basis of rescission were “predicated on events dealing with performance [of] the . .
. contract, rather than its making” or inducement).
132. See, e.g., Engle Homes, Inc., 870 So. 2d at 910–11 (holding that an arbitration provision in a purchase agreement did compel arbitration but remained silent on the presumption of
mistakes in contractual drafting being held against the drafter); Avid Eng’g, Inc. v. Orlando
Marketplace Ltd., 809 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (involving no mention of the
presumption of mistakes in contractual drafting being held against the drafter in their decision); Intracoastal Ventures Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 540 So. 2d 162, 164–65 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that an appraisal clause was not an arbitration clause by its plain
language, but not mentioning the presumption of mistakes in contractual drafting being held
against the drafter).
133. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co. v. Beauregard, 739 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1999) (citing Gale Grp., Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 683 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996)); see also Johnson v. Wells, 73 So. 188, 190–91 (Fla. 1916) (acknowledging that arbitration expedites and facilitates the settlement of disputes, thereby avoiding the
formalities, delay, and expense of ordinary litigation). But see Hauser et al., supra note 78, at
14.
134. Cassara v. Wofford, 55 So. 2d 102, 106 (Fla. 1951) (quoting Sapp v. Barenfeld, 212
P.2d 233, 237 (Cal. 1949) (in bank)).
135. Williams ex rel. Estate of Williams v. Manor Care of Dunedin, Inc., 923 So. 2d 615,
616 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896
So. 2d 707, 711 (Fla. 2005)).
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trial court’s finding that there was no waiver of the right when the appellee—
defendant below—failed to answer the complaint in a manner consistent with
those rights.136 Therefore, one can either expressly waive their right to arbitrate or implicitly do so by acting in a manner inconsistent with the right to
arbitrate.137
The Florida Jurisprudence, Second Edition does provide a stern word
of caution regarding Florida’s public policy favoring arbitration by reminding attorneys that every rule has exceptions.138
Caution: Where legislation clearly mandates that a particular issue
or type of dispute be resolved in a judicial forum, the policy favoring arbitration will yield. Other exceptions to the policy favoring
the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate arise where public policy is said to require that a matter in issue be determined by a court.
There is a narrow class of cases that have been excepted from arbitration on public policy grounds, but an incidental effect on the
public policy of the state is insufficient to remove a claim from arbitration where there is an agreement to arbitrate.
Arbitration is an alternative to the court system and limited review
is necessary to prevent arbitration from becoming merely an added
preliminary step to judicial resolution rather than a true alternative.139

Above all else, attorneys facing motions to compel arbitration should
always remember that these agreements and provisions are contractual in
nature, thus Floridian benches will view them matter-of-factly: “Like all
contracts, each arbitration agreement is unique. Although it may employ
some standard terms, the contract must be construed and understood in light
of its whole text, context, structure and purpose . . . [and] the entire undertaking must be considered.”140
2.

How is Arbitration Compelled?

Because this article focuses on the test to determine the arbitrability of
tort claims only slightly touching contracts, it is not necessary to dive into a
136. Id. at 617.
137. Cassara, 55 So. 2d at 106; Williams ex rel. Estate of Williams, 923 So. 2d at 617.
138. 3A FLA. JUR. 2D Arbitration and Award § 4 (2008).
139. Id. (footnotes omitted).
140. Aberdeen Golf & Country Club v. Bliss Constr., Inc., 932 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
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detailed discussion on how to compel such claims. It is important to note
that the issue being covered below—save for when parties expressly opt to
use common law—generally arises when the parties follow the procedures
set forth in the Florida Arbitration Code.141 Thus, this section is only intended as a rudimentary primer to further the understanding of the reader.
Below is the practical procedure, as stated in the Florida Statutes, that
an attorney must follow in Florida to initiate and have proceedings that can
compel arbitration.142
682.03 Proceedings to compel and to stay arbitration.–
(1) A party to an agreement or provision for arbitration subject to
this law claiming the neglect or refusal of another party thereto to
comply therewith may make application to the court for an order
directing the parties to proceed with arbitration in accordance with
the terms thereof. If the court is satisfied that no substantial issue
exists as to the making of the agreement or provision, it shall grant
the application. If the court shall find that a substantial issue is
raised as to the making of the agreement or provision, it shall
summarily hear and determine the issue and, according to its determination, shall grant or deny the application.
(2) If an issue referable to arbitration under an agreement or provision for arbitration subject to this law becomes involved in an action or proceeding pending in a court having jurisdiction to hear an
application under subsection (1), such application shall be made in
said court. Otherwise and subject to [section] 682.19, such application may be made in any court of competent jurisdiction.
(3) Any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under this law shall be stayed if an order for arbitration or an
application therefor [sic] has been made under this section or, if
the issue is severable, the stay may be with respect thereto only.
When the application is made in such action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include such stay.
(4) On application the court may stay an arbitration proceeding
commenced or about to be commenced, if it shall find that no
agreement or provision for arbitration subject to this law exists between the party making the application and the party causing the
arbitration to be had. The court shall summarily hear and deter141. FLA. STAT. § 682.03 (2012).
142. See id.
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mine the issue of the making of the agreement or provision and,
according to its determination, shall grant or deny the application.
(5) An order for arbitration shall not be refused on the ground that
the claim in issue lacks merit or bona fides or because any fault or
grounds for the claim sought to be arbitrated have not been
shown.143

Basically, when a court is hearing a motion to compel arbitration under
the Florida Arbitration Code, it must decide whether or not to compel arbitration based on three elements.144 First, the court must determine that a valid
written arbitration agreement exists.145 If the court finds that an agreement to
arbitrate exists, then it must determine whether an arbitrable issue exists; and
finally, if either party waived its right to arbitration.146
III. THE CASE AT HAND: JACKSON V. THE SHAKESPEARE FOUNDATION, INC.
A.

How Did We Get Here?

The case sub judice arose when the Supreme Court of Florida entered
an order accepting jurisdiction, resulting from the First District Court of Appeal certifying conflict with the Fifth District Court of Appeal.147 The proceeding before the court began when the respondent, Shakespeare Foundation (“Shakespeare”), along with its development team, Herd Community
Development Corporation (“Herd”), filed a complaint against the petitioners,
George Jackson, Kerry Jackson, and Jackson Realty Team, Inc. (“Jackson(s)”) in March of 2009.148 The complaint alleged “that the Jacksons had
fraudulently misrepresented, [among other things], the existence of wetlands
on certain real property in Bay County, Florida, that had been purchased by
Shakespeare and Herd from the Jacksons.”149 Specifically, the respondents
143. Id.
144. H. Michael Muñiz, Compelling Arbitration of Disputes—The Florida v. Federal Law
Quagmire, FLA. B.J., Dec. 2006, at 31, 32.
145. Id.
146. Id. For a more in-depth discussion on the issues related to compelling arbitration, the
reader should consult Compelling Arbitration of Disputes—The Florida v. Federal Law
Quagmire. Id.
147. Jackson II, 74 So. 3d 1083, 1083 (Fla. 2011) (unpublished table decision); Jackson I,
61 So. 3d 1194, 1200–01 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.) (discussing Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d
263, 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)), review granted, 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011).
148. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 1.
149. Petitioners’ Brief on Jurisdiction at 2, Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 74 So. 3d
1083 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-1196).
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complained that the petitioners “fraudulently misrepresented . . . the . . .
property . . . [as] ‘a great affordable housing project’ and that [a] ‘wetland
study verifies no wetlands.’”150 Furthermore, Shakespeare and Herd claim
that the damages suffered were a direct result of the fraudulent misrepresentation151 since Florida law could prevent development of the portion of property containing wetlands.152
In their responsive pleading, “[t]he Jacksons filed a motion to dismiss
[established upon] the existence of an arbitration clause contained within the
contract,”153 requiring the parties “to resolve the[ir] dispute through neutral
binding arbitration.”154 The lower court granted the Jacksons’ motion, causing Shakespeare and Herd to timely file an appeal.155 The First District Court
of Appeal held in favor of the appellant-plaintiffs, thereby reversing the order of the trial court.156 Lastly, “[t]he Jacksons . . . filed their Notice to Invoke Discretionary Jurisdiction.”157
1.

The Facts of the Case

Mr. and Mrs. Jackson owned property at 915 Everett Avenue, Panama
City, Florida, which Shakespeare and Herd agreed to purchase for
$253,000.158 Shakespeare and Herd did so with the intent to develop twentyseven affordable housing units upon that tract of land.159 The Jacksons ad-

150. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2.
151. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 2.
152. Id. at 2–3.
The controversy regarding the preservation of wetlands involves two diametrically opposed and equally important interests: [T]he maintenance of Florida's sensitive ecology and
the continued increase in Florida's population. As Florida's population increases, the need for
land development proportionately increases. Since a large portion of Florida's undeveloped
landmass is comprised of wetlands, and wetlands are relatively easy and inexpensive to develop, wetlands have been targeted by many developers as the construction site of choice. However, given the important role that wetlands play in Florida's ecology, the State protects wetlands by regulating their development.

Tirso M. Carreja, Jr., Adding A Statutory Stick to the Bundle of Rights: Florida’s Ability to
Regulate Wetlands Under Current Takings Jurisprudence and Under the Private Property
Rights Protection Act of 1995, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 423, 423–24 (1996) (footnote
omitted); see FLA. STAT. § 373.414(1) (2012).
153. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 3.
154. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2.
155. Id.
156. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1196, 1201 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74
So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011); Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2.
157. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2–3.
158. Id. at 3, 5.
159. Id. at 5.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss1/1

236

: Nova Law Review 37, 1

2012]

IT’S MY PARTY AND I’LL ARBITRATE IF I WANT TO

225

vertised the parcel of land on the Bay County Multiple Listing Service.160
The real estate advertisement posted by the petitioners contained a long paragraph about the prospective parcel, and the petitioners stated, among other
things, that the parcel was an “‘affordable housing project’ and that [the]
‘wetland study verifies no wetlands.’”161 The respondents argued that this
claim was a fraudulent misrepresentation, forcing them to suffer damages
“because the presence of . . . wetlands prevented them from developing a
portion of the property.”162
Once the property was purchased by Shakespeare and Herd, the developer began preparations to move into the construction phases of his plan.163
The initial step was “an onsite meeting . . . with their builder and engineer.”164 During the meeting, the builder observed “the foliage and the general lay of the land [causing him to opine] . . . that the subject property might
contain some wetlands.”165 Upon contacting the surveyor used by the petitioners,166 the respondents learned that according to the surveyor, someone
was hired to “‘walk the property,’” and from that stroll, the plot was declared
wetland free.167 Subsequent to this revelation, Shakespeare and Herd hired
their own team to conduct an in-depth wetlands survey, which revealed the
real estate to be twenty-six percent wetlands, and thus twenty-six percent
unbuildable.168
The purchase and sale agreement (“Contract”) for the parcel at 915 Everett Avenue contained an arbitration agreement clause in the Dispute Resolu160. Id. at 3.
161. Id. at 2 (quoting Complaint, supra note 17, at 3–4).
162. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 2.
At the time the above advertisement was posted by the Jacksons or Jackson Realty on the
Bay County Multiple Listing Service, the Jacksons had in their possession a Property Report
Land Use Planning Analysis prepared by Ron Thomasson, A.T.C.P., Land Use Consulting,
showing that, in fact, 25% of the land was in wetlands. The Jacksons purchased the property
shortly before listing it for sale through the Bay County Multiple Listing Service. Ms. Jackson
used the above-referenced report to negotiate the purchase price of the subject property from
the prior owner from $175,000.00 down to $145,000.00.

Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 4.
163. Id. at 5.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 5–6. The company hired by the Jacksons in connection with the property preparations was North Bay Engineering. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note
17, at 5.
167. Id. (emphasis added). “Shakespeare and Herd then contacted Ms. Jackson who stated
that she would provide a copy of the wetland study and a fill permit. As of the date of filing
the Complaint, no copy of a wetlands report or fill permit report had been provided to Shakespeare and Herd.” Id. at 5–6.
168. Id. at 6.
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tion section that “survive[d] the closing of the property . . . [and] state[d], in
pertinent part:”169
14. DISPUTE RESOLUTION: This Contract will be construed
under Florida law. All controversies, claims, and other matters in
question arising out of or relating to this transaction or this Contract or its breach will be settled as follows:
...
(b) All other disputes: Buyer and Seller will have 30 days from
the date a dispute arises between them to attempt to resolve the
matter through mediation, failing which the parties will resolve the
dispute through neutral binding arbitration in the county where the
Property is located. The arbitration may not alter the Contract
terms or award any remedy not provided for in this Contract . . .
.170

“The award will be based on the greater eight [sic] of the evidence and will
state findings of fact and the contractual authority on which it is based.”171
“This clause shall survive closing.”172
Because the above contract language does not specifically name the
causes of action that are subject to arbitration and the parties remain divided
on the issue, it is up to the court to determine whether the respondents’ fraud
in the inducement claim falls within the arbitrable realm.173
B.

Threshold Issues for the Court to Determine

In deciding Jackson II, the court must not forget that in Florida, arbitration is the “preferred mechanism of dispute resolution, and . . . any doubt[s]
regarding the arbitrability of a claim should be resolved in favor of allowing
arbitration.”174 The Supreme Court of Florida has even gone so far as to dec169. Petitioners’ Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 149, at 2; see also Respondents’ Answer
Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 2.
170. Respondents’ Amended Brief on Jurisdiction at 1, Jackson v. Shakespeare Found.,
Inc., 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-1196) (alteration in original); see also Petitioners’
Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 149, at 2–3.
171. Petitioners’ Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 149, at 3.
172. Respondents’ Amended Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 170, at 1.
173. See id.; Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266–67 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005); see
also Petitioner’s Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 149, at 5 (citing Maguire, 917 So. 2d at
264–66).
174. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 19.
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lare that when agreements are subject to the Florida Arbitration Code,
“‘courts [will] indulge every reasonable presumption to uphold proceedings
resulting in an award.’”175 As a result, it is not a stretch for one to claim
Florida has a very pro-arbitration policy.176 “This gloss of public policy
gives rise to a judicially employed rule of construction for arbitration language in a valid contract—the rule of maximum breadth.”177 Under the instructions of this rule, judges are to consider arbitration clauses giving the
“‘broadest possible interpretation to accomplish the salutary purpose of resolving controversies out of court.’”178
To the uninitiated, reading the preceding rules governing arbitration
along with the overlay of strong policy, it may appear as if questions regarding arbitrability consistently return the same unyielding answer—this is an
understandable misconception.179 What appears as a “monolith” of Florida
law is in reality a hollow shell.180 This is because Florida courts have yet
another important rule which commands “that, under the Florida Arbitration
Code, no party may be forced into arbitrating something they did not agree to
arbitrate, notwithstanding the general rule favoring arbitration.”181 In other
words, Florida courts adhere to contractual ideals, whereby contracts containing arbitration provisions “are to be carefully construed so as not to force
a nonarbitrable issue into arbitration.”182
This leads us to a crossroads at which formidable judicial ideals steadily
impede marked pro-arbitration preference ingrained in Florida law and public policy.183 Clearly, the courts are referring to the basic notion of intent;184
intent meaning that “part[ies] cannot be [forced] to submit to arbitration”
where a party neither intended nor agreed to arbitration.185 Hence, in spite of
conventional wisdom favoring arbitration, Florida courts will only allow
arbitration of a particular dispute based on contractual proviso if the four
175. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Roe v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 533 So. 2d 279, 281
(Fla. 1988)).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 20.
178. Id. (quoting Auchter Co. v. Zagloul, 949 So. 2d 1189, 1195 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2007); Benedict v. Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc., 846 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2003)).
179. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20.
185. Rolls-Royce PLC v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 960 So. 2d 768, 770 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 2007) (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648
(1986)); see also Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999).
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corners of the document evince the “parties’ intent to submit that particular
dispute to arbitration.”186 Conversely conceptualized, the judicial corollary
instruct that when arbitration clause language unmistakably constructs arbitral blockades—precluding certain types of claims by a party—the interpreting bench can positively conclude the intent of the parties was to exclude any
“extra-contractual or extra-textual claim[s]” from arbitration.187 The maintenance of this ideal of requiring contractual intent provides balance to the
rule of maximum breadth stemming from public policy favoring arbitration.188 Though both axioms find plenty of support in decisional reporters,
one must note that contract law wins the battle against arbitration-based
law.189
Finally, the main threshold question must be answered: How do we determine which disputes are appropriate for arbitration?190 According to the
Supreme Court of Florida, there must be “some nexus [linking] the dispute
[with] the contract containing the arbitration clause.”191
1.

The Intent of the Parties

With clear regard to the public policy and judicial ideal, the Supreme
Court of Florida has instructed that the first hurdle to clear when considering
arbitrability is the intent of the parties to arbitrate appropriate disputes.192
The intention to arbitrate can be express193 or actual.194
186.
187.
188.
189.
2001).

Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Hirshenson v. Spaccio, 800 So. 2d 670, 675–76 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.

There are maxims supporting this corollary in almost equal number to the reported judicial
language supporting the expansive rule of maximum breadth, such as, for example, “[i]t is the
intention as expressed by the language employed in the agreements that governs, not the afterthe-fact testimony of the parties.” Within this corollary, intent, subject to the common law and
evidence code filters restricting how contracting intent may be demonstrated, will seem to carry the day in a dispute over arbitrability.

Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
190. See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 638.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 636 (quoting Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343,
1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982)); see Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d 636).
193. Rosenhaus v. Star Sports, Inc., 929 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(citing Atencio v. U.S. Sec. Ins. Co., 676 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
Express, refers to contractual language that explicitly states the parties’ intentions. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 17c (9th ed. 2009).
194. Medanic v. Citicorp Inv. Servs., 954 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (citing Citigroup, Inc. v. Amodio, 894 So. 2d 296, 298–99 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)), rev’d
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In determining the intent of the parties, consideration is only given to
the language of the contract, and the “‘after-the-fact testimony of the parties’” is summarily disregarded.195 “Where questioned transactions involving
matters not covered by an arbitration clause are inextricably interwoven with
a subject which is expressly subject to the clause, an order requiring that the
issues be submitted to arbitration is proper.”196
The second hurdle in the preliminary step of determining the ambit of
an arbitration clause is classifying the clause as either broad or narrow.197
The Supreme Court of Florida has distinguished between broad and narrow
arbitration provisions.198 “Narrow arbitration clauses are those that require
disputes ‘arising out of’ or ‘under’ a contract to arbitration.”199 On the other
hand, “[b]road arbitration provisions are those that require claims ‘arising out
of or relating to’ a contract to be arbitrated.”200 Florida courts have also
stated that the “language providing for . . . arbitration of ‘any and all’
[claims] . . . [i]s broad,” and includes all controversies or disputes arising
from the contract.201
When a provision is found to be broad, the presumption in favor of arbitration can only be rebutted by “the most forceful evidence of an intent to
exclude a particular claim from arbitration.”202 Therefore, when an arbitration provision is found to be broad, it plays right to the strength of Florida’s
public policy favoring arbitration.203 But all coins have two sides, and the
contra positive is that when a provision is found to be narrow—such as when

in part, 958 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007). In this context, the term “actual” is
analogous to “implied,” and means the intention of the parties which can be discerned from
the language used by the parties in their agreement. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 17c (9th ed.
2009).
195. Maguire, 917 So. 2d at 266 (quoting Bill Heard Chevrolet Corp., Orlando v. Wilson,
877 So. 2d 15, 18 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004)). This step is always part of the analysis, but
not necessarily always the second part. See Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So. 2d 604, 608–09 (Fla.
1957); Wilson, 877 So. 2d at 18.
196. 3A FLA. JUR. 2D Arbitration and Award § 31 (2008).
197. See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636–38. The court makes this determination by examining
the wording of the arbitration clause. See id.
198. Id.
199. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1198 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.) (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at
636–37), review granted, 74 So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011).
200. Id. (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636–37).
201. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 22.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 19–20, 22.
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the parties use special purpose maxims—the balance shifts in favor of the
judicial ideals respecting the parties’ intent.204
In Jackson I, the First District Court of Appeal held that the arbitration
provision in the sale and purchase agreement between Jackson and Shakespeare to be broad under Florida precedent.205 This is because the language in
the clause within the contract states that “‘[a]ll controversies, claims, and
other matters in question arising out of or relating to this transaction or this
Contract or its breach’ to be arbitrated,” places it within the broad category
promulgated by the Supreme Court of Florida.206
2.

The Seifert Test for Arbitrability

The Supreme Court of Florida describes how to undertake finding
“some nexus between the dispute and the contract containing the arbitration
clause.”207 The court evinced a three element test to properly determine if a
given dispute is arbitrable: “(1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to
arbitration was waived.”208
This three-prong test and its aimed-at findings (for the existence of
arbitrability) of “valid agreement/yes, arbitrable issue/yes, waiver/no” has a jurisprudential gloss of its own. While applying this
test, Florida courts will instruct that arbitrability depends upon the
relationship between the claim and the agreement, not the legal label attached to the dispute. What this means is that the heart of
this three-prong test is the second prong, “arbitrable issue.”209

Therefore, once a contractual arbitration provision is deemed broad by the
court, the test for determining the arbitrability of the claim is the presence of

204. See id. at 22.
For example, Florida courts opine that intent not to arbitrate a claim is evidenced through
omission where an arbitration clause does not refer to the subject matter being contested. In
another example, Florida courts state that intent not to arbitrate a claim can be evidenced
through exclusion where the clause narrowly tailors its language to define or limit the scope of
arbitrable issues.

Id.
205. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198.
206. Id.
207. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636, 638 (Fla. 1999).
208. Id. at 636 (citing Terminix Int’l Co. v. Ponzio, 693 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1997)).
209. Cavendish, supra note 26, at 22.
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a “‘significant relationship’” between the contract containing the broad
clause and the cause of action.210
The First District Court of Appeal concluded that Shakespeare and
Herd’s claim failed the contractual nexus test despite the fact that the parties
would not have been adversaries but for the existence of the real estate contract.211 The appellate court reasoned that “the claim at the center of the dispute arose from a general duty owed under common law.”212 Continuing
further, the majority declared that torts must at least instigate some question
that can only be resolved by “‘reference to or construction of [or interpretation of] some portion of the contract itself.’”213 The rationale behind this
decision is that the claim of fraud in the inducement rests solely on Jackson’s
Multiple Listing Service (MLS) advertisements, therefore not requiring any
reference to or construction of the contract.214 Further bolstering this point,
the bench contended that “[t]he contract here is incidental to the dispute,
because [Shakespeare and Herd] . . . could have raised their . . . claim even
before the contract was signed if [they] detrimentally relied on [Jackson’s]
advertisement.”215
C.

The Petitioners’ Arguments

The petitioners raise two arguments in their brief to the Supreme Court
of Florida.216 First, the Jacksons’ claim that the respondent-plaintiffs’ “action for fraudulent inducement . . . requires [both] reference . . . and interpretation of the contract . . . [and therefore] is significantly related to the contract.”217 The second argument the petitioners raise is the undisputed nature
of the arbitration provision as broad means it is all encompassing as to dis210. Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 637–38 (citing Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal
Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 93 (4th Cir. 1996)).
211. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198–99 (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 638).
212. Id. at 1198. This seems to be the crux of the issue of the certified conflict between
the First District Court of Appeal and the Fifth District Court of Appeal, though it is not evidently clear from the opinion. See id. at 1198, 1201; Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 268
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
213. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198 (quoting Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 638).
214. See id. at 1199.
215. Id.
Appellees rely on Beazer Homes Corp. v. Bailey, 940 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 5th [Dist. Ct.
App.] 2006), in support of their argument that the fraud claim here bore a significant relationship to the contract. Beazer Homes, however, did not result in an opinion of the Fifth District,
as two judges on the panel concurred in result only.

Id. (citing Beazer Homes Corp. v. Bailey, 940 So. 2d 453, 455 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
216. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 5, 12.
217. Id. at 5, 8–10.
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putes between the parties.218 Thus, an action for fraud in the inducement falls
squarely within the provision.219
Addressing the first issue, the petitioners give a brief dissertation on the
history of Seifert, whereby they attempt to factually distinguish their case
from that hallmark decision, while urging the court to adopt the reasoning of
Maguire v. King.220 Howbeit, the true crux of the Jacksons’ argument is that
the respondents had a contractually imposed duty to perform a feasibility
study.221 This is based on a land use provision in the contract.222
6. LAND USE: Seller will deliver the Property to Buyer at the
time agreed in its present “as is” condition, with conditions resulting from Buyer's inspections and casualty damage, if any, excepted.
....
(c) Inspections: (check (1) or (2) below)
(1) Feasibility Study: Buyer will, at Buyer's expense and within
30 days from Effective Date (“Feasibility Study Period”), determine whether the Property is suitable, in Buyer's sole and absolute
discretion, for use. During the Feasibility Study Period, Buyer
may conduct a Phase 1 environmental assessment and any other
tests, analyses, surveys and investigations (“inspections”) that
Buyer deems necessary to determine to Buyer's satisfaction the
Property's engineering, architectural and environmental properties
. . . to determine the Property's suitability for the Buyer's intended
use.
....
Buyer will deliver written notice to Seller prior to the expiration
of the Feasibility Study Period of Buyer's determination of whether or not the Property is acceptable. Buyer's failure to comply
with this notice requirement will constitute acceptance of the
Property as suitable for Buyer's intended use in its “as is” condition. If the Property is unacceptable to the Buyer and written no-

218. Id. at 12.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 5–8, 10–11 (citing Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 635–38, 640,
642–43 (Fla. 1999); Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
221. Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–9.
222. Id.
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tice of this fact is timely delivered to Seller, this Contract will be
deemed terminated as of the day after the Feasibility Study period
ends and Buyer's deposit(s) will be returned after Escrow Agent
receives proper authorization from all interested parties.
(2) No Feasibility Study: Buyer is satisfied that the property is
suitable for Buyer's purposes . . . [t]his Contract is not contingent
on Buyer conducting any further investigations.223

The respondents checked option one in favor of a feasibility study.224 In
their complaint, Shakespeare and Herd allege that had they been aware of the
presence of wetlands—a fact misrepresented by the sellers in their advertisement—“they would not have purchased the property.”225 The petitioners
rely on the above clause to show that Shakespeare had a contractuallyimposed duty to perform a study on the property.226 This is a specious argument since the clause above actually imposes no duty.227 The clause provides
the procedure taken, and the time available for the buyer to refuse the property.228 The clause is in essence a sophisticated return policy.229 This is indicated by the fact that under Option One the buyers are taking the property
“as is” with the option to terminate within thirty days to perform a study.230
The will provisions for the buyer under this clause are for the buyer to determine, at his discretion, if the property is suitable for use.231 However, if
the buyer does not find the property up to par, the remaining will provisions
guide the acceptable method for rejecting the property.232 If the buyer fails to
comply with the will provisions the buyer is accepting the property as suitable in its “as is” condition.233 The remainder of the terminology in the clause
includes may provisions—“may conduct a Phase [one] . . . assessment”—
which means the buyer is not under a duty to do so.234 The buyer has the
option to let the thirty days lapse and accept the property in its current condition.235 The duties under this provision only arise in the event that the buyer
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
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Id. at 8; see Complaint, supra note 17, at 4.
Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–10.
Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 29.
Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–9.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–9.
See id. at 9.
Id.
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chooses Option One, performs a study, and then decides to reject the property as suitable.236 In this case, the seller-petitioners allegedly fraudulently
misrepresented the property as wetland-free in their MLS advertisement, and
the buyers relied on that advertisement in purchasing the property.237 In
doing so, they failed to exercise the option that would have created a contractual duty.238 Whether intentional, or accidental, the petitioner, by including
this clause—which clearly requires substantial interpretation—may have
actually won the battle to include the fraud in the inducement claim within
the scope of arbitration, but not in the manner originally designed.239
The second issue raised by the Jacksons is all about intent.240 Most of
the discussion put forth by the petitioners surrounds the respondents’ knowledge.241 The petitioner claims that because the buyers are sophisticated
within the area of real estate, and because they stated their intent to build on
the property, then they clearly intended to arbitrate these types of claims.242
Unfortunately, this argument is faulty since intent and knowledge, though
closely tied, are not analogous.243 Intent—in the vacuum of contract legalese—can only be derived from the language contained within the four corners of the contract.244 It is defined as “[t]he state of mind accompanying an
act, esp[ecially] a forbidden act. While motive is the inducement to do some
act, intent is the mental resolution or determination to do it.”245 On the other
hand, knowledge is generally accepted as being earned through experience.246
The accepted legal definition of knowledge is “[a]n awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance; a state of mind in which a person has no substantial doubt about the existence of a fact.”247 The petitioner correctly and
thoroughly explains that the broad nature of the arbitration provision within
236. See id. at 8–9.
237. Id. at 8; Complaint, supra note 17, at 3–4.
238. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–9. Remember, mere
reference to the contract does not necessarily create the contractual nexus. See Seifert v. U.S.
Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999).
239. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8–10.
240. Id. at 12–13.
241. Id. at 13.
242. Id. at 10, 13.
243. Compare BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009) (defining intent), with id. at
950 (defining knowledge).
244. See Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20. In several opinions, judges have written that
depending on the language of the contract, intent can also be inferred from the conduct of the
parties. See, e.g., Rosenhaus v. Star Sports, Inc., 929 So. 2d 40, 42–43 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
245. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added).
246. See id. at 950–51.
247. Id. at 950.
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the contract clearly indicates the intent to include a tort for fraud in the inducement as within its scope.248 The remaining question for the court to decide is whether the remainder of the contract continues this reasoning or limits the intent of the parties.249
Additionally, what the petitioner should have argued here, but only do
so impliedly, is that the facts underlying the complaint for fraud in the inducement are the same facts, which would support a breach of contract
claim. Therefore, the court should follow the reasoning of the Fifth District
Court of Appeal in Maguire.
D.

The Respondents’ Arguments

The respondent also raises the same two issues, but in the negative; thus,
the fraud claim bears no significant relationship to the contract and the clear
intent of the parties is to exclude these types of claims from arbitration.250
The first argument addressed by the respondent centers on a lengthy discussion of the complaint.251 This is because Florida law requires the court to
look at the allegations set forth in the complaint to determine whether the
dispute arises from or relates to the subject of the contract.252 Out of more
than twenty paragraphs, the contract in question is only mentioned thrice.253
As set forth above, the only reference to the Contract relate to the
fact that it exists, the price paid, and the prayer for attorney’s fees.
Shakespeare and Herd’s common-law fraud claim does not require
reference to or construction of the Contract for its resolution, nor
does it invoke any contractual provision.254

Therefore this shows that the contract slightly touches the complaint but does
not bear a significant relation.255 Next, Shakespeare and Herd go through the
entire process of proving fraud in the inducement without relation to the contract.256 However, this argument is subject to criticism because a buyer find248. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 12; see also Maguire v.
King, 917 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp.,
750 So. 2d 633, 640–41 (Fla. 1999)).
249. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 12.
250. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 11, 22.
251. Id. at 12; see also Complaint, supra note 17, at 3–6.
252. See Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 13–14.
253. See id. at 17; see also Complaint, supra note 17, at 4, 6.
254. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 18.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 18–20.
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ing a property unsuitable—based on the Feasibility Study Period—springs
forth particular contractual duties supported by the “Buyer Provision” discussed above.257 It is at this point the respondent should have pointed to the
complaint, which does not allege the desire to return the property, but states
that the harm inflicted by the Jacksons caused Shakespeare and Herd to miss
a favorable housing market, thus losing profits and additional expenses on
the property.258 This indicates that the relief sought is not based on the contract, but in common law principles.259 This is important because an essential
component of this conflict among the district courts is how the causes of
action averred in pleadings relate to the contractual provision.260
The second issue argued by the respondent is related to the intent of the
parties.261 The central theme of this argument is that because the contract
failed to provide any remedy for the fraud allegations, it indicates that the
intent of the parties was to exclude this from arbitration.262 The argument
rests on the theory that the remedies provision of the contract limits the extent of the arbitration award, thus limiting the scope of claims subject to arbitration.263
The remedies provided in the Contract are:
(1) A remedy for the Buyer in the event the “Seller fails, refuses or neglects to perform this Contract,” in which case the Buyer may choose to receive a return of the Buyer’s deposit without
waiving the right to seek damages or to seek specific performance
as per paragraph 14.
(2) A remedy for the Seller if the Buyer defaults, in which
case the Seller may choose to retain and collect all deposits paid
and agreed to be paid as liquidated damages or to seek specific
performance as per paragraph 14.
257. See Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 9. Shakespeare in fact
did undertake a feasibility study of the parcel of land upon which this dispute is grounded.
See Complaint, supra note 17, at 5.
258. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 So.
3d 1083 (Fla. 2011); see also Respondents’ Amended Brief on Jurisdiction, supra note 170, at
2; Complaint, supra note 17, at 5–6.
259. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198.
260. Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636–37 (Fla. 1999) (citing Mediterranean Enters., Inc. v. Ssangyong Corp., 708 F.2d 1458, 1464 (9th Cir.1983); In re Kinoshita &
Co., 287 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir.1961)).
261. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 22.
262. Id. at 22, 24–25, 27.
263. See id. at 27.
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(3) A remedy in the event of disputes concerning entitlements
to deposits, failing resolution through mediation, in which case the
Escrow Agent may choose to elect to have the issue resolved by
arbitration, a Florida Court, or the Florida Real Estate Commission.
(4) All other disputes, failing resolution in mediation, must be
determined through mutual binding arbitration in the county where
the Property is located, however, “the Arbitrator may not alter the
contract terms or award any remedy not provided for in this Contract.”264

However, this argument fails on two points.265 First, from the logical meansends analysis, one can point to the simple fact that the ends here of limiting
awards to those provided for in the contract do not bear a rational relationship to the means/causes of action.266 More likely, this provision is set forth
in the contract as a necessary way to limit the liability of the parties in the
event that either defaults. The respondent does a notable job of reciting Florida constitutional law in an effort to rebut this argument.267 This brings us to
the second point, whereby the right to redress can be limited by the parties to
the contract, a point rightly asserted by the dissent in the court below.268 In
fact, the court in Maguire dismissed the same exact argument.269 Moreover,
award-limiting provisions are more accurately viewed as an analogue to
guidelines or rules promulgated by the contracting parties for the arbitrator.270

264. Id. at 24.
265. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1198–99 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74
So. 3d 1083 (Fla. 2011).
266. See id.; see also Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 24.
267. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 26 (noting that a basic
right in Florida requires that the courts remain open for redress of all injuries); see also FLA.
CONST. art I, § 21.
268. Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1202–03 (Marstiller, J., dissenting) (citing Kaplan v. Kimball
Hill Homes Fla., Inc., 915 So. 2d 755, 761 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)).
269. Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 267 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
270. Id. (citing Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 405–07 & n.2 (2003);
see Rollins, Inc. v. Lighthouse Bay Holdings, Ltd., 898 So. 2d 86, 88–89 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2005)).
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IV. FALLOUT FROM THE DECISION
The discussion above reveals that regardless of which way the Supreme
Court of Florida ultimately decides on the issues raised in Jackson, the future
of arbitration provisions is a slippery slope.271
If the court sees fit to side with the arguments of the petitioner, it has
the potential to exponentially expand the public policy in Florida to the point
where almost all tort claims even remotely connected to a contract will be
subject to arbitration provisions within any contract between the litigants. 272
Agreeing with the petitioner would almost assuredly create precedent such
that arbitration provisions containing “any and all dispute” language would
be construed so broadly that only those disputes clearly unrelated to the contract could be litigated.273
Conversely, if the court agrees with the respondent’s arguments stating
how the claim can be resolved without reference or interpretation of the contract,274 the potential fallout could change how future lawyers draft arbitration provisions. Future drafters would surely react by carefully crafting contract language that is simultaneously more descriptive yet remains vague—
for example, “this arbitration provision contemplates torts, contractual provisions, employment, and all other disputes which may arise from this contract.” The blowback from this type of language means that courts will ulti-

271. See discussion infra Part III.D.
272. Compare Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198, with Maguire, 917 So. 2d at 266–67; see also
Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 12.
273. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1198; Petitioners’ Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note
30, at 12. For example, assume Buyer and Seller enter into a real estate agreement to construct and furnish a single-family home in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, which goes off without a
hitch. This real estate agreement includes an arbitration provision, which assuming arguendo,
is broad within Florida law. Sadly, ten years later Buyer is severely beaten by Seller because
Buyer slept with Seller’s wife, Desi. Now, Buyer wants to bring a civil suit for battery against
Seller. It would seem that the two events bear no relation and Buyer can litigate his claim.
However, what if we learn that Desi is short for Designer, and the entire genesis of the affair
between Buyer and Designer began a decade earlier when Designer and Buyer worked together to furnish the home, a duty imposed upon Designer only because of the real estate contract?
If the Florida courts continue on the path outlined above, it is plausible that Buyer’s battery
claim against Seller would be precluded from going to court because the past contract required
that the claim be arbitrated. See Maguire, 917 So. 2d at 266. Furthermore, it is disheartening
to ponder a legal climate where the gravamen of a decision can swing on such minutiae.
274. Respondents’ Answer Brief on the Merits, supra note 17, at 18 (quoting Petitioners’
Initial Brief on the Merits, supra note 30, at 8).
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mately be forced to construct or interpret contracts for the sheer fact of their
complexity.275
The result, as this author sees it, is the emergence of a new judicial
rule—that ultimately courts will be forced to create a new test based in equity and focused more on the intent of the parties as discerned through the language chosen and their actions.276 In other words, the test would force the
courts to ask, “was it foreseeable that this dispute would arise and litigation
would occur?” If the answer is yes, then the claim must be compelled to
arbitration. Conversely, if the answer is no, this is an unforeseeable cause of
action. Unforeseeable claims shall remain within the jurisdiction of the
courts.277
This test is essentially contractual intent distilled by traditional tort law,
and for the purposes of this article, it will be known as the “Shakespeare
Test.”278 The standard of review for the Shakespeare Test is that of an objectively reasonable person in the same circumstances as the party seeking to
enforce the arbitration clauses.279 The reason that a test based on foreseeabil275. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1199 (citing HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses,
S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1239–40 (Fla. 1996)).
276. See id. at 1201, 1204 (Marstiller, J., dissenting).
277. This test would not be unlike the current foreseeability test of proximate causation
used in common-law negligence analyses. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99,
101 (N.Y. 1928); see also McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 1992). This
test would establish a limitation on arbitration with respect to the scope of broad arbitration
clauses applied to torts. Palsgraf established the concept of proximate cause, which uses
foreseeability to limit the liability in negligence cases to repercussions of an action which
could reasonably been foreseen as opposed to every action which follows the negligent act.
See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101. Currently, Florida uses a test which is similar to the “but for”
test in torts. See Seifert v. U. S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999). However, with
regard to arbitration agreements, it is almost certain that but for the contract these two parties
would not have an issue in dispute. Therefore, one who seeks arbitration and is fortuitous
enough to have an injury in tort which a judge, in his discretion, sees as significantly related
or having a sufficient nexus to the contract—itself a perversion of “but for” applied to arbitration clauses—will be able to compel arbitration. See id. Sadly, if the judge does not find, in
his opinion, a “but for” relationship, then the dispute will not be subject to arbitration. See id.
Therefore, to avoid this, the author proposes that for a tort issue to be subject to a broad arbitration clause, it must be the type of dispute which reasonable contracting parties in a similar
situation would contemplate as a result of this contract or a breach of the same.
278. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d at 1197–98 (citing Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636).
279. See D'Alemberte v. Anderson, 349 So. 2d 164, 168 (Fla. 1977) (explaining the reasonably prudent person standard). One could also listen in on the first week of any torts class
at any law school within the state of Florida to learn about the reasonably prudent person
standard.
The reasonable person is an ideal of a model citizen, but will have shortcomings as determined appropriate by the fact finder.
However, the reasonable person may act differently in different situations. The fact
finder must determine what a reasonable person would do “under the same or similar cir-
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ity280 is the best test to determine whether a particular claim is subject to arbitration, is because it falls directly in line with contractual intent.281 When
discussing the intent of the parties within the bounds of contract law, courts
have repeatedly fallen back upon the essence of intent as an objective meeting of the minds.282 Obviously then, whenever a court is determining the
intent of the parties as to the breadth of an arbitration clause, the judges are
implicitly asking themselves: “What did these two parties want to be covered by this arbitration clause in this contract?”283 It is at this point that logical consideration must be given to what that question means. It means that at
some point, prior to signing the contract, the parties must have realized that
certain types of disputes are the plausible result of the contract they intend to
sign, and that those claims are too expensive, or present too much liability, or
any myriad of other reasons parties prefer to avoid litigation. The simple
point is that these parties contemplated and foresaw various disputes they
would prefer to arbitrate, rather than litigate; and it is these disputes which
are within the scope of the arbitration clause found within the agreement
between the parties.
V.

CONCLUSION

Due to the confusing nature of the test currently used in Florida, it is
difficult for contracting parties to know at the outset what future disputes are
cumstances” as the defendant. Although the reasonable person standard of conduct is clearly
determined by taking account of the facts of each situation, the reasonable person standard is,
minus narrow exceptions, an objective standard in regards to the actor. The idiosyncrasies of
individuals are not taken into account when determining whether an actor is liable for damages.

Kristin Harlow, Note, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis: How Tort Law
Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733, 1738 (2007) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted).
280. See McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502 (discussing foreseeability under Florida common law
with regard to proximate causation). In this respect, proximate cause is concerned with if and
to what magnitude the defendant’s conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the particular
injury in dispute. Id.
281. See Cavendish, supra note 26, at 20.
282. See Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384, 1385 (Fla. 1985) (emphasis added)
(quoting Blackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 302 So. 2d 404, 407
(Fla. 1974)) (stating that mutual assent refers not to both parties having the same subjective
intent but to both parties having the same understanding of the essential terms of a contract).
283. See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636 (citing Tracer Research Corp. v. Nat’l Envtl. Servs.
Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1294 (9th Cir. 1994); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co.,
690 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982); Miller v. Roberts, 682 So. 2d 691, 692 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App 1996); Regency Grp., Inc. v. McDaniels, 647 So. 2d 192, 193 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (per curiam)).
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potentially subject to arbitration.284 The split of authority amongst the district courts of Florida results in a failure of uniform jurisprudence, leaving
potential contractors without the capacity to determine their ability to redress
foreseeable future torts via litigation when considering agreements containing arbitration provisions.285 Though courts have seen fit to manipulate the
Seifert test under their discretion to decide conflicts, this test ultimately
proves to be more confusing than workable, owing mostly to its highly discretionary nature.286 The judges and lawyers overseeing these cases are assuredly highly intelligent, and therefore always able to reach a conclusion.
However, it is disturbing that two cases with analogous facts could reach
opposite results.287 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida should take this
opportunity to streamline the process of determining whether tort claims,
which tenuously touch commercial contracts, are subject to arbitration.

284. See Seifert, 750 So. 2d at 636–37; Hanzman, supra note 68, at 22–23; The Scope of
Arbitration Clauses in Florida, supra note 39.
285. See supra Parts II.A, III.
286. See supra Part III.B.2.
287. See Jackson I, 61 So. 3d 1194, 1197 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, 74 So.
3d 1083 (Fla. 2011); see also Maguire v. King, 917 So. 2d 263, 264–65, 268 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2005).
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